A world undone: the story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918 (110 page)

One of the war’s youngest leading figures also appeared to live too long. Winston Churchill’s career prospered in the decade after the Treaty of Versailles. He served as secretary of state for war from 1919 to 1921, as colonial secretary in 1921 and 1922, and as chancellor of the exchequer from 1924 to 1929. Along the way he left the Liberals to return to the Conservative Party, where he had begun a quarter century earlier, but the Conservatives despised him for his old apostasy and distrusted him deeply. From 1929 on he was consigned to what he called “the political wilderness,” a has-been issuing warnings about the rearmament of Nazi Germany that few were prepared to take seriously.

But that is another story.

Notes

PART ONE

July 1914:
Into the Abyss

T
he causes of the First World War, and the culpability of the nations and individuals involved, have been controversial through nine decades and appear likely to remain so forever. The relevant literature is almost infinite in quantity and in the variety of conclusions offered. The author, having attempted to consult as much of this literature as possible, found many works to be helpful but four to be particularly so: Immanuel Geiss’s
July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents
, William Jannen, Jr.’s
The Lions of July, Prelude to War, 1914
, Eugenia V. Nomikos and Robert C. North’s
International Crisis: The Outbreak of World War I
, and the second volume of Gerhard Ritter’s
The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany
. Geiss’s book is an invaluable collection of diplomatic communications and government records during the July crisis, though the interpretation that Geiss puts on these communications is itself controversial to the point of being generally discredited. Jannen’s day-by-day, hour-by-hour recounting of the crisis is unparalleled in the amount of detail provided, and Ritter offers a uniquely thorough analysis of what was happening on the German (and Austro-Hungarian) side and why.

“For heaven’s sake!” and “Sophie dear”: Taylor,
Fall of the Dynasties
, 13.

“It’s nothing”: Fromkin, 136.

“A higher power”: Remak, 160.

“My purpose…was to plant”: Millis, 23.

“the imperative duty”: the quotes from Bryan, the
Review of Reviews
, and Elihu Root are in Millis, 9-14.

“some young Serb might put”: Marshall, 25.

“he only wanted to die”: Z.A.B. Zeman, “The Balkans and the Coming of War,” in Evans and Strandmann,
Coming of the First World War
, 20.

“In 1908-1909 we would”: Ritter, 2:235.

In the course of 1913: Conrad’s 1913 calls for war are in Strachan,
First World War
, 69.

“a final and fundamental”: Ibid., 71.

“a man…the monarchy needed”: Jannen, 3.

He had at his disposal: Austria’s and Serbia’s 1913 manpower figures are in Herrmann, 123.

People who knew Franz Ferdinand:The archduke’s views on trialism are in, among other sources, Strachan,
First World War
, 68.

Bella gerant alii:
Taylor,
Dynasties
, 75.

“Yes, yes, but one is”:Remak, 162.

Gangs of hooligans:Details about disturbances in Sarajevo and Belgrade are in Jannen, 10;Marshall, 24; and Remak, 147.

“into one another’s arms”:Jannen, 10.

“behaving shamefully”:Fromkin, 143.

“The event almost failed”:Ibid.

Either of the Austro-Hungarian:Austria-Hungary’s mobilization plans are described in Strachan,
First World War
, 291.

“Then he’s a false rascal!”:Geiss, 346.

“Who authorized him to act that way?”:Jannen, 21.

“How often have I asked myself”:Ibid, 18.

“It was his opinion”:Geiss, 77.

“did not succeed in convincing me”:Ibid, 78.

“I don’t believe we are headed”:MacDonogh, 354.

At the July 5-6 meetings:Berchtold’s scheme for using Bulgaria to separate Romania from Russia is in Jannen, 30.

“put an end to Serbia’s intrigues”:Ibid, 41.

“Our exactions may be hard”:An Austro-Hungarian government summary of the council’s proceedings, and the quotes in this and the following paragraphs, are in Geiss, 80.

“would, as far as can humanly be”:Berghahn, 194.

“You are setting fire to Europe”:Lincoln, 428.

“The most brilliant example”:Fay, 2340.

“The Royal Government cannot accept”:Geiss, 203.

The Austrian mobilization that followed:The numbers of divisions are in L.C.F.Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” in Kennedy, 262.

They involved the mustering:troop numbers are in Fay, 298.

“I would like to call your attention”:Geiss, 206.

“a question of the balance”:Ibid, 209.

“in the most decided way”:Ibid, 236.

“He was always lecturing me”:Jannen, 37.

“Nothing has helped”:Ibid, 56.

“This was more than one could have expected”:Ibid, 147.

“a capitulation of the most humiliating”:Ibid.

“Orientals… therefore liars”:Fay, 420.

“Austria has declared war on us”:Jannen, 138.

“has left us in the dark concerning”:Geiss, 259.

He wanted to discuss a number of ideas: The content of the conversation, and the nature of the misunderstanding to which it gave rise, are detailed in Jannen, 133.

“complete readiness of France to fulfill”: Turner, “Russian Mobilization,” in Kennedy, 252.

“faith in the power”: Massie,
Nicholas and Alexandra
, 16.

“Among the falsest”: Ibid., 14.

“What am I going to do?”: Ibid., 43.

“ignoble war has been declared”: The words of the telegrams, and the kaiser’s marginal notes, are in Geiss, 260.

One ordered the mobilization: The numbers of army corps and divisions are in Ritter, 2:253.

Crowds were gathering in Vienna: The anecdotes about reactions to the impending war, including the words of Russell, Grey, and Churchill, are in Ferguson, 176ff.

“the leading nations of Europe”: Ritter, 2:253.

“kindly impress upon M. Sazonov”: Turner, “Russian Mobilization,” in Kennedy, 265.

In one of his middle-of-the-night: this exchange is in ibid., 263.

“Think of the responsibility”: Fay, 2:265.

Russia’s general mobilization: Nomikos and North, 6.

“Let Papa…not plan war”: Taylor,
Dynasties
, 243.

“unless Austria is willing”: Geiss, 286.

“serious error”: Jannen, 223.

“We are of course, ready”: Geiss, 293.

“how difficult it would be”: Ibid., 317.

“What a joke!”: Fromkin, 229.

“Fear is a bad counselor”: The words of Ambassador Nikolaus von Temerin Szécsen are in Jannen, 186.

“You must inform German Chancellor”: Grey’s message to Ambassador Sir Edward Goschen is in Geiss, 315.

“must follow in case Russia”: The double ultimatum is dealt with in Jannen, 256.

“If France had actually”: Renouvin, 224.

“the peace of Europe”: Geiss, 324.

“technically impossible”: Ibid., 323.

“the same guarantee from you”: Ibid., 344.

“Wherever the Sultan went”: Barber, 85.

“France will have to regard”: Mayeur and Reberieux, 350.

An hour later the French government: Joffre’s warning is in Fay, 531.

Their conversation turned into: An exceptionally thorough and lucid account of the dispute between Germany’s military and diplomatic leaders over whether and how to mobilize and declare war is in Ritter, 2:267.

“if I thought I could assure”: Geiss, 343.

“We shall simply march”: Jannen, 298.

“I assured His Majesty”: Strachan,
First World War
, 90.

“This pained me a good deal”: Renouvin, 251.

“it is understandable that each increase”: Röhl, 43.

“would make it difficult”: Geiss, 346.

“My impression”: Ibid., 347.

“I have no other reply”: Samsonov and Pourtalès each left an account of their last meeting. Not surprisingly, these accounts are not identical in their details, but they do not conflict substantially. Elements of their accounts have been taken from Gilbert,
First World War
, 30, and Jannen, 311.

PART TWO

August-December 1914:
Racing to Deadlock

E
ntering upon August 1914 and the opening of hostilities, the student of the Great War encounters problems having to do with the number of casualties suffered by the various belligerent nations in specific battles and in specific time periods shorter than the war as a whole. Years of research that included visits to the Imperial War Museum in London, the Library of Congress, and a variety of archives in and near Paris brought the author to the conclusion that there is no single, simple, or absolutely authoritative solution to such problems. Many of such numbers must be taken as approximations, especially in the case of countries whose record-keeping was never meticulous or whose records have been lost since the war. The best approximations are at a minimum useful as measures of the scale of the fighting and of the comparative effectiveness of the various armies, and they are used for this purpose in the present work. The number of published sources on the Battles of the Marne, Tannenberg, and First Ypres is of course immense. Different authors shed light on these subjects from different angles, and many of the resulting works are valuable. The author found the following works to be notably helpful as guides to these contests: Robert Asprey’s
The First Battle of the Marne
and
The German High Command at War
, Georges Blond’s
The Marne
, Holger H. Herwig’s
The First World War: Germany and Austria
, Henri Isselin’s
The Battle of the Marne
, and the first volume of Hew Strachan’s epic work-in-progress,
The First World War
.

“If the iron dice roll:” Tuchman,
Guns of August
, 74.

“a long weary struggle”: Barnett, 40.

“too reflective, too scrupulous”: Ibid., 23.

“Art is the only thing”: Blond, 30.

The so-called Grand Program: Strachan,
First World War
, 62.

By 1914, 1.4 million Russian troops: Rutherford, 20.

“We should exploit in the West”:L.C.F.Turner, “The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy, 200.

His commentaries, which he continued to produce:The weaknesses of the Schlieffen Plan, and Schlieffen’s recognition of those weaknesses, are described briefly in Stevenson,
Cataclysm
, 38, and in vastly greater detail in Ritter, 2193-216.

Bismarck had joked: Bismarck, 134: The kaiser said that this quip was Bismarck’s “pet motto.”

As late as 1913:France’s alertness to British sensitivities on the subject of Belgium, and Britain’s role in discouraging France from planning to violate Belgian neutrality, is described in Asprey,
Marne
, 24.

“for the civilian side to have”:Ritter, 2206.

“If we were to”:Ibid, 2195.

The infantry would have to do this:Herwig, 60.

Schlieffen calculated: Schlieffen’s estimates of the number of divisions required for executing his plan are in Farrar-Hockley, 6.

“Before the Germans reach the Somme”: Turner, “Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy, 202.

“It must come to a fight”:Asprey,
Marne
, 11.

The most challenging aspect:Herwig, 60.

“will hardly be possible”:Turner, “Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy, 212.

As the years passed:Moltke’s changes in the proportions of troops assigned to the German right and left wings are in Stevenson,
Cataclysm
, 39.

In its 1914 iteration:Turner, “Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy, 212.

In the thirty days following:The troop and division numbers given here and in the next paragraph are in Ferguson, 92.

This measure was a requirement:French and German conscription percentages are in Stevenson,
Cataclysm
, 161.

“the most hated man in France”:Berenson, 71.

Though his enemies accused him:Caillaux’s handling of the Morocco crisis is detailed in ibid, 76.