A History of the Roman World (25 page)

The early treaties between Rome and Carthage were treaties of friendship and for trade, formed to limit their spheres of influence. But in 306 the two Republics may have formed a closer political agreement which debarred the Carthaginians from interfering in Italy, and the Romans in Sicily (p. 124). Carthage again negotiated with Rome in 279; no defensive alliance was struck, but an emergency measure was designed, chiefly to keep Pyrrhus in Italy (p. 130). During the war Carthage neither received nor asked for help, not wishing to bring Romans into Sicily; Rome also kept to herself.

In 272 a puzzling incident occurred. When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, which was still held by Pyrrhus’ lieutenant Milo, a Carthaginian fleet suddenly appeared in the harbour, but quickly sailed off again. Had it come in reply to an appeal from Milo or on its own initiative; to help the Romans or to capture Tarentum? Later Roman writers accused Carthage of
having tried to seize Tarentum, alleging that the action was a breach of treaty rights; but the Carthaginians had not tried to land. Indeed, far from acting contrary to the agreements, the Punic admiral may have sailed up in accordance with Mago’s treaty to see whether he could help the Romans. It is perhaps most likely that the Carthaginians were reconnoitring on the offchance of turning the situation to their advantage, but when this seemed impossible they sailed away, while the home government disavowed the admiral’s action and Rome accepted the apology, as recorded by Orosius. But whether Rome suspected treachery or merely rebuffed a friendly gesture, the result would hardly improve relations between the two Republics.
⁸

When Pyrrhus left the shores of Sicily he is reported to have remarked: ‘What a cockpit we are now leaving for Carthaginian and Roman to fight in.’ The recent history of the island justified this prophecy. The Punic expansion had been checked during the reign of Agathocles as King of Syracuse (304–289), but after his death the Carthaginians again advanced their standards, until driven back by Pyrrhus. When he retired to Italy they defeated the Syracusan fleet, recovered their lost possessions and captured the Greek cities of central Sicily. Thus by 275 Syracuse’s influence was confined to eastern Sicily, and even there she met with rivals. Certain of Agathocles’ discharged Italian mercenaries on their return home had treacherously seized the town of Messana (
c.
288). Styling themselves Mamertines, after the Sabellian war god Mamers, they settled there and proceeded to plunder the surrounding districts, Carthaginian and Greek alike. Defeated but not exterminated by Pyrrhus, they were later defeated by the Syracusans under Hiero who now, if not earlier, assumed the title of king (265–264) and then undertook the siege of Messana. At this point the Carthaginians intervened, refusing to look on while Syracuse won control of the Sicilian straits by capturing Messana. Their admiral threw a Punic garrison into the town with the consent of the Mamertines, and Hiero was obliged to return to Syracuse, disregarding the complimentary exhortations of the poet Theocritus to continue fighting. But the Mamertines did not wish to keep their new garrison indefinitely: some advocated reaching an agreement with Carthage by which their autonomy would be respected, others preferred to seek alliance with a less alien people, the Romans. The latter party prevailed and Rome was suddenly faced with a request for alliance and help. What was she to do?

Rome and Carthage were thus brought abruptly face to face. By ejecting from Rhegium the Campanians who had tried to play at pirates like the Mamertines in Sicily the Romans had won control of the Straits (270). But now a Carthaginian garrison at Messana faced them from the opposite shore: it barred their access to Sicily, and constituted a
point d’appui
from which, following the example set by Dionysius and Agathocles, the Carthaginians could sail against the towns of the Italian coast, once they had taken eastern
Sicily. There could be no doubt that they would extend to Sicily the monopoly which they exercised throughout the western Mediterranean. That might not be of direct concern to the Romans, who were little interested in foreign trade, but it would be a severe blow to their allies in southern Italy. And there was the further danger that if Rome neglected her new Greek allies, they might turn to Carthage for protection in a desperate effort to preserve their Sicilian trade. It did indeed seem that Rome would have to listen to the appeal of the Mamertines, even though this might involve crossing swords with Carthage and possibly a deadly duel.

But the swords which the Mamertines virtually thrust into the rivals’ hands could scarcely have been kept permanently sheathed. Rome and Carthage had little in common. Different in race, culture and religion, with divergent moral and material interests, they would gravitate towards conflict when once the minor states between them had been eliminated or assimilated. In the Hellenistic east a common culture held the three great monarchies in a precarious balance of powers. When Rome had absorbed something of that culture, she adapted her policy in order to try to maintain the balance. But in the west rivalry would lead to war: compromise was difficult, if not impossible.

The immediate question before the Roman Senate was the appeal of the Mamertines, not war with Carthage, though the more far-sighted must have seen that this would probably follow the granting of the request. When the Senate failed to reach a decision the question was referred (by Appius Claudius?) to the people, who voted to send help to the Mamertines. Polybius, who here follows Fabius Pictor and thus gives at least a pro-Roman account, if not a tendentious justification, explains that the Senate hesitated, in spite of a full recognition of the danger of the advance of Carthage, because it felt unable to ally itself to a robber-state, especially as it had recently executed the brigands at Rhegium. But the weight of this moralistic argument has been questioned, since the seizure of Messana by the Mamertines had occurred twenty-five years earlier and the new state was now standing on its own feet and had been recognized by Carthage and several Greek cities; it was presumably autonomous and therefore Rome would not break her fetial law by granting alliance. Further, the parallel with Rhegium is weak, for there Rome interfered on behalf of her own allies, whereas she had had no dealings with Messana. But even if conscientious scruples were among the motives of the Senate’s hesitation, others also must be found in the fear of war with a great sea power, and in the aversion of the conservative element in the Senate to an expansionist policy which increased the power of the people and of the popular leaders whom a new war might bring into prominence. A further reason was probably that Roman interference in Sicily would involve a definite breach of the treaty of 306. The popular leaders who wanted war might argue that the Carthaginians had themselves annulled this agreement by their
action at Tarentum, and by their general attitude which was, according to Polybius (i, 7), one motive that had stimulated Rhegium to ask Rome for protection (
c.
280). But the Senate perhaps hesitated to disregard formal obligations.
⁹

The people had accepted the Mamertine alliance because of the advantages which their leaders said would attend it. These suggested benefits would not be land, tribute, or even booty, but the checking of the advance of Carthage and the increase of allies with the consequent decrease of effort by the citizen army. The personal advantages to the popular leaders from success in war was an aspect which they would hardly emphasize, but of which such families as the Otacilii of Beneventum and the Campanian Atilii would be fully conscious. But the main motive which led Rome to accept the alliance of the Mamertines was to secure an outpost which was necessary to the safety of Italy. The two rivals may both have rushed to secure this key position, but their motives were different; defensive imperialism dominated Rome’s policy, an exploiting commercial imperialism actuated Carthage.

In 264 the consul Appius Claudius Caudex was sent with two legions to announce Rome’s acceptance of Messana’s request for alliance and to garrison the town. His advance guard under his relative C. Claudius forced the Straits with little opposition: after a slight skirmish the Carthaginian admiral merely returned some ships, which he had captured, with the threat that he would not let the Romans so much as wash their hands in the sea. The attitude of the Punic commander in Messana was equally cautious. On the arrival of C. Claudius and under pressure from the Mamertines he evacuated the citadel, only to be crucified later for his lack of initiative and
pour encourager les autres
. The scrupulous behaviour of these Punic generals who, wishing to avoid any openly hostile acts, refused either to contest the passage of the Straits or to hold Messana, contrasts strongly with the decisive vigour of the Roman leaders.

The Roman occupation of Messana stung the Carthaginian government to action. War had not yet been formally declared, but the time was ripe. Further, Hiero of Syracuse was willing to forget the age-long hostility of Carthage to the Sicilian Greeks and to co-operate with the erstwhile enemy. This unnatural alliance was brought about mainly because both parties saw their common interests threatened by the rising power of Rome. Punic troops were sent to Sicily under Hanno, son of Hannibal, who garrisoned Agrigentum and encamped at Messana. Hiero also arrived there and camped further south of the town, while the Punic fleet anchored to the north. Seeing Messana thus blockaded, Appius Claudius succeeded in transporting his troops across the
Straits by night. Then, or possibly before crossing to Sicily, he sent an embassy to the Carthaginians and Hiero, ordering them to raise the siege of a town which was allied to Rome. On their refusal he formally declared war and the First Punic War had officially started.
¹⁰

Claudius acted quickly. Taking advantage of the distance between the two enemy camps, he assailed first Hiero’s and then Hanno’s. The result of these engagements is not certain; both sides according to their own historians claimed them as victories. But Hiero, who was displeased with his allies for allowing the Romans to cross to Sicily so easily, fell back on Syracuse soon afterwards (or perhaps not until the following year). Hanno also withdrew to garrison and protect the Carthaginian cities in Sicily.
¹¹
The next year both consuls, M’. Valerius and M’. Otacuius, were sent to Sicily with about 40,000 men. Though the retreat of Hiero and Hanno freed Messana, Rome must advance further in Sicily, not to conquer the island, but to force her enemies to recognize her Messanian alliance. When Valerius marched southwards many towns around Aetna submitted to him, yet he could have had little hope of taking Syracuse itself without control of the sea. Hiero, however, who could look for little support from his allies after abandoning them at Messana, began to make friendly overtures, to which the Romans readily responded. He was granted an alliance (renewed in 248) and the control of some thirty miles of territory around Syracuse in return for an indemnity of 100 talents (Diodorus’ reference to an annual tribute of 25 talents may be due only to a misunderstanding of a first instalment of the indemnity); he remained Rome’s loyal ally till his death in 215. His most immediate service was to help the Romans with supplies.

In March 262, Valerius celebrated a triumph over the Carthaginians and Hiero, and decorated a wall of the Curia Hostilia with a painting of his success. The Senate proposed to send out only two legions this year, but learning that the Carthaginians were recruiting in Spain, Liguria and Gaul, they despatched instead both consuls. These won the support of Segesta in the Punic province in Sicily, and advanced against the Carthaginian headquarters at the Greek city of Agrigentum, which lay on a hill whose steep sides made attack possible only from the south. Here they pitched two camps, joined by a double line of trenches, and besieged the city for five months. Before starvation forced the Punic commander Hannibal to capitulate, strong reinforcements arrived under Hanno who, ensconced on a neighbouring hill, cut off the Roman supplies, which the loyal Hiero supplemented with great difficulty. After two months Hanno gave battle in a desperate attempt to relieve the city. Though he was defeated, the Roman losses were so heavy that Hannibal and his garrison were enabled to escape from the doomed city. The next day Agrigentum was sacked and its inhabitants were sold into slavery; an act of clemency, which might have won over the Sicilians, would have proved a
better investment for the future than this barbarity. As the fall of Agrigentum did not bring Carthage to her knees and the consuls of 261 achieved little in Sicily, the Senate realized that peace could only be attained by conquering the whole island and driving out the Carthaginians. This could never be done while the Punic fleet threatened the seaboard towns of Sicily and even ravaged the coast of Italy. So Rome had to face the task of challenging the naval supremacy of her enemy.

The success with which the land-lubbers of Rome created a navy and defeated the Queen of the western Mediterranean naturally led later ages to embellish with legendary adornments what was undeniably a magnificent achievement. It was said that having no fleet of their own the Romans took a wrecked Punic vessel as a model and built 120 ships within sixty days from the hewing of the timber; meanwhile crews were taught to row on great wooden stages erected on land. The speed of this achievement has often been regarded with some scepticism, but the recent discovery of a Punic warship off Marsala shows methods of prefabrication and mass-production which the Romans may well have imitated. Although since 311
BC
duoviri navales
had commanded a squadron of 20 ships (for example, in 282, a
duovir
with 10 ships had been attacked by the Tarentines), such squadrons were probably only fitted out when required and were then laid up; thus Appius Claudius had to cross to Sicily in ships from allied Italian towns, because there was no Roman squadron ready equipped. Further, after the Pyrrhic War various southern Italian towns were perhaps liable by treaty to furnish ships, but these would not number more than 25 vessels all told. When Rome determined to challenge Carthage at sea, she built 20 triremes and 100 quinqueremes. The former represented the old type of duumviral squadron, the latter were built on a new model like the Punic vessels. More difficult than the construction was the manning of the new fleet. Many men could be drawn from the
socii navales
of the seafaring towns of southern Italy; but others would have to be trained to handle an oar instead of a plough, men who had no experience of the sea. To counteract their lack of skill the Romans determined to turn sea battles into land battles by avoiding the manoeuvring and ramming tactics of the enemy, and by adopting boarding tactics. This was achieved by the use of some kind of device which Polybius describes as a complicated boarding-bridge, known to the soldiers colloquially as a ‘crow’ (
corvus
) because its ‘beak’ was an iron spike which grappled the enemy’s deck. Thus the Romans intended to thwart their enemy’s superior naval skill, while they made doubly sure by outbuilding the Carthaginians. In all they probably raised 160 vessels, while the enemy had only 130 at sea. Rome was then ready to contest the sea, and when every allowance has been made for patriotic exaggeration in the traditional account, the plain fact is a magnificent tribute to her adaptability and resolve.
¹²

While the new fleet was mustering at Messana the commander Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed off with seventeen vessels to negotiate for the surrender of Lipara, but he was surprised and captured by a Punic squadron; this exploit gained for him the suitable cognomen, Asina. Thereupon the other consul of 260, C. Duilius, took over the command and relieved Segesta, which was besieged by Hamilcar, Hanno’s successor. But Duilius had greater claim to fame. Encountering the Punic fleet off Mylae near the north-east corner of Sicily he overcame the enemy’s tactical skill by grappling their vessels with his ‘crows’, so that his men soon swept the decks clear. With their superior numbers (perhaps 140 against 130) the Romans accounted for some 50 vessels, including the admiral’s flagship. Thus Rome in her first venture on the sea defeated a nation whose seafaring traditions were centuries old. Well might Duilius celebrate the first naval triumph in Rome and be honoured by the erection in the Forum of a column ornamented with the bronze rams of the vessels he had captured.
¹³

The Punic fleet had been defeated, but not destroyed; and Rome did not attempt to blockade by sea the Carthaginian strongholds of Panormus or Lilybaeum, still less to attack her enemy in Africa. Instead, one consul of 259, L. Cornelius Scipio, led an expedition against Sardinia and Corsica. This could have little effect on the main issues of the war, but it trained the Romans in the idea of sending expeditionary forces abroad and reduced the possibility of Punic or piratical raids on the Italian coast. Scipio captured Aleria in Corsica and won the island, but he failed to take the Punic fortress of Olbia in northern Sardinia. The appearance of Hannibal with reinforcements terminated his activity, but the next year his successor, C. Sulpicius, defeated the enemy’s fleet off Sulci in Rome’s second naval victory.

Meanwhile Hamilcar had made good progress against the one consular army operating in Sicily. After a successful engagement near Thermae he advanced as far as Enna and Camarina and fortified Drepana. To make good these losses the Romans prolonged Aquillius’ command as proconsul through the winter and sent out another consular army to join him in 258. Together the Roman generals advanced towards Panormus, where Hamilcar declined battle, and then by capturing Camarina and Enna they confined the enemy once more to the western end of the island. In 257 all effort in Sardinia was abandoned and little was achieved in Sicily, except that the consul. C. Atilius Regulus, after raiding Melita (Malta) fell in with the Punic fleet off Tyndaris and sank 18 vessels (Rome’s third naval victory).