Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (54 page)
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Authors: Jeremy Scahill
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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Despite the controversy, the State Department post allowed Black to remain at the center of U.S. counterterror policy. Black worked directly under Colin Powell, with whom he reportedly shared a common adversary within the administration—Donald Rumsfeld. As the Pentagon attempted to change U.S. policy after 9/11 to allow the military to insert Special Operations forces into countries without approval from the U.S. ambassador or CIA mission chief, Black became the point person in thwarting Rumsfeld’s plan. “I gave Cofer specific instructions to dismount, kill the horses and fight on foot—this is not going to happen,” Powell’s deputy, Richard Armitage, told the
Washington Post,
describing how he and others had stopped a half dozen Pentagon attempts to weaken chief-of-mission authority.
96
(Interestingly, Black, Armitage, and Powell all resigned within two weeks of one another in November 2004 after Bush’s reelection, while Rumsfeld continued on for another two years.)
Washington Post,
describing how he and others had stopped a half dozen Pentagon attempts to weaken chief-of-mission authority.
96
(Interestingly, Black, Armitage, and Powell all resigned within two weeks of one another in November 2004 after Bush’s reelection, while Rumsfeld continued on for another two years.)
Among Black’s other duties in his new post was coordinating security for the 2004 Olympics in Greece. He traveled to Athens and oversaw the training of more than thirteen hundred Greek security personnel under the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
97
More than two hundred of those trained were instructed in handling underwater explosives and responding to possible WMD attacks.
98
Blackwater was awarded a contract for an undisclosed amount of money in 2003 to train “special security teams” in advance of the international games.
99
The company denied there was anything untoward about that contract and that Black’s subsequent hiring was unrelated.
100
97
More than two hundred of those trained were instructed in handling underwater explosives and responding to possible WMD attacks.
98
Blackwater was awarded a contract for an undisclosed amount of money in 2003 to train “special security teams” in advance of the international games.
99
The company denied there was anything untoward about that contract and that Black’s subsequent hiring was unrelated.
100
On April 1, 2004, a day after the Blackwater Fallujah ambush, Black was testifying before the House Committee on International Relations in a hearing on “The Al Qaeda Threat” when he made his first public comments about Blackwater. “I can’t tell you how sad we all are to see that. And this takes me back; I have seen these things before,” he said. “I think since it specifically happened in the Fallujah area, which is very Saddam Hussein-oriented, tribally oriented, they do see us as the enemy, and their natural inclination, until we prove them otherwise, is to vent their frustration, what they see as their humiliation and defeat against an outside force, against representatives of that entity. It’s not that uncommon.”
101
Black continued, “The people that did this were not, you know, three guys, you know, on an excellent adventure. You know, these are people that have had the training, have a vested interest.” Asked about “any relationship you see between Al Qaeda and that kind of Islamic terrorism” evidenced in Fallujah, Black responded, “I think it is, from our perspective, it’s associated, it’s in proximity. There’s not, specifically, a direct tie between that crowd and Al Qaeda as we know it. They just find themselves with the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
102
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Black continued, “The people that did this were not, you know, three guys, you know, on an excellent adventure. You know, these are people that have had the training, have a vested interest.” Asked about “any relationship you see between Al Qaeda and that kind of Islamic terrorism” evidenced in Fallujah, Black responded, “I think it is, from our perspective, it’s associated, it’s in proximity. There’s not, specifically, a direct tie between that crowd and Al Qaeda as we know it. They just find themselves with the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
102
The next month, Black was giving a keynote dinner address at Blackwater’s World SWAT Challenge. In a mass e-mail announcing the speech, Blackwater president Gary Jackson wrote, “Dinner on Thursday night at Water-side has a fantastic guest speaker in Ambassador Cofer Black. Ambassador Black’s responsibilities include coordinating U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including the policy and planning of the Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program.”
103
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In late 2004, two months before the U.S. presidential election, Black grabbed headlines after claiming on Pakistani television that the United States was near to capturing bin Laden. “If he has a watch, he should be looking at it because the clock is ticking,” Black declared. “He will be caught.”
104
These bold declarations were controversial and quickly put senior White House and Pakistani officials on the defensive in the media. In November 2004, Black resigned his State Department post, he said, to explore new professional opportunities. “He thought it would be a good time between administrations to go,” said State Department spokesperson Adam Ereli. “He has a number of offers in the private sector, and he’s going to take some time to think about them.”
105
104
These bold declarations were controversial and quickly put senior White House and Pakistani officials on the defensive in the media. In November 2004, Black resigned his State Department post, he said, to explore new professional opportunities. “He thought it would be a good time between administrations to go,” said State Department spokesperson Adam Ereli. “He has a number of offers in the private sector, and he’s going to take some time to think about them.”
105
For a brief moment after 9/11, Cofer Black had helped run an unprecedented covert war that some officials had salivated for their entire careers. That now was history as human rights groups and lawyers worked feverishly to dismantle the shadowy system Black had worked so diligently to build. In 2005, he was targeted for sanction, along with George Tenet and another CIA official, by the agency’s Inspector General (IG) for bearing responsibility in the 9/11 intelligence failure.
106
The Bush Administration, however, worried that Tenet would retaliate and embarrass the White House by revealing damning information, buried the IG’s report, saving Black in the process.
107
106
The Bush Administration, however, worried that Tenet would retaliate and embarrass the White House by revealing damning information, buried the IG’s report, saving Black in the process.
107
Congressional Democrats would later use Black’s covert program as evidence that the Administration had “outsourced” the job of hunting bin Laden. But while his work as a government official may have ended, Black found a gold mine of opportunity in the dramatically expanding world of private military, intelligence, and security contracting—where human rights oversight was optional at best. On February 4, 2005, Blackwater USA officially announced that it had hired Black as the company’s vice chairman. “Ambassador Black brings with him thirty years of experience in combating terrorism around the globe and absolute devotion to freedom and democracy and the United States of America,” said Erik Prince. “We are honored to have him as part of our great team.”
108
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For Blackwater, hiring Cofer Black was an unbelievable score. In marketing terms, it would be almost impossible to rival. The company moved swiftly to use him as a brand in and of himself. In August 2005, Black incorporated his own “consulting” practice, The Black Group, which would specialize in executive protection and security. “The 9/11 attacks were designed to damage the economy of the United States,” Black said in a statement on his Web site. “To successfully inflict the greatest possible harm, terrorists will target the lifeblood of a nation: its economy. For that reason, Fortune 500 companies are especially attractive targets as governments continue to emphasize Homeland Security. We seek to anticipate and defeat the next terrorist tactic—disruptions of supply chains, coordinated attacks on key assets or customers, or even assassinations of top executives. Corporations are the most vulnerable targets. It’s our job to keep them safe.”
109
The Black Group boasted, “With leadership drawn from the Executive Branch of the United States Government, The Black Group has the practical experience and the network to mitigate any security issue. Ensure the security of your people and your assets.”
110
109
The Black Group boasted, “With leadership drawn from the Executive Branch of the United States Government, The Black Group has the practical experience and the network to mitigate any security issue. Ensure the security of your people and your assets.”
110
On The Black Group’s Web site, various images of potential targets flash on the screen: a crowd gathered at the Mall in Washington, D.C., a power plant, a man in a suit using a device to inspect the bottom of a car in an underground garage, a Wall Street sign. On the contact page, the other main figure listed on the site is Francis McLennand, another career CIA officer, who worked alongside Black at the agency.
111
The contact phone number for the company was the same number used by Erik Prince’s “Prince Group” in McLean, Virginia, not far from the CIA Counterterrorism Center Black once headed.
111
The contact phone number for the company was the same number used by Erik Prince’s “Prince Group” in McLean, Virginia, not far from the CIA Counterterrorism Center Black once headed.
Few other Americans had their hands as deeply into the inner workings of U.S. covert operations in the post-9/11 world as Cofer Black. He soon would begin acting as a godfather of sorts to the mercenary community as it refined its rebranding campaign. Potential Blackwater clients could now assume they were getting direct access to the resources of the CIA and intelligence world from “a leadership team drawn from senior levels of the United States government”
112
—something few other private firms could boast or imply. Black was a heavy hitter among the heaviest of them, the man who caught Carlos the Jackal and brought down the Taliban. He would soon take the lead in promoting Blackwater as a privatized peacekeeping force that could deploy at a moment’s notice in places like Darfur, Sudan, or domestically in U.S. Homeland Security operations. Other influential ex-government officials would soon join him at Blackwater as the company turned its sights on lucrative disaster contracting in the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in late 2005. But just as Black was rolling up his sleeves in his fancy new digs, more Blackwater men were dying in Iraq in what would be the deadliest days to date for the company.
112
—something few other private firms could boast or imply. Black was a heavy hitter among the heaviest of them, the man who caught Carlos the Jackal and brought down the Taliban. He would soon take the lead in promoting Blackwater as a privatized peacekeeping force that could deploy at a moment’s notice in places like Darfur, Sudan, or domestically in U.S. Homeland Security operations. Other influential ex-government officials would soon join him at Blackwater as the company turned its sights on lucrative disaster contracting in the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in late 2005. But just as Black was rolling up his sleeves in his fancy new digs, more Blackwater men were dying in Iraq in what would be the deadliest days to date for the company.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
DEATH SQUADS, MERCENARIES, AND THE “SALVADOR OPTION”
WHEN PAUL
Bremer skulked out of Iraq on June 28, 2004, he left behind a violent, chaotic mess that the White House called “a free and sovereign” Iraq.
1
Just how unstable the country was when Bremer departed was evident in the fact that he actually had to stage an exit in one plane for the press and then fly out of Baghdad in another to “get me out of here . . . preferably in one piece.”
2
In real terms, this “sovereignty,” which President Bush described as “the Iraqi people hav[ing] their country back,”
3
was a way to set the stage for U.S. officials to blame the puppet government in Baghdad for the worsening American-made disaster. When Bremer’s secret flight fled Iraq, anti-U.S. attacks were increasing by the day as more mercenaries poured into the country—now officially operating with immunity. In the meantime, more Iraqi factions began arming militias, and talk of civil war began drowning out that of a united resistance to the U.S. occupation. It was in the midst of these developments that Bremer’s successor arrived on the ground in Baghdad.
Bremer skulked out of Iraq on June 28, 2004, he left behind a violent, chaotic mess that the White House called “a free and sovereign” Iraq.
1
Just how unstable the country was when Bremer departed was evident in the fact that he actually had to stage an exit in one plane for the press and then fly out of Baghdad in another to “get me out of here . . . preferably in one piece.”
2
In real terms, this “sovereignty,” which President Bush described as “the Iraqi people hav[ing] their country back,”
3
was a way to set the stage for U.S. officials to blame the puppet government in Baghdad for the worsening American-made disaster. When Bremer’s secret flight fled Iraq, anti-U.S. attacks were increasing by the day as more mercenaries poured into the country—now officially operating with immunity. In the meantime, more Iraqi factions began arming militias, and talk of civil war began drowning out that of a united resistance to the U.S. occupation. It was in the midst of these developments that Bremer’s successor arrived on the ground in Baghdad.
Ambassador John Negroponte was certainly no stranger to wanton bloodletting and death-squad-style operations, having cut his teeth working under Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War.
4
Beginning in 1981, Negroponte was the Reagan administration’s point man in fueling death squads in Central America.
5
As ambassador to Honduras, Negroponte had presided over the second largest embassy in Latin America at the time and the largest CIA station in the world.
6
From that post, Negroponte had coordinated Washington’s covert support for the Contra death squads in Nicaragua and for the Honduran junta, covering up the crimes of its murderous Battalion 316.
7
During Negroponte’s tenure in Honduras, U.S. officials who worked under him said the State Department human rights reports on the country were drafted to read more like Norway’s than anything reflecting the actual reality in Honduras.
8
Negroponte’s predecessor in Honduras, Ambassador Jack R. Binns, told the
New York Times
that Negroponte had discouraged reporting to Washington of abductions, torture, and killings by notorious Honduran military units. “I think [Negroponte] was complicit in abuses, I think he tried to put a lid on reporting abuses and I think he was untruthful to Congress about those activities,” Binns said.
9
The
Wall Street Journal
reported that in Honduras, “Negroponte’s influence, backed by huge amounts of U.S. aid, was so great that it was said he far outweighed the country’s president and that his only real rival was Honduras’s military chief.”
10
He was “such a powerful ambassador in Honduras in the early 1980s that he was known as ‘the proconsul,’ a title given to powerful administrators in colonial times,” the
Journal
noted in a story published shortly after Negroponte’s nomination to the Iraq post. “Now President Bush has chosen him to reprise that role in Iraq.”
11
4
Beginning in 1981, Negroponte was the Reagan administration’s point man in fueling death squads in Central America.
5
As ambassador to Honduras, Negroponte had presided over the second largest embassy in Latin America at the time and the largest CIA station in the world.
6
From that post, Negroponte had coordinated Washington’s covert support for the Contra death squads in Nicaragua and for the Honduran junta, covering up the crimes of its murderous Battalion 316.
7
During Negroponte’s tenure in Honduras, U.S. officials who worked under him said the State Department human rights reports on the country were drafted to read more like Norway’s than anything reflecting the actual reality in Honduras.
8
Negroponte’s predecessor in Honduras, Ambassador Jack R. Binns, told the
New York Times
that Negroponte had discouraged reporting to Washington of abductions, torture, and killings by notorious Honduran military units. “I think [Negroponte] was complicit in abuses, I think he tried to put a lid on reporting abuses and I think he was untruthful to Congress about those activities,” Binns said.
9
The
Wall Street Journal
reported that in Honduras, “Negroponte’s influence, backed by huge amounts of U.S. aid, was so great that it was said he far outweighed the country’s president and that his only real rival was Honduras’s military chief.”
10
He was “such a powerful ambassador in Honduras in the early 1980s that he was known as ‘the proconsul,’ a title given to powerful administrators in colonial times,” the
Journal
noted in a story published shortly after Negroponte’s nomination to the Iraq post. “Now President Bush has chosen him to reprise that role in Iraq.”
11
Perhaps there was little irony, then, that shortly after Negroponte’s appointment as ambassador to Iraq, in April 2004, the Honduran government announced it was pulling its 370 troops out of the “coalition of the willing.”
12
Despite Negroponte’s well-documented record of involvement with a policy of horrible human rights abuses and killings, his confirmation as ambassador to Iraq went smoothly—he was approved by the Senate in a 95-3 vote on May 6, 2004. Senator Tom Harkin, who as a Congressman in the 1980s had investigated Negroponte’s activities in Central America, said he wished he had done more to stop Negroponte’s appointment. “I’ve been amazed at how this individual—from what he did in Central America, where under his watch hundreds of people disappeared—has moved up. He falsified reports and ignored what was happening,” Harkin said. “This is going to be our ambassador to Iraq at this time?”
13
12
Despite Negroponte’s well-documented record of involvement with a policy of horrible human rights abuses and killings, his confirmation as ambassador to Iraq went smoothly—he was approved by the Senate in a 95-3 vote on May 6, 2004. Senator Tom Harkin, who as a Congressman in the 1980s had investigated Negroponte’s activities in Central America, said he wished he had done more to stop Negroponte’s appointment. “I’ve been amazed at how this individual—from what he did in Central America, where under his watch hundreds of people disappeared—has moved up. He falsified reports and ignored what was happening,” Harkin said. “This is going to be our ambassador to Iraq at this time?”
13
Negroponte was guarded by Blackwater’s forces upon his arrival in Baghdad in June and as he stepped up the development of the largest U.S. Embassy in the world—overseeing an estimated staff of thirty-seven hundred, including twenty-five hundred security personnel, “a unit only slightly smaller than a full Marine Corps regiment.”
14
In an echo of his time in Honduras, the Baghdad Embassy would house some five hundred CIA operatives.
15
At the same time, Blackwater had just been awarded a vaunted diplomatic security contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
16
But it wasn’t just American private armies that were making their mark in Iraq. In addition to the mercenary companies increasingly being employed by the occupation forces and reconstruction industry, there was also a sharp rise in death-squad-style activities in the country in the months directly following the brief joint uprising of Shiites and Sunnis in March/April 2004.
14
In an echo of his time in Honduras, the Baghdad Embassy would house some five hundred CIA operatives.
15
At the same time, Blackwater had just been awarded a vaunted diplomatic security contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
16
But it wasn’t just American private armies that were making their mark in Iraq. In addition to the mercenary companies increasingly being employed by the occupation forces and reconstruction industry, there was also a sharp rise in death-squad-style activities in the country in the months directly following the brief joint uprising of Shiites and Sunnis in March/April 2004.
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