Asquith (19 page)

¹
_{Harcourt was diligent in a parliamentary sense, but he was lazy in a policy sense. As Arthur Acland had written to Asquith on January 20th, 1899, making a contrast with Harcourt’s practice: “ The great strength of Mr. G. and of Chamberlain has been that they were always.. . planning and gathering files of information from others with a view to the future.”
(Asquith Papers,
ix. 164-172).}

Things might now go better. And when Rosebery stood out against the new spirit of closing the existing ranks by attending a dinner of the City Liberal Club on May 5th and appealing again for a new party embodying all the pre-1886 Liberal elements, Asquith sat down on the following day and wrote him a long and vigorous letter of remonstrance:

6th May
,
1899

20 Cavendish Square
,
W.

My dear R,

I am writing in the spirit of friendship: otherwise I should remain silent.

I have read, and re-read, your speech of last night, and the effect upon me—for I have not compared notes with other people, except for two minutes with Spencer—is very depressing.

I do not dwell upon what you say as to the “ decay ” of Parliamentary Liberalism—though I think a kinder and more appreciative phrase might have been employed to describe the uphill endeavours of a small minority fighting against overwhelming odds and exposed to the recurrent loss of former leaders.

But the main and most serious question suggested by your speech is—what are to be the lines of reconstruction of the Liberal Party of the future? You revert to the
status quo
of ’85 as the possible and desirable point of a new departure, with the supplement of a due admixture of “ imperialism.”

This of course to the ordinary intelligence means (1) a repudiation of H(ome) R(ule), either as an immediate or as an ultimate aim of Liberal policy, and (2) a condonation of the constant and malignant activity of the small faction (numerically) but (electorally and politically) the powerful conjugation of ex-Liberal forces which from ’86 to ’99 have been in Parliament our most formidable and relentless foes and in the country the most militant and effective ally of the regular and normal Tory army.

Can it be supposed that Hartington and Chamberlain, and those whom they represent and lead, will find in the existing condition of things, or in any probable or possible remoulding of what is, any tempting inducement to abandon their present allies and return to the old camp? And if, as I think, their recantation is the vainest of dreams, what new principle of reconstruction do you offer to our own party—the men who in bad times and under discouraging conditions, and with every social influence arrayed against them, have stuck to the ship and supported their party? They are to surrender at discretion in order that, perchance, the spectacle of their compliance may—through pity or contempt— reconvert the apostates.

I am—I believe—an Imperialist in your sense and agree with you that the homage which the present government have paid to Imperialism is in the nature of Up-service and not (apart from the hysterics of rhetoric) a real devotion. But what will be said— and not without plausible argument—is that you are seeking to reconstruct the Liberal Party—or to create its successor—on the basis of an amalgam of Unionism and jingoism. This seems to me to offer to the doubting middle voters the maximum of inducement to remain or become Tory, and the minimum of motives to join our own ranks.

I have spoken frankly, and I know that you won’t misinterpret my motives, or question my real friendship and affection.

H.H.A.
^s

The force of this letter was somewhat reduced by the fact that, after he had written it, Asquith decided not to send it. But he kept it carefully amongst his papers, with the inscription “ not sent ” upon the envelope, and it depicted clearly the wide pohtical gulf which had opened between him and Rosebery at this time, and his own agreement with Campbell-Bannerman that the important task was to rally those elements in the Liberal Party which had remained faithful. While this agreement lasted there was hope for the Liberal Party. But it did not last for long.

1
_{This, together with Asquith’s comment when he received Harcourt’s letter that “ no word of any sort or kind (except a letter announcing Lou-Lou’s engagement) had passed between him and me during the autumn ” does not say a great deal for the cohesiveness of the Liberal opposition during parliamentary recesses.}

2
_{Quite reasonably in the circumstances Asquith took no notice of the last sentence of Harcourt’s letter which said: “ I must beg you to treat this communication
as absolutely secret
until the public announcement which must be immediate.”}

3
_{Ferguson and MacArthur, assistant Liberal whips with Roseberyite leanings, had apparently done this on one or two occasions.}

4
_{This was a reference to the persistent influence of Rosebery, and of his strongly committed organ, the
Daily News
, upon certain parts of the Liberal machine; and also, perhaps, to the fact that Ellis did not do as much to counteract this as he might have done.}

5
_{Bo
th Harcourt and Morley wrote in their public exchange as though some challenge to Harcourt’s leadership had been likely to emerge at this meeting; but as in the outcome a proposal at the meeting that Harcourt should be asked to reconsider his decision was not pressed on the ground that it would interfere with the prerogatives of the parliamentary party, this does not seem very plausible}
.

The issue which destroyed this delicate, new-found sense of Liberal unity, and sent Asquith temporarily back into the arms of Rosebery was the war in South Africa. The Boer ultimatum, which precipitated its outbreak, was delivered on October 9th, 1899 and fighting began three days later. This was no storm out of a clear sky. South Africa had been in a state of sustained crisis since the previous February; and in June, Chamberlain, in what he regarded as a most critical speech in Birmingham, had made the country face the possibility of war and had talked of how, “ having undertaken this business (the protection of the ‘ Uitlanders ’ in the Transvaal) we will see it through. ”
^a

At this preliminary stage, however, and even to some extent throughout the first phase of the war itself, the Liberal differences were containable. Although Chamberlain made a correct prognosis when he wrote in July that if it came to war “ the Government could rely upon the vast majority of its own supporters and a minority of the opposition,” Asquith and the other potential members of this minority showed no desire to commit themselves in advance; and this was in spite of the fact that Milner, still writing voluminously to Asquith, was far more in favour of forcing the issue than was Chamberlain. On June 20th the Colonial Secretary had invited Campbell-Bannerman to a private interview and had tried—unsuccessfully—to get his support for a show of force, presenting this not as a prelude to war but as a substitute for it. The only result was that on June 28th the Liberal leader publicly reaffirmed the opposition to military preparations which he had announced eleven days before.

There was no indication at this stage that Asquith disagreed with his chief. On September 2nd he went out of his way to express to his
constituents his disapproval of “irresponsible clamours which we hear from familiar quarters for war.” He saw no problem which could not be solved by " firm and prudent diplomacy"; and while Campbell-Bannerman might not have given as much stress to the firmness as to the prudence, they were still in reasonably close step with one another.
¹

¹
_{After this meeting, which he described as having taken place “ in a small upper room in Leven in the presence of about 100 females, with a small sprinkling of the other sex,” Asquith wrote to express the hope that Campbell-Bannerman would agree with his speech. But he added: “ It would be a mistake to suppose that our people—as a whole—are at all strongly pro-Boer. I talked to one or two representative Liberals before I spoke—Free Church ministers and such—and was rather surprised to find how anti-Kruger and bellicose was their frame of mind.” (
Campbell-Bannerman Papers
, 41210, 171-4).}

The decisive event for Asquith was the Boer ultimatum. “ From it,” his official biographers say, “ ... he ‘ dated as the Mohammedans do from the Hegira"
^b
And as he himself put it nearly two years later: “We (the Liberal Imperialists) held and still hold that war was neither intended nor desired by the Government and the people of Great Britain, but that it was forced upon us without adequate reason, entirely against our will.”
^c
It was in many ways an odd event to treat as an absolute determinant of attitude, especially by one who regarded Chamberlain’s diplomacy as indefensible, for it merely anticipated a British ultimatum which had been approved by the Cabinet on September 29th, and was in the process of delivery by the extraordinarily dilatory method of mail steamer. But this was not fully known at the time, and for the moment Asquith’s view about the outbreak of hostilities did not separate him from Campbell-Bannerman.
¹

¹
_{During the period leading up to hostilities, and the first few days after their outbreak, what separated Campbell-Bannerman from his colleagues, much more than any difference of political outlook, was the English Channel. As was his usual habit he had been at Marienbad since the beginning of August, but was persuaded with great difficulty by Herbert Gladstone (assisted by Asquith) to cut short his holiday and start for England about September 24th. Owing to the state of Lady Campbell-Bannerman’s health, he explained, he then travelled back by the shortest stages heard of since the development of railways. One day’s journey took him only from Frankfurt to Mainz. When he got to Brussels he read a several days’ old copy of
The Times
and decided that the situation had improved sufficiently for him to stay there. He got to London on October 3rd, but went back to Paris on the 7th
to fetch his wife. He was still there when war broke out, and was then delayed at Calais by a Channel storm on October 13 th. As a result the Shadow Cabinet could not meet until October 14th, two days after fighting had begun and five days after the Boer ultimatum. The whole episode illustrated the truth of his description of himself, in his leadership acceptance speech as of “ an easy-going disposition"}

The Liberal leader, in his first speech after the recall of Parliament on October 17th, spoke of the Boers as having “ committed an aggression which it was the plain duty of us all to resist,” and joined with Asquith in abstaining on an unofficial Liberal amendment to the address (moved by Philip Stanhope) censuring the Government’s conduct of the negotiations.

Nevertheless, even at this stage, Campbell-Bannerman’s underlying attitude to the problem of South Africa was not the same as Asquith’s. Bannerman claimed that he was “ anti-Joe, but never pro-Kruger,” and his behaviour throughout made the claim a perfectly reasonable one. Even so, his relatively simple character and nonmetropolitan outlook made him much less impatient of the slow and wily stubbornness of “ Oom Paul ” than was Asquith, with his smoothworking Balliol intellect. Furthermore, if Campbell-Bannerman did feel any hostility towards Kruger it was more than balanced by his distrust of Milner. He believed him to be an opinionated and dangerous man of doubtful judgment. He was nervous of his close relations with Asquith, and he scoffed at what he called the
religio Milneriatia,
a spiritual disease to which he believed Liberal intellectuals, and especially Liberal Balliol intellectuals, to be highly susceptible.