B008AITH44 EBOK (33 page)
Authors: Brigitte Hamann
The Swiss envoy informed Bern that the Emperor would personally assume the command in any impending battle outside the gates of Vienna. The crisis in Austria was so acute, he wrote, that there was already talk in Vienna of a regency by the Empress.
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Elisabeth, too, left Vienna on July 9 (that is, a mere six days after Königgrätz) and traveled to Budapest. Three days later, she returned to Vienna briefly to get the children, who had been brought to the capital from Bad Ischl.
Archduchess Sophie was outraged at this decision. In her considered opinion, the children were much safer in Bad Ischl, besides being able to
enjoy the salubrious mountain air. She feared that “the humid air and the bad water of Budapest” could harm the Crown Prince’s health. The fact that Hungary had been picked for the imperial family’s sanctuary was more than an annoyance to Sophie.
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In any case, she refused to join them and remained in Bad Ischl, moving all her valuables there.
Sisi’s choice of Hungary as a haven from this precarious, even desperate situation was a political decision of the greatest import. After all, it was just at this time that Bismarck, sparing no expense, essayed his support of the Klapka Legion, which aimed at separating Hungary from Austria and exploiting Austria’s desolate situation for a nationalist uprising. According to prevailing opinion, revolution in Hungary would signal the end of the Austrian monarchy.
Sisi’s journey to Hungary was carefully calculated: Of all the members of the imperial family, she maintained the best relations with Hungary. And these relations were now sorely needed. It is not known who was behind the plan. Considering the furious opposition of Archduchess
Sophie
, it is even likely that the whole action—a deeply political maneuver—can be ascribed to none other than the usually so apolitical Empress herself, and that this time she was able to get her way. It was also an essential part of the calculation that she took the children with her. The parallels to Maria Theresia’s cry for help to the Hungarians in Pressburg in 1741 (holding the little successor to the throne in her arms) was pointed out soon enough in the Hungarian newspapers—and its significance should not be underestimated.
A further gesture that attracted a great deal of attention on the part of the Empress occurred during her farewells at the Vienna railroad station: she publicly kissed the hand of her husband, who had been humiliated on every side. Franz Joseph’s popularity had fallen to an all-time low during these sad weeks. The populace, harried by war and misery, accused him of placing the interests of the dynasty before those of the state. The rumor was making the rounds that Emperor Maximilian was returning from Mexico to assume the regency in Austria. Shouts were heard, directed at the Emperor, “
Viva
Maximilian!”—that is, a demand for abdication. The phrase, “Let the Prussians come, we’ll build golden bridges for them” was even heard.
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In this situation, the Empress, usually so critical, stood by her husband.
In Hungary, Elisabeth and the children were received enthusiastically. Deák, Andrássy, and other leading political figures came to greet them at the railway station. Deák referred to the glittering reception accorded the Emperor and Empress during their most recent visit to Hungary when he
said, “I would consider it cowardice to turn our backs on the Empress in her misfortune after we came forward to meet her when the affairs of the dynasty were still favorable.”
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In Budapest, Elisabeth was entirely under Hungarian influence. Her daily, increasingly firm letters put pressure on her husband, supported the Hungarian demands, and urged Franz Joseph to make haste. Her first objective was to arrange a personal meeting between the Emperor and Deák.
Sisi was a willing, almost fanatical tool of Andrássy and his policies. He was extremely clever at making her feel that she was the savior of Austria (and Hungary). On July 15, she wrote the Emperor that she had just come from a meeting with Andrássy
alone, of course. He expressed his views clearly and precisely. I understood them and gained the conviction that, if you trust him, but
entirely
, we, and not Hungary alone, but the monarchy, can still be saved. But you must
at
least
speak with him yourself, and I mean at once, for each day can shape events in such a way that in the end he would no longer assume it; at such a moment it really does require a very large sacrifice to do it. So speak with him at once. You can do so frankly, for I can give you this assurance, you are not dealing with a man who wants to play a part at any price, who strives for a position, quite the contrary, he is jeopardizing his present position, which is a handsome one. But like any man of honor, he is also prepared, at the moment when the state is facing ruin, to contribute all in his power to salvage it; whatever he has, his reason, his influence in the country, he will place at your feet. For the last time, I beg you in the name of Rudolf, do not let the last opportunity slip by.
The letter continued in the same tone. At no other time in her life did Elisabeth write such long letters to her husband as she did now, when it was a matter of Hungary (and Andrássy’s will). For the sake of Hungary (and Andrássy), she worded her political preferences so sharply as to approximate blackmail:
I beg you, send me a telegram the minute you receive my letter whether Andrássy should take the evening train to Vienna. I am asking him to come again tomorrow to Paula [Königsegg, her
chatelaine], where I will give him an answer. If you say “No,” if you are unwilling at the final hour even to listen to
disinterested
advice any longer, then you are in fact acting un … ly to us all. In that case, you will be forever spared my further p … and ms. [pleas and molestations], and I have nothing to fall back on but to reassure myself with the knowledge that, whatever happens, I will one day be able honestly to tell Rudolf, “I did all in my power. Your misfortune does not weigh on my conscience.”
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Franz Joseph capitulated. Against his better judgment and the advice of his mother and his ministers in Vienna, he acceded to his wife’s rigorous demands.
Gyula Andrássy called on the Emperor on July 17, bringing with him a long letter from Sisi to her husband. The interview lasted an hour and a half. According to Franz Joseph, Andrássy spoke “very frankly and cleverly, developed all his views, and begged me most of all to speak with the old man”—that is, with Fèrencz Deák.
Franz Joseph’s suspicion of Andrássy, however, was deep-seated: “For the rest, I found him, as always, too imprecise in his views and without the necessary consideration of the other parts of the monarchy. He covets a great deal and offers too little at the present crucial moment.” On the other hand, the Emperor praised Andrássy’s “great frankness and
level-headedness
”: “but I fear that he has neither the strength nor can find the means in his country to carry out his present intentions.”
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Andrássy’s pronounced liberal policies ran completely counter to the principles of the Viennese court as well as those of the Emperor. It was obvious that adopting any such new policy for Hungary would also affect the other parts of the monarchy. For this reason, the Hungarian demands were supported by constitutionalists and liberals in the other parts of the monarchy.
On July 19, “the old man,” Ferencz Deák, also arrived at the Hofburg. The Emperor found him “Much clearer than A[ndrássy] and taking the rest of the monarchy much more into account. But I gained the same impression from him as I did from A. They covet everything in the widest sense and offer no guarantees of success, only hopes and probabilities, and they do not promise to hold out should they be unable to carry through their intentions in the country and are outflanked by the left.” Franz Joseph had “great respect for his honesty, frankness, and dynastic loyalty …
however, courage, decisiveness, and endurance in misfortune is not granted this man.”
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The Emperor felt hard-pressed on all sides. At court, anti-Hungarian sentiment was strong; but his wife regularly sent impassioned letters
pleading
the Hungarian cause. The Prussians were at the gates of Pressburg. A scalding heat lay over Vienna. Trains full of the wounded arrived daily.
Many exiled kings and princes from Italy and Germany had taken refuge at the Viennese court. There was much political discussion and much argument. Aggression filled the air. But the Emperor “intends to hold out to the last,” wrote Archduke Ludwig Viktor to his mother, Archduchess Sophie.
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In these days, Franz Joseph’s letters to his wife ended in a signature different from his usual closing. Instead of the standard wording, “Your ever-loving Franz,” the letters now read piteously, “Your devoted little man,” “Your manikin,” or “Your little one who loves you so much”—formulations the Emperor kept up for the rest of her life.
Hope for help from France was equally vain. Napoleon III had been given an enormous present—Venetia—and he had received it even before the war and without having to promise help in return. It never crossed Napoleon’s mind now to come to Austria’s aid. After all, he had never obligated himself to do so. Archduke Ludwig Viktor heaped reproaches on King Johann of Saxony on this score: “Uncle Johann, to whom today … I spoke my mind about Venetia, now deeply regrets having given this advice, since Napoleon does absolutely nothing for us and since now it is all over unless we get an armistice.”
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Finally, through French
intermediaries
, a cease-fire—for five days, to begin with—was arranged.
The southern army continued to fight in Northern Italy. On July 21, the news of the brilliant Austrian naval victory at Lissa, under Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, arrived. This victory gave particular satisfaction to Archduchess Sophie, since it was her son Max who, as commander in chief of the navy, had insisted on instituting important reforms before leaving Austria.
The newspapers made a great fuss over the victory and tried to elevate the dark mood that prevailed in Austria. The public was still unaware that Venetia was lost and that the victory was just as pointless as that of Custozza. But the mood in Vienna continued to be tense.
The decimated and exhausted troops of the northern army longed for peace every bit as much as the severely distressed populace. Of course, no one in Vienna knew that the Prussians, too, had exhausted their strength
because cholera had broken out; this circumstance could not, therefore, be used in Vienna’s favor during the negotiations.
Franz Joseph was already making his personal plans for the armistice. When he wrote to his wife, he expressed great longing for her and begged her to go to Bad Ischl with the children, “for your presence in Hungary would no longer be necessary, since thereafter, the political question there must be attacked, and the country will calm down.” In Bad Ischl, he added, he would be able “perhaps sometimes to visit” his family, “for I, too, could profit from a day or so of rest.”
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But Elisabeth remained in Budapest and continued to write her urgent letters. Franz Joseph’s patience began to show signs of exhaustion.
The peace negotiations dragged on. Everyone realized that Austria’s position of supremacy in Germany had come to an end. Franz Joseph to his wife: “In any case, we will withdraw from Germany entirely, whether it is demanded or not, and after what we have learned through bitter experience about our dear German allies, I consider this a fortunate turn of events for Austria.”
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On July 29, Archduke Ludwig Viktor wrote to his mother:
Peace would seem to be just about assured. At first, this gave me no joy. But then I read several letters from military men who were always very much in favor of the war and yet think now that we cannot carry on any longer, since the troops are too worn out and too discouraged by their lack of needle guns. Furthermore, it is said to be very necessary to make peace because of Hungary, since that country is not at all what it should be…. Bismarck, since he is clever and the King is trapped in his stupid arrogance, is now said to be much more malleable than the latter. For the time being, however, they are in Nikolsburg with poor Alinchen and are said to be ravaging the place.
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Of course, Archduke Ludwig Viktor failed to mention that it was not only Countess Alinchen Mensdorf who was suffering because the King of Prussia was quartered on her estate, but that whole provinces groaned under the yoke of Prussian occupation. Franz Joseph to Elisabeth: “The Prussians wreak havoc in the provinces they have occupied, so that a famine is imminent therefore and constant cries for help from there are heard here. It is heartrending.”
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The Emperor himself then informed his wife about the principal
provisions
of the Truce of Nikolsburg. It allowed “the integrity of Austria and Saxony [to be] preserved, we leave Germany entirely and pay 20 million thalers. What the Prussians do in the rest of Germany and what they will steal, I do not know, nor does it concern us further.”
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In this situation, too, Franz Joseph begged his wife to visit him in Vienna. “Now I have a pretty request. If you could visit me! It would make me infinitely happy.”
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