A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (63 page)

De Gaulle seems to have seen this, and as 1958 went on his references to integration became more and more perfunctory, and he assiduously avoided any explicit commitment to it. This in turn annoyed both the army in Algeria and the
pieds noirs
, both of whom were beginning to chafe at the lack of action and the vagueness of the lofty,
ex cathedra
pronouncements. During the Constantine speech of October, members of the local Committee of Public Safety had walked off the grandstand in outrage at de Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures towards the F.L.N. Closing ranks, the Left in France condemned the Constantine Plan as “neo-colonialism”: an attempt at “seducing the Algerian peasants by offering to them the urban mirage” declared Francis Jeanson.

But the full storm burst, from all sides, with the
paix des braves
offer. In France, even some of the left-of-centre moderates condemned it as inexorably leading to negotiations with the F.L.N., which were far too premature. Soustelle was deeply disquieted, and a breach between him and de Gaulle began to open. Speaking for the Left, Simone de Beauvoir said the “generous offer” was tantamount to “capitulation” for the F.L.N. if they took it up. And “capitulation” was equally the word heard in army as well as in
pied noir
circles in Algeria. The whiplash blow, however, came—perhaps predictably—from the F.L.N. in Tunis. Within forty-eight hours of de Gaulle’s offer of the
paix des braves
, it was rejected in summary and quite violent terms by the previously moderate Ferhat Abbas. “The problem of a ceasefire in Algeria”, he said, “is not simply a military problem. It is essentially political and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria.” He ended with a renewed appeal to the F.L.N. in Algeria for a war to the end, and his words were reinforced by a fresh campaign of terrorism.

First disenchantments

The F.L.N. rejection came as a deep shock to de Gaulle, and it is probably no exaggeration to rate it as one of the bitterest personal blows he ever suffered. It was hardened by the fact that he had already put out feelers towards the F.L.N. in June, through the intermediary of Abderrahmane Farès, former President of the Algiers Assembly, and had hoped for a more cordial response to his overture. He seems to have nurtured a mystical belief that somehow the F.L.N. would melt before his presence; that grandeur and generosity, as guaranteed by his person, had only to be displayed for the F.L.N. to come out of its caves waving a white flag.[
2
] Both the offer and de Gaulle’s ensuing discountenance betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the revolt as well as of the F.L.N. leadership, which could go far to explaining some of the failures of communication in the years to come. At the same time, the slap in the face to de Gaulle produced a powerful reaction among the uncommitted Muslims in Algeria who, since May, had been so enticed by the spell of his stature and authority. It was also to have its influence on the Algerian elections in November. For the French position it was a tragedy that de Gaulle could not have struck with the
paix des braves
while the iron was hot in June, when it might well have gained substantial Muslim support. By the end of October the momentum was lost.

The growth of disenchantment occurred almost simultaneously within both the Muslim and
pied noir
communities towards the end of 1958. In “ultra” circles on the Committee of Public Safety there were already rumblings about a “second 13 May” to replace de Gaulle’s Neguib by a Nasser chosen among themselves. After the Constantine speech, but before the
paix des braves
, Lagaillarde, Ortiz and Martel had tried to call a general strike on 16 October in protest against de Gaulle’s betrayal. The idea was squashed by some plain talk from General Massu. But the seeds of later revolt had been sown; for the “ultras” would never be able to rid themselves of the notion that, as they had brought de Gaulle to power, so they could despatch him from it. Not, however, without the army.

De Gaulle purges the army

Even if it could be said that de Gaulle had dragged his feet in formulating an Algerian policy, the same could not be held against him in his dealings with the army after May 1958. For de Gaulle, in his whole upbringing and career, the French army was everything—or almost everything—and its state of health was a far more pressing worry to him than either the F.L.N. or the
pieds noirs
. It was, however, no longer the same army that he had known so well in 1940–5, and since February 1956 its over-riding objective had been a political one; to push the authorities into carrying out a policy of
Algérie française
. “By and large, this great body of men, by nature concerned with the short run rather than the long, clung to the idea that France should keep possession of Algeria, symbol of her ancient power.” Understanding all this, he was well aware that he had to tread warily with the army in Algeria, over-sensitised and vastly powerful as it had become since 13 May. Yet at the same time he appreciated that it cried out for a firm hand and, masochistically, for a restoration of discipline. In the last analysis, he reckoned, “the army would obey”. Thus “On this vast apparatus, effective in preventing the situation from worsening, but incapable of solving the insoluble, a wealth of ingenuity, conscientiousness and patience was expended.” Ruthlessly, but with caution, de Gaulle embarked on a major purge of the “activists” in the army of Algiers. The loyal Gaullist General Ely was brought back as Chief of the General Staff and given the task of scattering the ringleaders of May by posting them, in twos and threes, to units in France or Germany. By the following March only two of those officers were still left in Algeria, while some 1,500 others had either been transferred, or simply retired. One of those remaining was the dependable
grognard
, General Massu, eternally faithful to de Gaulle and only too delighted to get away from the
bordel
of politics and back to his regiments.

In October Massu and the other army officers were instructed by de Gaulle to withdraw from the Committee of Public Safety (which was subsequently stood down altogether). That same day an order to Salan announced categorically: “The moment has come when the military must cease to take part in any organisation with a political character…” Algiers seethed, and this was the
casus belli
for the “ultras” to attempt a general strike. But de Gaulle won, and for the time being the power of the army and the “ultras” was effectively separated. Next, in December, Salan, who since May had with plenipotentiary powers combined the roles of both Commander-in-Chief and
de facto
civil governor, was himself despatched into “gilded retreat” as military governor of Paris. De Gaulle had promised to recall him for “high destinies”, which had made Salan hope for nothing less than General Ely’s top job. Yet here, after all he had achieved in his two years in Algeria, as well as the outstanding services rendered in May—not least in the name of de Gaulle himself—was an almost insultingly sinecure appointment. On leaving Algiers shortly before Christmas, Salan received this glowing testimony from the man by whom it was painfully clear he was neither liked nor entirely trusted: “You have conducted yourself with honour…I don’t regard you just as a loyal supporter of great quality, but as my companion and my friend.” But this was hardly enough to allay the deep resentment felt by Salan, chief among the many purged army officers, and in view of his subsequent career these were to become bitterly ironical words. The chagrin was increased when de Gaulle apparently lacked the thoughtfulness to inform Salan about the identity of his successor until he actually arrived in Algiers.

Exit Salan: enter Delouvrier and Challe

To replace the all-powerful Salan, de Gaulle appointed a duumvirate—Paul Delouvrier and General Maurice Challe. The civil and military powers would be divided between them but, in contrast to the past, both posts would be more subject to control from Paris. Aged only forty-four, Delouvrier had been an unknown technocrat in Luxembourg when summoned by de Gaulle that October. A practising Catholic from the Vosges, he helped a Resistance maquis near Fontainebleau where he had joined hands with General Patton during the Liberation of 1944. Considered to be one of France’s outstanding financial brains, Delouvrier had been picked out by Jean Monnet to work on his team with the embryo European Community, and currently he was head of the financial division of the Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg. Here he had demonstrated a remarkable capacity for work, and a certain high seriousness and authority in office. His tall, distinguished figure with a trim hairline moustache purveyed what the French tended to describe as a certain British elegance; but behind it lay a rather nervously sensitive personality. In no way did he resemble any of his predecessors in Algiers, and it appears that it was through his personal friendship with Michel Debré that Delouvrier first came to de Gaulle’s notice. He was aghast when told in October that de Gaulle had him in mind to succeed Salan, and that he was to go forthwith on a month’s “information tour” of Algeria. On his return he was received by de Gaulle at the Matignon, who asked for his impressions. Having noted how the attitude of the Muslim majority had now hardened towards independence since the initial euphoria of May, Delouvrier remarked: “
Mon général
, Algeria will be independent.”

At which de Gaulle is said to have waved him aside with, “In twenty-five years, Delouvrier, in twenty-five years….” Delouvrier was unable to decipher anything more precise about de Gaulle’s views on the future of Algeria. At a subsequent meeting Delouvrier remarked diffidently to de Gaulle that he felt he did not possess the “stature” for the job offered, to be told simply, “You’ll grow into it, Delouvrier….” His principal, and first, task would be to get the Constantine Plan under way, for which he would be allocated funds of 100 milliard (old) francs. “You are”, said de Gaulle with pointed emphasis, “France in Algeria—and
not
the representative of the Algerians in France.” Apart from this, Delouvrier’s instructions were extraordinarily vague—and would remain so.

Delouvrier’s other half, Maurice Challe, already mentioned in the context of the events of May, was a robust fifty-three with an open face and the physique of a rugger player. The two men together gave a good impression of youth and vigour. Working for the Resistance, Challe, a regular airman, had skilfully obtained the Luftwaffe order-of-battle on the eve of D-Day and transmitted it to London, for which he was awarded the British D.S.O. and a personal citation from Winston Churchill. His next contact with Britain was during the Suez campaign, as Mollet’s military envoy to Eden, and since then he had been deputy to the chief-of-staff. Well-liked by both equals and subordinates, Challe was as open as he looked: a calm, solid and tenacious pipe-smoker. There was nothing of the secretiveness of the “Mandarin” Salan about him; in fact, if anything he had a habit of speaking his mind too readily, which had slowed down his promotion on at least one occasion. He was a good Republican, an “unconditional Gaullist” but leaning marginally to the Left and maintaining close contacts with Guy Mollet. Above all, he was a highly competent airman, but also with a rare capacity for understanding land warfare; as such he was to prove the ablest of all the French commanders sent to Algeria. At their first meeting under the aegis of de Gaulle, Delouvrier and Challe took to each other instantly and were to work together throughout in the most outstanding harmony. Thus the omens could hardly have looked better. Challe’s brief was to mount the most crushing military offensive yet against the F.L.N., the success of which would be intended to give de Gaulle freedom to dispose the future of Algeria as he wished. Behind there also lay the perhaps more cynical secondary motive of distracting the army from any political discontents; “Give them tasks, they will think less…!” de Gaulle had declared at one of his first cabinet meetings.

On 19 December the new team arrived in Algiers; Delouvrier, the “Delegate-General” (a less imposing title than “governor-general” to show a break with the past) was clad conspicuously in civilian clothes, carrying a black “Anthony Eden” hat; Challe, in uniform, walked equally conspicuously one or two paces to the rear. It was a symbolic demonstration of the civil over the military, of Paris over Algiers. De Gaulle had at least made this point forcefully and clearly. Delouvrier’s first words sounded equally purposeful: “
La France reste
….” But the welcome accorded by the
pieds noirs
was barely less cool and mistrustful than it had been for Lacoste and Soustelle before him.

Preoccupations in France

Less readily visible to the army and
pieds noirs
alike in Algeria was one fundamental reason for de Gaulle’s dilatoriness in formulating an Algerian policy: his preoccupation with the Augean stables in France herself. The Gaullist programme called for the most thorough overhaul of France’s whole political system, economy and finances—left in a critical tangle by previous governments of the Fourth Republic—and her foreign relations and alliances. In fact, there were few fronts on which de Gaulle was not attacking with vigour and dedication in his first six plenipotential months. First and foremost there was the new constitution, involving a mountainous work of drafting and consultation. “I considered it necessary”, declared de Gaulle, “for the government to derive not from parliament, in other words from the parties, but, over and above them, from a leader directly mandated by the nation as a whole and empowered to choose, to decide and to act”. The executive would emerge immeasurably strengthened, with many of the weaknesses that had been the undoing of the Third and Fourth Republics purged from the body politic. Well before the triumphant result of the Constitutional Referendum it was abundantly clear that henceforth France was now going to be ruled, and her voice heard abroad. Already in mid-September de Gaulle was writing to Eisenhower and Macmillan, informing them that N.A.T.O. “was no longer adapted to the needs of our defence…the alliance should henceforth be placed under a triple rather than a dual direction, failing which France would take no further part”. In equally brutal language he was soon torpedoing Macmillan’s hopes for a Free Trade Area in Europe; while to his intimates he was revealing his ambitions to create a truly modern army at the earliest opportunity: “As soon as the Algerian war is ended, I shall form five atomic divisions….”