A Pretext for War (51 page)

2,300 missiles delivered; Afghanistan by then contained more personal weapons: Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 249.

“Oh my God”; “I hope he runs out of bullets”: Patricia Davis and Maria Glod, “CIA Shooter Kasi, Harbinger of Terror, Set to Die Tonight; U.S. Supreme Court, Virginina Governor Warner Deny Late Appeals,”
The Washington Post
(November 14, 2002); Frank Green and Rex Springston, “Kasi Dies for CIA Killings,”
Richmond Times Dispatch
(November 15, 2002).

“I shot approximately ten rounds”:
Mir Aimal Kasi v. Ronald J. Angelone,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, August 15, 2002.

“Like a suicide bomber”: Patricia Davis and Maria Glod, “A Muslim ‘Gets Even’ with the CIA,”
The Washington Post
(November 15, 2000).

Details on the FD/Trodpint team were derived from: Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 249.

“It was surreal”; details of Kasi’s capture: Patricia Davis and Maria Glod, “A Muslim ‘Gets Even’ with the CIA,”
The Washington Post
(November 15, 2000).

“We issue the following fatwa”: Osama bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” (February 23, 1998).

“We predict a black day”: Transcript, “Interview with Osama bin Laden,” ABC News (May 28, 1998).

“As of late 1999 no program”; “NOCs haven’t really changed”: Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Counterterrorist Myth,”
The Atlantic Monthly
(July/August 2001).

“
We would almost never in any operation”: Interview with a senior intelligence official, December 2003.

“We were always told”: Interview with a former NOC, January 2003.

“U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism”:
U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, The White House, June 21, 1995.

Details on Lacrosse satellites were derived from: Craig Covault, “Secret NRO Recons Eye Iraqi Threats,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology
(September 16, 2002).

“the intelligence wasn’t that solid”: Bob Woodward and Thomas E. Ricks, “CIA Trained Pakistanis to Nab Terrorist,”
The Washington Post
(October 3, 2001).

“As an American citizen”: Tim Weiner and James Risen, “Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise,”
The New York Times
(September 21, 1998).

“the distant enemy”: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights of the Distant Prophets.

“I think that raid really helped”: Bob Woodward and Thomas E. Ricks, “CIA Trained Pakistanis to Nab Terrorist,”
The Washington Post
(October 3, 2001).

“A few months ago, and again this week”: “There are No Expendable American Targets,”
The Washington Post
(August 21, 1998).

“We must now enter a new phase in our effort”: James Risen, “U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in ’98 of a Plane Attack,”
The New York Times
(September 19, 2002).

“UBL is actively planning against U.S. targets”; “The intelligence community has strong”: Joint Inquiry, testimony of Staff Director Eleanor Hill (September 18, 2002).

“We never had enough officers”: Joint Inquiry, Findings and Conclusions, Part One.

“In hindsight . . . I wish I had said”: George Tenet testimony, Joint Inquiry, October 17, 2002.

“As I declared war against Al Qaeda”: George Tenet testimony, Joint Inquiry, October 17, 2002.

“Senator Kyl once asked me”: Joint Inquiry, Findings and Conclusions, Part One.

“Let’s just blow the thing up”: Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 465.

“The rest of the CIA and the intelligence community”: Joint Inquiry, testimony of Staff Director Eleanor Hill (September 10, 2002).

“take direction from the ladies”: Joint Inquiry, Part 1, “Findings and Conclusions,” p. 64.

“They despised the FBI”: Interview with an FBI official, early 2004.

“If you get a guy that becomes a little bit too flashy”: Transcript, interview with Barry Mawn, head of the FBI’s New York office 2000–2002, “The Man Who Knew,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 2002).

“The working relationships were difficult at times”: Interview with a senior intelligence official, December 2002.

“Rich was seen by some”: Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 557–558.

“Unfair trials, torture and ill-treatment were routinely associated”: Report, “Uzbekistan,” Amnesty International (December 2002).

boiled to death: Nick Paton Walsh, “US Looks Away as New Ally Tortures Islamists,”
The Guardian
(May 26, 2003).

to smuggle large amounts of opium; “not a very good group of people to begin with”: Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 540, 538.

“At this time”: Joint Inquiry, Findings and Conclusions, Part One, pp. 91–92.

“We knew that some guys that looked”: Interview with a senior intelligence official, December 2003.

“we need to continue the effort to identify these travelers”: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, staff statement two.

“They refused to tell us”: Interview with FBI official, December 2003.

Details concerning Yazid Sufaat were derived from: Mark Fineman and Bob Drogin, “Terror: In Malaysia, a Jailed Cal State Graduate Helps Unravel Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asia Network,”
The Los Angeles Times
(February 2, 2002).

Details on TIPOFF: Joint Inquiry, testimony of Staff Director Eleanor Hill (September 18, 2002).

sitting on at least fifty-eight other suspected terrorists: Joint Inquiry, testimony of Staff Director Eleanor Hill (September 18, 2002).

“I remember playing football”: “John Walker Lindh,”
People in the News,
CNN (2002).

“We train volunteers in the most basic skills”: Mark Kukis, “My Heart Became Attached,”
Salon
(August 25, 2003).

“bin Laden had sent forth some fifty people”: Indictment,
United States of America v. John Walker Lindh.

“there should have been five planes”: Oliver Burkeman, “Al-Qaida Captive May Have Been Planning Fifth Hijack,”
The Guardian
(October 12, 2002).

“fifteen more operations were pending”: David Johnston and Don Van Natta Jr., “9/11 Inquiry Eyes Possible 5th Pilot,”
The New York Times
(October 10, 2002).

“We don’t even think about it”: Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman, “Where the Trail Led,”
The New York Times
(October 12, 2003).

“The coming weeks will hold important surprises”: “Taliban Leaders Dismiss U.S. Reports of a Terrorist Plot,” Associated Press (June 21, 2001).

“To all the mujahideen, your brothers”: “Video Shows bin Laden Urging Muslims to Prepare for Fighting,” CNN (June 20, 2001).

“He was eager to know Islam”: T. R. Reid and Keith B. Richburg, “Shoe Bomb Suspect’s Journey Into Al Qaeda,”
The Washington Post
(March 31, 2002).

“The U.S. and Israel are the enemy”: T. R. Reid and Keith B. Richburg, “Shoe Bomb Suspect’s Journey Into Al Qaeda,”
The Washington Post
(March 31, 2002).

“His trip to Jerusalem further emboldened”; “It angered him to see ‘Jews with guns’”: “Accused Shoe Bomber Says He Acted Alone,” CNN (September 12, 2002).

“reported to an associate in Afghanistan”: Government’s Sentencing Memorandum,
United States of America vs. Richard Covin
Reid
(January 17, 2003).

“Without America, there would be no Israel”: Government’s Sentencing Memorandum,
United States of America vs. Richard Covin Reid
(January 17, 2003).

Richard Clarke met in the Situation Room with top domestic law enforcement officials: David Johnston And Eric Schmitt, “Uneven response on Terror Seen in Summer of 2001,”
The New York Times
(April 3, 2001).

“Based on a review of all-source reporting”: Joint Inquiry, Staff Statement, Part One, September 18, 2002.

“We are going to be struck soon”: Transcript, Cofer Black testimony before the Joint Inquiry, September 26, 2002.

hijackers entered the U.S. a total of thirty-three times: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Hearings, Staff Statement No. 1, January 26, 2004.

“The innovation al Qaeda introduced”: Transcript, Doris Meissner testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, January 26, 2004.

“Throughout the summer of 2001”: Transcript, Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden testimony before the Joint Inquiry, October 17, 2002.

“unprecedented”: Transcript, Staff Director Eleanor Hill testimony before the Joint Inquiry, September 18, 2002.

“It’s central”: Interview of a senior intelligence official, December 2003.

“The match begins tomorrow”; “Tomorrow is zero hour”: David Ensor, “More Clues Before September 11 Surface,”
Newsnight with Aaron Brown,
CNN (June 19, 2002).

“Bush’s taste in office decor”: Glancey, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Fittings,”
The Guardian
(January 24, 2001).

“this is the guy”: Thomas M. DeFrank, “Bush Calm, Cool Over War,”
New York Daily News
(March 9, 2003).

“During and immediately after the Persian Gulf war”; “the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] was planning”: Report, U.S. Department of Justice, “The Bush Assassination Attempt.”

“Operation Love Storm”; “Literally everybody wanted to see”: Scott Shane, “When the Threat of Hussein Hit Home for Bush
,” Baltimore Sun
(February 23, 2003).

“terribly emotional”; “Laura Bush’s husband”: Scott Shane, “When the Threat of Hussein Hit Home for Bush
,” Baltimore Sun
(February 23, 2003).

“From all the evidence available”: The White House, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials (June 26, 1993).

“I tend to be extremely skeptical”: Scott Shane, “When the Threat of Hussein Hit Home for Bush
,” Baltimore Sun
(February 23, 2003).

Seymour M. Hersh: Seymour M. Hersh, “A Case Not Closed,”
The
New Yorker
(November 1, 1993).

“the defendants were not allowed”: Kuwait, Five Years of Impunity: Human Rights Concerns Since the Withdrawal of Iraqi Forces,
Amnesty International
(February 1996).

“The SOB tried to kill”: Thomas M. DeFrank, “Bush Calm, Cool Over War,”
New York Daily News
(March 9, 2003).

“I was a warrior for George Bush”:
A Charge To Keep: My Journey to the White House
(New York: Perennial, 1999), p. 182.

“Real change happens”: Transcript, address by George W. Bush at the Fishing School, January 30, 2001.

“Condi will run these meetings”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 70.

“Israel . . . can manage its own affairs”; “Whoever inherits Iraq”: Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000,
“A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (Israel) (1996).

Bramble Bush: Amos Harel, “Ya’alon: Reporting plan to kill Saddam was ‘irresponsible,’”
Ha’aretz
(December 17, 2003).

“We’re going to tilt it back toward Israel”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 71.

“I’m not going to go by past reputations”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 71.

“He stressed that a pullback by the United States”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 71.

“This is the best administration for Israel”: Robert G. Kaiser, “Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical On Mideast Policy,”
The Washington Post
(February 9, 2003).

“For the first time”: Robert G. Kaiser, “Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical On Mideast Policy,”
The Washington Post
(February 9, 2003).

“that Iraq might be the key to reshaping”; “that produced either chemical or biological”; details on the NSC meeting are derived from: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 72–73.

“What we and other allies”: Transcript, Secretary of State Colin Powell and German Foreign Minister On Iraq, February 22, 2001, American Embassy, Tel Aviv.