The American commander made the rather obvious military observation that he should retreat. But he was not confident that he had the authority to order a full withdrawal, since his commission from Congress directed him to confer with his “council of war.”
16
Washington felt bound by this language to obtain their sign-off before any major action.
17
The members of this war council were all appointed by the meddling Congress, and most were relative novices in military matters. In fact, only one, the slovenly military genius Charles Lee, was a professional soldier. Seeking to be deferential to the politicians’ and officers’ wishes, however, Washington dutifully brought the question of withdrawal before this group.
Washington and the war council “all agreed that the Town was not tenable if the Enemy was resolved to bombard and Cannonade it.”
18
Yet a majority on the council foolishly decided against a full withdrawal. Instead, “a Course was taken between abandoning it totally and concentrating our whole strength for its defence.”
19
Why would Washington take this militarily inexcusable risk? Because he believed that the micromanaging politicians expected him to do just that. Washington and the council were “influenced in their Opinion, to whom the determination of Congress was known, against an Evacuation totally; suspecting that Congress wished it to be maintained at every hazard . . . .”
20
Further, many of the novices on the war council—and even Washington, to a degree—had the naive view that they could still defeat the British, and they did not want to hurt morale further by another retreat. Therefore, the council made a decision that was contrary to Washington’s best judgment, but the commander respectfully acquiesced.
21
Washington quickly informed Congress that he would retain forces on Manhattan Island even though it was “extremely obvious, from all Intelligence,” that the British intended to encircle the Americans and “endeavour to cut this Army in pieces.”
22
Washington and his officers had bowed to civil authority, but their discontent was surfacing. With Congress and its war council peering over his shoulder at every turn, the commander in chief still lacked full command over his army.
23
His officers, feeling that Congress was forcing them to fight the war with one arm tied behind their back, began to question their political masters more openly. “The councils of the Congress seem to be dark and intricate, and very badly calculated,” wrote one of Washington’s officers. While the soldiers were trapped on the island, fearing for their lives and “anticipating the apprehended evil,” Congress was at a safe distance in Philadelphia.
24
And when Congress did send observers to survey the army’s condition, these “Philadelphia gentlemen who came over on visits, upon the first cannon shot went off in a most violent hurry.”
25
Washington and his army remained on the field, almost literally staring down the barrel of a gun. Washington’s assistant wrote to his wife, “We are still here in a posture somewhat awkward; we think (at least I do) that we cannot stay and yet we do not know how to go—so that we may be properly said to be between a hawk and a buzzard.”
26
Meanwhile, a comfortable eighty-two miles away in Philadelphia, Congress spent precious time debating the predicament. With the army’s fate hanging in the balance, the politicians back at cozy Independence Hall finally decided to send a small delegation to meet with Howe. This group consisted of Ben Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, a twenty-six-year-old North Carolinian who was the youngest man to sign the Declaration of Independence. The distinguished trio set off immediately by horse across New Jersey and then rowed out to Howe’s base on the southernmost tip of the island.
Greeted by an intimidating row of enemy fighters, Franklin and his two young co-diplomats were escorted into Bentley Manor, a stately stone house that was being used as a barracks. It was in a filthy state, but the redcoats had cleaned up one room overlooking the bay for the meeting.
27
Once inside, the Americans drank claret and ate ham, tongue, and mutton while they awaited their British adversary.
28
The veil of civility failed to mask the dangerous situation in which they sat.
The so-called “Staten Island Peace Conference” convened on September 11, 1776. This attempt to end the war was doomed from the start, however, and both sides knew it. Howe entered the meeting room in his sharp uniform, fully aware that he had the upper hand. He informed the delegation that it was in the Americans’ best interest to rescind their Declaration of Independence. While Howe attempted to be conciliatory, he could not help but act the role of a conqueror stating his terms: should they rejoin the empire, he would spare them. Howe indeed had authorization from London to pardon many of the patriots, and he was surprisingly eager to use it.
After three hours of discussion (in which Howe did most of the talking), the British general emotionally revealed that he viewed the schism between Britain and her former colonies with regret and still regarded the congressmen as his British kinsmen. He continued, “if America shall fall, I should feel for and lament it like the loss of a brother.” The wily Franklin said dryly, “we will use our utmost endeavors to save your lordship that mortification.” Howe, not one for dry humor, responded with a long monologue outlining his attempts at peace to the stone-faced congressmen. He explained his desire to reunite the empire by bringing the colonies—whom he viewed as his American brothers—back under the Crown. To that, Adams retorted with his typical biting eloquence: “Your lordship may consider me in what light you please . . . except that of a British subject. ”
29
Little did Adams know that his name was on a secret list of patriots to whom Howe was forbidden to grant pardon should America agree to end the rebellion.
30
Luckily for Adams, there would be no peace or pardoning that day. As Howe’s secretary summarized the conference, “They met, they talked, they parted. And now nothing remains but to fight it out.”
31
Although their meeting was fruitless, at least the congressmen had bought Washington a few more days of respite.
Washington met again with his war council. This time, they had intelligence that the British forces were preparing for an imminent attack, and the council agreed to a full withdrawal from Manhattan. Congress also changed tunes, deciding to allow the commander in chief to determine the timing of an evacuation.
32
Finally relinquishing the power to make such a tactical decision, Congress notified Washington that no part of the army “should remain in that city a moment longer” than he judged appropriate.
33
Washington could now do what he needed in order to save his army. He quickly pressed every available horse and wagon in the vicinity into service and commenced another mass retreat.
34
But Congress still prohibited him from acting on his more controversial wish: to set Manhattan ablaze.
Washington knew that the British forces were salivating at the thought of taking the island. With its large Loyalist population, great ports, ample housing, and plentiful sources of supplies, New York was the perfect place for them to live during the coming winter. The British troops could be healthy, well supplied, and ready to trounce the feeble American forces come spring. Further, Washington knew he had little chance of recovering the island, since such an amphibious invasion would require a navy to match mighty Britain’s, and he had virtually none. So the only logical tactic was to deprive the British of the city.
35
But Congress forbade him. They ordered Washington to do “no damage” to New York. Clueless of the military realities, they declared that they had “no doubt of being able to recover” the city if the British took it.
36
Washington grudgingly obeyed, although in private he grumbled that if he had his say, he would have “laid the city in ashes.”
37
And his wish would come true.
With the British invasion looming, Washington hurriedly withdrew his army up Manhattan with the goal of escaping into the Bronx. But he was too late. Howe was not about to allow him to slip away yet again. This time, the British pounced before the Americans had the chance to run.
15
Onslaught
O
ne Sunday morning during the dog days of summer 1776, a groggy baby-faced Connecticut private named Joseph Plumb Martin lay quietly in a defensive trench.
1
Only fifteen years old, he was too young to fight without his guardians’ consent, so he had threatened to run away unless his grandparents allowed him to enlist. They gave in.
And now this headstrong youth from a wealthy family, excited to be a part of the American cause, had been enjoying a seemingly peaceful morning. “The Hills, the Woods, the River, the Town, the [British] Ships . . . all Heightened by a most clear & delightful morning, furnished the finest Landscape that either art and nature combined could draw, or the Imagination conceive.”
2
With the sun little over an hour high, the day was already warm. As the menacing British warships silently passed by, Martin began amusing himself by reading some papers he found among the debris on the ground. It was the calm before the storm.
“I was demurely perusing these papers,” the teenager recalled, “when all of a sudden there came such a peal of thunder from the British shipping that I thought my head would go with the sound. I made a frog’s leap for the ditch, and lay as still as I could, and began to consider which part of my carcass was to go first.”
3
The ground trembled along with the American soldiers as the British warships launched a fearsome barrage from seventy cannons. Just four days after the collapse of peace talks, the violent bombardment of Manhattan was underway.
One British soldier observed, “The scene was awful and grand, I might say beautiful, but for the melancholy seriousness that which must attend every circumstance where the lives of men, even the basest malefactors, are at stake.”
4
The patriots did not think the scene was quite as beautiful. They were cowering in their trenches when 12,000 well-aligned British troops began to wade onto the shore in droves like a red war machine. Spotting their approach, the panicked Americans ran or surrendered. Barely any American rounds were fired, and the British forces invaded with “nothing to hinder them.”
5
Once ashore, the redcoats were welcomed by New York’s Loyalists as a liberation party. To the patriots’ chagrin, the Tories cheered and hoisted the British troops onto their shoulders as they celebrated like “overjoyed bedlamites.” The British soldiers were equally elated: they had landed without losing a single man.
6
Receiving no orders from their superiors, Martin and his battalion ran like hell, while “the grape shot and langrage flew merrily, which served to quicken [their] motions.”
7
They made a mad dash to a nearby house, where they came upon women and small children crying amidst the mayhem. Even though it was still morning, the soldiers were in need of a stiff drink. Much to their delight, the women placed a bottle of rum on the table and the thirsty soldiers helped themselves. Fortified with some liquid courage, Martin and his friends then snuck out the door and ran for miles to safety.
Hearing the British bombardment, Washington leapt onto his horse and raced to the scene. When he arrived, he was not pleased with what he saw. “The demons of fear and disorder” had infected his troops, sending them scattering.
8
Even in areas where they outnumbered the British, the Americans fled, dropping their muskets, bullets, food, and even clothing to run faster.
9
In Washington’s view, his soldiers were becoming a little too adept at running away. He was a man of action. Honor required that he stand and fight. Therefore, he boldly ordered his troops to stand their ground. Almost as if he were trying to beat honor into them, he struck several officers as they disobeyed.
Washington scrambled to organize a counterattack, but the Americans were too terrified to return fire. He could take no more of such impotence. In one of the few times the remarkably stoic general lost his temper, he dashed his hat on the ground and exclaimed, “Good God, have I got such Troops as those!”
10
Mad with rage, he mounted his horse and charged at the invaders. Almost no one followed him.
The commander rode with nearly suicidal fury and virtually no backup to within a football field of the redcoats. Frustrated by his inability to stop the British and distraught over the peril to his nation, the tremendously unflappable man lost control of his faculties. And it almost cost him his life. There he was, blind with anger, singlehandedly opposing the invasion. Realizing the horror about to transpire, two of his aides frantically grabbed for his horse’s reins as bullets whizzed past, kicking up the earth around them. The commander almost died in that instant. But luckily for the him—and for the Revolution—muskets were rather inaccurate weapons.
The French developed the flintlock musket in 1610. This ingenious contraption antiquated the need to ignite gunpowder with a match. Instead, the hammer used a piece of flint to cause the spark that created the (somewhat) controlled explosion that forced the lead musket ball through the gun barrel and hurling towards its target. This invention helped revolutionize warfare. The strength of these guns accounted for the prominence of the French musketeers, who were immortalized in the famous novel
The Three Musketeers
. Not to be outdone by their rivals, the British developed a similar musket and introduced it to their American colonies. Although tweaks were certainly made to the design over the next century and a half, the weapon remained largely the same. And Washington owed his life to this lack of innovation.