Read Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War Online
Authors: Paul Kennedy
Tags: #Technology & Engineering, #International Relations, #General, #Political Science, #Military, #Marine & Naval, #World War II, #History
L
OCATION OF
M
ERCHANT
S
HIPS OF THE
B
RITISH
E
MPIRE
, N
OVEMBER
1937
A wonderful scattergraph map showing the sheer enormity and vulnerability of the British Empire’s merchant shipping across the entire globe. Note the significance of the Mediterranean route, the massive trades from the Caribbean and South America, and the strategic significance of Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Gibraltar. This free-ranging system could not sustain the ravages of constant U-boat and aerial attack.
Click
here
to download a PDF of this map.
In addition, although the Admiralty did not possess an exact tally of the enemy’s U-boats, there did seem to be an awful lot more of them. In the course of 1942, Allied warships and aircraft had destroyed eighty-seven German and twenty-two Italian submarines. But the Third Reich was also gearing up its war production and had added seventeen new U-boats
each month
during that year. By the end of 1942, therefore, Doenitz commanded a total of 212 submarines that were operational (out of a grand total of 393, for many were working up, training new crews, or receiving new equipment), very significantly more than the 91 operational craft he had had (out of 249) at the beginning of that year.
2
Although victory in the Second World War was critically affected by each side’s inventiveness, technology, and organization, not just by sheer numbers, the blunt fact was that numbers
did
count. And by the time of the Casablanca conference it seemed that the Germans were having greater success at sinking Allied merchantmen than the Anglo-American forces were in sinking U-boats. Worse still, more and more U-boats were entering the fray.
In the months that followed, therefore, the prime minister’s nightmare appeared to be coming true. As March and April 1943 arrived and the convoy traffic to the British Isles resumed at a higher rate, so too did merchant ship losses. February’s total doubled that of the previous month, and in March the Allies lost 108 ships totaling 627,000 tons, making it the third-worst month on record during the war. What was more, nearly two-thirds of those ships were sunk in convoy; one was no longer talking here of the happy U-boat pickings of individual merchant ships off the well-lit shores of America early in 1942, or of the
almost equally easy raids upon Allied shipping routes in the South Atlantic. What was also truly alarming was that the losses had occurred chiefly along the single most important convoy route of all, that between New York and Halifax and the receiving ports of Glasgow and Liverpool. Between March 16 and 20 the greatest encounter in the entire Battle of the Atlantic saw Doenitz throw no fewer than forty U-boats against the two eastbound convoys HX 229 and SC 122. This epic fight will be analyzed in more detail below, but the result was awful for the Allies: twenty-one merchant ships totaling 141,000 tons were sunk, with the loss of only one U-boat. In the Admiralty’s own later account, “The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March, 1943.”
3
These ever-rising losses suggested, among other things, that the whole principle of convoy as the best means of defending maritime commerce was now in doubt.
The British Admiralty’s problems were nothing new in the annals of naval warfare. The protection of ships carrying goods at sea from hostile attack is one of the oldest problems in the history of war and peace. Even at the height of the Roman Empire merchants and consuls in Sicily and North Africa complained about the depredations of pirates against the grain, wine, and olive oil trades. Fifteen hundred years later Spanish commanders fumed at the plundering by Dutch and English raiders of their galleons bearing silver and precious spices; only a generation or two afterward the Dutch found their long-haul trade with the East Indies under French and English assault at sea. The age of European expansion and then of the Commercial Revolution (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) had moved ever greater shares of national wealth onto precarious maritime routes. In the age of Charlemagne, the dependence of rulers and peoples upon command of the sea was negligible. By the time of, say, the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) it was critical in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, at least for all advanced economies. If a west European nation lost control of the trade routes, it was most likely also going to lose—or at least not win—the war itself. This was the message of that classic work,
The Influence of Sea Power upon
History
(1890), composed by the American naval author Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Mahan’s ideas influenced the admiralties of Britain, Germany, Japan, the United States, and many lesser navies. The key belief was that the only way to gain command of the sea was to have the most powerful battle fleet afloat, one that would crush all rivals. Lesser forms of naval warfare, such as commerce raiding and cruiser and torpedo-boat operations—
la guerre de course
—didn’t count for much, because they didn’t win wars. It was true that during the Napoleonic Wars French predators had seized many independently sailing British merchantmen, but once the latter were organized in convoys and given an escort of warships, the sea routes were secure behind Nelson’s assembled fleets. The same truth revealed itself, albeit at great cost, during the First World War. For three years, and even though the Grand Fleet had command of the sea, Allied merchant ships steaming on their own were picked off in increasing numbers by German U-boats. After the Admiralty was compelled by the British cabinet to return to the convoy system in 1917, losses to enemy submarines dropped dramatically. Within a short while, moreover, the Allied warships would possess asdic (sonar), so for the first time ever they could detect a solid object under water. Provided one had command of the sea on the surface, it was argued, one would also control the waters below. A submarine would thus be as recognizable as the sails of a French frigate 150 years earlier. Such was the prevailing assumption of naval staffs in the years following the Treaty of Versailles, 1919. Convoys, plus sonar, worked.
4
Before we examine how and why that assumption was challenged by the renewed German U-boat threat during the first half of the Second World War, a couple of very important, though clashing, strategic-operational assumptions also need to be considered. The first of these, rarely articulated, is that one really didn’t need to sink surface commerce raiders or submarines to win the maritime war. So long as the Royal Navy shepherded without loss a group of fifty merchantmen from, say, Halifax to Liverpool, it had won. The larger Allied strategy was to keep Britain in the fight and then to make it the springboard for an enormous invasion of western Europe. Thus, if every transatlantic (and South American, Sierra Leonean, and South African) convoy got to port safely without ever encountering U-boats, the war was being
won, ship by ship, cargo by cargo. Even if the convoy escorts had to face a serious submarine attack but could beat off the predators, all would still be well. The task of the shepherd was to safeguard the sheep, not to kill the wolves.
The opposite argument was that killing the wolves had to be the essence of Allied maritime strategy. It too had its own logic: if the threat to the sea-lanes was forcibly removed, all would be fine and one of the Casablanca war aims could at last be implemented. In today’s language, the prevailing authorities cannot wait for terrorists to attack the international system but have to go and root out the terrorists. In maritime terms, therefore, a navy charged with protecting its merchant ships would either go on a submarine hunt or, an even bolder tactic, simply drive its convoys through U-boat-infested waters and force the submarines to fight—and be killed.
The first of these two convoy strategies was clearly defensive; the second (whether submarine hunting or forcing the convoys through) was equally clearly offensive. Both visions, it is worth noting, involved a tricky, interdependent three-way relationship between the merchant ships, the U-boats, and the naval and aerial escorts, not unlike the children’s rock-paper-scissors game. If the convoys could avoid an encounter or have the U-boats beaten off, fine for them; if the U-boats could get at the convoys without destruction from the escorts, fine for them; and if the escorts could destroy enough submarines, fine for them.
In the harsh world of the North Atlantic between 1939 and 1943, however, neither an Allied defensive operational strategy nor an offensive one was possible on its own. The way forward had to be achieved by a combination of both options, depending on the ups and downs of what turned out to be the longest campaign of the entire Second World War. And this route was, geopolitically, the most important maritime journey in the world. Of course the other Allied trade routes mattered, and all faced the same operational and logistical difficulties, or sometimes (as with the Arctic convoys) even greater ones. But maritime security across the Atlantic was the foundation stone of all Anglo-American grand strategy in the European theater. With a look forward to the remaining chapters of this book, it is worth restating the many interconnections. Winning this Atlantic battle preserved Britain’s own very large military-industrial base. Britain was also the unsinkable aircraft
carrier for the Allied strategic bombing campaigns, and the springboard for the eventual invasion of western Europe. Britain was the port of departure for most of the convoys to northern Russia and to the Mediterranean; it was the source for the many troopship convoys that Churchill dispatched, via the Cape, to Montgomery in Egypt and the Middle East. Controlling the Atlantic was the sheet anchor of the West’s plans to defeat Italy and Germany.
The top-to-bottom logic chain of Allied grand strategy here is also unusually clear, a fine example of Millett and Murray’s concept of the multilevel nature of “military effectiveness.”
5
The
political
aim was the unconditional defeat of the enemy, and the return to a world of peace and order. The
strategy
to achieve that purpose was to take the war to the enemy by all the means that were available: aerial, land-based, naval, economic, and diplomatic. This required decisive successes at the
operational
level, and in all the areas covered in the chapters of the present book. It would be foolish to argue about which of those operational regions was more important than others (even if the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to do so as they wrangled over allocating resources); they all were part of Allied grand strategy. What is incontestable, however, is that if the British, the Americans, and their smaller allies were to reconquer Europe from fascism, they first of all had to have command of the Atlantic waters.
Yet control of that vital route was itself determined, in the last resort, by a number of key technical and tactical factors. In other words, there is also in this story a clear example of a bottom-to-top logic chain. Every individual merchant ship that was preserved and every individual U-boat that was sunk by Allied escorts directly contributed to the relative success rate of each convoy. The tactical success rates of each single convoy contributed to the all-important monthly tonnage totals, and those monthly tonnage totals were the barometer to the winning or losing of the Battle of the Atlantic. That operational battle, as we have argued, was key to victory in western Europe and the Mediterranean. And winning in the West was a part of the strategic tripos—victory in the West, victory in the East (Eastern Front), and victory in the Pacific/Far East.
The Battle of the Atlantic was an operational and tactical contest that hung upon many factors. The first of these, from which all the others
flowed, was the possession of efficient and authoritative organization. This was so basic a point that it is often taken for granted, yet on brief reflection it is clear how important were the structures of command, the lines of information, and the integration of war-fighting systems. Both sides benefited greatly, of course, from the experiences of the epic campaign in the Atlantic during the First World War, and by the post-1919 lessons drawn from them. In terms of simplicity of command, Doenitz had it easier, for the U-boat service was separate from the German surface navy, and it became easier still for him when the failure of a squadron of heavy ships to destroy an Arctic convoy in the last days of 1942 led to an explosion of rage on Hitler’s part and to Grand Admiral Erich Raeder being replaced as commander in chief of the entire navy by Doenitz himself at the end of January 1943. Doenitz decided to remain commander of U-boats, so as to keep control of submarine operations, and it is evident that he found it much easier to obtain the Fuehrer’s backing than his predecessor had. This did not mean that he had no organizational fights. There was a constant struggle to gain the necessary share of war materials (steel, ball bearings, electrical parts, antiaircraft weaponry) against the enormous demands of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe. And, as we shall see, Doenitz had the greatest difficulty in getting aerial support for his boats. Nonetheless, it was an enormous advantage to have a single and very experienced authority directing the entire U-boat campaign.