In New Orleans, a key port city, the figures were even more African-weighted. In 1791, the population of 4,446 reflected 1,900 whites, 1,800 slaves, and 750 free blacks (Hunt, p. 46, and almanacs). In antebellum decades this almost startling ratio lessened, though the total numbers of Africans, slave or free, grew much higher and would continue to climb. In 1860 the black population was about 25,000, among about 144,000 whites. By 1880, about 57,000 blacks lived in the city, among 158,000 whites (John Blassingame, Black New Orleans 18601880, 1973).
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High as these numbers climbed, they were still dwarfed by the black majorities of eighty percent or more in St. Domingue (Haiti), Jamaica and other Caribbean islands, leading Genovese to conclude the numberstaken with other factorsweren't high enough in the American South to sustain a widespread rebellion. "[I]n general, their position steadily deteriorated over time until revolt became virtually suicidal" ( From Rebellion to Revolution , p. 49).
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While I concur and even applaud most of Genovese's analysis of the revolutionary climate of American slavedom, I propose considering the population factor in a different way. Blacks may not have constituted a majority, but their numbers were certainly high enough to launch, support and even win a protracted guerilla war, as reference to the successful wars of liberation of the twentieth century surely attests. Neither Fidel nor Mao, for example, controlled a majority of their country's populations at the outset of resistance.
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Further, the high black populations were so strictly segregated and alienated from the dominant white culture that a revolutionary movement would have had little trouble delineating the shape and nature of the struggle to its own people. The sharpness of that separationas simple as black and whitewould have turned the nation-within-a-nation predicament of the slaves to psychological advantage, not liability. Very much as in Haiti, blackness could have been used as a weapon of terror to destabi-
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