Assholes (2 page)

Our definition, in other words, is a
constructive proposal
. It tries to articulate what we ordinarily mean when we speak of “assholes” but ultimately stands or falls on whether it captures the importance assholes have for us—where the “us” is, in the first instance, you and me. I am proposing the definition in light of importance that assholes have for us. You decide whether you agree.
⁸

Before considering the details of our theory, we will first follow philosophical practice and ask what kind of theory we are looking for. We can then “test” a given theory—including the one just stated—by considering whether it explains what we are trying to explain. This gives us a modicum of control in a messy enterprise.

We begin with a puzzle. Although some assholes take a staggering toll on the lives of others, many assholes are not bad
in this way: the costs they impose upon other people may be moderate or small. Yet they are still clearly morally reprehensible. How could that be? Why would we be deeply bothered even by a person who makes little material difference to our lives?

In other words, we might put the puzzle this way. There are at least three things we should want from a good theory of assholes, but it is not immediately obvious how all three might be true.

The first is straightforward: we are looking for a stable trait of character, or type of person—a
vice
rather than a particular act, mere lapse in conduct, or brief phase of life. A single courageous or magnanimous act does not make for a courageous or magnanimous person. Nor does an occasional impatient or self-absorbed or foolish act make someone into an impatient or self-absorbed or foolish person. In the same way, someone can
act like
an asshole—in a particular situation or over a particular day or week—without really, ultimately,
being
an asshole.
⁹
When the assholish behavior doesn’t reflect the kind of person someone generally is, stably, in his life, he is better classified as a
jerk
, a
boor
, a
cad
, a
schmuck
, or a mere ass. What we want to understand, in the first instance, is the sort of person for whom assholish acts are quite
in
character, and indeed routine, because they
do
generally reflect the type of person he stably is. In particular, our target is the
average proper asshole
. We first seek neither the “royal asshole,” who is distinguished even among assholes, nor the “borderline asshole,” whose status
as an asshole is not entirely clear. We want to identify the mean asshole between these extremes: your normal, everyday asshole.

This also means that we should not think first of extreme cases such as Hitler, Stalin, or Mussolini. There are not enough harsh names for these figures, and it is fine to add “asshole” to the list. But it would be deeply offensive to
only
call Hitler or Stalin an asshole; there are much more important ways to describe them morally. At least initially, the
mere
asshole is a less confusing test case.

It should be said that we do not mean to prematurely close the possibility that talk of “assholes” really isn’t about any stable trait of character at all but is merely a form of swearing or term of abuse.
¹⁰
We certainly do swear at people and use this term, as when one says, “You disgust me, asshole!” Many more clearly descriptive terms (“coward” or “bully,” for example) lack the same special expressive power. But the term “asshole” can be expressive and
also
pick out a real feature of persons. It would not be incoherent to say of someone, without disapproval, “He is my friend, and he is fine to me personally, but I have to admit he is an asshole.” One might wonder why someone who said this stays friends with an asshole, but the statement could be
quite
true
and known to all: the person spoken of is, in fact, an asshole.
¹¹

The second and third things a theory of assholes should explain are related and must be handled with greater care. The second thing to explain is that most assholes are
not
morally beyond the pale, unlike, say, a murderer, rapist, or tyrant. Most assholes are not
that
bad. One post in the Urban Dictionary has it that “[an asshole is] the worst kind of person.… If you’re an asshole, you are disgusting, loathsome, vile, distasteful, wrathful, belligerent, agoraphobic, and more.… [Assholes] are the lowest of the low. They transcend all forms of immorality.”
¹²
This is overwrought and unhelpful. We can agree that the worst kinds of people can
also
be assholes, but it is not helpful to think first of people at the bottom of the moral barrel—the Hitlers, Stalins, or Mussolinis—since their corruption is wildly over-determined. As suggested earlier, the mere asshole is a clearer target of inquiry and, in any case, often not among the lowest of the low. We are quite justified in removing a murderer or a rapist or a tyrant from society by force, in handcuffs and at the point of a gun; the material costs such people impose upon others are enormous and often beyond repair. But the material costs many assholes impose upon others—a longer wait in line, a snide remark, a ruined afternoon—are often by comparison moderate or very small. It would be indefensible to forcibly remove them from society. Which is of course why we are often stuck interacting with them, why they seem to be everywhere.

And yet—and this is the third thing we need to explain—assholes are still repugnant people. Despite the fact that the material costs they impose are often moderate or small, assholes are rightly upsetting, even morally outrageous. Something else is deeply bothersome about them, something beyond mere material costs: something bad enough to drive an otherwise coolheaded person into a fit of rage;
¹³
something that lingers in one’s memory like a foul stench; something that warrants a name we use for a part of the body we hide in public, a part of the body that many people feel alienated from and perhaps wish
wasn’t there.
¹⁴
It is this bothersome “something” that we want to expose.

To summarize, then, our three requirements for a good theory of assholes are as follows. We are looking for (1) a stable trait of character, (2) that leads a person to impose only small or moderate material costs upon others, (3) but that nevertheless qualifies the person as morally repugnant.

Yet how could a person who imposes only small or modest costs upon others nevertheless count as morally reprehensible? What way of being could possibly be like that? This is not exactly a paradox. It is an interesting puzzle.

Recall our theory: a person counts as an
asshole
just in case he systematically allows himself to enjoy special advantages in interpersonal relations out of an entrenched sense of entitlement that immunizes him against the complaints of other people. This theory answers our challenge by zeroing in on a particular, distinctive way of being morally reprehensible. We can bring this out by considering the way our theory is
moral
through and through.

We should pause, however, to worry about overmoralizing. When the writer David Foster Wallace calls John Updike’s character Ben Turnbull an asshole (with the clear implication
that Updike is an asshole as well), the main ground for this is Turnbull’s (and Updike’s) general self-absorption, not his moral faults.
¹⁵
We will agree that self-absorption is crucial. We will also admit that there are more general uses of the term “asshole,” which we discuss later on. We start with the central, moral case.

According to our theory, the asshole does what he does out of a “sense of entitlement,” a sense of what he
deserves
, or is
due
, or has a
right
to. However misguided, the asshole is
morally motivated
. He is fundamentally different from the psychopath, who either lacks or fails to engage moral concepts, and who sees people as so many objects in the world to be manipulated at will. The asshole takes himself to be
justified
in enjoying special advantages from cooperative relations. Given his sense of his special standing, he claims advantages that he thinks no one can reasonably deny him. He is
resentful
or
indignant
when he feels his rights are not respected, in much the same way a fully sociable, cooperative person is.

Assholes and fully cooperative people simply have very different moral views of what their respective entitlements are. To bring out the difference, compare the point of view of “fully cooperative” people. Fully cooperative people, we may say,
see themselves as equals, as having grounds for special treatment only in special circumstances that others will equally enjoy at the appropriate times
. Here are several examples.

On one’s birthday, one expects to receive special indulgences from one’s friends, such as a party, a round of drinks, or a celebratory phone call. Yet all count as equals because everyone is assigned one such day of celebration each year on or around the calendar day of each person’s birth. If you are celebrating my existence now, I will be celebrating your existence at some point during the year.

The practice of forming a queue will degenerate into a scrum unless people by and large are willing to wait in the line. Yet it would be acceptable for you to cut to the front when you explain that there is a real emergency. You then receive a benefit because others accept a certain burden: if they weren’t waiting in line, there would be no line for you to cut in, and you might not be to able work your way to the front in a scrum. But under exigent circumstances, people of course understand. They will do likewise when an emergency comes up in their lives.

Two people will have a successful conversation, in which both speak and both are understood, only when each listens while the other talks and each is given a good amount of speaking time. Yet it is fine to interrupt someone speaking in order to make an especially important point, even if one’s excitement to make the point simply gets the best of one. We give each other this privilege, and we are happy to work around occasional interventions, as long as we both feel our conversation is moving along just fine.

Being someone’s friend requires consistent efforts to think of and present the friend in a good, supportive light. Yet it can be fine to point out a flaw, as gentle teasing or in order to crack a good joke. The joke can come at the friend’s expense if its “price” in discomfiture is low—low enough so that the friend is happy to pay for the sake of a laugh.

We might generalize from these examples in the following way. In each case, there are both normal expectations and special circumstances in which those expectations are, for certain parties, to be set aside. Those who happen to wind up in the special circumstances are permitted to take special benefits, advantages, or treatment, but not because they are themselves special. All are seen as, at bottom, equals. Each will have days of special privilege, as the occasion (e.g., birthday) arises in the normal course of things. And as long as we each take special advantages for good reasons of the right kinds—there really is a grave emergency—no one will be terribly bothered about how the exact distribution of benefits and burdens falls out. We say, “It will all work out in the end,” not as a
prediction
about the future (when is “the end”?) but as a vote of confidence: if we really are working together in good faith, accommodating one another for what we can each regard as good reasons of the right sorts, that would in and of itself realize a kind of relationship we could really value, quite aside from the outcomes that fate and circumstance ultimately bring.

The asshole, by contrast, sees no need to wait for special circumstances to come his way in the normal course of things. The asshole feels entitled to allow himself special advantages as he pleases systematically, across a wide range of social interactions. He cuts in line,
and
interrupts often,
and
drives without particular care,
and
persistently highlights people’s flaws. He rides people with wearing comments—veiled criticisms, insinuating questions, or awkward allusions to topics not normally discussed in polite company. He is often rude or more often borderline nasty. One feels he has just been intrusive or inconsiderate, though one can’t always pinpoint the norm of courtesy he has tread upon. Most important, the asshole gains special
advantages from interpersonal relations, not by stroke of continuous luck, but because he regards himself as special. His circumstances are special in each case, in his view, because
he
is in them. If one is special on one’s birthday, the asshole’s birthday comes every day.

None of this is to say that the asshole never shows restraint. Some assholes are indeed scrappy, acting unreflectively on any inclination and whim, though with varying degrees of success. The witty and charming asshole, however, will get away with more than a dull asshole can. A quite different stripe of asshole shows “principled” restraint when the advantages come too easily. Taking every last advantage, without at least a slight challenge, may seem beneath him, even undignified. He may, so he says, have better, perhaps nobler things to do with his precious time. The “dignified asshole” will share our displeasure with the scrappy asshole and may even hold a special contempt for his lax and unprincipled ways. Yet the dignified asshole is not so “principled” as to forgo the systematic enjoyment of special advantages; he may simply be especially good at justifying the special advantages he takes in his own eyes, by concocting “principled” rationalizations on the fly.