Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 (19 page)

shaping the
mentalit
^´
e
of the Soviet population.

^{144
Let. Livshin and Orlov, eds.,}
Sovetskaia povsednevnost’
, 20, 31.

^{145
Mem. N. Khrushchev, trans., J. L. Schecter and V. V. Luchkov,}
Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost’ Tapes
(Boston, 1990), 56; Resis,
Molotov Remembers
, 22–3.

^{146
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 10284, l. 2; d. 12976, l. 25.}

^{147
Let. V. Zenzinov,}
Vstrecha s Rossiei: Kak i Chem Zhivut v Sovetskom Soiuze. Pis’ma
v Krasnuiu Armiiu 1939–40 (New York, 1944), 498–9, 356, 321, 511.

^{148
Let. Ibid. 524, 545.}

The Liberator State? 1939–41
29

However, the overwhelming impression from the available docu-
ments is that Soviet citizens routinely went beyond the official press in order to make sense of the world around them. The spectacular volte- face of August 1939 caught many of them by surprise, and the later fragmentation of Official Soviet Identity made it necessary for ordinary individuals to turn to
bricolage
as a means of piecing together a com- posite picture of international affairs. The key message that circulated within the word-of-mouth network, despite press protestations to the contrary, was that war was imminent. Which war, and with which countries was unclear, but many Soviet citizens were convinced that it was just around the corner.

Official Soviet Identity as a mighty state

The process of creative
bricolage
also characterized the manner in which Soviet citizens engaged with official claims that the USSR was a mighty state. This was particularly evident in relation to the Finnish debacle which did more than anything to shake notions of Soviet military power in this period.
Pravda
’s confidence that this was going to be a one-sided contest was clearly infectious. Frontline journalists parted with ‘see you in Helsinki in three days’, and the first troops into battle were warned not to violate the Swedish frontier.
^{149
Political commissar Oreshin}
wrote in his diary in late October that, ‘the Finns strut around, rattle their weapons and say threateningly, “The life of one Finn will cost 10 Russians.” Stupid fools—what do they really think will happen?’
^150
The
same expectation of crushing victory clearly coursed through a young Muscovite who requested that the Komsomol ‘send me to any echelon to destroy the enemy’.
^{151
This bullish confidence was reinforced by the}
tiny number of casualties suffered (1,475) when the Polish borderlands had been overrun in September 1939.
¹⁵²

The harsh reality of a winter war in which well over 100,000 troops
died came as a shock to many Red Army troops. The bombast evapor- ated from Commissar Oreshin’s diary. Ten days into the conflict he

^{149
Mem. C. Mannerheim, trans., E. Lewehaupt,}
The Memoirs of Marshal Manner-
heim (London, 1953), 328–9; Nevezhin,
Sindrom Nastupatel’noi Voiny
, 93.

^{150
Mem. Carlow,}
Politruk Oreshinin
, 126.

^{151
Let. RGASPI f. M1, op. 23, d. 1439, ll. 50–60.}

^{152
Int. Fischer,}
Thirteen who Fled
, 215; A. Weiner, ‘Something to Die for, A Lot to Kill for: The Soviet System and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 1939–1945’, in

G. Kassimeris, ed.,
The Barbarisation of Warfare
(London, 2006), 104.

30
Being Soviet

wrote, ‘The men have lain in the snow for three days and didn’t dare to
lift their heads. Several of them are frost-bitten. ... We are bloody well fed up!’
^{153
Some of the soldiers’ letters reflected similar shock. Just seven}
days into the conflict one wrote that ‘The majority of us have lost the hope of returning home alive.’ Another wrote in February, ‘Our leaders promise that we will have won the whole of Finland by the 23rd February. But we will see.’
^{154
Similar sentiments also appeared in the}
frontline
svodki
and the reminiscences of HIP respondents who remem-

bered tales of soldiers injuring themselves to escape the fighting.
¹⁵⁵

A Red Army commander was later prosecuted for telling his wife that
many soldiers ‘did not want to fight with the enemy’.
^{156
The dark mood}
of the soldiers was tacitly recognized in a series of short lived cartoons in the army newspaper
Boevaia Krasnoarmeiskaia
. Pasha Berzhuntsov (Pasha the Liar) marvelled at the Finnish supermen and mocked the failures of the Red Army supply chain. Pasha was swiftly cut by the censor but even his more acceptable replacement, Vasia Terkin, had to struggle with gossips who told tales of Finnish troops who crossed the forests barefoot and hid in pill boxes that ‘make our shells look like crumbs’.
¹⁵⁷

Inside the USSR, the almost total silence of the official press about
the progress of the war forced Soviet citizens to rely on information obtained by word-of-mouth about the front. One mother described to her son at the frontline how ‘Everyone is talking in houses and in trams, in buses and in the street, in theatres and even in the laundry—only about the Red Army.’
^{158
The rumours they heard were not always}
positive. John Scott heard stories of divisional commanders being executed for retreating under sniper fire.
^{159
Meanwhile, the dark hu-}
mour of the front line spread to the rear. E.N.P. was prosecuted for constantly referring to Red Army soldiers as ‘cannon fodder’.
^{160
A joke}
from the time mocked the liberation corps of supposedly Finnish Soviet troops: ‘A Soviet soldier asked his friend whether he had seen the

^{153
Mem. Carlow,}
Politruk Oreshinin
, 128–31.

^{154
Let. Zenzinov,}
Vstrecha s Rossiei
, 164, 160.

^{155
HIP. B7, 15, 6. See: Merridale,}
Ivan’s War
, 49; Davies,
Popular Opinion
, 49.

^{156
Proc. GARF f. 8131, op. 31a, d. 13536, ll. 12–13.}

^{157
C. Van Dyke,}
The Soviet Invasion of Finland
(London, 1997), 121–3.

^{158
Let. Zenzinov,}
Vstrecha s Rossiei
, 513.

^{159
Mem. Scott,}
Duel for Europe
, 105.

^{160
Proc. GARF f. 8131, op. 31a, d. 97492, l. 3.}

The Liberator State? 1939–41
31

Finnish mines (Finnskiye miny). “No”, replied his friend, “I didn’t see
them but I did see the Finns from Minsk” (Minskiye Finny), that’s a greater wonder.’
^{161
Rumours about the frontline were particularly}
widespread in Leningrad, which was close to the battle. The steady stream of wounded soldiers provided a rich seam of information.
^{162
Tales of frostbite and amputation circulated widely and generated a}
particularly strong sense of revulsion.
¹⁶³

Even after the war was over, stories continued to circulate concerning
the Finnish disaster. A very large number of those prosecuted for counter-revolutionary agitation in this period were supposed to have criticized Sovinformburo for underestimating the losses at the front. Returning soldiers told those at home how ‘many thousands and thousands of soldiers had to be sent there, even though it was such a small country’.
^{164
Soviet citizens searched around for explanations of}
the Red Army’s difficulties. Some blamed supply lines, others the quality of armaments, others the lack of basic necessities in the country, and still others the poor clothing of the soldiers.
^{165
The silence of the}
state propaganda machine fed this process of inference. In the absence of a credible official narrative, Soviet citizens turned to
bricolage,
fusing snippets of news obtained by word-of-mouth with personal observa- tions and what official news there was, to create a composite picture of events at the front line.

This consciousness that the Finnish War had gone badly shaped the
reactions of some Soviet citizens to official claims about the might of the USSR. The May Day demonstration of military hardware in 1941 was regarded by some as a sign that war was coming, rather than a symbol of Soviet power.
^{166
The first elections in the former Polish territories were}
bedevilled by rumours that ‘In the forthcoming elections at the election points there will be two urns: on one will be written Germany and on the other Soviet.’ Apparently the Red Army could be forced out by democratic vote. The success of this rumour reflected the uncertainty

^{161
HIP. B7, 135, 12.}

^{162
Let. Zenzinov,}
Vstrecha s Rossiei,
159; Sv. Davies,
Popular Opinion
, 100–1.

^{163
Mem. Scott,}
Duel for Europe
, 108–9; Let. Livshin and Orlov,
Sovetskaia Povsed-
nevnost’, 337–8; Zenzinov,
Vstrecha s Rossiei
, 537.

^{164
HIP. A. 1, 9, 91.}

^{165
Let. Livshin and Orlov,}
Sovetskaia povsednevnost’
, 337–8; Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 45534, l. 3; d. 8837, l. 7; d. 10368, l. 11; d. 10122, l. 24.

^{166
Mem. Werth,}
Russia at War
, 122.

32
Being Soviet

generated by forced population transfers in the borderlands but it also
suggests that many of the new residents of the USSR were not convinced that the Soviets were strong enough to enforce their desire to stay.
^{167
The June 1940 labour laws were also widely interpreted as a sign of}
weakness.
^{168
The reaction to the laws themselves provides a perfect case}
study in the tactics of the Soviet habitat in operation. Over the coming months, Soviet report writers railed against the ways the legislation had been enforced. Managers and judges deployed the tactic of avoidance when they shielded workers from harsh punishment.
^{169
Some managers}
also reappropriated the new legislation in order to pursue personal vendettas against staff. In Kalinin
oblast’
there were several cases of managers moving unpopular employees to work that did not suit their specialities and then forwarding their cases for prosecution when they refused to work.
¹⁷⁰