Asquith (75 page)

In the meantime Bonar Law had decided that he had better consult tne other Unionist ministers. It is an extraordinary fact, explicable only by the extent to which he was influenced by Aitken and frightened by Carson, that he had not done this before. He called them together for the afternoon of Thursday, November 30th. Lansdowne, Curzon, Austen Chamberlain, Walter Long, Robert Cecil and F. E. Smith all attended. Did Balfour? Nearly all accounts, following Beaverbrook. say that he did not, owing to illness. But Balfour himself says that he did, and that his influenza did not strike him until later that evening.
⁷
* This discrepancy apart, there is substantial agreement about what took place at this meeting—which was by no means the case with subsequent Unionist gatherings during the crisis. The essence of the agreement lies in the fact that Aitken’s description obtained from Law immediately after the meeting, is confirmed by Austen Chamberlain, who has supplied much the best account of these events to be written by any ministerial participant. But he was not a central participant.

Chamberlain (in a letter to the Indian Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, dated December 8th) described how Law told the meeting of the proposals that he had made to Asquith, with the agreement of Carson and Lloyd George. The Unionist ministers were affronted both by their leader having proceeded so far without consulting them, and with the nature of the proposals themselves. There was no dispute about the need for some considerable change in the machinery of government. But no-one except Bonar Law wanted to do it in such a way as to give Lloyd George complete power. Perhaps not even Bonar Law wanted to do this. He gave Chamberlain the impression that he still wanted Asquith as Prime Minister. But nearly all his colleagues thought
that, whatever his intentions, he was playing directly into the hands of the War Minister. It was at this meeting that Cecil accused him of “ dragging the Conservative Party at the coat-tails of Lloyd George
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’

The Unionist ministers, Chamberlain says, “ made certain alternative proposals ” to Bonar Law. These, however, “ did not commend themselves to (him) who had, it was evident, committed himself too deeply to Carson and Lloyd George.”* The proposals were similar to a scheme which had been put forward by Cecil and provisionally adopted at the Cabinet—the last over which Asquith was ever to preside—on the previous morning. This provided for two small committees instead of one, the first to look after military and foreign affairs and the second to concern itself with the home front. Even if Lloyd George was to secure the chairmanship of the first—and there was no suggestion of this; Hankey, indeed, believed that he might be offered that of the second—he would certainly have to bring in the Prime Minister on matters which overlapped both committees. Bonar Law firmly rejected these proposals, and the Unionist meeting broke up in dissagreement.

Ironically, the preceding 48 hours may have seen Asquith moving a little way towards the Lloyd George/Bonar Law proposals. On the Tuesday he had summoned Hankey to luncheon and told him that he was inclined to support the scheme, provided that matters of personnel could be satisfactorily arranged. But this may not have meant much more than that Asquith was in favour of a small War Committee under his own chairmanship. At any rate, when Lloyd George made his next definite move, on the Friday morning, this was reported, again by Hankey, as having reduced Asquith to a state of mild gloom.

“War Committee at 12.45,” his diary entry for December 1st ran. “ I noticed that the Prime Minister was rather piano and I learned afterwards that Lloyd George had delivered his ultimatum, practically threatening to resign unless the War Committee was reconstituted with himself as Chairman, and demanding that Carson should have a place in the Government and Balfour leave the Admiralty. It is all an intolerable nuisance.. . . ”
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Whether or not Hankey correctly observed Asquith’s mood he gave a moderately accurate summary of what Lloyd George had put to the Prime Minister, in an interview, at noon that day. Lloyd George
had accompanied his words with a brief written memorandum. The essence of this was conveyed in the first three clauses:

(1) That the War Committee consist of three members, two of whom must be the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and deciding all departmental business, and a third Minister without a portfolio. One of the three to be Chairman.

(2) That the War Committee should have full powers, subject to the supreme control of the Prime Minister to direct all questions connected with the war.

(3) The Prime Minister in his discretion to have power to refer any question to the Cabinet.
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This was the first definite proposal for his own exclusion from the War Committee which was put to Asquith. On the other hand the new scheme was in one respect nearer to his own view than the one which had been put to him by Bonar Law on the previous Saturday; the Committee was not to be largely non-departmental, but was to include the two Service ministers. Perhaps for this reason the answer which he returned to Lloyd George, in a letter written that same Friday afternoon (December 1st), was somewhat more conciliatory than the one which he had given to Bonar Law:

My dear Lloyd George,

I have now had time to reflect on our conversation this morning and to study your memorandum.

Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast of the situation, actual and prospective, I am in complete agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the War, and that our methods of procedure, with the experience that we have gained during the last three months, call for reconsideration and revision.

The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done excellent work, are (1) that its numbers are too large, and (2) that there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its decisions.

I might with good reason add (3) that it is often kept in ignorance by the Departments of information, essential and even vital, of a technical kind, upon the problems that come before it; and (4) that it is overcharged with duties, many of which might well be delegated to subordinate bodies.

The result is that I am clearly of opinion that the War Committee should be reconstituted, and its relations to and authority over the Departments be more clearly defined and more effectively asserted. I come now to your specific proposals.

In my opinion, whatever changes are made in the composition or functions of the War Committee the Prime Minister must be its Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter in the background or a referee to the Cabinet.

In regard to its composition, I agree that the War Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty are necessary members. I am inclined to add to the same category the Minister of Munitions. There should be another member, either with or without portfolio, or charged only with comparatively light departmental duties. One of the members should be appointed Vice-Chairman.

I purposely in this letter do not discuss the delicate and difficult question of personnel.

The Committee should, as far as possible, sit
de die in diem
, and have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the Departments.

The reconstruction of the War Committee should be accompanied by the setting up of a Committee of National Organisation, to deal with the purely domestic side of our problems. It should have executive power within its own domain.

The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.

Yours always sincerely,

H. H. Asquith
¹

The difference between these proposals and Lloyd George’s was real but by no means limitless. The small War Committee was common ground, but Asquith was insisting on his own chairmanship, although his suggestions that meetings should be daily and that a vice-chairman should be appointed contained at least a hint that Lloyd George might be allowed to do much of the work on his own. The only other substantial difference about membership lay in the fact that, while they were both agreed that the First Lord of the Admiralty should be included, Asquith wanted Balfour to continue in this office, and Lloyd George wanted him replaced by Carson. Asquith also wanted the parallel “ Home Front ” committee, which Lloyd George
did not, but this point only had major significance if, with the Prime Minister firmly excluded, the chairman of the other body were seeking effective Prime Ministerial powers without the name. It was therefore subordinate to the first disagreement.

Lloyd George found Asquith’s reply “ entirely unsatisfactory.” He was in no doubt that he would fight on the issue. What was less certain was whether Bonar Law would fight with him. Lord Beaver-brook said that this question was in doubt until late on the Friday, but not after that. But it is not clear, either from Beaverbrook’s detailed account of events and conversations or from Mr. Robert Blake’s biography, what factors finally swung Bonar Law over to a completely committed position. During the earlier part of the day the pressures had been the other way. He had the disturbing memories of his isolation at the Unionist meeting the previous afternoon, which were fortified by a letter from Lansdowne complaining that these proceedings had left “ a nasty taste ” in his mouth. Then, at the end of the morning, Lloyd George showed Law his memorandum and reported on his interview with Asquith. Law was disturbed both at the extent to which Asquith was to be excluded and at the demand, which Lloyd George told him he had put forward, for the removal of Balfour from the Admiralty.

That evening Aitken dined alone with Law at the Hyde Park Hotel and exercised all his powers of persuasion in favour of Lloyd George. He was sufficiently successful for Law, towards the end of the meal, to say that he wanted to see Lloyd George at once. “ I had the means of finding Lloyd George at that time at any hour of the day or night,” Aitken wrote; and he set off in a taxi, accompanied by Law, to exploit his knowledge.

Lloyd George was the guest of Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of England, in the public restaurant of the Berkeley Hotel. The other members of the party were Edwin and Venetia Montagu. Lord Reading joined them after dinner. Montagu’s position throughout the crisis was openly equivocal. His personal attachment to Asquith was extreme. A year or so before he had written to him:

In all the things that matter, in all the issues that frighten, in all the apprehensions that disturb, you show yourself clear-sighted and self-possessed, ready to help, to elucidate, to respond, to formulate, to lead, to inspire. That’s why loving you and following you is so easy and so profitable; it’s worth while all the time.
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Montagu also had a high regard for Lloyd George. He saw the crisis as the tragedy of “ two great men of England. .. being slowly but surely pushed apart.” This result he attributed to the evil geniuses of Carson and Northcliffe operating upon the one, and of McKenna upon the other. His own endeavour throughout was to assist a solution which would marry the “ fertile, ever-working imagination and constructive power ” of Lloyd George with Asquith’s “ incomparable capacity for mastering a particular case at once, detecting the vital considerations, discarding the bad arguments, and giving a clear and right decision.” He and Reading were the only Liberals who kept open their lines of communication with both camps. Montagu, in particular, was indefatigable (although ineffective) in trying to arrange a compromise.

On the occasion of this Berkeley Hotel dinner he was able to do little in this direction. He found Lloyd George “ very disturbed and distrait, very little conversation occurred between us and he was called away.”
ⁿ

It was Aitken who did the calling. He beckoned from the comer of the restaurant and Lloyd George responded immediately. He knew that Law was the crucial man to influence. They joined the Unionist leader in the waiting taxi and drove back together to the Hyde Park Hotel. Lloyd George had already received Asquith’s reply to his memorandum, but it seems likely that he did not show it to Law that night; perhaps he did not have it with him. With or without it, he made the most delicate use of his persuasive powers. Aitken records that he “ exercised consummate tact.” By the following morning he felt certain enough of his man to send Law the following note:

December 2nd, 1916

My dear Bonar,

I enclose copy of P.M.’s letter.

The life of the country depends on resolute action by you

now.

Yours ever,

D.
Lloyd George
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Asquith in the meantime was behaving with his usual aplomb. He had made plans to go to Walmer for the Saturday night and Sunday, and he intended to stick to them. Reading endeavoured to dissuade
him, and received the curious reply that “ he (Asquith) was told that Carson was in the neighbourhood of Walmer and was very anxious to see him and discuss the matter.”
¹
Before going the Prime Minister again summoned Hankey to lunch at Downing Street. The latter wrote in his diary for that day:

I suggested a solution to the Prime Minister, but it was not well received. .. . Very shortly after lunch the Prime Minister left by motor for Walmer Castle. It was very typical of him that in the middle of this tremendous crisis he should go away for the weekend! Typical both of his qualities and of his defects; of his extraordinary composure and of his easy-going habits. After lunch, at Mrs. Asquith’s request, I saw Bonar Law, and learned from him that he had called a party meeting of Unionist Cabinet members for the following day, and that he would probably “ send a letter ”
(viz.
of resignation) after it. He explained that he must do this in order not to appear in the eyes of his party to be dragged at the heels of Lloyd George. ... Bonar Law told me that he might put off his party meeting if he was sure that Lloyd George would not resign first.... So I went after Reading... . Reading, however, had only been able to persuade Lloyd George to postpone action until tomorrow. I went back to Bonar Law, but this was not good enough for him and he decided to go on with his party meeting. So back to Downing Street where we arranged that Bonham Carter should follow the Prime Minister to Walmer and bring him back tomorrow morning. I walked home with Reading. We both agreed that the whole crisis is intolerable. There is really very little between them. Everyone agrees that the methods of the War Committee call for reform. Everyone agrees that the Prime Minister possesses the best judgment. The only thing is that Lloyd George and Bonar Law insist that the former and not the Prime Minister must be the man to run the war.... The obvious compromise is for the Prime Minister to retain the Presidency of the War Committee with Lloyd George as Chairman, and to give Lloyd George a fairly free run for his money. This is my solution.
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