Command and Control (85 page)

“I have always been of the belief”
:
The president's news conference of February 3, 1960, in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Containing the Public Messages and Statements of the President, January 1, 1960 to January 20, 1961
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1961), p. 152.

“an essential element” of the NATO stockpile
:
Quoted in Anderson,
Outsider in the Senate
, p. 170.

a private understanding with Norstad
:
See Trachtenberg,
Constructed Peace,
p. 170.

“nearly wet my pants”
:
Agnew interview.

“All [the Italians] have to do is hit him on the head”
:
Transcript, Executive Session, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Meeting No. 87-1-4, February 20, 1960, NSA, p. 73
.

“There were three Jupiters setting there”
:
Ibid, p. 66.

“Non-Americans with non-American vehicles”
:
Ibid, p. 47.

“The prime loyalty of the guards, of course”
:
“Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 33.

French
officers sought to gain control of a nuclear device
:
I first learned about the attempt from Thomas Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force and adviser to President Ronald Reagan. Reed briefly mentions the episode in a book that he wrote with Danny B. Stillman, a former director of the Los Alamos Technical Intelligence Division:
The Nuclear Express: A Political
History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation
(Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), pp. 79–80. The story is told in much greater detail by Bruno Tertrais in “A Nuclear Coup? France, the Algerian War and the April 1961 Nuclear Test,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Draft, October 2, 2011.

“Refrain from detonating your little bomb”
:
Quoted in Tetrais, “A Nuclear Coup?,” p. 11.

“the dumping ground for obsolete warheads”
:
“Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 45.

Holifield estimated that about half of the Jupiters
:
Transcript, Executive Session, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Meeting No. 87-1-4, p. 82.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted
:
See Nash,
Other Missiles of October,
p. 56.

“It would have been better to dump them in the ocean”
:
Quoted in ibid., p. 3.

The Mark 7 atomic bombs carried by NATO fighters
:
Agnew, Stevens, Peurifoy interviews.

amazed to see a group of NATO weapon handlers pull the arming wires out
:
Agnew interview. The bombs lacked trajectory-sensing switches and therefore could detonate without having to fall from a plane. Senator Anderson noted that at Vogel Air Base in the Netherlands “a safety wire designed to keep the firing switch open had been accidentally pulled from a nuclear weapon and that device,
if dropped, would have exploded.” See Anderson,
Outsider in the Senate
, p. 172. “Letter, From Harold M. Agnew,” p. 8; “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 37.

A rocket-propelled version of the Mark 7 was unloaded, fully armed
:
See “Incidents and Accidents,” Incident #3, p. 21.

“During initial inspection after receipt”
:
See ibid., Incident #1, p. 52.

A screwdriver was found inside one of the bombs;
an Allen wrench was somehow left inside another
:
See ibid., Incident #1, p. 70.

the training and operating manuals for the Mark 7
:
See “Letter, from Harold M. Agnew,” p. 2.

“In many areas we visited”
:
“Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 38.

“far from remote”
:
Ibid., p. 2.

a mishap on January 16, 1961
:
See ibid. and “Incidents and Accidents,” Incident #3, p. 38. I was able to confirm where the accident occurred.

the current “fictional” custody arrangements
:
“Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 39.

A lone American sentry . . . was bound to start “goofing off”
:
See ibid., p. 32.

Agnew brought an early version of the electromechanical locking system
:
Agnew interview.

The coded switch . . . weighed about a pound
:
A weapon often contained two of these switches as a redundancy, to ensure that at least one would
work. See “Command and Control Systems for Nuclear Weapons,” p. 13.

the decoder weighed about forty
:
Ibid., p. 14.

anywhere from thirty seconds to two and a half minutes to unlock
:
Ibid., p. 13.

“No single device can be expected to increase”
:
Quoted in “Subject: Atomic Stockpile, Letter, From John H. Pender, Legal Adviser, Department of State, To Abram J. Chayes, Legal Adviser, Department of State,” July 16, 1961 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), NSA, p. 4.

“adequately safe, within the limits”
:
Quoted in ibid.

“all is well with the atomic stockpile program”
:
Ibid.

Wiesner was deeply concerned about the risk
:
See Carl Kaysen, “Peace Became His Profession,” in Walter A. Rosenblith, ed.,
Jerry Wiesner: Scientist, Statesman, Humanist
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 102.

the locks might help “to buy time”
:
The quote comes from “Memorandum for the President, From Jerome B. Wiesner, May 29, 1962,” in “PAL Control of Theater Nuclear Weapons,” p. 84.

“individual psychotics”
:
Ibid.

prevent “unauthorized use by military forces”
:
Ibid.

Known at first as “Prescribed Action Links”
:
See Stein and Feaver,
Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons,
pp. 36–37.

the broad outlines of his defense policies
:
“The decisions of March 1961,” Desmond Ball has written, “determined to a very large extent the character of the U.S. strategic-force posture for the next decade.” The most important decisions had been made during the first two weeks of the month. See Ball,
Politics and Force Levels
, pp. 107–26. The quote is from page 121.

five of them would inflict more damage
:
The comparison was made between five 1-megaton weapons and one 10-megaton—with the larger number of small weapons achieving more blast damage. See Enthoven,
How Much Is Enough?
, pp. 179–84.

the Navy had requested a dozen Polaris subs
:
See Ball,
Politics and Force Levels
, pp. 45–46.

Kennedy decided to build 41
:
See ibid., pp. 46–7, 116–17.

about half of SAC's bomber crews, if not more
:
Cited in “Statement of Robert S. McNamara on the RS-70,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 14, 1962 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), NSA, p. 12. This document somehow escaped the black pen of a Pentagon censor—it discloses the nuclear yield and accuracy of the major strategic weapon systems at the time. That information can be found on page 18.

“pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type”
:
I first encountered this quote in Fred Kaplan's superb
Wizards of Armageddon: The Untold Story of the Small Group of Men Who Have Devised the Plans and Shaped the Policies on How to Use the Bomb
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 255. It comes
from an article by White about the whiz kids running the Pentagon, “Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals,
Saturday Evening Post
, May 4, 1963.

the proportion of SAC bombers on ground alert . . . on airborne alert
:
Policies that Eisenhower had strongly resisted became routine early in the Kennedy administration. During the presidential campaign, Kennedy had promised that SAC would have a round-the-clock airborne alert. For the details of SAC's new alert policies, see “History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1961,” SAC Historical Study No. 89, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, January 1962 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), NSA, pp. 58–65. For Kennedy's campaign promise, see Ball,
Politics and Force Levels
, p. 18.

“one defense policy, not three”
:
Quoted in Jack Raymond, “M'Namara Scores Defense Discord,”
New York Times
, April 21, 1963. McNamara had made his opposition to interservice rivalry clear from the start.

the Army was now seeking thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons
:
Cited in “Memorandum from Secretary Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer),” May 23, 1962 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified),
Foreign Relations of the United States
, 1961–1963,
Volume VIII, National Security Policy
, p. 297.

as urgently needed . . . as intercontinental ballistic missiles
:
See “History of the XW-51 Warhead,” SC-M-67-683, AEC Atomic Weapon Data, January 1968 (
SECRET
/
RESTRICTED DATA
/declassified), p. 10.

“appear to be unreasonably high”
:
The document that the Army submitted as a reply to McNamara's questions has been heavily censored, and yet the justification for seeking so many nuclear weapons seems clear. The Army wanted to defeat the Soviets on the ground in Western Europe, using “quick kill, quick response weapons.” And the author of the report was aware that the request might seem unreasonable. The full quote reads: “At the first reading, the number of weapons suggested appear to be unreasonably high.” In any event, the Army's arguments failed to be persuasive. See “Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Special Studies Group (JCS), Project 23, C 2379, October 1962 (
TOP SECRET
/
RESTRICTED DATA
/declassified), p. 55.

“if the enemy does”
:
Taylor criticized the “emotional resistance in some quarters” to providing American troops in Europe with tens of thousands of small nuclear weapons. See “Memorandum from the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, May 25, 1962 (
TOP
SECRET
/declassified),
Foreign Relations of the United States
, 1961–1963,
Volume VIII, National Security Policy
, pp. 299–300. The quote is on page 300.

Air Force Intelligence had warned
:
According to the Air Force, the Soviet Union would have as many as 950 long-range missiles by mid-1964 and 1,200 by mid-1965. Instead, the Soviets never had more than 209 long-range missiles until the late 1960s. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,” in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds.,
Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), p. 141.

only four missiles that could reach the United States
:
Cited in ibid.

the Soviet program had secretly endured a major setback
:
A leading Soviet rocket designer wrote the most authoritative account of what came to be known as the “Nedelin Catastrophe.” See Boris Chertok,
Rockets and People, Volume II: Creating a Rocket Industry
(Washington, D.C.: NASA History Series, 2006), pp. 597–641.

Tass . . . announced that Nedelin had been killed in a plane crash
:
See
Osgood Caruthers, “Chief of Rockets Killed in Soviet,”
New York Times
, October 26, 1960.

“it would be premature to reach a judgment”
:
See “Transcript of the Kennedy News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters,”
New York Times
, February. 9, 1961.

Eisenhower had thought that twenty to forty would be enough
:
Cited in “The Ballistic Missile Decisions,” Robert L. Perry, The RAND Corporation, October 1967, p. 14.

Jerome Wiesner advised President Kennedy that roughly ten times that number
:
Wiesner thought that about two hundred missiles would be enough. See Ball,
Politics and Force Levels
, p. 85.

General Power wanted . . . ten thousand Minuteman missiles
:
Cited in Herbert F. York,
Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race
(New York: Simon Schuster, 1970), p. 152.

it
was “a round number”
:
The adviser was Herbert F. York. Quoted in Herken,
Counsels of War
, p. 153.

“a matter of transcendent priority”
:
“Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Subject: Command and Control,” Robert S. McNamara, August 21, 1961 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), NSA, p. 1.