Attack on Pearl Harbor (51 page)

Only by proving what the midget submarine did do could all other courses of action be eliminated. In the case of the fifth midget submarine, there are witnesses that saw evidence of her attack on the
St. Louis
, but if the torpedo misses, there are always those who can claim that the witnesses were mistaken.

Without concrete proof, there will be no curbs on speculation. Theories, no matter how unlikely, will continue to be explored by ratings-inclined television producers or researchers.

A lingering possibility exists that the American copy of the photograph that started the controversy simply had a smudge or imperfection that only looks like a submarine. The area of the photograph under question is tiny.

The Japanese originally used this photograph during their BDA assessment. They annotated the photograph in detail, down to mentioning the torpedo tracks in the loch. They examined the original of this photograph very closely. There was no mention of midget submarines on their copies.

The last word on this controversy ought to be left to the Japanese. A program on NHK Broadcasting,
The Mystery of Pearl Harbor: The Tragedy of the Special Submarines
was broadcast on 6 December 2009. It was a joint production with the US Public Broadcasting station WGBH, which funded and broadcast the
Killer Sub in Pearl Harbor
program, and used much of the same footage.

To the Japanese audience the program renounced their government’s previous report that one of their midget submarines sank
Arizona
. They concluded that the fifth midget submarine expended its torpedoes against
St. Louis
. The midget submarine crews were appropriately honored for their bravery and sacrifice.

Conclusion

The West Loch theory has several components that could represent single point failures; for example, if the torpedoes could be somehow confirmed as being fired outside the harbor. But there are also single pieces of evidence that, if discovered, could signal the theory is correct; for example, discovery of an intelligence report of a dud Type 97 torpedo recovered from the vicinity of Battleship Row, or reports dealing with a previously unknown midget submarine salvaged from the West Loch.

Until such evidence is discovered, the search will continue. If the theory is eventually confirmed, its proponents will have achieved one of the more remarkable cases of historical detective work in modern history.

Evaluation of the Midget Submarine Operation

The midget submarine operation was only scheduled after a personal appeal to Yamamoto. He authorized it over the opposition of most of the air staff officers, who feared that the midget submarines might be detected. Yamamoto’s emotional decision ought to have been overridden by cold calculation.

Crews were killed in training when depth control was lost and the submarines nosed into the bottom muck and could not surface. American anti-submarine technology and tactics were known to be good.
³²
With all these factors in play, all that could be expected even by the most optimistic planners was that one or two submarines might penetrate into the harbor and achieve a hit, maybe two.

The downside was huge. If detected, the element of surprise could be lost for the attack as a whole. The Americans would be given hours to go on alert, shift their mental outlook into wartime thinking, and ready themselves for war. The attacking aircraft would lose the element of surprise and possibly be greeted by the defenses outlined in
Chapter 9
. The cream of the Imperial Naval Carrier Aviation Corps was at risk.

Any Western naval officer who accepted such odds would be labeled a fool. But the Imperial Japanese Navy did not operate on Western standards of rationality, but rather depended upon the “favor of providential help” and the “supremacy of mental power.”
³³
To any other way of thinking, risking thousands of men and the future of your country in order to accommodate the knight-errant ambitions of a few junior officers in an unproven weapon makes no sense whatsoever.

But, to deny young warriors such a chance for glory? That was not Yamamoto’s way of war.

Most of the historical treatment of the Pearl Harbor attack has centered upon the human tragedy of the events and the story of the decisions that shaped those events. This analysis has developed a dramatically new assessment of the Pearl Harbor attack. This, in turn, requires a reassessment of some of the key participants.

The Americans

General Short, Commander of Pearl Harbor’s Defenses

Pearl Harbor was supposed to be a sanctuary, a place where the Pacific Fleet could rest, break down equipment for maintenance (including AA guns and directors), and allow crews rest and liberty, all of which were needed considering the Fleet’s intense training schedule. General Short, the commander in charge of the air and ground defenses of the islands, was tasked to provide that sanctuary.

He had maintained a high level of alert up until the eve of the attack. Then, inexplicably, after receiving a “war warning” message, he returned the ammunition to the magazines, parked the mobile AA batteries in storage, allowed the fighter pilots off base, allowed fighters to be placed out of service for maintenance, and locked up their ammunition in hangars. The Air Information Center remained inoperative. In effect, he disarmed his air defenses.

Fearful of the Islands’ Japanese immigrants and nationalized citizens, he made the decision to park his aircraft wingtip-to-wingtip as an anti-sabotage measure, rather than dispersing them into their revetments.

This was all done after he received intelligence that war was imminent and that the Japanese fleet was on the move. It was as if he knew that the war was coming but rejected any possibility of an attack on the islands, so he was giving his men a last weekend of rest before the balloon went up.

General Short had sufficient forces and equipment to do his job. If the AIC had been active and his air defenses alert, the Army defenders would likely have given the Japanese a very bloody nose and the fleet would have been well defended. The anti-sabotage parking measure alone tripled the US aircraft losses on the ground.

General Short was held responsible for his decisions, and rightly so.

Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Many feel that Kimmel was ill-treated and made a scapegoat. Kimmel argued that Washington withheld information that would have prompted different decisions. Placing that aside, he remains worthy of censure on other grounds.

Kimmel was responsible for deep reconnaissance around the islands. His argument for not fulfilling this responsibility was that he had insufficient aircraft for a continuous, full 360-degree search over the months of the developing war crisis, the only kind he contended would be useful. Such patrolling would indeed have worn his force to the nub quickly.

However, short-term patrols during high-risk periods were possible. Before 7 December Kimmel had in hand a “war warning” message from Washington, something truly special, and well beyond previous advisories of rising tensions or the status of negotiations. He also had reports of major Japanese fleet units moving towards an invasion of Southeast Asia—in fact, 90% of the Japanese Navy was underway on 6 December 1941. This should have triggered a decision to initiate patrolling.

His intelligence chief reported he had lost track of the Japanese carriers. Kimmel asked the right question: “Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head this minute and we wouldn’t know?” He did not act on the answer.

Kimmel’s own instructions to the fleet highlighted the possibility of a Japanese aerial attack. Instead, he, too, gave his men the weekend off. A reasonable alternative, never mentioned, was the possibility of employing an “Outer Air Patrol” designed to detect incoming air raids. Such a patrol could have detected the approach of the Japanese air strike and provided 40 minutes warning. An Outer Air Patrol was doctrine in the fleet while underway,
¹
and required far fewer aircraft than those needed for a 700nm, 360-degree search. Forty minutes would have been sufficient to disperse the aircraft on the ground,
²
get any “ready” fighters aloft, and make the ships and their AA defenses ready to repel attackers.

The most significant deficiency was that the Air Information Center was inactive. Had the AIC been up and operational, 40 minutes warning would have been given the fleet and the Army AA units. Kimmel bears a portion of the responsibility for not insisting that the AIC be activated after its successful operational test. Lack of manpower was the excuse for not activating the Center. Kimmel could have provided the needed Navy officers and ought to have insisted that the Army follow suit.

Kimmel knew his battleships were vulnerable to torpedoes. He knew about Taranto, and he had been informed by the CNO that he could not assume that harbor depth would preclude a torpedo attack.
³
He rejected torpedo nets for operational considerations, but there were other countermeasures possible. He could have shielded the battleships with less-valuable deep draft auxiliaries moored outboard, or just obtained some hulks from the local boneyard and ballasted them down as a torpedo shield. A barge anchored in the shipyard turning basin mounting a few dozen .50-cal machine guns would, if the performance of
Bagley’s
AA gunners was duplicated, have gone a long way towards thwarting the attack. But, as one naval officer has observed, “He just wasn’t interested, in plain truth.”

Those championing Kimmel’s cause contend that he should be exonerated since he was not in charge of the harbor’s defenses. The Navy has a long tradition of responsibility epitomized by the saying, “You get what you
inspect
, not what you
expect
.” Aboard ship, responsibility has to be delegated; a captain cannot run every piece of machinery and make every decision. However, the captain still bears the responsibility, and is expected to perform sufficient inspections and oversight to ensure his ship is run effectively and safely. The saying is akin to Ronald Reagan’s famous “Trust, but verify.”

While Kimmel was not responsible for the air defenses of the island, he was responsible for the safety of the fleet. He did not “inspect” to get what he “expected.” As Prange noted,

When General Short relaxed readiness, Kimmel should have recognized what the new condition of readiness constituted, and taken action to reverse that egregious decision. He expected his fleet to be defended, but did not ensure that the defense was in place. He did not inspect. He did not verify.

Kimmel’s standing orders to the fleet of 14 October 1941, a short seven weeks before the attack, stated that “a declaration of war may be preceded by 1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor; 2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area; or 3) a combination of these two.”
⁵
He lost sight of his own standing orders. He was more concerned with preparing a plan to lure the Japanese fleet into an early contest between the battlelines in the Central Pacific. His actions were conditioned by his assumptions: “I never thought those little yellow sons of bitches could pull off such an attack so far from Japan.”
⁶

Prange contends that there was no action open to Kimmel on 7 December with more than a negligible bearing on the outcome.
⁷
That obfuscates what Kimmel could have done, the simplest thing of all: keeping his people informed. If he had informed his command that war was imminent, something he could have done without revealing any code-breaking secrets, there were things that could have been accomplished even in minutes before the attack. For example, no ship CO in the fleet would have allowed voids to remain open over a weekend had they known what Kimmel knew on 6 December.

Kimmel informed Rear Admiral William Halsey of the imminence of war. When Halsey took Task Force Eight to sea he placed it on a war footing, under radio silence, magazines unlocked and aircraft fully armed. What Halsey did, Kimmel should have done; had others been kept informed, their actions could not have been as overt as Halsey’s, but still could have saved hundreds of lives.

Kimmel bears an appropriate degree of responsibility for what happened. His failure remains an example of the consequences of insufficient oversight. To exonerate him decades removed from the events would only obscure that lesson.

The Japanese

Genda, the Brilliant Planner

Genda has been praised for putting together a brilliant attack plan. He has been lauded as a genius.
⁸
Analysis leads to a different impression.

Genda was operating under significant constraints, particularly in the experience level of his aviators. Many of his aircrews were nuggets; the air groups of two of his six carriers had only recently been formed and were green. His available A6M Zero fighter pilots were especially so. Consequently, he decided early the roles to be played by each of his squadrons in order to allow his aviators to concentrate on their specific roles. He left no flexibility to change those roles based on the hit percentages achieved during training or if the problem of delivering torpedoes in shallow water was or was not solved. He decided early in the planning process the numbers of torpedo bombers, high-altitude level bombers, and OCA aircraft. His solution achieved the strike’s objectives and should be praised as such, even though his plan received the unexpected assistance of some really bad command decisions by the Americans.

Otherwise, Genda’s attack plan was simple and uncomplicated. He divided the bombers up into groups, gave them their targets, and expected them to hit. He allocated sufficient firepower to cripple the battleships, which was his boss’s objective; but he allocated just a bit more to follow his own lodestar, the destruction of the carriers, including a follow-on attack by dive bombers assigned to hit carriers even if they were capsized hulks. True to his boss, yes; but even more true to his own vision.

The plan was simple, constrained by the training level of the personnel with which he had to work. But it also was so simple that it could have been disastrous. There was no attempt to have the aircraft arrive over their targets simultaneously in a time-on-target strike. There was no control over the fighters to have them maintain a CAP with their bombers and over the airfields. There was no provision for SEAD, even though SEAD tactics were practiced for attacks against fleet units at sea. Probably worst of all, the torpedo aircrews were given a complicated prioritization scheme for the selection of their targets that was unworkable under combat conditions, one of the reasons for the poor distribution of weapons over the available targets. The second-wave dive-bombers were to hit targets of opportunity also in accordance with a prioritization scheme, which became a muddled affair when their objectives were changed literally at the last moment before take-off, and upon arrival over the target, smoke and cloud cover restricted visibility at the dive-bombers’ normal pitch-over altitude. The plan for the employment of fighters ignored any responsibility to protect the strike’s heavy hitters, the torpedo bombers, in favor of slap-dash strafing attacks against scattered airfields. Even then, the distribution of fighters against airfields made little sense: more first-wave fighters were sent against a base serving reconnaissance seaplanes rather than against bases serving fighters and bombers.

Genda did not include a full rehearsal of the specific attack in his timetable, allowing only two days for all the aircraft types and formations to practice in a group setting against fleet units anchored in an open bay—a setting dissimilar to what the attackers would find at Pearl Harbor. This allowed several planning problems to slip through. Practicing the attack against a mock-up of the carrier moorings might have discovered the problem of making torpedo runs into the rising sun, and perhaps could have prevented wasting valuable torpedoes on the
Utah
. The coordination and deconfliction of crossing torpedo bomber attack routes did not happen. The problem of overconcentration on some targets was noted, but apparently no action was taken to resolve the issue. The problem of deploying the torpedo bombers into long strings was not practiced, and was to be a serious problem in the actual attack.

Prior to sailing, all of Genda’s plans assumed that surprise would be achieved. This is astonishing, particularly considering that he had almost a year to work on alternatives, and that the operations order specified that the attack would be launched even if
Kido Butai
was detected as much as a day prior to the attack. Several other plans based on other sets of assumptions were put together during the transit to the target, but they were only minor riffs on the original theme. They were not well thought out, as exemplified by the flare signaling method that was supposed to shift the attackers from one plan to another. The confusion that resulted directly led to most of the B5N Kate losses, and the premature bombing alerted the American AA fire that may have contributed to the low percentage of hits by the torpedo bombers.

Overall, the attack plan created by Genda (with assistance from Fuchida and other Japanese experts) was simplistic and much less than state of the art for the period. It was not the product of genius. It succeeded because there were 40 aircrews in B5N Kate torpedo bombers who struck with fortitude, overcoming the plan’s problems to deliver their attacks with skill and determination, and 15 of them managed to hit the targets they needed to hit. Aside from that, to paraphrase the intrepid World War I pilot Manfred von Richtofen, “Anything else is rubbish.”

Fuchida, the Intrepid Warrior