Asquith (61 page)

By the end of 1914 there was widespread discontent with the conduct of the war. The public was disappointed by the absence of quick victories. The generals, the Press and the politicians were on terms of mutual irritation. Within the Cabinet, the most questing minds were looking for some alternative to the bloody stalemate in France which had settled in with the Battle of the Aisne.

On December 29th Churchill wrote to Asquith transmitting Lord Fisher’s scheme for forcing open the Baltic and landing on the flat shore 90 miles north of Berlin. This was certainly preferable, he commented, to sending more armies “ to chew barbed wire in Flanders.” Two days later he wrote again, raising the possibility of an attack on Gallipoli as well as the Baltic landing, and urging a series of daily meetings of the War Council for a thorough review of the whole range of strategic possibilities. “ No topic can be pressed to any fruitful result at weekly intervals,”
^a
he concluded.

Lloyd George also sent a New Year’s Eve letter. He, too, wanted more frequent War Council meetings and the opening up of a new theatre—preferably from Salonika; but he was also full of criticism of the military leaders (including Kitchener) for their incompetence about the supply of ammunition: “Had I not been a witness of their deplorable lack of provision I should not have thought it possible that men so responsibly placed could have displayed so little foresight
.”
^b

Asquith did not treat these communications defensively. “ I have also received today two long memoranda—one from Winston, the other from Lloyd George (quite good, the latter) as to the public conduct of the war,” he wrote to Miss Stanley.... “I am summoning our little ‘ War Council ’ for Thursday and Friday to review the whole
situation....” At these meetings (on January 7th and 8th) and at a subsequent one on January 13 th a more comprehensive piece of forward planning than anything hitherto known was attempted. Unfortunately for our knowledge of Asquith’s state of mind on these occasions, he saw Miss Stanley very quickly after two of them. As a result he communicated most of his impressions verbally instead of by letter. On January 13th, he wrote: “A most interesting discussion, but so confidential and secret that I won’t put anything down on paper, but I will talk fully to you tomorrow. ...” He did however record some comments about personalities:

I maintained an almost unbroken silence until the end, when I intervened with my (four) conclusions. . . . French sat next to me on one side and A.J.B. on the other; next to French, K(itchener), then old Jacky Fisher, Winston and Sir A. Wilson (the Naval Trinity); and beyond them Crewe, Grey and Ll. George. You won’t often see a stranger collection of men at one table. Of the lay disputants the best were A.J.B. and Ll. George. French and K. were polite and almost mealy-mouthed to one another. Happily the great question upon which they are nearly at daggers-drawn (how the new ‘ K ’ armies are to be organised—as separate entities, or intermingled with the old units) tho’ broached, was tacitly postponed to a later and more convenient date. Winston (if such a phrase is possible) showed a good deal of rugged fluency.

Asquith’s four conclusions were sensibly worked out compromises between conflicting views. But these compromises contained the seeds of destruction of the Liberal Government. The great conflict was between “ Easterners ” and “ Westerners,” those on the one hand who were constantly seeking an escape from the Flanders
impasse
, and those on the other who thought that the decisive battles must inevitably be fought in the West and who were consequently hostile to any deflection of resources from the vital theatre. Asquith stood between the two schools, but appreciably nearer to the “ Westerners.” In consequence, while he did not resist the demands of Churchill and Lloyd George for some diversion which would help both ourselves and the Russians, he did not force the military leaders to disgorge from France the men and materials which might have given it a high chance of success.

This was not only because Asquith was tom in his own mind. It was also because he never thought it his duty to impose strategic decisions upon the service chiefs. They were the experts. When they disagreed his duty was to coax them towards agreement. But he would no more have thought it right to issue a directive which ran counter to their united voices than to tell the Lord Chief Justice what judgments he should deliver.

As a result, the caution of the military leaders—and of Kitchener in particular—led to a somewhat half-hearted mounting of the Dardanelles expedition. The original plan was to force the Narrows and to capture both the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople by a purely naval force composed of a large number of semi-obsolete battleships. This plan commanded the support of Kitchener, because it might help Russia without the employment of any British troops, and of Churchill (although he would have liked a more complete commitment), because it offered the prospect of a world-shaking naval victory. It did not command the support of Fisher. The First Sea Lord was never much attracted by the idea of a foray in the Eastern Mediterranean. If any amphibious move was to be attempted he preferred his own plan for a Baltic landing. Still more was he influenced by a naval version of the extreme “ Western ” theory. The great task of the Royal Navy was to defeat the German Grand Fleet in pitched battle. Until that had been accomplished any diversion was dangerous. But if, in spite of the risks, a diversion was to be attempted, it was essential that the army should be involved in the enterprise. Fisher, like the Dardanelles Commission when it came to report in 1917, did not believe that a fleet could capture a peninsula; and his views here were fortified by a growing jealousy of Kitchener’s position.

In all military matters the Secretary of State for War was supreme. He had a politician (H. J. Tennant, Margot Asquith’s brother) under him, who was useful for dealing with the House of Commons, but there was no question of one being over him. Not only was he impregnable in his own department, but he had enough spare prestige to exert considerable influence over naval dispositions. His voice was an important one in favour of the Dardanelles plan, but he gave his blessing to the naval part of the expedition while retaining complete freedom as to whether or not to commit any troops.

Fisher enjoyed no such power in his own department, let alone the right to interfere in others. Above him he had a highly political, determined and argumentative First Lord, who was 34 years his junior. In peacetime and during the early months of the war Churchill and Fisher worked together well enough. The admiral was grateful to the politician for having brought him back into active service; they warmed each other with mutual congratulations on the Navy’s readiness for the conflict; and the fondness of the one for working from the early hours of the morning and of the other for continuing far into the night meant that the high command of the Admiralty was virtually on a shift system and that these two dominant personalities did not see too much of each other. At the close of 1914 Fisher was still concluding letters to Churchill with assurances that he was “ yours till hell freezes.” But alas, as Churchill pointed out in
The World Crisis
, the moment soon came when this improbable event had apparently occurred. As the plans for the Dardanelles were driven forward by the force of Churchill’s eloquence, Fisher became increasingly apprehensive and sulky. On January 28th Asquith wrote: Another personal matter which rather worries me is the growing friction between Winston and Fisher. They came to see me this morning, before the War Council, and gave tongue to their mutual grievances. I tried to compose their differences by a compromise, under which Winston was to give up for the present his bornbardment of Zeebrugge, Fisher withdrawing his opposition to the operation against the Dardanelles. When at the Council we came to discuss the latter—wh. is warmly supported by Kitchener and Grey and enthusiastically by A.J.B.
¹
—old “ Jacky ” maintained an obstinate and ominous silence. He is always threatening to resign & writes an almost daily letter to Winston, expressing his desire to return to the cultivation of his “ roses at Richmond.” K. has now taken on the role of conciliator, for wh. you might think that he was not naturally cut out!

¹
_{What peculiar manifestation of “ enthusiasm ” by Balfour, one wonders, can have caused Asquith, so rarely loose with language, to differentiate between this and the “ warmth ” of Kitchener and Grey?}

Here then was the rift at the Admiralty, which despite the efforts of Asquith, Kitchener and other would-be conciliators was never again to be fully healed. This departmental quarrel eventually brought down a government which over 8½ years had suffered and survived almost every known political vicissitude. Before that could happen, however, the quarrel had to be exacerbated and Conservative distrust of Churchill increased by failure to achieve a quick success in the Dardanelles. These two conditions were abundantly fulfilled by the middle of May. The naval action started reasonably well at the end
of February and reached its first climax on March 18th, when the fleet carried out a major bornbardment and advanced to within a few miles of the Narrows. Had there been troops available for a large-scale landing at this stage, or had the navy pressed on relentlessly on its own, a quick break-through to Constantinople might well have been achieved. But the troops were not available. It was not until March 10th that Kitchener agreed to the despatch from England of the 29th Division, the employment of which had been at issue throughout February; and it was not until March 12th that he gave command of the expeditionary force to Sir Ian Hamilton.

Asquith allowed himself, perhaps against his better judgment, to accept Kitchener’s procrastination. The movement of his mind on the issue is clearly shown by two letters to Miss Stanley. In the first, dated 23rd February, he wrote:

We are all agreed (except K.) that the naval adventure in the Dardanelles slid, be backed up by a strong military force. I say “ except K.,” but he quite agrees in principle. Only he is very sticky about sending out there the 29th Division, which is the best one we have left at home... . One must take a lot of risks in war, and I am strongly of opinion that the chance of forcing the Dardanelles, & occupying Constantinople, and cutting Turkey in half, and arousing on our side the whole Balkan peninsula, presents such a unique opportunity that we ought to hazard elsewhere rather than forgo it. If he can be convinced, well & good: but to discard his advice and overrule his judgment on a military question is to take a great responsibility. So I am rather anxious.

Kitchener was not convinced. And on February 26th Asquith wrote:

Our War Council lasted nearly
2
½
hours. Winston was in some ways at his worst—having quite a presentable case. He was noisy, rhetorical, tactless & temperless—or full. K., I think on the whole rightly, insisted on keeping his 29th Division at home, free to go either to the Dardanelles or to France....

Close on the heels of this military delay there followed an even more damaging piece of naval delay. Paradoxically, it appears to have arisen directly out of Kitchener’s eventual decision to commit a large force to the theatre. After the partially successful bornbardment of March 18th the Turks waited with apprehension for an early renewal of an attack which they were in poor condition to withstand. Such a
renewal was the original intention of de Robeck, the British admiral in command. But on March 22nd he conferred with Hamilton, who had just arrived in the Aegean, and who persuaded him, perhaps without too much difficulty, to wait until the expeditionary force was assembled for a simultaneous thrust.

This news was received by Churchill with incredulity and by Asquith with disappointment.

“Winston came to see me about the Dardanelles,” the Prime Minister wrote late at night on March 24th. “ The weather is infamous there, and the Naval experts seem to be suffering from a fit of nerves. They are now disposed to wait until the troops can assist them in force, which ought to be not later than about April 10th. Winston thinks, and I agree with him, that the ships, as soon as the weather clears, & the aeroplanes can detect the condition of the forts & the position of the concealed guns, ought to make another push; & I hope this will be done.”

But it was not done. Fisher stood out against Churchill's attempt to overrule de Robeck; and, once again, Asquith subordinated his own better (if tentative) judgment to the opinion of the professional experts. The delay which then followed was considerably longer than had been feared. It was April 25th before the combined attack could be mounted. The Turks, under their German commander, used the interval to great advantage. The Gallipoli landings, which took place on a coast which a month before had been deserted and unfortified, met with the stiffest resistance. Casualties were fearful and only the most constricted beachheads could be established. Within a few days the concept of a great war of movement in the Eastern Mediterranean had lost itself in a confrontation as immobile as that which prevailed on the Western Front.