Brave Battalion (25 page)

The Canadian Scottish—officially only being in support for the preceding nine days—lost one officer killed and three wounded with forty-one other ranks dead and another ninety wounded.
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Added to the 349 casualties suffered in early September, these losses left the battalion desperately needing time to rebuild—a story that was true of all the division's battalions.

Withdrawn to a rest area at Warloy-Baillon, about five miles west of Albert, Major General Arthur Currie thought his 1
^st
Division would be given sufficient time to incorporate reinforcements. Almost all raw recruits, they lacked even the most rudimentary skills of trench survival. There was a desperate shortage of officers. Few of those posted to the Canadian Scottish had any former combat experience.

Yet, even as the Battle of Thiepval Ridge was declared over, General Haig decided to renew the offensive on October 12. This time there would be an advance of two miles across the breadth of Fourth and Reserve Armies' fronts. Reserve Army would make two thrusts, which would converge at Miraumont. One thrust, made by Canadian Corps, would drive northward from Thiepval Ridge through Grandcourt to Miraumont while the other followed the western bank of the Ancre River through Beaumont Hamel and then headed east to the point of convergence. Before this plan could rise beyond the theoretical, however, Regina Trench must be taken because it was to serve as the Canadian start line.

On October 1, 2
^nd
Division went for the trench at 1515 hours to no avail and a cost of several hundred casualties. Byng decided he had no choice but try again with 1
^st
Division supported to the right by 3
^rd
Division. Heavy rains forced a postponement, but Byng knew time was short, for the Canadian Corps had to be in possession of Regina Trench by October 11 in order to carry out its role in Haig's offensive. While waiting for the rain to let up, Byng drafted a plan of attack with sights set on a two-mile section of Regina Trench stretching from a point 500 yards west of Kenora Trench to where Canadian Corps lines met Fourth Army's left flank. Each division was assigned half this frontage and would advance two brigades with two battalions forward so that eight battalions would simultaneously overwhelm Regina Trench. Currie assigned 1
^st
Division's share in the attack to his 1
^st
and 3
^rd
brigades. For his part, Brigadier Tuxford recognized that the Royal Montreal Regiment and 48
^th
Highlanders were currently too beaten up for combat duty. So the Royal Highlanders and Canadian Scottish would have to lead.
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Regina Trench lay on Ancre Height's reverse slope and could only be examined by aerial reconnaissance, which the rain made impossible. Hidden behind the heights, it presented a difficult artillery target requiring blind fire. Great banks of wire entanglements protected its front, and although the artillery daily ripped holes in it, each night the Germans repaired the damage by packing the gaps with coiled bales of concertina wire. The German defenders were mostly proud naval marines.

Finally the rain let up and, at dusk on October 7, 3
^rd
Brigade moved to assembly positions inside some abandoned German training trenches northeast of Courcelette. Directly in support of the brigade were two trench mortars, which would each fire 120 rounds.
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The Canadian Scottish would advance on the brigade's right with the Royal Highlanders to its left and 1
^st
Brigade's 3
^rd
Battalion on its other flank. Artillery support had been promised, but it seemed strangely desultory and the officers distrusted the assurances that the wire fronting the trench had been broken. Having had no opportunity to send battalion scouts to reconnoitre the ground, they used flashlights to examine their maps and hoped these matched reality.

Initially the night “was fine and peaceful with moonlight so clear that a man's shadow showed up dark and well defined. As the hours moved on, high, fleecy clouds overspread the sky, and the brightness became subdued; soon afterwards the moon sank down and, at zero it was quite dark.” The battalion was arranged so that Major Sydney Goodall's No. 1 Company was on the right and No. 4 Company, under Major George Lynch, was on the left with No. 2 Company, still commanded by Lt. Duncan, behind Goodall and Major John Hall's No. 3 backing Lynch.
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Each platoon leader had an extra water bottle filled with rum to provide his men with a little liquid courage just before the attack.
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At 0100 hours on October 8, the first wave slipped into No Man's Land and dug in about 120 yards in front of the training trenches to shorten the distance it must cover while the second wave occupied the trench system. Regina Trench lay 700 yards distant, its position clearly indicated by the numerous flares the Germans fired into the sky. A few minutes before Zero Hour—0450 hours—the artillery on both sides ceased and an unnatural quiet settled over No Man's Land. Then, precisely at Zero Hour, the Canadian Corps guns spoke again and unleashed the creeping barrage.

The guns firing signalled the Canadian Scottish to stand and advance. Each company's platoons went forward in two waves spaced 50 yards apart, so the battalion advanced in four orderly lines. Major Lynch, Captain David Bell, SM Arden Mackie, and No. 4 Company's piper James Richardson walked into the open and watched the shells fall for a couple of minutes. Then Lynch, Mackie, and the piper bade Bell adieu for he was to lead the company's second line. Lynch blew his whistle and the three men walked ahead of the leading line with Richardson to Lynch's left, Mackie his right.

Lynch had planned to leave Richardson behind, thinking a piper unnecessary for a night assault. But the twenty-year-old had demanded to be paraded before Lt.-Col. Leckie and begged to accompany the troops. Leckie had overruled Lynch.

The ground free of craters, the battalions were able to keep their lines properly dressed. Halfway to Regina Trench Mackie asked Richardson why he was not playing the pipes. Richardson replied he was to await Lynch's order. On they went, taking little German fire and men began to hope their luck might hold. Then they passed over the crest of the hill and began descending toward the wire. With a sense of dread Mackie “was astonished to see it was not cut. I tried to locate a way through but could find no opening. When the company came up the enemy started throwing bombs and opened rifle fire. Seeing a big shell-hole on the left I ran over to Major Lynch to ask him to get in there until I could get the wire cutters to work on the wire, but as I got up to him he fell—shot in the breast. I knelt to bandage him but saw he was breathing his last. Piper Jimmy Richardson came over to me at this moment and asked if he could help, but I told him our company commander was gone.”
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The company was completely bunched in front of the wire. Some men threw bombs toward the German trench while others tried to beat down the wooden stakes supporting the wire with their rifle butts and then trample it into the mud. The German grenades generally fell short as they were throwing uphill, but their rifle fire was “deadly accurate.” Casualties mounted. Unless something were to be done quickly, Mackie realized that No. 4 Company would be wiped out.

Suddenly Richardson turned to the sergeant. “Wull I gie them wund?” he asked calmly. “Aye mon, gie 'em wind,” Mackie barked back.
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Coolly, the young smooth-faced soldier marched back and forth in front of the wire, playing the pipes while a storm of fire swirled past him on either side. “The effect was instantaneous,” reads his Victoria Cross commendation. “Inspired by his splendid example, the company rushed the wire with, such fury and determination that the obstacle was overcome and the positions captured.”
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On the battalion's right flank, No. 1 Company's situation proved less perilous, for the artillery had “smashed gaps in the wire” and the men charged through and gained the trench. Working rightward to join up with the left flank of 1
^st
Brigade, the two companies here commanded by Major Goodall and Lt. Duncan met fierce resistance from the marines who neither asked for nor granted any quarter. Goodall was mortally wounded and Duncan killed on the spot.

On the left flank, Sgt. Mackie had taken the head of No. 4 Company after Captain Bell was killed shortly after Lynch. Commissioned from the ranks in 1915, Bell's competence had been such that just before the attack he was offered a temporary staff appointment at brigade headquarters. In refusing it, Bell had said to leave before an attack was akin to desertion. While leading the second wave through the wire, a bullet pierced his helmet and he fell dead.

Major Hall had also been wounded at the wire. While waiting for the stretcher-bearers, he had jotted a note to Leckie: “My compliments to the Commanding Officer, and tell him I'm awfully sorry I am not able to carry on.” Hall died after being hit a second time while the stretcher-bearers were carrying him to the rear.
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Daybreak found the battalion locked in a fierce mêlée. Every commanding officer was dead. All its bombers were dead or wounded. Some men were throwing German bombs for everyone had exhausted their supplies. The right flank was in contact with 3
^rd
Battalion from 1
^st
Brigade but, on the left, there was no sign of 13
^th
Battalion. Only a small Royal Montreal Regiment section led by a junior officer had managed to gain Regina Trench. They joined the Canadian Scottish. Sgt. George Slessor's platoon held that flank and they hurriedly barricaded the trench with sandbags and hammered together bits of lumber ripped from the doors leading to German dugouts.

A quick count revealed ninety-eight Can Scots had reached Regina Trench. These included four officers and five non-commissioned officers. Looking back they could see the rest of the battalion hanging dead or wounded in the wire or scattered on the ground before it. Just two Lewis guns remained. Everyone was desperately low on ammunition, stripping it from the wounded. Lt. Edward Hart commanded. To advance beyond Regina would be suicidal, he decided, so they would dig in and hang on to the 360 yards of trench they had won.

Hart doubted that would prove possible, for the Germans busted through the barricade on the left and Slessor was wounded. A bloody bayonet charge regained the barricade, but the naval marines only went back a few feet and kept pressing forward at the slightest opportunity. No fool, Hart knew the Germans would inevitably break through. Lt. Charles Bevan was the only other Can Scot officer standing. He and Hall worked opposite ends of a line that kept shrinking as men fell. At 1500 hours they decided “to fall back.” Hart later wrote: “We had by this time no more than seventy-five all told in the trench. … It was apparently impossible for me to get messages back to Battalion Headquarters or for Headquarters to get messages to me. Therefore, I took the responsibility rightly or wrongly of ordering the Battalion to retire. Retirement was effected with light casualties, the men being passed back a few at a time to the jumping off trench.”
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Piper Richardson was among the few who did not reach safety. In the trench, Richardson had set his pipes aside and first joined the bombers before serving as a stretcher-bearer. About 200 yards from the trench, Richardson paused and announced he had forgotten his pipes. Refusing to be dissuaded, he headed back toward Regina Trench. He was never seen again. First declared missing, he was registered as presumed dead a year later. On October 22, 1918, Richardson was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

The October 8 attack ended in disaster with neither division succeeding. This failure marked the end of 16
^th
Battalion's Somme operations. On the morning of October 11, its remnants—numbering the strength of a single company—marched to the rear. En route they passed the men of the 72
^nd
Battalion (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) from 4
^th
Canadian Division advancing to their battle christening. The Seaforths among the Can Scots greeted their fellows affectionately, but one observer thought the contrast between them “pathetic. The new Battalion, smart and buoyant, flushed with the prospect of meeting the enemy in its first engagement; the old one, shattered, faced for the second time with the task of rebuilding battalion esprit and organization from the ground upward.”
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- OCTOBER 12, 1916-MAY 4, 1917 -

Canadian Corps suffered 1,364 casualties in the October 8 attack with 344, or roughly twenty-five percent, of this total coming from 16
^th
Battalion. Eight of the battalion's 13 officer casualties died while 131 other ranks were killed. This was a staggeringly high percentage of men killed, slightly more than a third.
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