Church and State
The relationship between Church and State can be described as the institutional form of the relation between religion and politics. As a problem, ‘Church and State’ has been a particularly Western and Christian concern. This is not only because Western secularization has required a limit to the powers of religious authorities, but it has its origins in a much earlier period, in the development of separate Church and State institutions in Christendom which were natural rivals (with rival claims of authority and law enforcement) to a degree incomprehensible in the realms of other prominent religions. Thus the rivalry between Emperor and Pope was a key feature of the politics of Europe in the Middle Ages and in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth century the rivalry between Guelphs (or Guelfs) and Ghibellines was the greatest contest in Italian politics. It had started as a feud between South German tribes but became a partisan quarrel between the papal faction (Guelfs) and the imperial Ghibellines.
Western society thus has a long history of rivalry between Church and State ( see e.g.
Augustine
;
Aquinas
;
Bodin
; and
Calvin
) which has helped foster secular and anticlerical movements. Many modern states and parties welcome the separation of Church and State, but a suspicion has often attached to Catholic politicians in predominantly Protestant countries, such as John F. Kennedy , that they are, whatever they may say, religiously committed to extending the influence of their Church over the State.
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CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency)
The US government agency charged with collecting and analysing intelligence. The agency was established in 1947 to advise the
National Security Council
. The Intelligence Directorate assesses economic and military information on foreign countries, and the Operations Directorate co-ordinates covert operations. Involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the
Watergate
break-in, and the Iran-Contra affair, have led to the role of the CIA being questioned, and a growth in Congressional' oversight.
Cicero , Marcus Tullius
(106–43BC)
Roman jurist and political theorist. Strangely, the Romans, who contributed so much to the development of political institutions, and gave us the legal system known as Roman law, added almost nothing to the ideas developed by the Greeks. Cicero is one of the few exceptions, and even he drew heavily on Plato. His
De finibus
(On the purposes of human life) might be said to have laid foundations for a political philosophy.
De officiis
(On duty), a moral treatise, bears on political behaviour.
De legibus
(On laws) is positivist: it deals with natural and sacred laws, law courts, and the rulings of magistrates.
De re publica
(
The Republic
) does deal with political philosophy in a
utopian way
. There is satirical criticism of forms of government; a model state (the Roman state idealized); the ideal politician (the best among the good). The basis of government is justice and harmony among the people (
res populi
). In a crisis there should be a sole ruler, who would rule constitutionally, not for remuneration or fame, but for immortality.
To find Cicero's real political philosophy we must turn to his life and speeches. He was born into a wealthy but not noble family. He was the greatest Roman orator, part barrister and part politician. He was guided by the notion of constitutionality, the rule of the senate, and the consensus of all good people, not the rule of the
optimates
(aristocrats), much less of a self-appointed triumvirate, such as established itself in 62 BC. He agreed to a single leader in time of crisis, but not at other times or permanently. In 31 BC, after the battle of Actium, Octavian became sole ruler of the Roman empire. So ended Cicero's dream of senatorial constitutional rule.
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citizenship
The status of being a citizen, usually determined by law. In the republican tradition, qualifications for citizenship are associated with particular rights and duties of citizens, and a commitment to equality between citizens is compatible with considerable exclusivity in the qualifying conditions. For example, classical republics excluded slaves, women, and certain classes of workmen from citizenship. In general, qualifications for citizenship reflect a conception of the purposes of the political community and a view about which persons are able to contribute to, or enjoy the benefits of, the common good, or the freedom of the city. Although the concept of citizenship may refer to a status conferred by law, it may also be deployed to argue that persons have entitlements as a consequence of their position within a community or polity. This approach suggests that since individuals, as a matter of fact, participate in a common life, they have rights and duties as a consequence. Hence, it has been argued, we have moral obligations to one another because of that shared existence, whether what is shared be characterized as economic activity, culture, or political obligation. There may, then, be an uncertain connection between the ideas of membership of a community and citizenship of a polity. Both membership and citizenship may be construed as conferred statuses or as empirically determined positions; membership of a community may be asserted as a qualification for citizenship; the common good may be seen as what gives value to both community and political organization. And both membership and citizenship may be valued partly because they are not universally available.
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