The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (102 page)

Absence of interference or impediment. Unfortunately, and as a reflection of the importance which has been attached to ideas of freedom, almost every aspect of its characterization is controversial. Gerald MacCallum has suggested that all statements about freedom can be cast in the same form—
A
is free from
B
to
p
(
p
stands for any verb of action)—and that disputes about freedom are disputes about the three terms involved, referring to the agent, the obstacle and the action or state to be achieved, respectively. This may help to diagnose disagreement, and it does provide a formal framework in which various conceptions may be cast, but it does not itself provide a substantive account. There may be one concept of freedom (in this formal sense), but many conceptions of it (that is, many substantive ways of filling out the formula). Sir Isaiah Berlin proposed in a famous lecture that two accounts of liberty be distinguished: negative liberty, focusing on the absence of interference by others, and positive liberty, focusing on an agent's capacity to
p
. Berlin particularly emphasized the connection between the positive conception and a willingness to accept an intrapersonal notion of freedom, because he was suspicious of the idea of the self upon which such intrapersonal notions rested—they seemed to rely upon a higher self and a lower self, or a similar bifurcation. Three problems will illustrate how substantively different conceptions of freedom may be put forward. First, attempts have been made to distinguish freedom from ability. In most social contexts the concern is with interference or impediments which are the responsibility of other persons, suggesting to some a distinction between a person's ability to do something and his or her freedom to do it. Hence I am free to fly like a bird (no one is interfering or will impede me) but I am unable to do so; I am able to do many actions which I am legally unfree to do. If I break my wrist accidentally, I am unable to write; if you handcuff me I am unfree to do so. But in these last two examples the distinction between ability and freedom looks less straightforward than in the first two, because in both cases the immediately relevant impediment is physical. The most obvious description of the handcuff case is that I am unfree to write because disabled by you, suggesting ability is a condition of freedom. If ability is a condition of freedom, however, I am unable and therefore unfree to fly like a bird. Clearly, both the agent and others can affect physical capacity, and this in various ways: handcuffs are a temporary impediment, but some disabling conditions are not reversible; both the agent and others can affect an individual's abilities in an accidental way and in an intentional way. (Suppose I deliberately broke my wrist: is the relationship between my ability to write and my freedom now the same as if you had handcuffed me?) In Hillel Steiner's conception of freedom, a person is unfree if and only if his action is prevented by another person. Hence a person is unfree to
p
only if he is unable to
p
because of someone else—a conception which makes freedom depend on ability but only in interpersonal cases.
The second major difficulty arises specifically from the comparison of interpersonal and intrapersonal cases. Some, like Steiner, see freedom solely in interpersonal terms. Others, however, have wanted to extend the range of freedom-reducing impediments or obstacles with which a person may be faced to include those which arise from ‘internal’ characteristics or dispositions. Suppose I am unlucky enough to suffer from agoraphobia. No one else is responsible for my condition—it has not been imposed on me by others, even if they might be able to help me overcome it. If we say that my freedom would be enhanced by the removal of this phobia, we accept that freedom can be intrapersonal. Alternatively, if we restrict freedom to interpersonal cases, we may say that I am free to walk in open spaces but apparently psychologically unable to bring myself to do so.
A third problem is the relation between freedom and resources. To be able to achieve some objectives, or even to do particular actions, persons require access to the components of action—most fundamentally space and, often, funds. To describe someone who lacks the resources to
p
as free to
p
is to suggest that if he or she is now provided with the resources there has been no increase in freedom, only resources; and many writers accept that characterization of the situation. Others have suggested the need to distinguish formal freedom from substantive freedom. In the present case, there would be no change in the person's formal freedom, but an increase in his or her substantive freedom. (A similar point is made about
rights
.) The freedom persons care about is substantive.
This suggestion raises another issue: whether it is plausible to characterize freedom independently of the reasons we might have for valuing it. Some hold that there are two quite separate questions: What is freedom? Why, if at all, is freedom valuable? Others regard the attempt at separation as implausible. For example, many discussions of freedom make reference to the value of individual choice or autonomy. Is the point of having freedom to enhance choice or autonomy, or is what freedom is the having of choice or autonomy? One approach is to distinguish between freedom in some general sense and particular freedoms (although it is not clear how ‘freedoms’ are to be aggregated). A class of apparently valueless freedoms—for example, to do the many things I am free to do but do not choose to do, or the things I am free to do but lack the resources to do—may be consistent with an explanation of the value of freedom. My wants may change, I may acquire the resources, and the value of freedom in general (it enables choice, it respects autonomy) is compatible with contingently valueless freedoms.
The various responses to the controversial aspects of ‘freedom’ mentioned here (and others) have generated many conceptions of freedom. Attempts to adjudicate between them have raised the charge that ideological preference masquerades as philosophical discrimination.
AR 

 
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The free access of the public to information contained in government records. In the United Kingdom this is highly limited. Local government records are available within a short period under the 1986 Local Government (Access to Information) Act. However, under the public records acts only a selection of the records of central government are available and then only after thirty years. The principle of administrative secrecy was established during the period of absolute monarchy, and, in the absence of a written constitution, has not been overturned. Indeed, governments have established further control over access to information by resort to the principles of the sovereignty of Parliament and parliamentary privilege. Disclosure of information is further constrained by the 1989 Official Secrets Act, and other statutes. Civil servants are not allowed to keep diaries, and under civil service rules are bound to keep their work confidential.
Elsewhere, freedom of information is considered the hallmark of open government. Introduction of freedom of information acts in the United States and in continental Europe have led to, so far unsuccessful, calls for reform in the United Kingdom. The origins of failure lie, at least in part, in differences over conceptions of liberal democracy, and in differences over what is to be achieved by freedom of information.
JBr 

 
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The right to practice the religion of one's choice, or to be a non-believer. The persecution of men and women for their religious beliefs has a long history and is, even yet, far from universally eradicated. In the United Kingdom, the worst forms of religious discrimination have long since disappeared, although the lack of any separation between Church and State remains offensive to many citizens who do not share the Anglican faith.
In the United States the principle is regarded far more seriously for several reasons. Many of the early settlers who founded the nation were fugitives from religious persecution in Europe and in modern times an extraordinary number of religions are represented in the country. The
First Amendment
specifically prohibits the founding of an established church, or any other limitation on the freedom of religion.
The continued significance of these issues in the United States can be seen in the Supreme Court's school prayer rulings over the last thirty years. In
Engel v. Vitale
(1962) the Court declared unconstitutional the preparation by a New York state agency of a prayer to be read aloud by children in public schools. Although the prayer was clearly non-denominational, the Supreme Court insisted that officially sponsored religious services were tantamount to the establishment of religion and were therefore unconstitutional. A year later the Court struck down a Pennsylvania state law calling for bible reading and a reading of the Lord's Prayer in that state's public schools. More recently, in 1992, the Court declared unconstitutional the offering of non-sectarian prayers at public school graduation ceremonies. These and other similar decisions have evoked bitter controversy and led to calls for constitutional amendment. Nevertheless these judgements are testimony to the continued importance of the principle of religious freedom in the United States.
DM 

 
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