Atlantic Fury (2 page)

‘Quite so. But they are nevertheless committed to this operation and are merely withdrawn to Squadron Headquarters at Portsmouth for re-fit. They are replaced by an RASC trawler. Not so costly perhaps, but still pretty expensive. In addition, a helicopter is periodically required to deliver mail.'

Throughout this interchange the DRA explained to me that he was very much on the defensive. He knew the operation could not be justified on grounds of cost alone. ‘It's the men,' he said. ‘They feel cut off if they don't get regular mail. In any case, we've already decided to dispense with the trawler this winter and rely on Army helicopters for mail and relief of personnel. An experiment recommended by Colonel Standing, the Range Commandant. We've yet to find out how it will work. Conditions for helicopter flying are not all that good, particularly after the end of October.'

‘That's merely a matter of detail,' the Director of Finance said. ‘I have been into all this very carefully. Correct me if I'm wrong, but as I understand it the only maintenance required on the really vital equipment, the radar, is that it should be run once a day, mainly to warm it up. One man's work for a few hours each day. To keep him there you apparently require over thirty men …'

‘I've reported on this to the Secretary for War more than once,' the DRA cut in. ‘The tracking station cost a lot to establish. It isn't only the radar that has to be maintained. There's the camp, the vehicles, the boats; to abandon Laerg for seven months in the year would result in rapid deterioration through gales and the salt in the atmosphere. Moreover, trawlermen use Shelter Bay in the winter – Norwegians, Belgians, French, Spanish, as well as Scots. There wouldn't be much left of our installations if there were nobody there to guard them.'

At this point the Permanent Under-Secretary intervened. ‘I don't think we need query the number of men involved or the necessity for maintaining the station throughout the year in present circumstances. Presumably this was all gone into at the time and agreed as unavoidable. What we have to decide now is whether or not Laerg has become redundant in view of this new equipment we've been offered. You've had a report on it, I believe. The results of the trials were very impressive, I thought.'

The DRA didn't say anything. He was staring out of the window at the cloudless blue of the sky. From where he sat he looked across the pale stone outline of the Horseguards to the trees in St James's Park. They were still in summer leaf. It had been a mild autumn and so fine were the yellow brush strokes of the early frosts that only a painter's eye would have discerned the warning breath of winter in that green canvas. The DRA was not a painter. His hobby, he explained to me, was bird-watching and he was wishing he had been able to find time to visit Laerg during the nesting season. The room was hot and airless, full of smoke, and the sun slanted golden bars of light across the table.

‘Before we finally make up our minds, perhaps we should hear what Ordnance Board have to say about it.' The Permanent Under-Secretary reached for the phone and asked for the Colonel who had conducted the trials to be sent in. The discussion that followed was technical, and as the equipment concerned was secret the DRA did not discuss it with me. He did, however, say that it was American equipment and that he had pointed out that it would be costly to install. To this the Permanent Under-Secretary had replied, ‘But as they are using the range themselves they are offering it to us on a long-term credit basis.' That, the DRA told me, was the decisive factor. The matter was settled and what happened later stemmed from that moment, for the Permanent Under-Secretary was under considerable pressure. ‘I'd like to be able to report to the PM,' he said, ‘that you'll have your men and equipment off the island and the station closed down, say by the end of the month. Would that be possible?'

‘I suppose so. It depends on the weather.'

‘Naturally. But we're in for a fine spell now. I heard the forecast this morning.'

‘Laerg is over six hundred miles north of here and it's getting late in the season.'

‘All the more reason to hurry it.'

The DRA was not disposed to argue. He had held his appointment for less than six months, and anyway he was wondering how to handle the next item on the agenda, which was of far more importance to the Artillery than Laerg. ‘I've no doubt we'll manage,' he said and made a note on his pad to instruct his Brigadier General Staff.

The BGS, questioned by the President of the Court Martial about the DRA's acceptance of that time limit, made the point that some such limit was essential in an operation of this kind. If the evacuation were not completed before the winter gales set in, there would be little likelihood of getting the men and equipment off that winter. Even a partial failure to complete it would necessitate the maintenance of the station probably until the spring, with all the attendant problems of supply aggravated by the fact that essential stores would be lacking. ‘Without a time limit,' he said, ‘the operation would have lacked the necessary atmosphere of urgency.'

Unfortunately, all the items on the agenda could not be dealt with that afternoon and the conference was resumed again at ten the following morning. As a result, the Brigadier General Staff received his instructions about Laerg in the form of a hurriedly dictated memo that listed some half-dozen other items for his immediate attention. The BGS was a keen yachtsman, and though he had never sailed in the Hebrides, he was able to appreciate better than most people in the War Office the difficulties that could arise in an evacuation involving landing craft operating across an open beach. With the weekend imminent he decided to shelve the matter until Monday when Brigadier Matthieson was due in London. He marked it in his diary for the morning of October 11, the final decision to be taken after discussion with the DRA. Meantime, he teleprinted Matthieson at Scottish Command ordering him to have a plan of operations prepared for the immediate withdrawal of all stores, equipment and personnel.

Having established that there was a delay of four vital days between the DRA's original agreement to the principle of evacuation and the final decision to go ahead, I should perhaps add that only exceptional circumstances would have produced speedier action, and in this case the exceptional circumstances had not arisen. The pressure at this stage was from the Permanent Under-Secretary, not from the weather; a full two weeks was to elapse before that freak meteorological brew began to ferment in the sea areas Bailey, Hebrides and Faeroes. There was, in any case, a good deal of preliminary work to be done. In particular, the agreement of the RASC to the use of the landing craft had to be obtained and the plan itself worked out. This last the DRA, Scottish Command, brought with him to London so that once it was agreed it only needed an executive order to start the thing moving.

After reading the plan and discussing it with Matthieson, the BGS took him in to see the General. It was then just after midday and again the weather was fine in London, the sun shining out of a clear sky. In describing this meeting to me, Matthieson made it clear that though the DRA was under considerable pressure at the time and obviously determined to proceed with the evacuation, he had, nevertheless, been at some pains to allay any fears his subordinates might have. ‘I suppose you're worrying about the weather,' was his opening remark. ‘Naturally, I raised the point myself. The Permanent Under-Secretary was not impressed. The sun was shining and it was damnably hot in his room.' He glanced towards the windows. ‘The sun is still shining. Did you listen to the shipping forecast this morning?' This to the BGS. And when he admitted he hadn't, the General said, ‘Well, I did. Made a special point of it. I know you sailing types. There's a high pressure system covering the British Isles and the nearest depression is down in the German Bight. As to the alternative we've been offered, the responsibility rests with Ordnance Board. I made that perfectly plain. If it doesn't work …'

‘Oh, I expect it'll work, sir,' the BGS said.

‘Well, what's worrying you then?'

‘Apart from the weather – Simon Standing.'

‘Standing? He's one of our best instructors.'

‘That's just the trouble. He's a wizard at ballistics, but this is his first independent command and if anything went wrong …'

‘Have you any reason to suppose that anything is going to go wrong?'

‘Of course not. All I'm saying is that this operation doesn't call for the qualities that make a brilliant Instructor-in-Gunnery. It calls for a man of action.'

‘Fine. It will give him some practical experience. Isn't that why you recommended him for the job? Practical experience is essential if he is to go on getting promotion at his present rate. How old is he?'

‘Thirty-seven, thirty-eight.'

‘That makes him just about the youngest I.G. with the rank of full Colonel. And he's ambitious. He'll make out all right. I seem to remember he's got Hartley as his second-in-command. Met him at Larkhill. Excellent at administration and a sound tactician. Just the man Simon needs.'

‘Unfortunately he's in hospital – jaundice.'

‘I see. Well, there's an adjutant presumably.'

‘Young fellow by the name of Ferguson. He's not very experienced.'

‘And you're not happy about him?'

‘I can't say that. I don't know anything about him. He's only twenty-six, just promoted Captain and filling in a vacancy.'

‘What's wrong with him then?'

‘Well …' I don't think BGS wanted to go into this, but it was essential to the point he was making. ‘His record shows that he volunteered for paratrooping and didn't complete the course.'

‘Funked his jumps?'

‘Something like that. He was posted to BAOR.'

‘All right then. Get on to AG6. Have them post somebody up there temporarily just to hold Simon's hand – an older man with practical experience. The AGG ought to be able to rake up somebody to fill in for a few weeks. Anything else on your mind?'

‘Only the timing. The operation had been planned on the basis of completing by the end of the month, but nobody can possibly guarantee that. Fortunately we'd agreed to Standing's idea of cutting the size of the wintering unit and maintaining contact by helicopter. As a result one of the huts had already been dismantled. Nevertheless, I must emphasise that the maintenance of a planning schedule as tight as this depends entirely on the continuance of the present fine weather.'

‘Of course. That's understood. Service Corps have already made it clear that they're not taking any chances with their landing craft. And rightly.' He turned to Matthieson. ‘That satisfy you?'

Matthieson hesitated. He was well aware of the dangers. He told me he had tried to visit Laerg twice and each time had been turned back by bad weather. He had held his present post for almost two years and he knew the difficulties that must arise if conditions deteriorated and the operation became a protracted one. But this was only the second interview he had had with the DRA since the General's appointment. Doubtless he felt it wasn't the moment to voice his misgivings. My impression is that he decided to play his luck. At any rate, all he apparently said was, ‘Captain Pinney, the present Detachment Commander, is pretty experienced; so is the skipper of one of the landing craft – the other was a replacement halfway through the season. Still, I think the whole thing should go off quite smoothly.' However, to cover himself, he added, ‘But Laerg can be the devil if it blows up and we're getting on towards winter in the north.'

The DRA nodded. ‘Well that settles it then. We pray for fine weather and get on with the job, eh? Signal them to go ahead with the operation right away.'

And so the decision was finally agreed. Matthieson sent off the necessary signal and the BGS phoned about the temporary attachment of an officer to assist Standing.

He was immediately offered a Major George Braddock.

The reason given by the AGG for recommending this particular officer was that he wanted to be posted to the Hebrides. Not only had Braddock written twice from Cyprus, where he commanded a battery, but a few days before he had sought a personal interview with the AGG to press the matter. He had then just arrived in London on leave.

To the BGS it seemed the perfect answer to the problem. Braddock was about forty, his rank was right, and so was his record. He had an MC and two Mentions in Dispatches, awarded during the last war, as well as an excellent record during the Malayan trouble. Moreover, he was in England and immediately available. Locating him took a little time. His wife, who with her two children lived at Hertford, had apparently been separated from him for a number of years and did not know where he was. All she could say was that he liked fishing and usually went to Wales for his leave. He was eventually traced to a Country Club near Brecon. By then it was late at night and Braddock didn't reach London until the following afternoon.

That was Tuesday and as far as I can gather that was the day Ed Lane arrived in Lyons. I suppose almost every disaster requires something to trigger it off – a catalyst, as it were.
A decision that calls for action involves men, and men cannot escape their own natures … their basic characters
. In writing that I believe my brother was thinking of this Canadian businessman from Vancouver. Lane wasn't, of course, involved in the operation. He was probing Braddock's background and to that extent he exerted a pressure on events and was, in a sense, the catalyst. He had seen Braddock in Cyprus a fortnight before and had then gone on to the Middle East on business for his firm. Now that business was finished and he was free to concentrate on his private affairs. Whilst Braddock was travelling up to the War Office, Lane was interviewing one of the few people who could help him in his inquiries.