A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (21 page)

40.) Thus the later Mohists provided a hedonistic justification for the ulilitarianistic philosophy of the Mohist school.

This position reminds us of the "principle of utility" of Jeremy Bentham. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham says: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do....The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law." (P. I.) Thus Bentham reduces good and bad to a question of pleasure and pain. According to him the aim of morality is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." (Ibid.)

This is also what the later Mohists do. Having defined "the beneficial," they go on to define the virtues in the light of this concept. Thus in the first Canon we find: Righteousness consists in doing the beneficial. Loyalty consists in benefiting one's ruler." "Filial piety consists in benefiting one's parents.

Meritorious accomplishment consists in benefiting the people. (Ch. 4°.) "Benefiting the people means "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Regarding the theory of all—embracing love, the later Mohists maintain that its major attribute is its all-embracing character. In the "Minor Illustrations we read: In loving men one needs to love all men before one can

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regard oneself as loving men. In not loving men one does not need not to love any man [before one can regard oneself as not loving men]. Not to have all-embracing love is not to love men. When riding horses, one need iiol ride all horses in order to regard oneself as riding a horse. For if one rides only a few horses, one is still riding horses. But when not riding horses, one must ride no horse at all in order to regard oneself as not riding horses. This is the difference between all-inclusiveness [in the case of loving men] and the absence of all-inclusiveness [in the case of riding horses]. "(Ch. 44.) Every man, as a matter of fact, has someone whom he loves. Every man, for example, loves his own children. Hence the mere fact that a man loves someone does not mean that he loves men in general. But on the negative side, the fact that he does wrong to someone, even his own children, does mean that he does not love men. Such is the reasoning of the Mohists.

Defense of All-embracing Love

Against this view of the later Mohists, there were at that time two main objections. The first was that the number of men in the world is infinite; how, then, is it possible for one to love them all? This objection was referred to under the title: Infinity is incompatible with all—embracing love. And the second objection was that if failure to love a single man means failure to love men in general, there should then be no such punishment as killing a robber." This objection was known under the title: To kill a robber is to kill a man." The later Mohists used their dialectic to try to refute these objections.

In the second Canon there is the statement: Infinity is not incompatible with all-embracingness. The reason is given under 'full or not.'" (Ch. 40.) The second Exposition of the Canons develops this statement as follows: "Infinity: (Objection:) ' I f the South has a limit, it can be included in toto. [Theke was a common belief in ancient China that the South had no limit] If it has no limit, it cannot be included in toto. It is impossible to know whether it has a limit or not and hence it is impossible to know whether it can all be included or not. It is impossible to know whether people fill this [space] or not, and hence it is impossible to know whether they can be included in toto or not. This being so, it is perverse to hold that all people can be included in our love. (Answer:) If people do not fill what is unlimited, then [the number of] people has a limit, and there is no difficulty in including anything that is limited [in number]. But if people do fill what is unlimited, then what is [supposed to be] unlimited is limited, and then there is no difficulty in including what is limited. " (Ch. 43-) To kill a robber is to kill a man is the other major objection to the Mo— 2.OO . THE LATER MOHISTS

hists, because killing a man is not consistent with loving all men equally and universally. To this

objection the Minor Illustrations answers as follows:

"A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride a horse. Huo [name of a person J is a man. To love Huo is to love a man. Tsang [ name of a person ] is a man. To love Tsang is to love a man. This is to affirm what is right.

"But Huo's parents are men. Yet when Huo serves his parents, he is not serving men. His younger brother is a handsome man. Yet when he loves his younger brother, he is not loving handsome men. A cart is wood, but to ride a cart is not to ride wood. A boat is wood, but to ride a boat is not to ride wood.

A robber is a man, but that there are many robbers does not mean that there are many men; and that there are no robbers does not mean that there are no men.

"How is this explained? To hate the existence of many robbers is not to hate the existence of many men. To wish that there were no robbers is not to wish that there were no men. The world generally agrees on this. And this being the ease, although a robber—man is a man, yet to love robbers is not to love men, and not to love robbers is not to love men. Likewise to kill a robber-man is not to kill a man.

There is no difficulty in this proposition." (Ch. 45-)

With such dialectic as this the later Mohists refuted the objection that the killing of a robber is inconsistent with their principle of all-embracing love.

Criticsm of Other Schools

Using their dialectic, the later Mohists not only refute the objections of other schools against them, but also make criticisms of their own against these schools. For example, the "Mohist Canons" contain a number of objections against the arguments of the School of Names. Hui Shih, it will be remembered, had argued for the "unity of similarity and difference." In his ten paradoxes he passed from the premise that all things are similar lo each other," to the conclusion: "Love all things equally. Heaven and Earth are one body." This, for the later Mohists, is a fallacy arising from the ambiguity of the Chinese word t ung. T ung may be variously used to mean identity, "agreement, or "similarity. In the first "Canon there is a statement which reads: "Tung: There is that of identity, that of part-and-whole relationship, that of co—existence, and that of generic relation. (Ch. 4®-) And the Exposition" explains further: "T ung: That there are two names for one actuality is identity. Inclusion in one whole is part—and—whole relationship. Both being in the same room is co-existence. Having some points of similarity is generic relation. (Ch. 42-)The same Canon and Exposition also have a

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discussion on "difference," which is just the reverse of t'ung.

The Mohist Canons fail actually to mention Hui Shih by name. As a matter of fact, no name is ever mentioned in these chapters. But from this analysis of the word t' ung, Hui Shih' s fallacy becomes dear.

That all things are similar to each other means that they have generic relationship, that they are of the same class, the class of "things." But that Heaven and Earth are one body means that they have a part—and—whole relationship. The truth of the one proposition as applied to a particular situation cannot be inferred from the truth of the other, even though the same word, t ung, is used in both cases.

As regards Kung-sun Lung s argument for "the separation of hardness and whiteness, the later Mohists thought only in terms of concrete hard and white stones as they actually exist in the physical universe. Hence they maintained that the qualities of hardness and whiteness both simultaneously inhere in the stone. As a result, they are not mutually exclusive, but "must pervade each other." (Chaps.

40, 42.)

The later Mohists also criticized the Taoists. In the second Canon we read: "Learning is useful. The reason is given by those who oppose it." (Ch. 41-) The second "Exposition' comments on this: "Learning: By maintaining that people do not know that learning is useless, one is thereby informing them of this fact. This informing that learning is useless, is itself a teaching. Thus by holding that learning is useless, one teaches. This is perverse." (Ch. 43.)

This is a criticism of a statement in the Lao-tzu: Banish learning and there will be no grieving." (Ch.

10.) According to the later Mohists, learning and teaching are related terms. If learning is to be banished, so is teaching. For once there is teaching, there is also learning, and if teaching is useful, learning cannot be useless. The very teaching that learning is useless proves in itself that it is useful.

In the second "Canon" we read: "To say that in argument there is no winner is necessarily incorrect.

The reason is given under 'argument'." The second "Exposition comments on this: "In speaking, what people say either agrees or disagrees. There is agreement when one person says something is a puppy, and another says it is a dog. There is disagreement when one says it is an ox, and another says it is a horse. [That is to say, when there is disagreement, there is argumencj When neither of them wins, there is no argument. Argument is that in which one person says the thing is so, and another says it is not so.

The one who is right will win." (Ch. 43.)

In the second Canon we also read: To hold that all speech is perverse is perverse. The reason is given under speech.'" (Ch. 41.) The second "Exposition comments on this: [To hold that all speech J is perverse, is not

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permissible. If the speech of this man Lwho holds this doctrine J is permissible, then at least ihis speech is not perverse, and there is some speech that is permissible. If the speech of this man is not permissible, then it is wrong to take it as being correct. (Ch. 43>)

The second "Canon" also says: "That knowing it and not knowing it are the same, is perverse. The reason is given under no means. (Ch. 4L) And the second "Exposition" comments: "When there is knowledge, there is discussion about it. Unless there is knowledge, there is no means [of discussion]."

(Ch. 43.)

Yet again the second "Canon states: "To condemn criticism is perverse. The reason is given under 'not to condemn.'" (Ch. 41.) On which the second "Exposition" comments: "To condemn criticism is to condemn one's own condemnation. If one does not condemn it, there is nothing to be condemned. When one cannot condemn it, this means not to condemn criticism. (Ch. 43-) These are all criticisms against Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu maintained that nothing can be decided in argument. Even if someone wins, he said, the winner is not necessarily right or the loser necessarily wrong. But according lo the later Mohists, Chuang Tzu, by expressing this very doctrine, showed himself in disagreement with others and was himself arguing. If he won the argument, did not this very fact prove him to be wrong? Chuang Tzu also said: "Great argument does not require words." And again: "Speech that argues falls short of its aim. (Chuaiig—lzu, oh. 2..) Hence all speech is perverse. Furthermore, he held that everything is right in its own way and in its own opinion, and one should not criticize the other.

(Ibid.) But according to the later Mohists, what Chuang Tzu said itself consists of speech and itself constitutes a criticism against others. So if all speech is perverse, is not this saying of Chuang Tzu also perverse? And if all criticism against others is to be condemned, then Chuang Tzu's criticism should be condemned first of all. Chuang Tzu also talked much about the importance of having no knowledge. But such discussion is itself a form of knowledge. When there is no knowledge, there can be no discussion about it.

In criticizing the Taoists, the later Mohists pointed out certain logical paradoxes that have also appeared in Western philosophy. Il is only with the development of a new logic in recent times that these paradoxes have been solved. Thus in contemporary logic, the criticisms made by the later Mohists are no longer valid. Yet it is interesting to note that the later Mohists were so logically minded. More than any other school of ancient China, they attempted to create a pure system of epistemology and logic.

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CHAPTER 12

THE YIN-YANG SCHOOL AND EARLY CHINESE COSMOGONY

IN the second chapter of this book I said that the Yin-Yang School had its origin in the occultists. These occultists were anciently known as the fang shih, that is, practitioner of occult arts. In the "Treatise on Literature" (ch. 30) in the History of the Former Han Dynasty, which is based on the Seven Summaries by Liu Hsin, these occult arts are grouped into six classes.

The Six Classes of Occult Arts

The first is astrology. "Astrology, says this chapter in the Han History; "serves to arrange in order the twenty-eight constellations, and note the progressions of the five planets and of the sun and the moon, so as to record thereby the manifestations of fortune and misfortune."

The second deals with almanacs. "Almanacs," says the same treatise, serve to arrange the four seasons in proper order, to adjust the times of the equinoxes and solstices, and to note the concordance of the periods of the sun, moon, and five planets, so as thereby to examine into the actualities of cold and heat, life and death....Through this art, the miseries of calamities and the happiness of prosperity all appear manifest."