Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (3 page)

Nevertheless, the growth in Rand scholarship and influence has generated few comprehensive, book-length examinations of her thought (rather than her life and cultural impact). Three earlier attempts at extended critique, by
Albert Ellis
(1968),
William F O’Neill
([1971] 1977), and
John W. Robbins
(1974), were published eight to twelve years before Rand’s death and, hence, did not assess her full contribution.
The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand
,
edited by Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1984), is an important anthology of essays written by several scholars who examine aspects of Rand’s epistemology, ethics, and politics, from different perspectives. Peikoff’s
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand
(1991b) is the first systematic statement of Rand’s philosophy, albeit from an orthodox, noncritical vantage point. And
Ronald Merrill
’s
Ideas of Ayn Rand
(1991)—recently updated by Marsha Familaro Enright (Merrill and Enright 2013)—presents some original theses, though with a broader cultural orientation.

This book is the first scholarly attempt to trace Rand’s roots and assess her place in intellectual history. My central theme is captured by the title:
Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical
, for in this book I address two questions:

1. In what sense can Rand’s philosophy be understood as a response to her Russian past?

2. In what sense can Rand’s philosophy be understood as a contribution to twentieth-century radical thought?

The answers to these questions provide a new interpretation of Rand’s Objectivism in terms of its intellectual origins and its significance for the history of social theory. I contend that Rand achieved a unique synthesis by rejecting—and absorbing—key elements in the Russian tradition. She rejected the
Marxist
and
religious
content of Russian thought. She accepted the
dialectical
revolt against formal
dualism
. Her distinctive integration of a libertarian politics with a dialectical method forges a revolutionary link. She projected a dialectical sensibility while formulating a fundamentally non-Marxist,
radical
critique of
statism
.

In this book, I do not focus on Ayn
Rand’s
personal life
or on the controversial movement she inspired. I reconstructed certain biographical
elements, especially concerning Rand’s Russian education, in an effort to trace her early intellectual development. In a few instances, I could not ignore circumstances in Rand’s public and private life, particularly those events which divided sympathetic and critical commentators alike and led to interpretive modifications, or distortions, of her
overall
project. It is my hope that this book will contribute to a much-needed scholarly appreciation of Rand’s profoundly original theoretical system.

RAND SCHOLARSHIP: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

I must admit that Rand’s deeply controversial public persona has left for the present generation of scholars two major, related problems: (1) the need to distinguish Rand’s
personality
from her philosophical legacy; and (2) the task of determining what (and who) defines
Objectivism
as a distinct school of thought.

The first problem is not peculiar to Rand scholarship. It is a truism that in studying any philosophy, one must never lose sight of the personal, cultural, and historical context of the originating philosopher. Yet the study of philosophy cannot be reduced to exploring this or that philosopher’s idiosyncrasies. That would be psychologism at its worst. One should not judge Schopenhauer’s philosophy by his penchant for sleeping with loaded pistols or Nietzsche’s by the fact that he died insane. Similarly, one should not judge Rand’s philosophy by her intolerance toward dissenters, her penchant for moralizing, her style of polemical exposition, or the “cult of personality” that she inspired.

Perhaps even more than her status as an iconoclastic thinker, a novelist, or a woman, Rand’s truculent temperament and cultic following severely hampered serious scholarship on her work. Indeed, the fledgling Objectivist movement in the 1960s contributed to a second major problem: the difficulty in pinpointing the “genuine” representatives of her philosophy. Echoing the sectarianism and authoritarianism within the left academy, Objectivists have tended to engage in philosophical “purges” and personal disputes that have led some to disavow the contributions of others still working largely within the broad framework defined by Rand. The first such schism occurred in 1968, when Rand ended her personal and professional relationship with her chief associate, psychologist Nathaniel Branden.
⁸

In my view, there are distinctions between the “orthodox” interpreters of
Rand
’s thought and those who can be termed “
neo-Objectivists
.” The orthodox thinkers see Rand’s philosophy as closed and complete. The neo-Objectivists accept certain basic principles, while expanding, modifying, or revising other aspects of Rand’s thought. The “neo-Objectivist” label is
not employed critically; for history, I believe, will describe all these thinkers simply as “Objectivists.” Nevertheless, Rand did not sanction all of the developments proceeding from her influence. In the case of Nathaniel Branden, for instance, although Rand enthusiastically approved his theoretical work while he was her associate, she repudiated his subsequent efforts.
⁹
A later dispute between Leonard
Peikoff
and David
Kelley
centered on the question of what
precisely
constitutes the philosophy of
Objectivism
.

Adopting an orthodox, “closed-system” approach, Peikoff (1991b) has stated: “‘Objectivism’ is the name of Ayn Rand’s philosophy as presented in the material she herself wrote or endorsed” (xv). Peikoff excludes from “official Objectivist doctrine” both his own work after Rand’s death and Rand’s unedited, unpublished lectures and journals, since she “had no opportunity to see or approve” of the material.
¹⁰

Peikoff follows Rand’s own pronouncements. At the time of the Branden schism, Rand maintained (in 1968) that she was a theoretician of Objectivism, which she characterized as “a philosophical system originated by me and publicly associated with my name.”
¹¹
She claimed that it was her “right and responsibility” to defend the system’s integrity, and she renounced any “organized
movement
” in her name.

Twelve years after this “statement of policy,” when a magazine called
The Objectivist Forum
was established, Rand approved the journal as “a
forum
for students of Objectivism to discuss their ideas, each speaking only for himself.” Rand stated that the magazine was neither the “official voice” of her philosophy nor her “representative” or “spokesman.”

Rand explained further that those who agree with certain tenets of Objectivism but disagree with others should give proper acknowledgment “and then indulge in any flights of fancy [they] wish, on [their] own.” Anyone using the name of “Objectivism” for his own

philosophical hodgepodge … is guilty of the fraudulent presumption of trying to put thoughts into
my
brain (or of trying to pass his thinking off as mine—an attempt which fails, for obvious reasons). I chose the name “Objectivism” at a time when my philosophy was beginning to be known and some people were starting to call themselves “Randists.” I am much too conceited to allow such a use of my name.
¹²

Upholding the consistency of her system as one of its virtues, Rand opposed the practice of those philosophers who “regard philosophy as a
verb,
not a noun (they are not studying or creating philosophy, they are ‘
doing
’ it)” (2). Thus Peikoff’s interpretation of Objectivism as a “closed system” clearly mirrors Rand’s own view.

By contrast, David Kelley (1990) views
Objectivism
as an “open system”: “A
philosophy
defines a school of thought, a category of thinkers who subscribe to the same principles. In an open philosophy, members of the school may differ among themselves over many issues within the framework of the basic principles they accept” (57).

The evolution of academic Marxist thought illustrates Kelley’s point clearly. In defining the essence of contemporary Marxism, it is impossible to disconnect the statements of Karl Marx from the multiple interpretations constructed over the past century. These interpretations are as much a logical development of Marx’s methods and theories as they are a reflection of the particular historical, social, and personal
contexts
of his interpreters. The interpretations also reflect different periods in Marx’s own development. Some scholars stress the earlier, more “humanistic” Marx, whereas others argue for an economistic interpretation based on his mature works. Most scholars would agree, however, that one cannot detach Marx’s unpublished writings from the corpus of his thought. Indeed, the great bulk of Marx’s work was issued posthumously. For example, Marx’s
Grundrisse
,
composed of seven unedited workbooks, was first published in the twentieth century. It provides a cornucopia of material from which one can reconstruct his method of inquiry as a distinct “moment” (or aspect) of his dialectical approach. The
Grundrisse
is an essential complement to and reflection on Marx’s published exposition in
Capital
.

In addition, a Marxist scholar cannot neglect the plethora of interpretive twists resulting from the combination of Marx’s theories with compatible approaches in psychology, anthropology, and sociology. What has emerged is a scholarly industry that must take account of structuralist, phenomenological, critical, and analytical approaches, to name but a few. Finally, we have been presented with different philosophical interpretations of the “real” Karl Marx: the Aristotelian Marx, the Kantian Marx, the Hegelian Marx, and the Leninist Marx.
¹³

None of these developments alter the essential body of theory that Marx proposed in his lifetime. One can empathize with the innovative theorist who, jealously guarding his discoveries, aims to protect the “purity” of the doctrine. Ironically,
Rand
suggests a spiritual affinity with Marx on this issue. She remembers that upon hearing the “outrageous statements” made by some of his “Marxist” followers, Marx exclaimed: “But I am not a Marxist.”
¹⁴

Nevertheless, although one can debate whether a particular philosophy is “closed” or “open,”
scholarship
must consider the many theoretical developments emerging over time directly or indirectly from the innovator’s authentic formulations. Much of current intellectual
history
focuses not on the ideas of the innovator, but rather, on the evolution of the ideas and on
the context in which the ideas emerged and developed. As
W. W. Bartley
argues, the affirmation of a theory involves many logical implications that are not immediately apparent to the original theorist. In Bartley’s words, “The informative content of any idea includes an infinity of unforeseeable nontrivial statements.” The creation of mathematics for instance, “generates problems that are wholly independent of the intentions of its creators.”
¹⁵

In this book, I have adopted a similarly
hermeneutical
approach. The principles of this scholarly technique were sketched by
Paul Ricoeur
in his classic essay, “
The Model of the Text
.”
¹⁶
Ricoeur maintains that a text is detached from its author and develops consequences of its own. In so doing, it transcends its relevance to its initial situation and addresses an indefinite range of possible readers. Hence, the text must be understood not only in terms of the author’s context but also in the context of the multiple interpretations that emerge during its subsequent history.

I do not mean to suggest that Rand’s ideas lack objective validity, that is, validity independent of the interpretations of others. Ultimately, one must judge the validity of any idea by its correspondence to reality and/or its explanatory power. But to evaluate the truthfulness of a philosophic formulation is not the only legitimate task of scholarship. Indeed, my primary purpose in this study as an intellectual historian and political theorist is
not
to demonstrate either the validity or the falsity of Rand’s ideas. Rather, it is to shed light on her philosophy by examining the context in which it was both formulated and developed.

In this book I attempt to grasp Rand’s Objectivism as a text developing over time. As a concept, “Objectivism” is open-ended; it
contains
its history and its future. It must be understood in terms of both its historical origins and its post-Randian evolution. The existential conditions from which it emerged and to which it speaks are in large part what give it its very significance. So, too, its meaning continues to unfold through a clash of interpretations offered by followers and critics alike. By clarifying these conditions and factors, I hope to provide an enriched appreciation of Rand’s contributions.

Such an assertion might imply that I claim to have grasped the implications of Objectivism even more thoroughly than did Rand herself.
¹⁷
Although I would never presume to such intellectual hubris, it is true, nonetheless, that Rand could not have explored the full implications of her philosophy in her lifetime. Such a task is reserved necessarily for succeeding generations of scholars.

First and foremost then, this is a book about ideas. I discuss Rand’s ideas as she expressed them in her published and unpublished
works
, in her written essays and spoken lectures, from the earliest available material to
the last. I consider
all
these sources important to a comprehensive understanding of her thought and legacy. Unfortunately, because Rand never wrote an exhaustive treatise, her system must be pieced together from her novels, essays, and lectures. Furthermore, many of Rand’s journals and private papers are not yet available to the scholarly community. Since Rand agreed to place these papers with the
Library of Congress
, it is hoped that future scholars will have more information at their disposal than I have had.
¹⁸