electoral geography
Term covering the geography of elections, electoral systems, and
apportionment
. Electoral geography first developed as a distinct subdiscipline in France, where
Siegfried
established an association between different physical features of the terrain of western France and different voting patterns. Siegfried's ecological association techniques were copied by a few others, notably V. O. Key for the Southern United States, and Henry Pelling and other scholars working on Victorian and Edwardian Britain. These methods were eclipsed by survey-based methods in the 1960s because of concern about ecological fallacy, but are reviving with more sophisticated techniques.
The geography of electoral systems is widely but patchily studied. Plurality electoral systems reward small concentrated parties and punish small dispersed parties; they reward large dispersed parties and punish large concentrated parties. ‘Small’ and ‘large’ are defined in relation to the threshold of support at which a party tips from one to the other; in a three-party system this threshold is around one-third of the vote, in a four-party system around a quarter, and so on. Similar effects will be noted in any other electoral system short of the most fully proportional achievable.
The geography of apportionment deals with both the allocation of seats among multiseat units (such as states, multiseat districts, or counties), and the allocation of seats within them. The former raises the problem of allocating an integer number of seats when the exact proportion is a fractional number. The latter deals with
gerrymandering
and with the computations needed to achieve optimal non-partisan districting.
electoral system
Any set of rules whereby the votes of citizens determine the selection of executives and/or legislators. Electoral systems may be categorized in several ways. The most useful is probably a three-way division into
plurality
, majoritarian, and proportional systems. For national elections, plurality systems are found only in Great Britain and some former British colonies (including the United States and India). Majoritarian systems are found in France and Australia for legislative elections, and in about half of the countries with directly elected chief executives. There are many proportional systems in the democratic world; they differ widely and there is no agreed criterion whereby one may be judged better than another.
Each family of systems has a number of distinctive features. Plurality systems tend to concentrate the vote on the two leading parties ( see
Duverger's law
) except where there are concentrated regional parties. Majoritarian systems are appropriate for presidential elections, since there is only one president who ought to have majority support at least against the last rival left in the field; therefore systems such as
alternative vote
are justifiable, though imperfect. However, using a majoritarian system to elect a legislature can lead to severe distortions. The number of parties elected under a proportional system is a function partly of the size of districts it employs (the more seats there are in each district, the more parties will tend to be represented), and partly of the underlying cleavages in the society.
élitism
(1) The belief: that government ought in principle, always and everywhere, to be confined to élites. Rarely a worked-out doctrine in its own right, more often a piece of unexamined value judgement, or a view which follows from some more general argument in political philosophy, as for example in Plato's
Republic
.
(2) The belief: that government is in practice confined to élites; that, following a maxim of
Hume
, ‘ought implies can’ (in other words, that there is no point in saying that government ought to be controlled by the people if in practice it cannot); and that we might just as well accept what we are bound to have anyhow. These views are especially associated with Mosca and with
Pareto
in the early twentieth century, and with
Schumpeter
in mid-century. All three writers shade into élitism in sense 1 because they go on to produce normative justifications of rule by élites in a democracy. However, their earlier arguments do not in themselves imply that if democratic control of the government were somehow achievable it would be undesirable.
(3) The belief: that government is in practice confined to élites; that this has often been justified by arguments from Plato or Schumpeter; but that this is undesirable because élite rule is in practice rule on behalf of the vested interests of (usually economic) élites. See also
community power
.
emigration