The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (63 page)
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CSCE
Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is generally regarded as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, one in which the world moved perceptibly close to nuclear conflict between the superpowers.
In the period after Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba, 1959, the Americans considered various plans to restore an anti-Communist government. In April 1961 these plans culminated in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion which the American government authorized and supported. This was followed by a build-up of Soviet forces in Cuba. Throughout 1962 the issue of Cuba caused difficult relations between the superpowers, already tense as a result of the Berlin Wall crisis of the previous year. The Americans publicly signalled that they would not tolerate the Soviets placing ‘offensive’ nuclear missiles in Cuba, which lay only about one hundred miles from the coast of Florida. Nikita Khrushchev , the Soviet leader, appeared to understand and to comply with this demand. President Kennedy stated on 13 September that if Cuba were to become an offensive military base then he would take whatever steps were necessary to protect American security. During September the first missiles and the equipment to build the launchers arrived in Cuba.
On 14 October photographs from U2 aircraft revealed that medium-range missiles were being installed and on 16 October the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) held the first of its meetings to resolve what the American government regarded as a direct threat to its security. President Kennedy announced on television the detection of the missiles, demanded their removal, and the ExCom went into semi-permanent session to consider the next American steps. A variety of strategies was considered, including doing nothing (which was quickly dismissed), various forms of diplomatic action (which ran the risk of leading to negotiation and hence counter-concessions by the Americans) over the missiles' removal, invasion, an air strike against the missiles, and a blockade. Kennedy initially favoured military action of some sort and the possibility of invasion and air strike was held in reserve throughout the crisis. However, a blockade to prevent further missiles reaching Cuba emerged as the preferred solution. A blockade, accompanied by demands for the removal of the existing missiles, offered various advantages. It demonstrated American resolve and willingness to use military force, it capitalized on America's local naval superiority, it gave time for Khrushchev to back down, and it threw back onto him the difficult next step of escalating further the crisis if he were not to comply. The ultimatum, in short, offered the ‘last clear chance’ to avoid an uncontrollable confrontation which might probably end in nuclear war.
At first Khrushchev appeared reluctant to comply. He made a good deal both of the American threat to Cuba's integrity and the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was reluctant to make any deal which traded the Turkish for the Cuban missiles, though he personally had ordered the removal of the missiles from Turkey several months earlier on the grounds that they were unnecessary to American security and provocative to the Soviet Union. The imposition of the American blockade went ahead and the risks of incidents between the two naval forces became apparent.
In the days after 16 October the tension increased and the two states appeared to be moving to war as the Soviets showed no willingness to back down. On 26 October the Americans received in secret what they interpreted as a personal letter from Khrushchev which offered the possibility of a solution. The letter, in effect, offered to remove the missiles in return for the Americans removing the blockade and agreeing not to invade Cuba. The following day Khrushchev sent a public letter which was both more belligerent in tone and which demanded the removal of the missiles from Turkey in return for removal of the missiles from Cuba. The Americans were adamant that such a deal was unacceptable, moreover the tone of the letter suggested to them that Khrushchev might have lost control within the Presidium to more hawkish elements. The same day Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Cuba shot down an American plane. American military action appeared imminent. At that point Robert Kennedy , brother of the President, suggested that the Americans agree to Khrushchev's first (secret) letter, publicize the ‘agreement’, and in that way attempt to lure Khrushchev into acceptance— making clear at the same time that the burden of failure and responsibility for war would fall onto Khrushchev if he failed to accept.
The following day the crisis ended on these terms. The Americans had secured a great diplomatic victory, though by running enormous risks, and Kennedy's prestige stood at its new peak. The Soviets got much less out of the crisis, though they were able to share public credit for the resolution of the crisis. However, they had got the American promise not to invade Cuba and, some time later, they saw the Americans remove their medium-range missiles not merely from Turkey but from Europe as a whole. The Soviet withdrawal appears to have fatally undermined Khrushchev's prestige within the Presidium and to have led to his overthrow two years later. The Americans consolidated their leadership within NATO which had been threatened by their inability to prevent the Soviet gains in Berlin in 1961.
The motives which led Khrushchev to place missiles in Cuba, after having been clearly warned by the Americans not to do so, remain much debated. Some writers have argued that the American warning was not in fact clear—that he could flout it and make capital out of having flouted it. Cuba from this perspective was part of a broader strategy of waging the
Cold War
. A victory in Cuba would have undermined American prestige throughout the world and been particularly damaging in Western Europe and Latin America. There are other explanations. Khrushchev might have been seeking to bargain the missiles away against the removal of American missiles in Turkey and Europe. Khrushchev might have been motivated primarily by Cuba itself—the missiles were there to guarantee Cuba against invasion. From this perspective, which the Soviets themselves emphasized after October 1962, the crisis had worked out to their satisfaction. Lastly, and perhaps most plausibly, the Soviets were aware by 1962 that the Americans were far ahead in the strategic arms race, and in particular the development of long-range missiles and bombers. Deploying medium-range missiles in Cuba offered a technologically cheap means of meeting at least some of the deficit until Soviet production of long-range weapons came on stream.
The successful resolution of the crisis led to an immediate improvement in superpower relations. The ‘hot line’ was installed to give direct communications between the leaderships in Washington and Moscow, and in 1963 the two powers, with Britain playing an important minor role, went on to conclude the Partial Test Ban Treaty which outlawed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Above all, the mutual realization of how close the world had come to war led the two superpowers to give renewed attention to their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the West the missile crisis was taken as a paradigm case of a new science or art of ‘crisis management’, and the decision-making processes within ExCom were analysed in order to learn the ‘rules’ or conventions of the new science. In particular the importance of manipulating risk, or brinkmanship, emerged as a key element in coercive diplomacy—using the risk of war to push the opponent into backing down— together with the equal importance of allowing the opponent a last clear chance to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Kennedy himself laid great emphasis on finding terms to offer to Khrushchev that would not be so humiliating that in fact he would decline to take them.
PBy
In the period after Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba, 1959, the Americans considered various plans to restore an anti-Communist government. In April 1961 these plans culminated in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion which the American government authorized and supported. This was followed by a build-up of Soviet forces in Cuba. Throughout 1962 the issue of Cuba caused difficult relations between the superpowers, already tense as a result of the Berlin Wall crisis of the previous year. The Americans publicly signalled that they would not tolerate the Soviets placing ‘offensive’ nuclear missiles in Cuba, which lay only about one hundred miles from the coast of Florida. Nikita Khrushchev , the Soviet leader, appeared to understand and to comply with this demand. President Kennedy stated on 13 September that if Cuba were to become an offensive military base then he would take whatever steps were necessary to protect American security. During September the first missiles and the equipment to build the launchers arrived in Cuba.
On 14 October photographs from U2 aircraft revealed that medium-range missiles were being installed and on 16 October the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) held the first of its meetings to resolve what the American government regarded as a direct threat to its security. President Kennedy announced on television the detection of the missiles, demanded their removal, and the ExCom went into semi-permanent session to consider the next American steps. A variety of strategies was considered, including doing nothing (which was quickly dismissed), various forms of diplomatic action (which ran the risk of leading to negotiation and hence counter-concessions by the Americans) over the missiles' removal, invasion, an air strike against the missiles, and a blockade. Kennedy initially favoured military action of some sort and the possibility of invasion and air strike was held in reserve throughout the crisis. However, a blockade to prevent further missiles reaching Cuba emerged as the preferred solution. A blockade, accompanied by demands for the removal of the existing missiles, offered various advantages. It demonstrated American resolve and willingness to use military force, it capitalized on America's local naval superiority, it gave time for Khrushchev to back down, and it threw back onto him the difficult next step of escalating further the crisis if he were not to comply. The ultimatum, in short, offered the ‘last clear chance’ to avoid an uncontrollable confrontation which might probably end in nuclear war.
At first Khrushchev appeared reluctant to comply. He made a good deal both of the American threat to Cuba's integrity and the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was reluctant to make any deal which traded the Turkish for the Cuban missiles, though he personally had ordered the removal of the missiles from Turkey several months earlier on the grounds that they were unnecessary to American security and provocative to the Soviet Union. The imposition of the American blockade went ahead and the risks of incidents between the two naval forces became apparent.
In the days after 16 October the tension increased and the two states appeared to be moving to war as the Soviets showed no willingness to back down. On 26 October the Americans received in secret what they interpreted as a personal letter from Khrushchev which offered the possibility of a solution. The letter, in effect, offered to remove the missiles in return for the Americans removing the blockade and agreeing not to invade Cuba. The following day Khrushchev sent a public letter which was both more belligerent in tone and which demanded the removal of the missiles from Turkey in return for removal of the missiles from Cuba. The Americans were adamant that such a deal was unacceptable, moreover the tone of the letter suggested to them that Khrushchev might have lost control within the Presidium to more hawkish elements. The same day Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Cuba shot down an American plane. American military action appeared imminent. At that point Robert Kennedy , brother of the President, suggested that the Americans agree to Khrushchev's first (secret) letter, publicize the ‘agreement’, and in that way attempt to lure Khrushchev into acceptance— making clear at the same time that the burden of failure and responsibility for war would fall onto Khrushchev if he failed to accept.
The following day the crisis ended on these terms. The Americans had secured a great diplomatic victory, though by running enormous risks, and Kennedy's prestige stood at its new peak. The Soviets got much less out of the crisis, though they were able to share public credit for the resolution of the crisis. However, they had got the American promise not to invade Cuba and, some time later, they saw the Americans remove their medium-range missiles not merely from Turkey but from Europe as a whole. The Soviet withdrawal appears to have fatally undermined Khrushchev's prestige within the Presidium and to have led to his overthrow two years later. The Americans consolidated their leadership within NATO which had been threatened by their inability to prevent the Soviet gains in Berlin in 1961.
The motives which led Khrushchev to place missiles in Cuba, after having been clearly warned by the Americans not to do so, remain much debated. Some writers have argued that the American warning was not in fact clear—that he could flout it and make capital out of having flouted it. Cuba from this perspective was part of a broader strategy of waging the
Cold War
. A victory in Cuba would have undermined American prestige throughout the world and been particularly damaging in Western Europe and Latin America. There are other explanations. Khrushchev might have been seeking to bargain the missiles away against the removal of American missiles in Turkey and Europe. Khrushchev might have been motivated primarily by Cuba itself—the missiles were there to guarantee Cuba against invasion. From this perspective, which the Soviets themselves emphasized after October 1962, the crisis had worked out to their satisfaction. Lastly, and perhaps most plausibly, the Soviets were aware by 1962 that the Americans were far ahead in the strategic arms race, and in particular the development of long-range missiles and bombers. Deploying medium-range missiles in Cuba offered a technologically cheap means of meeting at least some of the deficit until Soviet production of long-range weapons came on stream.
The successful resolution of the crisis led to an immediate improvement in superpower relations. The ‘hot line’ was installed to give direct communications between the leaderships in Washington and Moscow, and in 1963 the two powers, with Britain playing an important minor role, went on to conclude the Partial Test Ban Treaty which outlawed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Above all, the mutual realization of how close the world had come to war led the two superpowers to give renewed attention to their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the West the missile crisis was taken as a paradigm case of a new science or art of ‘crisis management’, and the decision-making processes within ExCom were analysed in order to learn the ‘rules’ or conventions of the new science. In particular the importance of manipulating risk, or brinkmanship, emerged as a key element in coercive diplomacy—using the risk of war to push the opponent into backing down— together with the equal importance of allowing the opponent a last clear chance to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Kennedy himself laid great emphasis on finding terms to offer to Khrushchev that would not be so humiliating that in fact he would decline to take them.
PBy
cube law
, better as
cube rule
, better as
cube rule
A relationship discovered by M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart . in 1950, when they observed that the effect of the
first-past-the-post electoral system
in Britain was to produce a ratio of seats between the (two) parties which was the cube of their ratio of votes. For instance, a party which won a British general election by 55 to 45 per cent of the vote would win seats in the ratio 64.6 per cent to 35.6 per cent (55
3
to 45
3
). Subsequent research has shown that the cube ratio was a product of the geographical distribution of the voters for each party, and that the exaggerative effect of the operation of the system in Britain has tended to decline.
Note that the cube rule and its generalization apply only to the ratio of votes between the two leading parties. Third parties such as the British Liberal Democrats suffer much more severely from underrepresentation if their vote is evenly dispersed, while concentrated third parties such as the Ulster Unionists may obtain as high or higher a ratio of seats as of votes.
first-past-the-post electoral system
in Britain was to produce a ratio of seats between the (two) parties which was the cube of their ratio of votes. For instance, a party which won a British general election by 55 to 45 per cent of the vote would win seats in the ratio 64.6 per cent to 35.6 per cent (55
3
to 45
3
). Subsequent research has shown that the cube ratio was a product of the geographical distribution of the voters for each party, and that the exaggerative effect of the operation of the system in Britain has tended to decline.
Note that the cube rule and its generalization apply only to the ratio of votes between the two leading parties. Third parties such as the British Liberal Democrats suffer much more severely from underrepresentation if their vote is evenly dispersed, while concentrated third parties such as the Ulster Unionists may obtain as high or higher a ratio of seats as of votes.
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