Application of the theory of imperialism developed by
Lenin
to centre-periphery relationships within a country. The Leninist theory of imperialism argued that an imperialist country exported the exploitation of the proletariat to its colonies, or to other undeveloped countries whose terms of trade it could control; therefore the proletariat of the colonizing country were ‘bought off’ or subsidized by the proletariat of the exploited countries. Internal colonialism uses the same argument to account for the development of rich and poor regions within a country. Although the best-known such attempt—that by Michael Hechter (
Internal Colonialism
, 1975) to explain relationships between England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland—is only patchily supported by the evidence (it fits Ireland well and Scotland badly), the idea of internal colonialism remains fruitful. Robert Blauner (
Racial Oppression in America
, 1972) used the concept to describe race relations in the United States and elsewhere.
The judicial arm of the United Nations. Established in 1946 it is composed of fifteen judges appointed by the General Assembly and Security Council. It acts as a body of arbitration for consenting states in conflict over a particular issue, and makes its decisions according to international law. It also provides legal advice to other UN institutions.
JBr
A set of rules generally recognized by civilized nations as governing their conduct towards each other and towards each other's citizens. How far international law may be thought to differ from municipal (national) law depends on whether one takes a positivist or a naturalist view. For positivists, law is the command of a sovereign backed by force. Since the international system is an
anarchy
, with no supreme authority, international law is necessarily deficient. Naturalists take a different view, believing that positive law consists in the recognition and codification of other sources of law, such as custom, which do not rely upon a sovereign for their authority.
It is certainly true that custom and general principles as sources of international law have a strong flavour of the medieval natural law tradition about them, and the acceptance of the views of expert publicists only slightly less so. Thomas
Aquinas
, summing up the European naturalist position in the thirteenth century, had argued that the world as created by God was orderly or law-governed. This made it possible for the physical world to be understood through mathematics and the strict deductive processes of theoretical reasoning. But because of the imperfection of man following the Fall, human affairs were afflicted with contingency or uncertainty. Practical reason, which concerned human conduct, was therefore a much less clear-cut business than theoretical reason. Yet the two were loosely analogous. Thus, law could be ascertained by a quasi-deductive process of reasoning from first principles such as ‘Do unto others as you would be done by’; such practical reasoning called for skill and judgement in which expert jurists might have an advantage over sovereigns or statesmen; and laws and customs widely adopted by differing peoples (
jus gentium
) were good evidence of the success of human practical reason in discovering natural law.
By the early modern period, custom, general principle, and the views of expert publicists had yielded international law on the use of force—to name only one area—in which states were generally content to acquiesce. There was general agreement within Christendom—of which Shakespeare showed considerable awareness in
Henry V
—both on the reasons for which a prince might go to war (
jus ad bellum
) and the right conduct of war once begun (
jus in bello
).
Subsequently, a general substitution of statute and other written forms of municipal law has led to a strong preference for convention as a source of international law. Treaties create international law, but commit only those states that are signatories to them. The term convention is more often applied to multilateral treaties with large numbers of signatories, and it is worth noting that even now, with an abundance of conventions, the source of law is often not what at first appears. Where non-signatories acquiesce in the provisions of a convention these may come to be regarded as customary international law, binding upon all states.
Such conventions now cover a wide range of subjects including territory, the sea, the responsibilities of states, human rights, treaties, dispute settlement, and the use of force. International law relating to territory covers not only the demarcation of frontiers, but airspace and outer space. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, though it has still not received sufficient ratifications to enter into force, provides law relating to shipping, coastlines, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and rights to resources on and under the deep sea bed. Law relating to the responsibilities of states to each other's citizens covers both the care of refugees and asylum seekers and the expropriation and compensation of multinational corporations.
Until recently only states were subjects of international law, but individuals now have rights specifically recognized. Typical of the transition from customary to conventional international law is the fact that freedom from slavery, established as customary international law by 1815, has been secured under conventions only in the present century. Again, since 1945 the European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (which is not a convention) have gone some way to committing states to provision of a broader range of human rights. The United Nations Charter, which does have the force of law, suggests suitable rights without conferring them on individuals; the final act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which does not, is more specific.
The ways in which states may accede to, abrogate, and interpret treaties is covered by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which came into force in 1980. Legal procedures for the settlement of disputes between states range from the exercise of good offices by a third party, through mediation and conciliation, to formal arbitration. Under the 1899 Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and subsequent conventions states have been able to submit disputes for settlement, but the process depended on the consent of both parties. Only since the formation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922 and its successor, the International Court of Justice in 1946, has there been a court to which a state could unilaterally bring a complaint against another state.
The use of force is the area most often referred to by those who are sceptical about international law; they forget, perhaps, that municipal law does not stop law-breaking, though it provides generally accepted ways of dealing with it. Under the United Nations Charter of 1945 the use of force by states against one another is illegal, except in self-defence. This has not prevented war, though it may have prevented some wars. Other conventions govern the kinds of weapons which states may use, the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war, and the conduct of UN peace-keeping forces.
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