Amerithrax (35 page)

“In contrast to the simple schizophrenic, a psychopath is outgoing and articulate,” wrote Robert Kessler. “A psycho- path will actually kill someone and then sit where the police drink coffee and listen.” Howard D. Teten, the father of profiling at the FBI National Academy, once told Kessler that the psychopath “gets a great thrill from hearing the po- lice discussing how this crime happened. This gives him a great sense of superiority, that he knows something they don’t know, and they’ll never figure it out. If they stop in-

vestigating, he may commit another crime to get the police going. He may even write them a taunting letter”—and often go back to the crime scene.

The FBI profiler decided that their quarry had above av- erage intelligence, preferred skilled work, and was sexually competent. The power over his victims (in this case an entire nation) might be his sexual stimulant. Amerithrax was or- ganized and knowledgeable (he did not contract the disease while preparing his anthrax letters). He was probably an older sibling who drank before committing a crime. He had social skills and after his crime might change jobs or leave town.

The FBI profile sketched a picture of Amerithrax as a science loner with a grudge against society. “Based on the selection of anthrax as the ‘weapon’ of choice by this in- dividual,” the analysis stated, “the offender is likely an adult male. If employed, he is likely to be in a position requiring little contact with the public, or other employees. He may work in a laboratory. He is apparently comfortable working with an extremely hazardous material. He probably has a scientific background to some extent, or at least a strong interest in science. The anthrax killer is a male loner with a scientific background and lab experience...a man who feels comfortable in the Trenton area where the letters were postmarked.”

DeLong thought Amerithrax drove to Trenton twice to make the authorities think he lived in that area. “Let’s not forget what Kaczynski did,” she said. “He went twenty-nine hours on a bus to San Francisco just to mail one of his bombs. The Anthrax Killer is a very smart guy and so was Kaczynski. He’s going to put a lot of distance between him- self and those postmarks. As for ‘probably an adult male’— well, that’s going out on a limb. I am on record, having spent all day—this came out on Friday, and I was in the chair at MSNBC in New York all day Saturday—I probably did five or six hits in an eight-hour period. I’m on record saying that not only is it a white male, without question it is someone over thirty-five and probably someone over forty who has advanced degrees, a lot of letters after his name, possibly Ph.D., possibly M.D.

“Why? Because this is a sophisticated crime. This is not a kiddy-crime. The person attempted to make himself look childish and immature by the handwriting and by the mes- sage. The message tried to pin this rap on Islamic extremists. To me the person was trying to disguise who they really are. So the fact that they tried to make themselves look like Arab extremists tells me it’s an American—and a home- grown one.

“The misspelling of penicillin was a deliberate attempt to make himself look dumber than he is, which tells me he is smart and educated. He mentioned the wrong medication for anthrax and that too was deliberate. Just like when Kaczynski mentioned ‘
We
are a group.’ Ted Kaczynski put himself in jail, right where he is today.”

Profilers thought the evidence pointed to a person who wanted to send a message and show off his talents, not nec- essarily to kill. Yet after Bob Stevens died, Amerithrax had mailed even more deadly letters. Some of the letters warned the recipient to start taking penicillin. On the other hand, the strain Amerithrax had selected was not a drug-resistant strain, but one treatable with common antibiotics.

The FBI’s profile stated that Amerithrax “has likely taken appropriate protective steps to ensure his own safety, which may include the use of an anthrax vaccination or antibiotics [such as Cipro]... has access to a source of anthrax and possesses knowledge and expertise to refine it... possesses or has access to some laboratory equipment, i.e., micro- scope, glassware, centrifuge, etc.” The evidence indicated that Amerithrax had access to a sophisticated laboratory be- tween the two mailing dates and used it to refine the pure anthrax mailed to the senators.

Various specialists believed Amerithrax could have wea- ponized anthrax in a basement lab for as little as twenty- five hundred dollars. Others disagreed. “Just collecting the stuff is a trick,” said Steven Lancos, executive vice president for Niro Inc., a leading manufacturer of spray dryers, the likeliest tool needed to weaponize the attack anthrax. The FBI studied the catalogs, trying to visualize Amerithrax’s lab. He would most likely have among his instruments a flash drying system—a Flash Jet Dryer or the Fluidized Bed

Dryer, known as the Quick Dryer. He might have a jet mill—a horizontal-type mill or the single-track version or a vertical-type jet mill or the complete jet milling package system or the Co-Jet System for small-quantity processing. On November 9, Boston agents visited Sturtevant Inc., in Hanover, Massachusetts, which manufactures jet mills.

“Even on a small scale,” said Lancos, “you still need containment. If you’re going to do it right, it could cost millions of dollars.” He believed that whoever weaponized the spores was “operating at the outer limits of known aer- osol technology. The anthrax mailer needed a powder that could negotiate the U.S. postal system without absorbing so much moisture that it would cake up. At the end of the trip, the coated spores had to be light and supple enough to fly into the air with no delivery system beyond the rip of the letter opener through an envelope. Their extremely small size gives them an aerodynamic quality and their high sur- face area allows them to readily trap moisture, acting as a natural desiccant.”

The most likely method of constructing the coated spores would be to get fine glass particles—a special kind of silicon dioxide, “fumed silica” or “solid smoke”—and combine them with spores in a spray dryer. “You would need a chemist who is familiar with colloidal silica,” concluded Lanos, “and a ma- terials science person to put it all together, and then some me- chanical engineers to make this work; probably some containment people, if you don’t want to kill anybody. You need half a dozen, I think, really smart people... some ex- perience with aerosols and...a lot of anthrax to practice on.” Silica nanopower, superfine powdered glass, was available on the Internet. It would cause the spores to crumble apart. According to the FBI psychological portrait, Amerithrax “has exhibited an organized, rational thought process in fur- therance of his criminal behavior... is a nonconfrontation person, at least in his public life. He lacks the personal skills necessary to confront others. He chooses to confront his

problems ‘long distance’ and not face-to-face.”

The FBI believed that Amerithrax might hold grudges for a long time, “vowing that he will get even with ‘them’

one day. There are probably other, earlier examples of this type of behavior. While these earlier incidents were not ac- tual anthrax mailings, he may have chosen to anonymously harass other individuals or entities that he perceived as having wronged him. He may also have chosen to utilize the mail on those occasions.”

“This thing about [how] he’s probably written nasty let- ters in the past,” said DeLong, “that’s right out of the Una- bomber. It’s just describing everything Kaczynski did to the UNSUB [Unknown Subject of a criminal investigation] of the anthrax case.”

He is “ ‘standoffish’ and prefers to be alone rather than in groups,” continued the profile. Amerithrax “prefers being by himself more often than not. If he is involved in a per- sonal relationship it will likely be of a self-serving nature.” He may have shown a “passive disinterest in the events which otherwise captivated the nation.”

The profile suggested that his pre-offense behavior, fol- lowing the events of 9-11, may have made him “mission oriented.” He may have “exhibited significant behavioral changes at various critical periods of time throughout the course of the anthrax mailings and related media coverage.” He may have become “more secretive” after the mailings, exhibiting an unusual pattern of activity. He may have started taking antibiotics “unexpectedly.”

“ ‘Secretive,’ it says in the Amerithrax profile,” said DeLong. “Once again they’re comparing him to Kaczynski. I found a contradiction where the profile says ‘pre-offense behavior.’ ‘Additionally he may have displayed a passive disinterest in the events which otherwise captivated the na- tion.’ But in the post-offense behavior they suggest he was extremely interested in what was going on, more than the average person, and it contradicts. This is just utter non- sense, this profile, or at least silly. They say he altered his physical appearance. No. No one knows he committed this crime. Let me tell you who alters their appearance. It’s men who go into a woman’s house and rape and murder her and they live in the neighborhood. They might be associated with her so if they have a beard they shave it. This guy

knows nobody knows he did this, why would he alter his behavior?”

Clint Van Zandt, a twenty-five-year veteran of the FBI and former supervisor of the agency’s criminal profiling unit, was now a private consultant. He too saw parallels between the anthrax attacker and Ted Kaczynski, the Una- bomber. Amerithrax was “cut out of a similar bolt of cloth as the Unabomber, who did it for purposes he thought were greater than himself. Kaczynski tried to warn about the dan- gers of technology,” said Van Zandt. He additionally saw comparisons to Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. “McVeigh tried to warn about excesses on the part of gov- ernment,” Van Zandt said, “and the anthrax sender, I be- lieve, did it because he felt the United States was not responsive [to the threat of bioterrorism].”

The FBI conjectured Amerithrax was “likely an older man, a loner living in the United States who has substantial scientific and laboratory skills. He has no ties to organized terrorists, but sought to use the September 11 terror attacks as cover for the mailings.” He may have altered his physical appearance and demonstrated “pronounced anxiety, atypical media interest, and noticeable mood swings.”

“This profile of the anthrax killer isn’t going to point to anyone,” continued DeLong. “Here are the things that are on target: ‘probably works in a laboratory, has access to anthrax’—duh!—and ‘scientific background.’ Anybody could figure that out. A social worker did not commit this crime,” she said scathingly. “We’re talking about somebody who knows how to handle deadly anthrax. Also the person has the expertise to refine it; well, that’s possible, but my understanding is that the FBI also said it wouldn’t take a Ph.D. to refine this. That if you had twenty-five hundred dollars of centrifuge equipment and whatnot, you could do it in your basement. ‘Organized, rational thought process.’ Absolutely.”

The FBI said the UNSUB may have become more with- drawn, shown an unusual absenteeism, an “unusual level of preoccupation,” and changed his sleeping and eating habits. He may have been especially manic during September 18 and October 9, 2001, the time the anthrax letters were

mailed. The FBI had to ask—did he show any reaction to the deaths and illnesses of nontargeted victims?

As the investigation into the airplane attacks wound down, Van Harp, an assistant director of the FBI in charge of the Washington field office, had practically his entire of- fice of 659 agents working on the anthrax letters. Special Agent Arthur Eberhart, overseer of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit, formed two squads of ten agents each— Amerithrax 1 (run by John Hess) and Amerithrax 2 (run by David Wilson)—that took up half the seventh floor. Amer- ithrax 2 utilized the talents of a CDC epidemiologist, Dr. Cindy Friedman, and a Navy anthrax expert, James Burans. “It is highly probable, bordering on certainty,” advised FBI profiler Jim Fitzgerald, “that all three letters were au- thored by the same person. Letters One [Brokaw] and Two [the
New York Post
] are identical copies. Letter Three [Das- chle], however, contains a somewhat different message than the other letters. The anthrax used in Letter Three was much more refined, more potent, and more easily disbursed than

in Letters One and Two.

“In the past the public has helped the FBI solve high- profile investigations that involved writings by coming for- ward to identify the author, either by how he wrote or by what he wrote. We are asking for the public’s help here again in the same way. Leads from the public will play an integral role perhaps in identifying this individual.”

The FBI hoped the new profile might lead to a replay of their 1996 capture of the Unabomber, a case Fitzgerald worked. But in actuality it was a tip from the public, not the profile, that snared him. The Unabomber’s brother and sister-in-law had recognized his writing style in a lengthy manifesto and tipped the FBI through their lawyer. Kaczyn- ski had been the biggest loner of all.

Anthrax and Old Lace

ON
November 9, 2001, after sixteen days of intensive treat- ment David Hose was discharged from the hospital. On Oc- tober 30, his white blood cell count had peaked at 31,300/ mm3. The next day, an “enlargement of the right pleural effusion required thoracentesis and removal of 900 cc of serosanguinous fluid,” but he had survived. He returned to his Winchester, Virginia, home to convalesce, but as he at- tempted to regain his strength through physical therapy, he had little energy. “I’m just so tired,” lamented Hose, a com- plaint echoed by the other survivors.