Read A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival's Mind Online
Authors: Zachary Shore
Tags: #History, #Modern, #General
20
. “Army Council and General Dyer,” pp. 1719–34.
21
. “Army Council and General Dyer,” pp. 1719–34.
22
. Herman,
Gandhi and Churchill
, pp. 393–98.
23
. “Army Council and General Dyer,” pp. 1719–34.
24
. “Army Council and General Dyer,” pp. 1719–34.
25
. Collett,
Butcher
, p. 386.
26
. Even in his later years, Gandhi remained attuned to the evolution of British attitudes. After the Second World War, he noted that a new type of Briton had come into being, “burning to make reparation for what his forefathers did.”
Collected Works
, vol. 82, p. 155, on or after December 1, 1945.
27
. Judith M. Brown,
The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 12, “Gandhi’s Global Impact.”
Chapter 2
1
. Gustav Stresemann,
The Stresemann Diaries
(New York: MacMillan, 1935), preface.
2
. The Nobel Foundation did not award a Peace Prize in 1925. In 1926 it retroactively awarded the Peace Prize of 1925 to Charles Dawes and Austen Chamberlain while simultaneously awarding the Peace Prize of 1926 to Stresemann and Briand.
3
. Antonina Vallentin,
Stresemann
(London: Constable & Co., 1931), Foreword by Albert Einstein, pp. v–vi.
4
. For an early important work on Locarno see Jon Jacobson,
Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
5
. Vallentin,
Stresemann
, p. 26.
6
. For a thorough overview of Chicherin’s background, see Timothy E. O’Connor,
Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918–1930
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1988).
7
. Stephen White,
The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet Western Relations, 1921–1922
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
8
. White,
Origins of Détente
, p. 181.
9
. Philipp Scheidemann,
The Making of New Germany: The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann
, vol. 2, trans. J. E. Mitchell (New York: D. Appleton, 1929), p. 355. According to Scheidemann, the Kassel police repeatedly warned him of threats to his life.
10
. For a more recent account of Stresemann’s anti-inflation policies, see Liaquat Ahamed,
Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World
(New York: Penguin, 2009).
11
. See Patrick Cohrs,
The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 112–13.
12
. For more on the Buchrucker affair, see John Wheeler-Bennett,
The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
13
. Jon Jacobson,
When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
14
. Werner Angress,
Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923
(Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972).
15
.
Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik
,
1918–1945
(hereafter
ADAP
), Series A, vol. 8, doc. 161, pp. 410–11.
16
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 8, doc. 165, pp. 419–21.
17
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 9, doc. 32, pp. 74–76. See also Stresemann,
The Stresemann Diaries
, Stresemann to Brockdorf-Rantzau, December 1, 1923.
18
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 9, doc. 76, pp. 193–94. December 29, 1923, Schubert to Brockdorff-Rantzau.
19
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 8, doc. 137, pp. 354–57.
20
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 9, doc. 170, pp. 451–58.
21
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 10, doc. 50, pp. 129–30.
22
.
ADAP
, Series a, vol. 10, doc. 59, pp. 144–45. See also
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 10, doc. 65, pp. 162–63.
23
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 10, doc. 112, pp. 274–75.
24
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 10, doc. 131, pp. 319–22.
25
. In fact, as historians now know, Trotsky’s fortunes were already in decline and Stalin was in ascendance, having managed to suppress Lenin’s scathing written criticism of the coarse Georgian. Nonetheless, Stresemann and other outsiders, of course, could not have known for certain the actual state of power politics inside the Kremlin at this time.
26
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 10, doc. 213, pp. 534–38.
27
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 11, doc. 93, pp. 219–20.
28
. Nachlass Stresemann, Reel 3120, Serial 7178, Band 17, doc. 157411–19.
29
. Nachlass Stresemann,
Politische Akten
, October 29, 1924, reel 3111, pp. 147173–76.
30
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 11, doc. 265, pp. 661–62.
31
. Nachlass Stresemann, Stresemann to Houghton, June 4, 1925, reel 3114, pp. 148780–93.
32
. Nachlass Stresemann, June 11, 1925, Reel 3113, Serial 7129, Band 272, doc. 147850.
33
. Gaines Post,
The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 114, fn. 60.
34
. Gustav Stresemann,
Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters, and Papers
, vol. 1, trans. Eric Sutton (New York: MacMillan, 1935), p. 489.
35
. Nachlass Stresemann, undated entry by Stresemann, Reel 3112, p. 147736.
36
. Although Locarno was a Western-oriented policy, the foreign ministry’s overall approach throughout the 1920s was one of
Schaukelpolitik
, a balancing between East and West while steadily regaining strength through revision of Versailles.
37
. The Serbian official represented the country then known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The country’s name was later changed to Yugoslavia in 1929.
38
. Military Intelligence Division, “German Soviet Relations,”
U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, Germany, 1919–1941
, NA RG 165, microfilm, University Publications of America, August 9, 1925, 2: 207.
39
. Wright,
Stresemann
, p. 324.
40
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 14, doc. 109, pp. 284–91.
41
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 14, doc. 109.
42
.
ADAP
, Series A, vol. 14, doc. 110.
43
. Peter Krüger,
Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar
(Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), p. 209. Krüger writes: “Der deutschen Aussenpolitik kamen Stresemanns Realismus, seine rasche Auffassungsgabe und Intelligenz ebenso zugute wie die so dringend benoetigte Klarheit und Konsequenz seiner Poltik und vor alllem seine Besonnenheit, die . . . stets das uebergeordnete, wesentliche Kennzeichen seiner Aussenpolitik blieb.” [Author’s translation: “German foreign policy benefited from Stresemann’s realism, quick-wittedness and intelligence and from the urgently needed clarity and forthrightness of his politics, and especially from his caution which always remained the overriding, essential hallmark of his foreign policy.”]
44
.
ADAP
, Series B, vol. II/I, doc. 112, pp. 280–83. “Wir haetten aber die Erfahrung gemacht, wir den in Deutschland immernoch sehr gefaehrlichen Kommunismus, der von Russland genaehrt wuerde, dann besser bekaepfen koennten, wenn wir mit Russland gut staenden.”
45
. Mary Habeck,
Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 81. For a much earlier work on Russo–German cooperation in this period see Gerald Freund,
Unholy Alliance: Russian
–
German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin
(London: Harcourt, Brace, 1957).
46
. Nachlass Stresemann, December 22, 1925, Reel 3113, Serial 7129, Band 272, doc. 148109–18.
47
. For more on internal Bolshevik power politics, see Robert W. Service,
A History of Twentieth-Century Russia
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
48
.
ADAP
, Series B, vol. II/2, doc. 37, pp. 90–93.
49
.
ADAP
, Series B, vol. II/2, doc. 44, pp. 105–6.
50
.
ADAP
, Series B, vol. II/2, doc. 64, p. 143.
51
.
ADAP
, Series B, vol. II/2, doc. 80, p. 182.
52
. Germany was permitted to maintain armament levels for self-defense, including an army of 100,000 men.
Chapter 3
1
. “German Royalists Accused of Raising Huge Secret Army,”
Washington Post
, December 17, 1926.
2
.
Truppenamt
was the Army’s euphemism for the General Staff.
3
.
Verhandlungen des Reichstages
, vol. 391, doc. 1924, pp. 8577–86.
4
.
Verhandlungen des Reichstages
, vol. 391, doc. 1924, pp. 8577–86.
5
.
Verhandlungen des Reichstages
, vol. 391, doc. 1924, pp. 8577–86.
6
.
Verhandlungen des Reichstages
, vol. 391, doc. 1924, pp. 8577–86.
7
. Perhaps part of Scheidemann’s anger can be traced to his personal grief. Only four months prior to this passionate address, Scheidemann’s wife had died of a stroke.
8
.
Verhandlungen des Reichstages
, vol. 391, doc. 1924, pp. 8577–86.
9
. “German Royalists Accused of Raising Huge Secret Army,”
Washington Post
, December 17, 1926.
10
. “Germany’s Cabinet, Defeated, Resigns in Face of Charges,”
Washington Post
, December 18, 1926.
11
. “Wild Scenes Mark Reichstag Session,”
The New York Times
, December 17, 1926. See also “Christmas Crisis,”
Time
, December 27, 1926.
12
. “The Distrust of Herr Gessler,”
Manchester Guardian
, December 17, 1926, p. 11.
13
. “German Gun-Running,”
Manchester Guardian
, December 18, 1926, p. 11.
14
. “The Exposure of German Militarists,”
Manchester Guardian
, December 21, 1926, p. 7.
15
. “German–Soviet Alliance?”
Times
(London), May 1, 1922, p. 11; “German Ascendancy in Russia,”
Times
(London), May 8, 1922, p. 9.
16
. “Attack on Marx Cabinet,”
Times
(London), December 17, 1926.
17
. Post,
Civil-Military Fabric
, p. 118. See Dirksen notes of meeting with Schubert, Wetzell, and Major Fischer, January 24, 1927. AA 4564/E163483.
18
. “Summary of the Final Report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control into the General Inspection of German Armaments, February 15, 1925,”
Documents on British Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office, Confidential Print
, Part II, Series F, Vol. 36, pp. 61–65. The final sentence states: “All these infractions taken together are, in the opinion of the Commission, sufficiently important to require putting right, and the Commission will not, on its own initiative, be able to declare the military clauses fulfilled until these points are sufficiently advanced as to have attained the degree of disarmament required by the Treaty, which is now far from the case” (p. 63).
19
. “World Statesmen Get Nobel Prizes,”
The New York Times
, December 11, 1926, p. 5.
20
. “World Statesmen,” p. 5.
21
. “A German Statesman,”
The New York Times
, July 4, 1927, p. 14.