An American Bride in Kabul: A Memoir (18 page)

I did not know it then, but I certainly know it now: Apostasy is a capital crime in Islam.

According to knowledgeable Muslim and ex-Muslim dissidents, apostasy is the most serious crime you can commit under Muslim religious (Sharia) law. The distinguished author Ibn Warraq is a pioneer in this area. In 2003 he edited the anthology
Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out.
The contributors are from Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey, the Far East, India, Tunisia—and the United States. They describe having to break with their families after being threatened with death, having to flee, adopt new identities—or having to keep their conversion, even their atheism, strictly secret.

I have submitted courtroom affidavits on behalf of a number of potential victims of honor killings. In these cases the families of girls and women who had converted to Christianity vowed to kill them for this perceived betrayal of faith.

In 2003 the courageous Egyptian-born Nonie Darwish, author of
Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel,
and the War on Terror,
wrote and talked about having been rejected and demonized by her family, and the considerable danger and contempt she still faces because she converted away from Islam. She is a gracious and eloquent woman, and my heart breaks for her.

Back in the early 1960s no one—not I or my parents or my lawyers—understood anything about how some Muslims view apostates—that they view them as traitors to the faith who deserve to die.

I now believe that the grounds my parents chose for the annulment also represented a wishful fantasy on their part. Perhaps they needed to minimize my rejection of their way of life by arguing that Abdul-Kareem had at least promised to become an American and an Orthodox Jew.

But if this got out, if anyone—a jealous brother, a political rival—believed this was true, Abdul-Kareem could have been jailed, ostracized, impoverished, executed—exiled if he was lucky. The rumor that he had even
considered
becoming a Jew could ruin him.

If this is why he would not let me go, it makes no sense. If only he had agreed to a divorce, I would not have had to move for an annulment. What does he want with me? Does he really love me this much? If so, how could he have treated me so badly? If not, does he actually view me as his property? Is this possible—am I his runaway cow he must lure back home?

He is certainly persistent—but his persistence is cruel and deceptive. Has he always been like this? I don’t think so. No. But living in Kabul has hardened him, changed him, perhaps returned him to the man he was supposed to become had he not gone to America.

Even after he knows I’ve hired lawyers and am actively seeking a divorce and an annulment, Abdul-Kareem continues to share the intimate details of his life with me—just as if I were still his wife. He idealizes our relationship in the same way he once idealized life in Afghanistan.

Abdul-Kareem writes to my lawyers explaining that he is still trying to convince me to give our marriage another chance because he loves me. To me he writes, “I’ll be honest with you, Darling, if you do not love me anymore, there is not a single thing in the world that I can do to keep you and there is not a single thing in the world that I wouldn’t do to make you come back to me.”

How debonair he sounds. He is traveling and leading the glamorous life he always coveted. I am working and going to school and barely have time to sleep.

On and on he goes, sharing all the names of famous artists he is meeting and befriending. “Satyajit Ray of India, Stanley Kramer, Peter
Ustinov, Fellini, and many others. [Nothing but] parties, parties, and parties. I am invited to two or three different parties, every day. I feel I need a rest, but I am afraid I cannot get it.

“How are you, Phyllis? Happy? Content? Remember me? Goodnight, my dear, I shall never stop loving you.”

Two years pass. Toward the end of 1963 my lawyers advertise in a number of newspapers in New York City, a means of summoning Abdul-Kareem to appear in court in the matter of an annulment. He never appears. I am not sure if his lawyer even comes to the hearing. According to the legal documents, I am the sole witness. I do not remember testifying. In response to these legal events Abdul-Kareem writes, “I never expected us to come down to this—Oh, well—that is life—love must be answered with hate. . . . As your lawyer must have informed you, I cannot be served [with] a summons here and our case cannot be tried in a U.S. court. Legally, you are an Afghan citizen.”

On March 20, 1964, two years and three months after I left Kabul, Judge Charles J. Beckinella grants me an annulment, which will be finalized in three months.

I am now free to ask the Department of State to help me retrieve some of my possessions left behind—mainly my college papers and some books. I am told that “the United States Government has no jurisdiction over an Afghan national residing in Afghanistan.” However, Robert J. Carle, a State Department official, offers to approach the embassy in Kabul to see if an “informal approach” can be made.

In 1965, eight months after the annulment is finalized, I write directly to Lowell B. Laingen, who works at the Afghanistan Desk in the State Department, and explain that Abdul-Kareem has promised, again and again, to return my papers to me. Finally, later that year, I hear from the American embassy in Kabul, from Thomas J. Wajda, the vice consul. He writes:

While in my office, Mr. M. [Abdul-Kareem] mentioned that he is now having some difficulties with various Afghan authorities over your failure to return to Afghanistan. You may recall that when you left this country it was necessary for Mr. M. to guarantee your return. I assume that you now have no intention of returning to Afghanistan. If this is the case, you would probably be doing Mr. M. a great favor by returning your Afghan passport, and with it, a notarized statement concerning the annulment of your marriage. He would then, perhaps, be able to straighten things out with the passport authorities.

What kind of tribal-totalitarian police state is this?

Now, more than fifty years later, I believe that Abdul-Kareem could indeed have been held accountable for a missing Afghan passport or, rather, for a missing piece of Afghan property: me. I believe that he could have been punished for having brought an American bride home in the first place—and for then having lost her. He once mentioned that he spent a year in the army. I wonder, only now, if this was his punishment.

The Afghan monarch and the country’s bureaucracy—that excuse for not getting things done, that system for leading people on for months and years and exacting whatever gain the individual clerk can obtain—has imprisoned and executed people for lesser crimes.

Ten years after I left Kabul, I reread these letters. My conclusion then was that I was a pawn in the power struggle between Abdul-Kareem and his father. Abdul-Kareem wanted his foreign Jewish bride, his father did not think he had made a wise choice. Abdul-Kareem once wrote to say that he had broken with his father forever, that he had been disowned. Maybe his father would not give him the money with which to pursue me further. I believe that everything that happened in that country, from the king on down, was father controlled.

I took only three things out with me when I left Kabul. One was a song that I carefully learned and that I still sing. Another was the bright turquoise nargileh, or water-pipe, that came from Mazar-i-Sharif. Last was my bright orange Afghan passport, which I have also kept—a memento of happier times, a memento of tragic times.

Please allow me to apologize to Abdul-Kareem here and now—if indeed the nonreturn of my Afghan passport caused him any difficulties whatsoever.

Nearly three years after I left, toward the end of 1964, Abdul-Kareem writes again, “Upon my arrival in Kabul I found a court document granting you an annulment. I must admit I was hurt. . . . We were so involved and I loved you so much that it is very difficult for me to accept that it is all over. Even now it doesn’t have to be! Well, I guess that is asking for too much. I’d like to help you in any way I can, so please don’t hesitate to let me know if there is anything I can do for you.”

At the end of April 1965, the American embassy in Kabul received a sealed package that contained my college papers.

I
t is over. I am legally free. I will never be free. Here I am, still writing about it all, trying to make sense of what happened and what it may mean to other people in the larger scheme of things.

My young self may not have been wise, but she proved as strong, as persistent, and as adamant as her Afghan husband was. I was physically trapped and I got out. I was legally trapped and I got out, too. We were an evenly matched pair. Neither of us veered from our chosen path.

My parents are no longer alive, but I owe them a profound debt of gratitude for standing by me—their rebel child.

Abdul-Kareem once wrote, “I’d always hoped you’d use your time here to write a great novel—I know you can. Michener’s
Caravans
is not literature; I always expected that someday you would write the first novel about Afghanistan that deals with the life, people, etc., and you would do it here with love and great insight.”

Ah, Abdul-Kareem, this is not a novel, but here I am, writing about us and about Afghanistan as best I can.

Nine

My Afghan Family Arrives in America

I
n the decade after I left Afghanistan, I finished college and worked full time while attending graduate school. I was lucky. I returned to America when it was possible for a serious young woman to become truly independent. In less than a decade I received my doctorate and obtained a position as a professor of psychology.

I was also privileged to have come of age when second-wave feminism was sweeping the country. I reported for duty in 1967, and by 1969 I was one of the many visible leaders of this extraordinary movement for women’s freedom.

My Afghan experience taught me to recognize variations of sexism (or gender apartheid) everywhere, including in America.

The civil rights movement: the voter registration drives, sit-ins, and marches in the South were noble and tempting, but I could not go to Alabama or Mississippi and also finish school. Instead I joined the Northern Student Movement and tutored students in Harlem and in my East Village apartment. Like others, I ran into unexpected sexism and thus had many more illusions upended.

Although I joined some anti–Vietnam War marches, and was considered more leftist than rightist, sexism among leftist men was as alive
as it was among those who opposed such marches as unpatriotic and dangerous.

Unlike many of my contemporaries, I no longer romanticized the masses or the people of the Third World. I knew too much about the oppression of women and men in at least one poor, illiterate, tribal, and religiously fundamentalist country. Thus, although I was a critic of sexism in America, I could no longer mindlessly demonize my own country or culture. I knew, firsthand, that it was far better here than elsewhere.

I knew what could happen to a woman living in the developing world. It had nearly happened to me. I could not forget how close I had come to an imprisoned life and an early death. Thus I was always concerned with women everywhere, not only with women in America, most of whom at least had the right to battle for their rights without risking death at the hands of their families—or prison, torture, and death at the hands of the state.

Such views set me apart from many in my activist generation.

In 1969 I published an article in
Mademoiselle
about some of my experiences in Afghanistan. I had not forgotten about the country, but Afghanistan was not part of my work and was no longer on my mind.

Abdul-Kareem and I no longer corresponded. I had no idea what he was doing or how he was. Still, I religiously clipped articles about Afghanistan whenever they appeared and kept them safe. I have them now.

I may have left Abdul-Kareem, but I remained connected to other Muslims.

I befriended Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians, Saudis, Turks, Moroccans, Iranians, and Pakistanis. Many were interested in what I had experienced in Kabul and shared with me their own stories.

I met Jihan Sadat and Raymonda Hawa Tawil (who became Yasir Arafat’s mother-in-law). I became friendly with the leading feminists of Egypt: Nawal El Saadawi and Laila Abou-Saif. In time I also met the academic Leila Ahmed.

I met Middle Eastern filmmakers, Iranian anti-Shah activists, a Turkish Japanese feminist, a number of brave Saudi Arabian feminists, and two exceptionally glamorous and defiant feminists: Fatima Mernissi of Morocco and Rhonda Al-Fatal of Syria.

I wonder: How are they now, where are they, are they alive and alright?

By the end of 1979 I had published four books that had been translated into many European and into some Middle Eastern and Asian
languages. I was working on a fifth book—and I was also the new mother of a wonderful one-year-old son.

A
nd then one day, toward the end of 1979, my phone rang.

It was Abdul-Kareem.

He wanted to meet.

Disguised as a peasant, he had escaped from Soviet-infiltrated and now Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. He knew it was time to get out “once the Soviets massacred their own hand-picked puppet-leader, Daoud Khan, together with Daoud’s entire family, women, children and all.”

Abdul-Kareem had been a deputy minister of culture and probably a member of Daoud’s cabinet.

With only a toothbrush in his pocket he had crossed into Pakistan. After waiting in a one-room flat in Germany for five months, he, his wife, and their two young children flew to the West Coast; Boeing had promised him a job as a sales representative for Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Ruefully, and with a characteristic touch of Afghan absurdist humor, Abdul-Kareem said, “It took many months to get the necessary visas. By the time I arrived in America, Iran had already been taken over by the mullahs, Afghanistan by the Russians, and Turkey had decided to buy from McDonnell Douglas instead. Boeing had no need for me.”

Abdul-Kareem got out of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, but before he escaped he had lived through nearly two decades of increasing Soviet infiltration.

In his essay, “Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan” (which appears in Rosanne Klass’s major anthology,
Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited
),
Yossef Bodansky writes, “Like their Tsarist predecessors, they [the Soviets] have always perceived their position in Central Asia in terms of global strategy. In August 1919 Leon Trotsky wrote to the Central Committee, ‘ . . . The road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal.’”

In another essay, “The Road to Crisis 1919–1980: American Failures, Afghan Errors, and Soviet Successes,” in Klass’s anthology, Leon Poullada, an American diplomat and author, writes, “It was not until Moscow began paying increasing attention to Third World countries in the 1950s that a more active and permanent Soviet role became manifest. . . . Moscow’s influence in Kabul developed into a position of pre-eminence that was never threatened . . . by any outside powers.”

During this time of post–World War II Soviet imperialism, America was unwilling to intervene or compete diplomatically, adopting instead a
laissez-faire attitude toward Afghanistan. In her introduction to the anthology Klass documents America’s mistakes in regard to Afghanistan: “In 1953, then Prime Minister [and prince] Mohammed Daoud asked for American aid to update an army which consisted of a few World War I biplanes and horse-drawn artillery.” America rejected Daoud’s request, and “Daoud turned to Moscow for arms, and the patient Russian pachyderm . . . began to edge its way into Kabul.”

As a result of America’s diplomatic miscalculations and Moscow’s business savvy, the Soviets found an ally in Mohammed Daoud Khan, a cousin of the king and prime minister from 1953 to 1963. At that time Daoud had been asked to leave his post. He sat at home and brooded. Then Daoud and the Soviets got rid of King Zahir Shah.

Poor Abdul-Kareem! His adopted country, America, had let him—and America’s own interests—down. I feel terrible for him.

Abdul-Kareem had dreamed of bringing his country into the twentieth century. Now the best he can hope for is to become a consultant on Afghanistan for the American government. Probably every other Afghan immigrant in town is looking for this kind of position. He gave a lecture at Freedom House about the five million Afghan refugees who had been displaced by the Soviet conflict and who were residing in Pakistan. He wanted to be of use, to undo the grievous harm to his country that was unfolding and continues to unfold.

Abdul-Kareem thought I might be able to help him become established in America by writing an article about him, his escape, and his views. He wanted a portrait in the major media. So I obtained a commission from the
New York Times Magazine
for a piece I subsequently decided not to write.

We talked for many hours and I taped our conversation. I wanted to help, but the material was overwhelming and, at the time, far too complicated for me to evaluate. (Klass’s anthology had not yet been published and I was really unfamiliar with the histories of Afghanistan.) Also, Abdul-Kareem’s emotions were too raw, even wild, and his political views seemed contradictory and confusing. I did not want to disappoint him—indeed I wanted him to understand that I did wield the power of the pen—yet I was afraid that publishing this interview would hurt rather than help him. He threatened to sue me if I did not go through with the project.

I reminded him that in America a writer cannot be sued for nonperformance. He never mentioned the article again.

Thirty-three years later, as I reread the transcription of this long interview, I find that it is historically priceless, a dramatic tale of how one man and his family experienced the gradual but heavy-handed Soviet takeover of their country.

Only now do I appreciate the importance of what he was saying. I regret that I did not publish his story sooner. Still, I admit it: I was happy to see him and to reconnect.

Until now, it was not easy for me to view him as a figure on the stage of history. Mainly I viewed him as my former husband—just as he viewed me as his former wife. I hereby want to acknowledge that Abdul-Kareem has always favored a modern constitutional democracy. He stands on record for individual liberty and even women’s rights—so long as each husband can still limit the rights of his own wife. He is so proud that Afghanistan passed a constitution in 1964.

Abdul-Kareem is secular. The Bolsheviks were also secular—but their arrogant and heartless infiltration of his country—their essentially totalitarian nature—frightened and disgusted him. In retrospect, as I revisit this interview, I am again reminded of why the barefoot Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) became so popular, not just in Afghanistan but around the world. They took on the Soviet giant with only their faith and their will to remain independent. They were the ultimate underdogs in a victim-worshipping era.

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence spy and government leadership did not want to lose control of the border territory between Pakistan and Afghanistan; they found Afghan warlords who could be bought and were of like minds. The Afghan warlords did not want the Soviets to occupy and change their country. The Islamist Arabs viewed the battle against the Soviets as a religious jihad—and Afghanistan as a good place to train Muslim holy warriors for the future global jihad. At the time no one understood that the heroic holy warriors would one day become the savage Taliban or al-Qaeda.

Americans and Europeans did not understand that war was a permanent way of life for the Afghan tribes and that the Afghan warlords who subsequently arose would never stop trying to destroy each other at the expense of the Afghan civilian population.

In the mid-1980s the British American journalist and author Jan Goodwin visited Afghanistan twice and embedded herself among the mujahideen—the only woman among the brothers. In 1987 she published a dramatic book about the experience:
Caught in the Crossfire.
The cover shows a turbaned Goodwin in male dress among the warriors, and the book is subtitled
The True Story of an American Woman’s Secret and Perilous Journey with the Freedom Fighters Through War-torn Afghanistan.

Although Goodwin is critical of the plight of Afghan women and expresses her loathing of the burqa, she is deeply sympathetic to the mujahideen and to their cause. To her they are freedom fighters, and one of her main goals in this book is to humanize them and to show how vulnerable and sentimental they can be.

The mujahideen’s unexpected victory against the brutal, calculated, and better-equipped Soviet army was heroic, legendary, moving, and entirely unexpected. However, the victory was bittersweet because it led to the rise of the regressive Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist terrorist groups, as well as to prolonged civil war in Afghanistan. Many people blamed America for this never-ending debacle, but a lot of hands had stirred this putrid pot: the Soviets, Pakistanis, Americans, Islamist
Arabs—and the Afghans themselves.

Pakistan had tricked America into backing the sadistic and anti-American warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Pakistan wanted to make sure that the Soviets did not incorporate any disputed areas of Pakistan, such as Pushtunistan and the tribal border areas. Hekmatyar was their man.

In her excellent book
Kabul in Winter,
the author and activist Ann Jones describes this particularly wicked warlord, who fought in (and arguably started) the Afghan civil war, which lasted from 1992 to 1996. Hekmatyar killed tens of thousands of his own people—mainly civilians, including those who were still trapped in Kabul. Jones describes what a professor from Kabul University told her: “Hekmatyar assaulted women students who appeared on campus in Western dress. Some report that he threw acid at their unveiled faces and at the legs of those who wore short skirts. The professor remembers that [Hekmatyar] more often beat women up. ‘He’s a psychopath. . . . He should have been locked up then.’”

The Soviets feared an increasing Islamification of their own Muslim republics and thus stepped up their indoctrination and infiltration of Afghanistan. Now, the Soviets moved their puppets into place more daringly.

Abdul-Kareem remembers it well. He tells me, “It was 1973 and I woke one morning, and a servant brought me coffee and told me that there had been a coup d’état. The king had been replaced by Daoud, who would remain president until 1978.”

Abdul-Kareem realized that the Soviets could never succeed in a country like Afghanistan. He says, “Communism was designed for a country like Germany—that is to say, for a country that is highly industrialized. When you apply communism by force, rather than by harnessing it to the national will—when you are dealing with an underdeveloped country where there is no industry, where there are mainly peasant farmers, and no serious landowners—the result will be a disaster. On top of that, Afghanistan is a conservative and deeply religious Muslim society. The people will resist until there is nothing left of the country, and then the Russians will leave.”

Oh, my. I wish he had described Afghanistan to me just like this way back when. I only wish he had said that returning to Afghanistan with him would mean real hardship and deprivation because the country was tribal and quite backward. On the other hand I had never intended to stay there. I really thought we would be meeting his family, traveling the country, and then leaving together.