Bonnie Prince Charlie: A Biography (21 page)

Charles was attempting to bring more clans into his fold, telling the hesitant chiefs that he ''had undoubted assurances of assistance from France and Spain" and hoping that they would be impressed by what they heard about his success at Prestonpans. To his intense disappointment, however, the principal Skye chieftains, along with most of the northerly clans, decided to support the government, partly because of the vigorous efforts of the lord president Duncan Forbes at Inverness. Forbes, having been authorized to raise twenty "independent companies" of Highlanders, was wooing the clan chiefs with the promise of a command, and achieving success.

If the Jacobites were to keep up their momentum, the French and Spanish assistance Charles seemed so confident of receiving would have to materialize, and soon.

On October 14 Alexandre Jean Baptiste de Boyer, Marquis d'Eguilles, arrived in Edinburgh, a special envoy from the French court. He brought with him four thousand guineas, nearly thirteen hundred guns and small arms, six Swedish field guns, ten French gunners and an artillery expert. Colonel James Grant, whom Charles at once made his commander of artillery. D'Eguilles, a protégé of the Marquis d'Argenson, the French foreign minister, was a wellborn, pious and sober young man, and a devout Catholic. He was no diplomat, but he had the dignity and social standing to be a creditable representative of Louis XV. In fact, d'Eguilles had been chosen to go to Scotland precisely because he was neither so unimportant as to be an insult to Charles nor so important that he was authorized to bring him much help.

King Louis was inclined to back Charles, but wanted a firsthand report from one of his own courtiers before deciding to do so. D'Eguilles was under orders to see for himself how many men Charles had, how much support he had from the Scots and whether or not his conquest had the feel of permanence about it. The king had asked his naval minister Maurepas to prepare an expeditionary force of six thousand men to be sent either to England or Scotland, and to study the possibility of reviving the invasion plan that had met with disaster in 1744. Maurepas, who was vehemently against the new venture, wrote a detailed report in which he argued that it would be foolish to attempt an invasion now that the British coast was so heavily guarded, and the realm on a war footing. To convey six thousand troops would necessitate readying thirty ships—which would, according to the minister, require three months—and even if all thirty were ready in time they would have to be launched from Brittany and sail around the west of Ireland, avoiding the Channel. So long a voyage would mean carrying a heavy load of provisions— and this in turn would mean that the number of soldiers on board each ship would have to be reduced. And then there was the weather, hazardous enough in summer, extremely hazardous in winter.

These negatives aside, Maurepas suggested that if the king was really determined to send French troops to Britain, they ought to be sent to Scotland, not England, and in fast privateer ships which would sail not as a flotilla but individually, dodging the British navy just as the
Elisabeth
had done. Even so, the weather would be a formidable obstacle. Maurepas strongly recommended sending off the ships and men before the end of October at the very latest, to avoid the worst of the winter storms.

The naval minister's report was not encouraging, especially as Maurepas calculated that the expeditionary force would cost upwards of two million livres. But the memorandum prepared for King Louis by his minister of state, the Due de Noailles, was even harsher in its opposition to sending any French troops to Britain. In Noailles's view—and his opinion counted for a great deal with the king—the only possible landing site for a proposed French expedition was Ireland. To land men there would draw the English away from Scotland, thus giving Charles a freer hand there, and might draw in Spanish forces as well, which would take pressure off the French treasury.

Neither Maurepas nor Noailles alluded to the practical difficulties of obtaining pilots and cajoling unwilling soldiers to embark on violently stormy seas in winter. Antoine Walsh, now back in Paris, had thought of these things and had approached Maurepas about them, offering to take charge of organizing the conveyance of the French force to Britain and to guide it, if necessary, in "fisher boats" if the weather was foul.
¹⁰

Indeed the same Irish Jacobite shipowners who had lent their support to Charles now came forward to offer their help, and King Louis, despite his ministers' dissent, was inclined to accept it.

D'Eguilles brought Charles a letter from King Louis, addressed "to his brother Prince Charles Edward" and assuring Charles of his "sincere interest" in all his affairs. In the letter the king asked Charles to credit everything d'Eguilles said on his behalf, though he acknowledged that his envoy was not likely to say anything very specific about France's military plans. Louis was, he said, "disposed to give him [Charles] every evidence of his affection," and was praying for him. The brief letter was signed "Your good brother Louis," and was by far the most warm and intimate message the French king had ever sent him.
¹¹

Had the king known, when he wrote this letter, the outcome of the battle of Prestonpans it would no doubt have been warmer still. (Word of the victory took some time to reach France, arriving via English smugglers in Boulogne.) Once the Jacobites' phenomenal triumph was known, the king's determination to send an expedition grew greater than ever. A week before d'Eguilles landed in Scotland, Maurepas was instructed to go forward with preparations to launch an invasion force of six thousand men, the proposed landing site to be, not Scotland, but England. In addition, the Scots exile Lord John Drummond, brother of the Jacobite Duke of Perth, was to be sent into England with his regiment of Scots Royals—plus any volunteers from the Irish Brigade who might want to join in. A week later a formal alliance, the Treaty of Fontainebleau, was signed by representatives of the Stuarts and the foreign minister, the Marquis d'Argenson. In the treaty, France promised military aid to Charles in his conflict with the "Elector of Hanover," George II.
¹²

The language of the treaty took account of the possibility that Charles might continue to be his father's regent for the kingdom of Scotland, but might not succeed in conquering England. To the most optimistic of the Stuart supporters this seemed nothing more than a diplomatic nicety, a fine point. Yet the longer Charles stayed at Holyrood House, building a fragile administration, consolidating his army, holding soirees in the evenings which drew hundreds of admirers and curious skeptics, the more sensible it seemed for him to be satisfied with his Scots kingdom, at least for the time being, and not to risk losing it for the sake of the much more difficult attempt to conquer England.

Certainly this was the view of the clan chiefs who had joined the rising with the intention of restoring the Scottish throne to the Stuarts. What happened in London, though it affected them indirectly, was not real to them; they had never imagined leading their Highlanders there as a conquering army. From the purely military point of view, Charles's advisers counseled, he ought to stay in Edinburgh at least until spring, by which time the French would be able to send a large and well equipped support force to back him up. In the meantime he could make himself incalculably stronger within Scotland by dissolving the union between Scotland and England, making himself a hero to the entire nation. He could then summon the Scottish Parliament, impose taxes and gain supplies for his army. When the British attack came, he would be in a better position to defend himself, both legally and militarily. And perhaps the British would not be so foolish as to attack in winter in any case.

Such was the advice Charles heard every day—and every day he repeated his objections to it. Everything he had accomplished so far had come about because of swiftness, surprise and boldness. No one had dreamed he would have the daring to come to Scotland without thousands of soldiers, therefore he had not met a well-entrenched, well prepared opposition when he landed. Cope had imagined his army secure against attack at Prestonpans—and an unexpected, bold frontal assault had been his downfall. The citizens of Edinburgh too had thought themselves safe until the Highlanders swarmed in and took the town. Having achieved so much in such a short time by daring and unconventional tactics, it seemed logical to take the final step of seizing England the same way. And the Highlanders thirsted for action, they would never submit to becoming a static, garrison force waiting to receive an attack. They would melt away long before it came.

Besides, there was d'Eguilles, smiling and confident, making no definite promise of any more men or money but giving every indication short of an explicit promise that both would be on their way before long. Charles knew that he had to impress d'Eguilles with his courage and élan; any further assistance from France depended on that. D'Eguilles insisted (on the basis of exaggerated reports in Paris) that once the Stuart army entered England, huge numbers of the English would rise up and join it. So far the English Jacobites had not made themselves helpful or even visible, but Charles could not let that hinder him.

Finally, Charles knew, the French were much more likely to support him in strength if he invaded England than if he stayed in Scotland. Their aims were far wider than his; they hoped to see a Protestant Hanoverian enemy state replaced by a religiously tolerant Stuart ally. The Bank of England was financing France's continental enemies. An invasion force would create enough panic to destroy the bank and end the war subventions. None of this would happen if Charles stayed in Scotland.

'T leave for England in eight days," Charles told d'Eguilles, his face alight with joy. "England will be ours in two months." He pressed the Frenchman to give him at least an approximate date for the landing of the support force, but d'Eguilles was vague. Still, there was now a written treaty between the Stuart power and the French. He had to go forward once again, on faith. His temperament, his best judgment, his confidence in his destiny all demanded it. "As matters stand," Charles wrote to his father, 'T must either conquer or perish in a little while." On November 1, the Highland army set out for England.

Chapter 13

Three roads ran south from Edinburgh in 1745. The principal one went along the eastern coast, through Dunbar and Berwick to Newcastle. Another went south-westward through the most rugged of the mountainous borderlands to Carlisle. A third crossed the Lammermuir Hills to Lauder, went on to Kelso, and so continued southward to the River Esk.

Knowing that a large government army, commanded by Field Marshall Wade, was at Newcastle, Charles's first impulse was to march his men along the main coast road as quickly as possible, encountering Wade's men either at Newcastle or on the way there and overwhelming them. The clan chiefs opposed this, as did, more significantly, Charles's principal commander. Lord George Murray, who advised deploying the troops in such a way as to mislead Wade and prevent a confrontation. On reflection, Charles decided to follow Murray's advice and divided his men into three groups, none of which took the principal road.

By this time there were some five thousand foot soldiers and five hundred cavalry in the Stuart army, including a last-minute contingent of a thousand Atholl men who had arrived in Edinburgh on October 30. The heart of the army was firmly loyal to the chiefs and, through them, to Charles. But there were many men who had not joined the rebellion voluntarily, rather they had been intimidated by their chiefs or landlords. Some had had their lives threatened.
¹
A magistrate in Dumfries wrote to a friend in Carlisle in mid-September that the Duke of Perth had shot three of his tenants who had refused to come out and fight, and Tullibardine was said to have shot another. It was these involuntary Jacobites, the hesitant, the waverers, who might not be relied on completely and whose vacillation might make the difference between defeat and victory in a hard-fought battle.

The uncertain loyalty of these men must have been on Charles's mind as he led his column of troops out of Dalkeith, bound for Lauder. He was concerned too about what would become of Edinburgh, now that it was virtually bereft of soldiers, and of Aberdeen, and of Perth, where he left a small body of men. Only a few days earlier, there had been a disturbing scene at Perth. On October 30, George IPs birthday, a crowd of Hanoverian loyalists had attacked the residence of the deputy governor, Oliphant of Cask. The same thing had happened at Dundee, where the governor, David Fotheringham, was run out of town.
²

Much depended on keeping the momentum of victory, and for this the army needed discipline. But discipline was not the Highlanders' strength; it was their very impetuousness, their tendency to break into spontaneous violence, that made them such a fearsome enemy.

The day book of Lord Ogilvy's regiment reveals how difficult it was to keep order in the ranks as the army made its way south. Officers were repeatedly told to reprimand their men for shooting off their weapons ''in an idle fashion," for breaking into houses and stealing whatever took their fancy, for causing disturbances and even for molesting the nonmilitary members of the baggage train. The men refused to march in ranks, even when officers were placed along the flanks and at the head and rear of each column. There were constant complaints about the "scampering soldiers" who wandered here and there at will. Peremptory orders had to be issued against applications for leave of absence—and this despite the fact that Ogilvy's men had only been under arms since the first week of October.

Clementina Sobieska, wife of James Stuart, attributed to Trevisani.

NATIONAL GALLERIES OF SCOTLAND