B00BY4HXME EBOK (29 page)

In dealing with the United States, Pyongyang chose to target Washington’s usual weak spot—that is, fear of nuclear proliferation. In 2002 accusations of uranium enrichment led to the repudiation of previous US-NK agreements. Until 2009 North Korea vehemently denied the very existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. In 2009 the existence of the HEU program was acknowledged and in November 2010 Pyongyang extended an invitation to Dr. Hecker, former director of the US Department of Energy Nuclear research site at Los Alamos, to visit their nuclear facilities. They showed him around a modern, fully operational (and very large) uranium enrichment facility. Of course, this once again demonstrated that North Koreans had been lying all those years. Hardly anybody was surprised by such a discovery, however.

Another important change of the last decade was the reemergence of China in North Korean politics. In the early 1990s, China obviously wrote Pyongyang off and perhaps did not expect the Kim family regime to last for more than a few years. But from around 2001, trade and general economic interactions between North Korea and China began to grow, and this growth accelerated around 2006, when the first nuclear test led to a tightening of the sanctions regime. Chinese dignitaries began to frequent Pyongyang, and in the last years of his life Kim Jong Il visited China at least once a year. By 2010 annual trade between North Korea and China had exceeded North Korea’s trade with all other countries combined.

China is often described in the media as “North Korea’s ally.” This is not really the case, since in reality the Chinese—general public and officials alike—tend to look at North Korea with bemused disdain. It reminds them of parts of their own past few if any Chinese want to return to. The Chinese are often annoyed by North Korea’s provocative behavior that jeopardizes stability in the region. Most Chinese scholars and scholar-officials behind closed doors agree that
in the long run
unification of Korea under Seoul’s control appears to be likely, and almost inevitable (this position was confirmed by WikiLeaks cables, but this was hardly a revelation for those who interact with the Chinese frequently). However, China would prefer this long run to be very long indeed—and with good reason. For Chinese policy makers, all things considered, a nuclear-armed North Korea seems to be a lesser evil than an unstable or collapsing North Korea (and, perhaps, even less an evil than a Korea unified under a US-friendly Seoul government).

Chinese goals on the Korean peninsula fall along a hierarchy. To simplify things a bit, first of all, China needs stability in and around Korea. Second, China would prefer to see the Korean peninsula divided. The desire to stop North Korea from developing nukes comes as a rather distant third.

Beijing’s greatest fear seems to be the instability that would be caused by North Korea’s implosion. China sees such a prospect as dangerous because it will have to deal with refugee flows, the threat of WMD proliferation, and geopolitical uncertainties of different kinds—like, say, smuggling of the nuclear material to (or through) Chinese territory.

The Chinese government also has valid domestic reasons to prefer the status quo. Chinese leaders are well aware that the domestic support for their own regime overwhelmingly depends on their ability to maintain a very high level of economic growth. Any disturbances in adjacent areas might divert resources and in the worst case scenario might even trigger some unrest in China itself.

The second most important concern of Beijing’s policy makers is to keep Korea divided (if not forever, at least for the longest possible time). North Korea constitutes a buffer zone on the borders of China, and, the
official pro-unification rhetoric notwithstanding, the emergence of a unified Korean state will not serve Beijing’s long-term interests. There is little if any doubt that such a unified state would be dominated by South Korea, so unification will produce a democratic and strongly nationalist state, likely to be a US ally, on China’s borders.

The continued division of Korea also provides China with manifold economic advantages. The dire economic situation of the North Korean state allows Chinese companies to get access to North Korean mineral resources and transport infrastructure at minimal cost. It is also possible that over the next decade, China will begin to make use of North Korea’s cheap but relatively skilled labor. Needless to say, in a unified Korea labor will not remain cheap and it will be much more difficult for Chinese businesses to acquire mining rights.

Last but not least China also worries about the influence such a unified Korean state would exercise on the ethnic Korean minority in China—and quasi-official territorial claims, frequently voiced in Seoul,
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do not help to quell these worries, either. One should remember that a significant number of South Koreans, including several politicians, have openly expressed reservations about the 1909 Treaty between Korea (then under Japanese domination) and China that defines the current land border between the two countries. They claim that a large area of Kando (Jiandao in Chinese), in Northeast China, should rightfully belong to Korea—the area is currently home to millions of Chinese citizens. In 2004 up to a dozen ROK National Assembly members established a group solely dedicated to the promotion of the Kando claims.
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More radical nationalist Korean groups continue to make loud territorial claims to even greater parts of Manchuria and Russia’s Maritime Provinces.
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The third Chinese strategic aim in dealing with North Korea is denuclearization. Admittedly, the nuclear issue is less important to China than to the United States. Nonetheless, it is still significant. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, China is one of five recognized nuclear weapon possessing states. This makes China a member of a small and highly exclusive international club, giving it little reason to welcome dilution of the power accorded by nuclear weapon possession.
In addition to this, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions could potentially trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia, with South Korea and Japan developing nuclear weapons as well—a prospect that would not be welcomed by Beijing.

Economic considerations are often discussed when it comes to Chinese goals in Korea. Indeed, China dominates North Korea’s foreign trade almost completely. In 1995 the trade volume between the two countries was $0.55 billion. By 2000 it had decreased slightly, to $0.49 billion. From there growth began. By 2005 the volume had tripled, reaching $1.6 billion; in the next five years it tripled again, reaching the level of $5.6 billion by 2011, increasing from $3.4 billion in 2010.
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Currently it is difficult to know to what extent such a growth is driven by the strategic considerations of Beijing, and to what extent it comes “naturally,” as a byproduct of China’s own unstoppable growth and its appetite for natural resources. It seems that both the strategic considerations of the Chinese state and the purely economic interests of Chinese businesses have conspired to bring about this growth.

However, in spite of the impressive growth in trade volume, in purely economic terms North Korea is of very secondary importance to China. Loud talk of a Chinese “economic takeover of North Korea” should not obscure the fact that the volume of trade between the North and China is a paltry $5.6 billion, while the volume of trade between South Korea and China is $246 billion—an impressive 44-fold difference.
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To put things in a more global perspective, China’s trade with Chile ($29 billion in 2011) is roughly five times larger than its trade with North Korea, even though Chile has a smaller population and, needless to say, is far more distant both politically and geographically.

To the extent China’s economic interests exist, they can be divided into three groups. First, Chinese companies are interested in North Korea’s mineral resources. North Korean deposits of coal, iron ore, and copper might not be exceptionally rich by world standards, but nonetheless are of considerable value to the resource-hungry China. Thus, over the last decade Chinese companies have negotiated a number of concessions on mining rights issues.

Second, China is interested in the use of North Korea’s transportation infrastructure. Three North Eastern Provinces of China are landlocked, so if a Chinese company in the vast and populous area wants to ship goods overseas, the nearest port is either Dandong or Dalian, about 1,000 km away. If China obtains the right to use port facilities on Korea’s East Coast, it will dramatically shorten the land routes and save much in transportation costs. It seems that the June 2011 decision to revitalize the special economic zone in Rason is related to this goal.

Third, Chinese small businesses are increasingly interested in outsourcing to North Korea, where wages are well below what would be acceptable for Chinese unskilled and semiskilled workers. In North Korea, local girls are willing to work at a Chinese-operated sweatshop for $20–25 a month. In China, an entrepreneur would have to pay some $100 a month for the same job.
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Growing economic dependency on China worries Pyongyang. For decades, the North Korean government has been very good at avoiding exclusive dependence on just one donor, since Pyongyang politicians liked to use the donor countries’ rivalry to its advantage.

Therefore, one should not be surprised that China is not treated too favorably by internal North Korean propaganda (this was also the case for the Soviet Union when it was the major donor to North Korea in the 1980s), and the North Korean minders do express their dislike for the Chinese even to trusted (sort of) foreign visitors. The North Korean public and, especially, North Korean officials are frequently reminded by their superiors that they should not get too cozy with the Chinese. In 2007 North Korea’s state media reported on alleged spies of an unnamed foreign country being unmasked by the North Korean security service. No details were given at the time, but hints indicate that these real or alleged spies were working for China.

The North Korean elite has good reason to be cautious. It is true that China would prefer to see Korea divided and hence favor a separate regime in Pyongyang, but this does not mean China has to maintain the Kim family in power. China seems to be the only power that has the potential to intervene in North Korean domestic affairs when and if it sees some
serious need to do so. The North Korean leadership seems to take seriously the probability of another Chinese-backed conspiracy, somewhat similar to the August conspiracy of 1956. China is not eager to intervene directly in the internal politics of Pyongyang, since it has no reason to jeopardize the status quo that, on balance, serves China’s interests reasonably well. But things may very well change eventually.

As we will see later, there might be situations in which the North Korean elite changes its attitude toward China. However, that will most likely be a last resort—if, for instance, an acute domestic crisis arises. For the time being, however, Pyongyang clearly prefers to keep Beijing at arm’s length.

The degree of not-so-hidden mistrust between Pyongyang and Beijing is well demonstrated by what David Straub once aptly described as “the strategic partnership fantasy,” quite widespread in North Korean ruling circles. In spite of all the anti-American rhetoric, frequently of almost comical bellicosity, in confidential talks North Korean dignitaries often suggest that North Korea does not really mind becoming an ally of the United States, thus helping Washington to deter China (for a hefty reward, needless to say). When I myself first heard such remarks from a North Korean official, I was taken aback, but then it became clear that such hopes are regularly expressed to foreign interlocutors, including influential Western diplomats or ex-diplomats (of whom David Straub is one). This dramatic reorientation is not going to happen, to be sure, but the existence of such unrealistic expectations speaks volumes about the actual attitude toward China in Pyongyang’s ruling circles.

Many in the United States, especially in the last few years, have expressed a hope that China can use its alleged influence in Pyongyang in order to somehow press North Korea into denuclearization. Alas, this hope is unfounded since China has very limited leverage when it comes to dealing with North Korea. As all major partners of North Korea (including Seoul, Moscow, and Washington) have learned to their dismay, significant economic involvement with and assistance to North Korea does not translate into comparable political leverage.

Theoretically China could make the economic situation of North Korea extremely difficult by halting aid and putting severe restrictions on
cross-border trade. If China wished to do so, it could plunge North Korea into another economic disaster that might even exceed the Arduous March of the late 1990s. However, China cannot fine-tune North Korean politics and squeeze concessions on the issues North Korean leaders see as vital for their survival. A senior South Korean diplomat once told the present author, “China doesn’t have leverage when it comes to dealing with North Korea. What it has is not a lever, but rather a hammer. China can knock North Korea unconscious if it wishes, but it cannot really manage its behavior.”

Contrary to the expectations of some optimists in Washington and Seoul, China has little reason to use this “hammer.” The problems created by North Korea’s risky behavior and its nuclear program are seen in Beijing as less significant than the problems likely to be created by a serious domestic crisis in North Korea and/or by the emergence of a unified Korean state on China’s border. China prefers to maintain a status quo, which has many downsides, but on balance seems to be better than any of the likely alternatives.

Let’s be frank: it is beyond humans’ power to predict the future. History has a very long (and still growing) list of prophets whose confident predictions have been proven completely wrong. Many widely anticipated events never happened, while a number of pivotal changes came absolutely out of the blue.