B00BY4HXME EBOK (42 page)

3
. Chad Raymond, “No Responsibility and No Rice: The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Collectivization in Vietnam,”
Agricultural History
, vol.82 (2008), iss.1: 54–55.

4
. Sang T. Choe, “North Korea Moving from Isolation to an Open Market Economy: Is It time to Invest or to Continue Observing?”
Competitiveness Review
, vol. 13 (2003), iss.2: 60–69.

5
. Terence Roehrig, “Creating the Conditions for Peace in Korea: Promoting Incremental Change in North Korea,”
Korea Observer
, vol. 40 (2009), iss.1: 222.

6
. For details on the ongoing argument over the actual size of the North Korean GDP, see I Chong-sok, “Pukhan kukmin sotuk chaepyongka” [Reassessment of the National Income of North Korea],
Chongsewa chongchaek
3 (2008): 1–4.

For the most recent estimates of the North Korean GDP see: 2011
Pukhan-
ŭ
i chuyo t’onggye chip’yo
[
Major Statistical Indicators for North Korea, 2011
] (Seoul: National Statistics Office, 2012).

7
. Richard Vinen,
History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century
(London: Abacus, 2002), 513.

8
. There is, actually, an ongoing debate on the reasons behind this relative success of the former nomenklatura and, more broadly speaking, Communist Party members in the post-Communist societies. Majority opinion is that it was brought about by the survival of institutions and networks, while the minority believes it is due to their personal qualities—opportunism, ambitions, organizational skills. There is no need, however, to go into excessive details: the continuing domination of the former elite is an undisputable and widely recognized fact. See Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva, “The Privileges of Past Communist Party Membership in Russia and Endogenous Switching Regression,”
Social Science Research
30 (2001): 641–652.

9
.
Tokyo Shimbun
, February 2, 2011.

10
. Nicholas Eberstadt once aptly described North Korean diplomacy as a “chain of aid-seeking stratagems.”

11
. For a detailed study of the “food diversion problem,” see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland,
Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 108–125.

12
. Seen as the beginning of a long-awaited Chinese-style reform program, the 7.1 measures have been treated at great length by numerous scholars. For the best summary in English, see Young Chul Chung, “North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli (Practical) Socialism,’”
Pacific Affairs
, vol. 77 (2004), iss. 2: 283–305. For Korean, see Kang Il-chon and Kong Son-yong, “7.1 kyongche kwanri kaeson chochi 1 nyonui pyongkawa chaehaesok” [The First Anniversary of the 7.1 Economy Management Improvement Measures: The Analysis and Appraisal],
Tongil munche yonku
, vol. 15 (2003): 131–146.

13
. See, respectively,
Wall Street Journal
, June 20, 2004; Victor Cha and Chris Hoffmeister, “North Korea’s Drug Habit,”
New York Times
, June 3, 2004; Howard W. French, “North Korea Experiments, with China As Its Model,”
New York Times
, March 28, 2005.

14
. Yim Kyong-hun, “Pukhansik kyongche kaehyok-e taehan pyongka-wa chonmang: 7.1 kyongche kwanri kaeson chochirul chungsim-uro” [The Appraisal and Prospects of an Economic Reform, North Korean Style; Centered around 7.1 Economy Management Improvement Measures],
Hankuk chongchi yonku
, vol. 16 (2007): 290, 295–391.

15
. Nam Song-uk, “Nongop punyaui kaehyok tanhaengkwa paekupche chaekae” [Execution of Reforms in Agriculture and Revival of the Rationing System],
Pukhan
2005, iss.12: 81.

16
. Between May and June of 2005 rice at Hamhung market cost 950 won per kilo. See Kim Yong-chin, “Hampuk Musan chiyok ssalkaps sopok harak” [Rice Prices in Dramatic Decline in Musan and North Hamgyong],
Daily NK
, July 17, 2007.

17
. Kim Yong-chin, “Paek
ŭ
p 700g taesang
ŭ
n motu chikchang chulk
ŭ
nhara” [Those Who Are Eligible for 700g Rations Must Go to the Workplace],
Daily NK
, December 7, 2006.

18
. The coming of this ban was reported in October when rumors began to spread. The ban went into effect on December 1, 2007. See
On
ŭ
l-
ŭ
i Pukhan sosik
, December 6, 2007, 2.

19
.
On
ŭ
l-
ŭ
i Pukhan sosik
, March 12, 2008, 2–3.

20
.
On
ŭ
l-
ŭ
i Pukhan sosik
, November 6, 2008, 1–2.

21
. Regarding the number of North Korean defectors hiding in China from 2006 to 2008, there are still large estimates, but the author tends to agree with Yun Yo-sang. See Yun Yo-sang, “Haeoe talpukcha siltaewa taechaek” [The Current Situation of North Korean Defectors Overseas and Policy toward Them],
Pukhan
2008, iss.5: 70. Yun concludes that in 2007 there were between 30,000 and 50,000 North Koreans hiding in China. In May 2007 NGO representatives operating in China also agreed that the number of refugees was close to 30,000. See “Talpuk haengryol 10 nyon … suscha chulko kyechung tayang” [Ten Years of Defections from the North … Numbers Go Down, Social Variety Increases],
Daily NK
, May 14, 2007. These estimates agree with what the present author himself heard on trips in 2007 and 2008 to the borderland areas both from Chinese officials and from independent researchers.

22
. The interview was widely reported in the media. For example, see “Kim Jong Il’s Son Talks Succession,”
CNN World
, October 12, 2010.

23
. As quoted by Yonhap Agency report, January 28, 2011.

CHAPTER
4

1
. Gregory Schulte, “Stopping Proliferation Before It Starts,”
Foreign Affairs
(July/August 2010): 83.

2
. On Syria—North Korea nuclear cooperation, see, for example: Gregory Schulte,
Uncovering Syria’s Covert Reactor
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

3
. For a description of South Korea’s short-lived nuclear weapons program, see Don Oberdorfer,
The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History
(New York: Basic Books, 2001), 68–74.

4
. Walter Clemens, “North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence,”
Journal of East Asian Studies
, vol.10 (2010), iss.1: 127.

5
. The United States’ near obsession with the nuclear program produced an impressive volume of literature dealing with the topic—dozens of books, hundreds of research papers. For a short and document-based introduction into the early history of the North Korean nuclear project, see a collection of articles edited by James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov:
The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia
(New York: Routledge, 2000). For more up-to-date information, a report by the Congressional Research Service might be of great help: Larry Niksch,
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010). For a short and highly professional review of the North Korean nuclear program, see an article by Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos Laboratories: Siegfried Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,”
Daedalus
139 (2010): 44–56.

6
. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,
2005 Annual Report
(New York: KEDO, 2005), 13.

7
. For a short but comprehensive review of KEDO’s history, see Yoshinori Takeda, “KEDO Adrift,”
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
, vol. 6 (2005), iss. 2: 123–131. The article might be seen as an unintended obituary for the KEDO, which ceased operations soon after it was published.

8
. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Accord with North Korea May Open Country to Change,”
Washington Post
, October 23, 1994, A36. Expectations of imminent collapse were widely—albeit privately—shared with the journalists at the time. See, for example, Jim Hoagland, “The Trojan Horse at North Korea’s Gate,”
Washington Post
, August 2, 1995, A25.

9
. The World Food Program INTERFAIS database. Available at
www.wfp.org/fais
.

10
. For a detailed description of the monitoring regime, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland,
Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 92–102.

11
. Siegfried Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,”
Daedalus
139 (Winter 2010): 47.

12
. The Kosis, the database of the National Statistics Office, is available at nso.go.kr.

13
.
2010 T’ongil
ŭ
isik chosa [2010 Survey of unification opinion]
(Seoul: S
ŏ
ultaehakkyo t’ongilp’y
ŏ
nghway
ŏ
nkuso, 2010), 22–23.

14
. Aidan Foster-Carter, “Towards the Korean Endgame,”
The Observer
, December 1, 2002.

15
. The World Food Program INTERFAIS database. Available at
www.wfp.org/fais
.

16
. T’ongkyech’
ŏ
ng,
Pukhan
ŭ
i chuyot’ongkyechip’yoo [North Korea’s main statistical indicators]
(Seoul: National Statistical Office, 2010), 35, 87.

17
. Statistics for the K
ǔ
mgang project can be found at “K
ŭ
mkangsan kwankwang 10 chuny
ŏ
n kwanly
ŏ
n charyo,”
Pukhan ky
ŏ
ngche ripyu
, 2008, iss. 11: 78–95.

18
. For the best available summary on the KIZ situation in English, see Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin,
The Kaes
ŏ
ng North-South Korean Industrial Complex
. RL 34903 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

19
. Hahm Chaibong, “South Korea’s Miraculous Democracy,”
Journal of Democracy
19 (2008): 138.

20
. Kando, known in Chinese as Jiandao, is an area located on the western bank of the Tuman River. The exact borders of the area are disputed, but more radical Korean nationalists include a large part of Manchuria in Kando.

21
. Hangyore, September 4, 2004.

22
. For a detailed treatment of the history wars between China and the Koreas, see Terence Roehrig, “History as a Strategic Weapon: The Korean and Chinese Struggle over Koguryo,” in
Korean Studies in the World: Democracy, Peace, Prosperity, and Culture
, ed. Seung Ham Yang, Yeon Sik Choi, and Jong Kun Choi (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2008); Peter Hays Gries, “The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today,”
East Asia
, vol. 22 (2005), iss.4: 3–17; Andrei Lankov, “The Legacy of Long-Gone States: China, Korea and the Koguryo Wars.”
Japan Focus
, September 2, 2006.

23
. For 2010 data, see Chungang Ilbo, May 27, 2011; for other data, see Dick Nanto and Mark E. Manyin,
China-North Korea Relations
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 15. For 2011 data, see:
2011ny
ŏ
nto Pukhan-
ŭ
i taeoe ky
ŏ
ngche silch
ŏ
k puns
ŏ
k-kwa 2012 ny
ŏ
nto ch
ŏ
nmang [2011 North Korea’s domestic an international economic performance and 2012 outlook]
(Seoul: Taeoe ky
ŏ
ngche ch
ŏ
ngch’aek y
ŏ
nkuw
ŏ
n, 2012), 4.

24
. “China, South Korea Start Talks on Free-Trade Pact,”
Bloomberg News
, May 2, 2012.

25
. For a detailed review of the current state of Chinese economic advances into North Korea, see Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China: Political Ramifications,”
Asian Survey
48 (2008): 343–372.

INTERLUDE

1
. “North Korea: 6 Million Are Hungry,”
Reuters
, March 26, 2011; Charles Clover, “Catastrophe in North Korea; China must pressure Pyongyang to allow food aid to millions threatened by famine,”
The Times
. March 22, 2010. 2; Blaine Harden, “At the Heart of North Korea’s Troubles, an Intractable Hunger Crisis,”
Washington Post
, March 6, 2009, A.1; Reuters, “Food Shortage Looms in North Korea,”
International Herald Tribune
, April 17, 2008, 3.

2
. 2009ny
ŏ
n pukhan ky
ŏ
ngches
ŏ
ngchangryul ch’uch
ŏ
ng ky
ŏ
lkwa [Results from estimates of North Korea’s 2009 growth rates] (Seoul: Hankuk
ŭ
nhaeng, 2010), 1.

CHAPTER
5

1
. Wade L. Huntley, “Sit Down and Talk,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
59 (2003): 28.

2
. Wade L. Huntley, “Threats All the Way Down: U.S. Nuclear Initiatives in a Unipolar World,”
Review of International Studies
32 (2006): 49–67.

3
. Lee Edwards,
Mediapolitik: How the Mass Media Have Transformed World Politics
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 126.

4
. InterMedia,
International Broadcasting in North Korea: North Korean Refugee/Traveler Survey Report April–August 2009
(Washington, D.C.: InterMedia, 2009).

5
. Peter Beck, “North Korea’s Radio Waves of Resistance,”
Wall Street Journal
, April 16, 2010.