Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (79 page)

34
. Aristotle,
Rhetoric
1.2.1355b26–27, in Aristotle 1941, 1329. In this context, “dialectics” also suggests a type of metaphysical reasoning from first principles. Thanks to Rasmussen in Kelley 1993T for this observation. For a defense of Aristotle as the most significant ancient theoretician of dialectical method, see Sciabarra 2000,
chapter 1
.

35
. For this point, thanks to Gotthelf (29 April 1994C).

36
. Nevertheless, Irwin (1988) argues that Aristotle uses a form of dialectics in negative demonstration, in which one proceeds from premises that one’s opponent cannot reject (174–78). This “strong dialectic” is an aspect of Aristotle’s defense of “first principles” or ultimate truths. Thanks to Rasmussen (19 April 1994C) for bringing this to my attention. Rand’s ontology also makes use of negative demonstration.

37
. Engels [1878] 1947, 29, 29n; Marx [1867] 1967, 59, 408. Marx [1867] 1967 and [1894] 1967 are hereafter cited as
Capital
by volume and page number in text and notes.

38
. Lenin (1914–16), “On Aristotle’s
Metaphysics
,” in Selsam and Martel 1963, 361.

39
. Thanks to Walsh (19 April 1994C) and to Gotthelf (29 April 1994C), who notes too that some of this technique can be found in Aristotle, though less systematically.

40
. In the history of philosophy, it was not Hegel who enunciated the triadic formulation. One can find hints of this terminology in Kant’s discussion of the antinomies, but it is used most extensively by Fichte [1794] 1970, in
The Science of Knowledge
(
Wissenschaftslehre
).

41
. This is most true of “reductionist” monists. Ontologically, dualists posit two basic and different “stuffs” in existence, for example, the “mental” and the “physical.” The “reductionist” monists express the basic “stuff” in terms of a single attribute, that is, as
either
“mental”
or
“physical.” By contrast, “neutral monists” argue that there is one basic “stuff” in existence of which the “mental” and the “physical” are attributes. There are many variations on these positions. For clarifying these issues, thanks to Rasmussen (interview, 15 March 1994). A critique of “neutral monism” is provided in Lossky 1952. Interviews, unless otherwise cited, were conducted by the author on the date indicated.

42
. Dialectical method transcends neither logical “contradictions” nor “contraries.” This distinction was proposed by Aristotle in the seventh chapter of
De Interpretatione
(
On Interpretation
), in Aristotle 1941, 43–45. Thorslev (1971) explains: “Contradictory propositions cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false: they are exclusive, and between them they exhaust the field of discourse. Contraries, on the other hand, cannot both be true, but they may both be false; they are exclusive but not exhaustive” (50). Typically, the dialectical thinker sees opposing perspectives as neither “contradictory” nor “contrary” per se, but rather as “partial” or “one-sided,” combining elements of truth and elements of falsity. By examining opposition within a wider context, the dialectical thinker often views the two alternatives as
neither
exclusive
nor
exhaustive, since they
both
share a common premise
and
restrict the field of possible alternatives by reifying their limitations.

43
. This raises an interesting question concerning the ontology that underlies the dialectical approach, something which I do not address in this book. It can be said that dialectics recognizes the reality of “relation”—not as substance—but as a category that cannot be reduced to any other. Rasmussen (19 April 1994C) suggests that Rand’s understanding of the “objective” is, in fact, based on her refusal to collapse what is relational into its terms, what she calls “intrinsic” and “subjective.” If Rand recognized the reality of “relation,” this would suggest that she was not as fully “Aristotelian” as she maintained. I do not believe that Rand had an identifiable ontological doctrine of “relation.” However, there are significant elements of relationalism in every branch of Objectivism.

44
. Thorslev 1971, 50. Thorslev criticizes the “Both-And-Syndrome” as one of the “dangers of dialectic thinking.” In some instances, however, Thorslev confuses dialectics with formal dualistic and monistic alternatives.

45
. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in Rand 1975b, 40. For this observation, thanks to Kamhi (interview, 23 May 1994). Rand 1975b is hereafter cited as
Romantic Manifesto
by page number in both text and notes.

46
. Thanks to Kelley in Kelley (1993T) for this observation. Thorslev (1971) suggests that insofar as dialectics attempts to define “polar opposites,” it is a method that “is at least as old as philosophy—indeed, Claude Lévi-Strauss has suggested that it is basically characteristic of all human thinking whatever, and that it is this which we moderns have in common with the savage” (45–46). See also Lévi-Strauss 1966. As I have defined it, dialectics is not merely an attempt to
define
“polar opposites,” but to
transcend
them in a nondualistic, nonmonistic manner, based on an awareness of their organic unity.

47
. I have personally encountered this view among Rand enthusiasts in several Objectivist forums.

48
. Thanks to Gotthelf (15 February 1993C) for reiterating this observation.

49
. This is
not
my opinion; Rand did not merely synthesize previously developed philosophic doctrines. It is my conviction that she developed not only an original synthesis, but an original, nondualistic defense of egoism and capitalism.

50
. Rand (July 1966), “Introduction to
Capitalism
:
The Unknown Ideal
,” in Rand 1967, vii. Rand 1967 is hereafter cited as
Unknown Ideal
by page number in both text and notes.

51
. In Sciabarra 1988a, 1995b, and 2000, I argue that Hayek exhibits a similar dialectical sensibility.

52
. Nietzsche’s dictum on “muddy waters” appears in his
Thus Spake Zarathustra
([1954] 1970, 240). A similar statement appears in sec. 173 of
The Gay Science
([1887] 1974). Thanks to both Kline (8 September 1993C) and Enright (22 December 1993C) for their assistance in locating these references.

CHAPTER 1. SYNTHESIS IN RUSSIAN CULTURE

1
. The name appearing on Rand’s dossier at Leningrad University is Alissa Zinovievna Rosenbaum (Leningrad University Archives, 06.08.92). Rand’s middle name, or “patronymic,” suggests that her father’s name was Zinovy. This is confirmed by Binswanger 1994T, who lists Rand’s father’s name as Zinovy Zakharovich, and her mother’s name as Anna Borisovna. In Barbara Branden’s biography (1986), however, the father’s name is listed as “Fronz,” which is not typically Russian. “Zinovy,” though not very common, is fully
Russian
. Perhaps “Fronz” was Rand’s nickname for her father. Thanks to Kline (20 October 1992C) and B. Lossky (17 September 1992C) for clarifying these issues.

2
. Rand (June 1969), “Introduction,” in
Romantic Manifesto,
vi.

3
.
Sobornost
’ can also be translated as “communality,” and
Sobornyi
, the adjectival form, as “communal.” But
Sobornost
’ is better translated as “conciliarity,” and
Sobornyi,
as “conciliar.” Kline (26 February 1994C) notes that the word “communal” is more secular than the original Russian meaning, which suggests church councils (
sobory
). Kline’s translation gives these terms a more appropriately religious flavor.

4
. Hessen (1978), writing for an Objectivist periodical, praises Tibor Szamuely’s
Russian Tradition
, which demonstrates that nearly all aspects of Russian culture, including moral and political philosophy, rejected the concept of individual rights, affirming the ideal of self-sacrifice to the collective and/or the state.

5
. Rosenthal (15 November 1993C) suggests that Rand probably reacted against the mystic, occult doctrines that were popular in the late Russian and early Soviet period. Nathaniel Branden (1982T) argues that the Russian mystical context of Rand’s youth often made her “quick on the draw” concerning any theories that hinted of “mysticism,” such as hypnosis, telepathy, ESP, or associated “altered states” of consciousness, which might have a natural, rather than supernatural, basis.

6
. Leibniz in fact, served as an adviser to Czar Peter. Since Russia was both a European and Asian country, it absorbed influences from both West and East. Though Russian religious philosophy owes much to Greek Orthodox and Byzantine traditions, it also mirrors many mystic Eastern and Asian traditions that stress—like their more secular Western, dialectical counterparts—a form of holistic unity and relational identity. Unfortunately, Rand and her Objectivist successors have largely ignored Eastern philosophy. See Walsh 1988T for some interesting analysis.

7
. For this observation, thanks to Walsh (interview, 22 April 1994).

8
. Copleston 1986, 60–61. Echoing this view, see Marcuse [1941] 1960, 40–42.

9
. Despite their common organicism, these thinkers should not be taken as a single unit. See Lossky 1951, 59–78.

10
. Lossky 1951, 62. Lenin ([1903] 1969) appropriates Chernyshevsky’s question in discussing the movement for Russian social change.

11
. In contrast to his later writings, Solovyov’s earlier work is far more critical of Hegel. Kline (1974) argues persuasively that Solovyov owed much of his philosophical and metaphilosophical system to Hegel.

12
. Lossky 1951, 142. Chicherin is one of the very few Russian philosophers to defend property rights. For this observation, thanks to Rosenthal (15 November 1993C).

13
. For what follows, I owe a great intellectual debt to Bernice Rosenthal. See Rosenthal 1975, 1980, 1986, 1990 (with Bohachevsky-Chomiak), 1991a, 1991b, and 1994.

14
. Rosenthal and Bohachevsky-Chomiak 1990, 25. In opposition to the Symbolists, even the Russian futurists embraced aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The futurists celebrated the machine age, while emphasizing the Dionysian elements of change and flux. They rejected transcendentalism and dualism. They were among the first artistic groups to support the Revolution, though not all were Bolshevik sympathizers. Rosenthal 1991a.

15
. Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 18. Not all Symbolists advocated a libertine sexual ideal.

16
. Kline (18 August 1993C) observes that unlike the Symbolists, Nietzsche envisioned the emergence of the supermen only after thousands of years of cultural change.

17
. Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 10; Rosenthal 1994.

18
. Rand (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in Rand 1975a, 58. She also employs Apollonian-Dionysian imagery in Rand (February 1970), “The left: Old and new,” in Rand 1975a, 82–95. She credits the Old Left with attempting “to maintain an Apollonian mask” of reason in its defense of socialism and describes the New Left as having abandoned all pretense to rational justification. Rand 1975a is hereafter cited as
New Left
by page number in both text and notes.

19
. Rand calls Blok’s “sense of life” “ghastly,” but Blok himself “a magnificent poet” (in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11). A representative of “pre-October” Russian culture, Blok was praised by Trotsky ([1924] 1960) for his poem, “The Twelve.”

20
. Evelyn Bristol, “Blok between Nietzsche and Soloviev,” in Rosenthal 1986, 150; Rosenthal and Bohachevsky-Chomiak 1990, 291.

21
. Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 20.

22
. Most conceptions of
Sobornost
’ stress its anarchistic character.

23
. Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 39–40.

24
. Ibid., 35–37.

25
. Mihajlov, “The great catalyzer: Nietzsche and Russian neo-idealism,” in Rosenthal 1986, 132. The full impact of Nietzsche on Russian neo-Idealism has not been studied. Mihajlov’s essay provides an introduction to this topic.

26
. Rand believed that Dostoyevsky was unequaled “in the psychological depth of his images of human evil.” Rand (May–June 1969), “What is romanticism?” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 114. She greatly appreciated his technique, and listed him among her favorite fiction writers. Rand [1958] 1986T, Lecture 12, and (April 1977), “Favorite writers,” in Rand 1991. Rand 1991 is hereafter cited as
Column
by page number in both text and notes.

27
. Not all neo-Idealists sought to overcome the Kantian distinction. Some are traditional neo-Kantians. Berdyaev (1951), for instance, sees an impenetrable split between physical nature and spirit. For Berdyaev, human beings are dual entities who live in both phenomenal and noumenal worlds. Berdyaev liked Nietzsche, but had no great sympathy for Hegelianism. For a time, he tried to synthesize Marxism and Kantianism and admitted to a “tendency to dualism” (127).

28
. Frank wrote
Marx’s Theory of Value and Its Significance,
which was influenced by the early Austrian economists like Boehm-Bawerk. Rosenthal 1991b, 60. This early Austrian school was a precursor to the Mises-Hayek Austrian tradition of the twentieth century.

29
. Mihajlo Mihajlov, “The great catalyzer: Nietzsche and Russian neo-Idealism,” in Rosenthal 1986, 133–34.

30
. Kline (1967) sees three groups of Russian Marxists: Nietzschean, orthodox (including the Marxist-Leninists), and neo-Kantian. I do not survey the many Russian Marxist derivatives.

31
. Copleston 1988. On the inherent problems of trying to integrate Slavophile and Marxist perspectives, see Peikoff (July 1992), “Some notes about tomorrow, part one,” in Schwartz 6.4.4. Peikoff argues that Russian Marxism tried to offer “the essence of the Slavophile mentality under the veneer of being western, worldly, scientific.” According to Peikoff, the Marxist concept of “class” is too abstract for the Slavophile mentality, which appeals to tribal notions of race and nationality. With the collapse of the Marxist paradigm, nationalism has erupted with a vengeance within the former Soviet Union. John Ridpath (1987T) provides another Objectivist analysis of the messianic roots of Bolshevism. In a comparable vein, Pipes (1994), a non-Objectivist, has argued that Soviet totalitarianism was a distinctive outgrowth of both Marxism and the Russian “patrimonial heritage.”