Apollo: The Race to the Moon (75 page)

“This is not a meeting to bring up”: This and subsequent quotes from the CARR are from a partial transcript of the CARR, provided courtesy of Robert Sherrod.

“Specific NASA direction”: “CARR Action Responses—CSM 012,” 26 September 1966, Internal Letter, North American Aviation, J.S.C. History Office.

“I do not think it technically prudent”: Letter from Hilliard Paige to Joseph Shea, 30 September 1966, J.S.C. History Office.

“our usual press of business”: Memorandum from William Bland to Joseph Shea, 23 November 1966, J.S.C. History Office.

“our inherent hazards from fire”: Letter from Joseph Shea to Hilliard Paige, 5 December 1966, J.S.C. History Office.

14. “Did he say ‘fire’?”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with John Tribe.

The description of the probable source of the fire is taken from the Final Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board as summarized in Baker, History of Manned Space Flight, pp. 279–83, plus authors’ interviews.

The description of the crew’s transmission is taken from Part V.c of the Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board, “Analyses of Crew Voice Transmission During the Fire,” pp. 5.8–5.9, plus authors’ interviews with Martin Cioffoletti and Donald Arabian, who listened to the tape repeatedly as part of the investigation.

The accounts of Gary Propst, Donald Babbitt, James Gleaves, Clarence Chauvin, Deke Slayton, Stephen Clemmons, and L.D. Reece are taken from statements given in testimony before the Apollo 204 Review Board as published in Appendix B to the Final Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board.

The New York Times’s report of the spacecraft and crew’s condition: This was a scandal at the time, with NASA angrily denying the report (which in fact had been grossly inaccurate). References to the article indicate that the Times’s article appeared on Sunday. But a review of the Times coverage of the fire on Sunday, January 29, and the rest of the week as well, using the microfilmed New York Times held by the Library of Congress, failed to uncover the offending passage—it apparently ran only in the paper’s early editions (the final edition is used for archival purposes). But it clearly existed. Here is Time magazine’s summary of it: “Quoting an unidentified ‘official source,’ the New York Times said that the three had suffered horribly as the fire spread: that they shrieked repeatedly, pleading for help; that they died scrambling frantically at the sealed hatch cover of the capsule, leaving shreds of flesh on the metal; and that their bodies were incinerated until little more than bones remained”: “Inquest on Apollo,” Time, 10 February 1967, p. 9.

Condition of the bodies after the fire: Taken from the Report of Panel 11, Medical Analysis Panel, Appendix D-11 to the Final Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board, pp. D11-7 to D11-8, plus unpublished materials provided courtesy of Joseph Shea.

“a spine-tingling affair”: Claudia Alta Johnson, A White House Diary (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), p. 481.

Gilruth catching a plane to the Cape: This is Gilruth’s recollection from the authors’ interview with him. It is a minor point, but the plane may have been North American’s or McDonnell’s—during his research, Robert Sherrod tried valiantly to pin this point down but without success.

15. The Crucible

Chapter title: From Joe Shea’s original title for the Goddard Lecture, “The Crucible of Development.”

The account of Shea’s activities: From the week after the fire until he left Houston for the headquarters job, Shea kept a daily technical diary, supplemented with personal observations. A few years after the fire, Shea also wrote up a detailed account of the first weekend after the fire. Much of the account in this chapter is drawn from these materials, provided courtesy of Joseph Shea.

“What is done is done”: From “Talk to Apollo Contractors,” 3 February 1967, provided courtesy of Joseph Shea.

“I may be overoptimistic”: From Shea’s technical diary.

“a more thorough inspection was required”: Quoted in Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. Newkirk with Courtney G. Brooks, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1978), vol. 4, pp. 80–81.

1,407 errors: Benson and Faherty, Moonport, p. 411.

“The more we probed”: Frank Borman and Robert J. Serling, Countdown: An Autobiography (New York: William Morrow, 1988), p. 175.

“getting drunk seemed like a good idea”: Borman and Serling, Countdown, p. 173. Other sources for this account are Shea’s technical diary and Robert Sherrod’s interview with Paul Haney, 7 January 1970. Description of the Goddard Lecture is drawn from the typescript of the speech, provided courtesy of Joseph Shea.

“The dry technical prose of the report”: “Incompetence and Negligence” (editorial), New York Times, 11 April 1967. Note the exquisite placement of the New York Times misspelling of “Apollo.”

16. “You’ve got to start biting somewhere”

Chapter title: NASA history interview with Bastian Hello, 20 December 1968.

Recruiting George Low for ASPO: For Low’s very carefully worded account of this incident, see George Low, “The Spaceships,” in Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, edited by Edgar Cortright (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1975), pp. 59–60.

“I hope you don’t think I’m nuts”: Memorandum from Julian Scheer to George Low, provided courtesy of Judith Wyatt.

“My general impression”: George Low, Apollo Notes to Dr. Gilruth, 18 May 1967. Reprinted with permission of the George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

“North American was positively schizophrenic”: Borman and Serling, Countdown, p. 182.

“No copies to anyone except RRG”: George Low, Apollo Notes to Dr. Gilruth, 26 September 1967. Reprinted with permission of the George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Grumman “needs a Healey”: George Low, Apollo Notes to Dr. Gilruth, 5 October 1967. Reprinted with permission of the George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

“fewer discrepancies than on any spacecraft”: Brooks et al., Chariots, p. 253.

17. “And then on launch day it worked”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Ike Rigell.

The numbering of the Apollo flights: Brooks et al., Chariots, pp. 231–32.

Cracking pressure of eggs as the standard for the crane operators: Benson and Faherty, Moonport, p. 412.

Details of the joining of the stages and the lists of tests also come from Benson and Faherty, Moonport, pp. 412–13.

Description of the problems with the C.D.D.T. are taken from Benson and Faherty, Moonport, pp. 427–28, and Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, pp. 352–55, plus authors’ interviews.

Arthur Rudolph’s history with von Braun: Ordway Sharpe, The Rocket Team, pp. 22–23.

Sequence of operations in the countdown: Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, Appendix B: Saturn V Prelaunch-Launch Sequence.

Sequence of operations in engine start: Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, p. 111.

Mike Collins’s reflections on watching the launch of 501: Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut’s Journey (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1974), p. 286.

18. “We’re going to put a guy in that thing and light it”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Walter Williams.

“It’s almost impossible to describe”: Unpublished manuscript by Walter Williams, NASA History Office, Washington.

19. “There will always be people who want to work in that room”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Michelle Brekke (the first woman flight director).

20. “The flight director may take any necessary action”

Chapter title: From Rule 1-6, from Flight Mission Rules, Apollo 11: “The flight director may, after analysis of the flight, choose to take any necessary action required for the successful completion of the mission”: Provided courtesy of Eugene Kranz. The statement of the rule remained the same throughout the Apollo program.

21. “There was no mercy in those days”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Edward Fendell.

“Specifically, his job is to determine the operational rules”: George M. Low, “Announcement: Chief of Apollo Data Priority Coordination, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office,” 3 August 1967, provided courtesy of Howard W. Tindall, Jr.

“teensy weensy”: Tindallgram, “Transearth midcourse correction philosophy—a major operational breakthrough!” 3 June 1968, provided courtesy of Howard W. Tindall, Jr.

The discussion of the “unbelievable” proposal: Tindallgram, “LM rendezvous radar is essential,” 1 August 1968, provided courtesy of Howard W. Tindall, Jr.

“The present LM weight and descent trajectory”: Tindallgram, “LM DPS low level light fixing,” 25 November 1968, provided courtesy of Howard W. Tindall, Jr.

22. “You’ve lost the engines?”

Chapter title: Clifford Charlesworth, transcribed from the flight director’s loop for Apollo 6.

Details regarding launch times and timing of events during flights, for this and subsequent chapters: Baker, History of Manned Space Flight, especially Tables 7-15 at the back of the book.

Fixes for pogo in A.S.-502: Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, p. 363.

Fix for the engine failures in A.S.-502: Samuel C. Phillips, “The Shakedown Cruises,” in Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, edited by Edgar Cortright (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1975), p. 168; plus authors’ interview with Jerry Thomson.

“Chris Kraft and I agreed”: George Low, Apollo Notes to Dr. Gilruth, 24 May 1968. Reprinted with permission of the George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Low’s first thoughts about a circumlunar flight in 1968: On 19 August 1968, George Low dictated a thirteen-page memorandum for his private files called “Special Notes for August 9, 1968, and Subsequent.” He began by discussing the period of June-July 1968, describing the delays in preparing the first lunar module and stating, “In this time period also the possibility of a circumlunar or lunar orbit mission during 1968, using AS 503 and CSM 103, first occurred to me as a contingency mission to take a major step forward in the Apollo program.” (p. 1) “Special Notes” were provided courtesy of Judith Wyatt. Copies are also filed in the J.S.C. History Office and the George M. Low Papers at Rensselaer.

The August 9 meeting at Marshall: See Samuel Phillips account in “The Shakedown Cruises,” Apollo Expeditions, p. 171, and “Minutes of Meeting Held at MSFC, 9 August 1968, at Dr. Gilruth’s Request,” J.S.C. History Office.

“It doesn’t matter to the launch vehicle”: Attributed to von Braun by George Low, “Special Notes for August 9 and Subsequent,” p. 8.

23. “It was darn scary”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Marty Cioffoletti.

“We’ll have a hell of a time”: Phillips, “The Shakedown Cruises,” Apollo Expeditions, p. 172.

“Mueller was ‘skeptical and cool.’” Phillips, “The Shakedown Cruises,” Apollo Expeditions, p. 172.

“there is no technical reason not to fly Apollo 8”: From an unpublished manuscript by Robert Sherrod, who was present at the meeting, provided courtesy of Robert Sherrod.

“There are grave risks”: Letter from George Mueller to Robert Gilruth, 4 November 1968.

Account of meetings on November 10–11: George Low, “Special notes for November 10 and 11, 1968,” 14 November 1968.

“Suddenly the familiar map of the earth”: Robert Sherrod, unpublished manuscript.

24. “We … we’re go on that, Flight”

Chapter title: Steve Bales, transcribed from the flight director’s loop for Apollo 11.

“Suddenly we were in a very, very free-form world”: Will Bischoff, quoted in Charles R. Pellegrino and Joshua Stoff, Chariots for Apollo: The Making of the Lunar Module (New York: Atheneum, 1985), p. 33. To avoid confusion with Brooks et al., Chariots, the short citation for the Pellegrino and Stoff book will be Lunar Module.

Stories about volatile fuel and pressures in the tanks: Pellegrino and Stoff, Lunar Module, pp. 41–44ff.

The reason for choosing 47,000 feet as the cutoff point for Apollo 10: Wilford, We Reach the Moon, p. 233.

“The Apollo 12 crew was in the simulator”: This detail and others regarding the simulations preceding Apollo 11 were provided courtesy of Eugene Kranz, personal communication, after he had reviewed the simulation logs for that period.

25. “Well, let’s light this sumbitch and it better work”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with Glynn Lunney.

“There’s no telling what it will do”: Pellegrino and Stoff, Lunar Module, p. 167. Their account of the little-known problem with the blocked fuel line, pp. 166–68, is by far the most complete ever published, and is the main source for our description. Additional technical information was obtained from Donald Arabian et al., Mission Evaluation Report: Apollo 11. Such a report was prepared by the Test Division for each of the flights, and was provided to the authors courtesy of Robert Fricke.

Neil Armstrong breaking the arming switch: Pellegrino and Stoff, Lunar Module, pp. 168–69. Additional technical information from Arabian et al., Mission Evaluation Report: Apollo 11.

Mike Collins awaiting Eagle’s liftoff: Collins, Carrying the Fire, p. 418.

Display on the MOCR’s screens after splashdown: Baker, History of Manned Space Flight, p. 358.

26. “I think we need to do a little more all-weather testing”

Chapter title: Pete Conrad, transcribed from the air-to-ground loop for Apollo 12.

Details about the lightning strike: Don Arabian et al., Mission Evaluation Report: Apollo 12; plus authors’ interviews.

27. “You really need to understand that the C.S.M. is dying”

Chapter title: Authors’ interview with John Aaron.

Safety record of manned space flight: Baker, History of Manned Space Flight, Table 27, p. 540.

Swigert’s position as a last-minute replacement: Henry S. F. Cooper, Jr., 13: The Flight That Failed (New York: Dial Press, 1973), pp. 12–13.

“If somebody had thrown that at us in the simulator”: Quoted in Cooper, Flight That Failed, p. 41.

For unusually clear illustrations of the systems involved in the accident, see Lovell, “Houston, We’ve Had a Problem,” in Apollo Expeditions , pp. 252–53.

Account of the history of O2 Tank 2 is drawn from Baker, History of Manned Space Flight, pp. 374 and 387; plus authors’ interviews with Seymour Liebergot and Donald Arabian.