The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (156 page)

⁷⁰
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘India and Pakistan: Towards Greater Bilateral Stability’,
Strategic Survey 2003/4
(London: Routledge, 2004), 231.

⁷¹
Ibid.

⁷²
Available at emmanicholson.info/work/overwhelming-backing-from-the-parliament.html

⁷³
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘South Asia: New Possibilities, Old Problems’,
Strategic Survey 2006
(London: Routledge, 2006), 304–5.

^*
I am grateful to Pat Walsh, then (2002–5) Executive Director of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comiss
o Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (henceforth: CAVR)) in Díli, East Timor, for his assistance with the first section of this chapter and for providing all the references from the Public Record Office (PRO) FCO Archive, copies of which are held in the Dowson Archive of the CAVR.

¹
James Dunn,
Timor: A People Betrayed
(Milton, Qld: Jacaranda Press, 1983), 97–8. The text of Constitutional Law 7/75 can be found in Heike Krieger (ed.),
East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 34–6.

²
See Telegram 244 from British Embassy Jakarta to FCO, London, 4 July 1975, FCO 15/1704, PRO; which reported that ‘The Indonesians admit… that a referendum held now [mid-1975] would probably result in a majority for independence’; quoted Brad Simpson, ‘“Illegally and Beautifully”: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974–1976’,
Cold War History
, 5.3 (Aug. 2005) 288, 307 n. 36, 308 n. 37. See also Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds.),
East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation
(Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1995), 5, on the 55 per cent vote for the main independence party, Fretilin, in local elections in July 1975.

³
Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente/Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) and UDT (União Democrática Timorense/Timorese Democratic Union) were the two main political parties founded in East Timor after the 25 Apr. 1974 ‘Carnation’ Revolution in Lisbon. On the civil war, see Dunn,
Timor
, 165–206.

⁴
The figure is from the 2005 CAVR Report on the killings and human rights abuses in Timor Leste between 1974 and 1999. It estimated the number of ‘conflict-related’ deaths at between 102,800 and 183,000, a figure which includes both killings and deaths due to privation. CAVR Press Release, Díli, 4 Jan. 2006.

⁵
The announcement was made simultaneously (there is a 14-hour time difference between NYC and Díli) on Friday, 3 Sep. in New York, and on Saturday, 4 Sep., in Díli.

⁶
SC Res. 384 of 22 Dec. 1975; and SC Res. 389 of 22 Apr. 1976.

⁷
This was a reference to the increase in the Committee’s numbers to twenty-four in 1962. Its full title is ‘The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. See further Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 30–32.

⁸
José Ramos-Horta,
Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor
(Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987), 6–7.

⁹
Special Committee Statement, Lisbon, 14 June 1975. See further Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 18 ff.

¹⁰
Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 165, 166–83.

¹¹
Colonel Mário Lemos Pires, videotaped presentation to the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), Public Hearing on Self-Determination, Díli, 15–17 Mar. 2004.

¹²
Memo from J. A. Ford, British Embassy Jakarta, to P. J. E. Male of the FCO, 14 July 1975, FCO 15/1715, PRO, quoted in Simpson, ‘Illegally and Beautifully’, 290,308 n. 47. See further Dunn,
Timor
, 119–20.

¹³
Quoted in Wendy Way (ed.),
Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976
(Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 314.

¹⁴
Richard Dalton to FCO, 11 June 1976, CAVR Archive, Díli, East Timor, Dowson File, original document in FCO 15/1717, PRO.

¹⁵
SC Res. 1264 of 15 Sep. 1999, para. 3.

¹⁶
See Statements of Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia in Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 63 para. 90, 103 para. 11.

¹⁷
Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 53–4.

¹⁸
See Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 114 para. 13. See also Dunn,
Timor
, 363 on Japan’s ‘ardent support’ for Indonesia in the months following the invasion.

¹⁹
See Dunn,
Timor
, 362, 370.

²⁰
Daniel P. Moynihan with Suzanne Weaver,
A Dangerous Place
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 247. On Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s equally dismissive attitude at the time of the Indonesian invasion, see Simpson, ‘Illegally and Beautifully’, 296–302.

²¹
See Eilís Ward and Peter Carey, ‘The East Timor Issue in the Context of EU-Indonesian Relations, 1975–99’,
Indonesia and the Malay World
29, no. 83 (2001), 56.

²²
Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, ‘East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications’, in Carey and Carter Bentley (eds),
East Timor at the Crossroads
, 140.

²³
Indonesia lies along the Malaka Straits, which carries 42% of the world’s maritime commercial traffic, and athwart the Sunda, Lombok, and Ombai-Wetar straits. The last two are especially important as deepwater passages for tanker and submarine traffic: the US Seventh Fleet, for example, used the Ombai-Wetar, which runs for some of its length along the north coast of East Timor, for the transit of its nuclear submarines at depths (2,000 metres + ) undetectable by Soviet spy satellites.

²⁴
SC Res. 1272 of 25 Oct. 1999.

²⁵
See Dunn,
Timor
, 360; and Horta,
Funu
, 116–17.

²⁶
Guiccardi’s reports of 29 Feb. and 22 June 1976 can be found in UN doc. S/12011 of 12 Mar. 1976 and UN doc. S/12106 of 22 June 1976, see Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 49–51.

²⁷
UN doc. S/12106, Annex 1, para. 8. Reprinted in Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 51.

²⁸
See Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 47.

²⁹
Confidential FCO Record of comments over dinner at the Excelsior Hotel, Heathrow Airport, 15 May 1976, between UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and The Rt. Hon. Evan Luard MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, from CAVR Archive, Díli, East Timor, Dowson File, original document in FCO 15/1710, PRO. On the Aug. 1969 ‘Act of Free Choice’ in West Papua (then West Irian), see John Saltford,
The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). The
‘Anschluss’
(forced union/annexation) referred to by Waldheim was the Nazi takeover of Austria on 9 Mar. 1938, an unfortunate analogy given Waldheim’s own murky war record in the Balkans.

³⁰
Horta,
Funu
, 117.

³¹
Ibid., 122–3.

³²
CAVR Archive, Díli, East Timor, Dowson File, original in FCO 15/1717, PRO.

³³
See Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, in David M. Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 21.

³⁴
See Krieger (ed),
Basic Documents
, 129–33, for a chart chronicling the steady decline in the percentage of votes cast in favour of GAOR Resolutions on East Timor: 50%in 1975, 46% 1976, 45% 1977, 39% 1978, 40% 1979, 37% 1980, 34% 1981, and 32% 1982. By the 1982 vote, only ifty countries supported the resolution with forty-six against and fifty abstaining.

³⁵
Apparently at the new SG Javier Pérez de Cuéillar’s insistence, see Horta,
Funu
, 134.

³⁶
Krieger (ed.),
Basic Documents
, 162 para. 37.

³⁷
Horta,
Funu
, 138.

³⁸
Ibid., 133.

³⁹
See Simon Chesterman, ‘Virtual Trusteeship’, in Malone (ed),
Security Council
, 225.

⁴⁰
Malone, ‘Introduction’, ibid., 5.

⁴¹
Wallensteen and Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, ibid., 18–19.

⁴²
Jean-David Levitte, Permanent Representative of France to the UN (1999–2002), quoted ibid., 644.

⁴³
See Sarah Niner, ‘A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of CNRT’, in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R. Shalom (eds.),
Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 20–3.

⁴⁴
Ward and Carey, ‘East Timor Issue’, 56–7.

⁴⁵
According to the Lisbon-based ecumenical organization A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste (Peace is Possible in East Timor),
East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre/Timor Oriental: Le Massacre de Santa Cruz
(Lisbon: A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste, Feb. 1992), 2, there were 271 killed, 250 ‘missing’, and 382 wounded, but the numbers of dead were certainly much higher because the report does not mention the ‘second massacre’ when Santa Cruz survivors were done to death by the Indonesian Army in the main military hospital in Díli, see Max Stahl, ‘Indonesians Fed “Death Pills” to Wounded’,
Sunday Times
, 13 Feb. 1994, 17.

⁴⁶
See Wallensteen and Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, 24; and Fernando Mão de Ferro (ed.),
East Timor – Nobel Peace Prize: Lectures Delivered at the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Awarding Ceremony
(Lisbon: Edicoes Colíbri, 1997).

⁴⁷
Joanna Weschler, ‘Human Rights’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 64.

⁴⁸
Wallensteen and Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, 23–4.

⁴⁹
On Prime Minister John Howard’s letter to Habibie of 19 Dec. 1998 suggesting a New Caledonian-style resolution of the Timor problem through an independence referendum in five to ten years time, see DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 29–37, 181–3. For Habibie’s petulant ‘autonomy or immediate independence’ response, see Ward and Carey, ‘East Timor Issue’, 67 n. 8.

⁵⁰
Teresa Whitfield, ‘Groups of Friends’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 319.

⁵¹
Portugal only became a member of the Core Group in mid-2000 once UNTAET was clearly in nation-building mode, see Stewart Eldon, ‘East Timor’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 553. Indonesia, for obvious reasons, was never invited to join.

⁵²
The Core Group’s existence was first revealed in a speech by the Australian Ambassador to the UN, Penny Wensley, on 23 Feb. 2000, see Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 565 n. 4.

⁵³
Whitfield, ‘Groups of Friends’, 319, ‘Indonesian actors’ refers primarily to Defence Minister and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto and the Indonesian Army.

⁵⁴
See Malone, ‘Conclusion’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 664; Sir Jeremy Greenstock referred to Holbrooke as a ‘brilliant’ diplomat ‘whose weight was necessary to get things through the Council process’ during the vote on SC Res. 1264 mandating InterFET. Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Ditchley Park, Oxon, 27 Oct. 2005 (henceforth: ‘Greenstock, Interview’).

⁵⁵
SC Res. 1236 of 7 May 1999.

⁵⁶
SC Res. 1246 of 11 June 1999.

⁵⁷
SC Res. 1257 of 3 Aug. 1999; and SC Res. 1262 of 27 Aug. 1999.

⁵⁸
SC Res. 1264 of 15 Sep. 1999.

⁵⁹
SC Res. 1272 of 25 Oct. 1999. The resolution provided for a troop strength of 8,950 with 200 military observers, and an international police element of 1,640, at an estimated cost of US $900 million over UNTAET’s two and a half-year mandate (25 Oct. 1999–20 May 2002).

⁶⁰
Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili, 8–12 Sep. 1999, UN doc. S/1999/976.

⁶¹
See Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Conflict Prevention’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 109–10.