British Voices (14 page)

One night early in October, I took out a party in two Crossley lorries (about sixteen men all told) to raid a village called Castletown, which lies to the northwest of Bandon. On the way we had to pass through another village called Newcestown, where we arrived about 10.15pm. Seeing the local ‘pub' full of men, I stopped the cars and had it surrounded, but as we did so a man, who pretended to be drunk, got past the sentry at the back door, and slipped away. After searching the remainder who all gave false names, but who, I knew well, were really just the local Company returned from parade, and after finding no arms or documents on them, we continued out journey, but had not gone more than 300 or 400 yards when a heavy fire was opened on both cars from behind the hedge on the side of the road. The cars were, of course, silhouetted in the light made by the head-lamps and were an excellent target. After passing through the ambush I stopped the cars and counter-attacked the enemy, who, by this time, had retired across the next field, and of course, could not be seen in the dark. The result of this small action was that we had two officers killed and three men wounded, while we had probably inflicted no damage on the enemy. It subsequently transpired that the man who escaped out of the back-door of the ‘pub', was the commandant of the local Flying Column which had just been formed, and which was at the time billetted at a farm just outside the village. He had just time to get them into position while we were busy in the ‘pub'. This man's name was John Hales, who subsequently became a Deputy of the Free State Parliament, and was himself murdered in Dublin about a year ago.

In November 1920 took place the murder of fifteen officers in Dublin in their bedrooms on a Sunday morning.

During this period the Military had no powers of retaliation and were entirely on the defensive. In the bad areas lorry convoys escorted by armoured cars had to be organised, to take supplies to the various detachments and this was practically the only means of communication between one detachment and another. In fact, the whole of the
strength of the Army was taken up with defensive and protective measures; the Army was forced, by the role imposed upon it, to entirely violate the principle of ‘offensive action', and ‘Economy of Force'. Lorry convoy tactics became quite a little problem in itself. It soon became evident that lorry convoys must consist of not less than six lorries with a suitable escort. To avoid all being ambushed simultaneously, these lorries were divided into two or more groups, which moved at 300 or 400 yds interval. Part of the escort was placed in each group, the idea being that, if ambushed, the other group would stop and the escort counter-atack the ambushers.

Very strict discipline was required to prevent lorries closing up too near to each other, or individual lorries becoming detached owing to breakdowns, etc. Experiments were made with armour plating on lorries, but though useful for town work, it was found that the lorries became too heavy for work on the country roads. Most of the lorries were, however, provided with plating to protect the drivers. Armoured cars (heavy pattern) if available accompanied the conveys.

The effect of the defensive attitude of the Government was to greatly raise the ‘morale' of the IRA which increased in strength and efficiency and so bad did conditions become that Martial Law had to be declared in the most disturbed parts of Southern Ireland – Cork – Kerry – etc., on 10 December 1920.

January-March 1921

The main results of the declaration of Martial Law were:-
Operations assumed a military aspect, the military henceforth were able to function by themselves and it was not necessary for the military to be accompanied by the RIC.

The RIC practically ceased to function except for ordinary routine business, e.g., granting of licences, etc., individually, they were of assistance for supplying local intelligence.

The military authorities took over the complete control of the
county as far as the restoration of law and order was concerned. The principal steps taken by the GOC 6th Division to this were:

• (i)
  The setting up of summary courts in the Bn. areas which were presided over by officers specially detailed for this duty. These officers were empowered to pass a sentence of six months imprisonment or to award a fine up to £50.
  
• (ii)
  A standing Courts-Martial sat at Cork consisting entirely of special Courts-Martial officers. This Court dealt with the more serious cases.
  
• (iii) Drum-head Courts-Martial for dealing with Rebels caught with arms in their hands.
  
• (iv)
  Penalties for harbouring rebels, or for failing to report ambushes, etc., or giving a wrong name.
  
• (v) A restriction was put on the holding of Fairs and Markets in the more disturbed areas, as these provided opportunities for the IRA leaders to meet together and discuss plans.
  
• (vi)
  To hamper the communication of the IRA, the use of motor cars, except by specially authorised persons, e.g. Doctors, etc. was forbidden. The use of bicycles was similarly prohibited.
  
• (vii)
  A curfew was declared in certain bad areas. This was later extended to cover the whole of the Martial Law area and was of great assistance to the Military, as it meant that anybody out after the curfew was automatically a law-breaker.
  

In addition to the above, the policy of internment was introduced about this time, by which any man, who was known to be a leader in the IRA, could be interned without trial.

It was realised now that the only chance of success was to take offensive action against the IRA. To enable this to be done, it was necessary to economise forces by reducing the number of small detachments in existence and accordingly the detachments at Ballineen
and Timoleague were withdrawn, those at Bandon and Clonakilty being retained to provide bases for operations, this not only made available a number of men for active operations, but also reduced the amount of mechanical transport required for the supply of these detachments, which about this time became a matter of considerable difficulty.

The offensive operations now instituted first of all took the form of area round-ups, on a large scale. The usual procedure was to select an area to be searched, study it carefully on a map, and allot definite farms or houses to each party of half a dozen men under an officer. The whole party would then leave barracks either in lorries or on foot in time to arrive on the ground at dawn and commence the search, either working inwards towards the centre of a circle or driving the area towards a line of ‘stops' put out to catch the ‘runners'. As only officers were allowed to enter houses, a large number of officers were required for this work. The orders issued were for all young men to be collected and brought to a rendezvous where they were sorted out and those known to be active members of the IRA kept for internment. This ‘sorting out' process was a difficult affair as the ‘wanted' men invariably gave wrong names, and it required a very good intelligence service to find out who they really were. The result of these operations was to collect a number of the ordinary rank and file of the IRA, but the leaders usually managed to escape, which was not difficult to do in such a thick and intricate country. On one occasion a soldier fell into a covered hole containing five stolen motor cars without actually seeing it.

The reply of the IRA to these activities was to deny to us the use of roads by cutting deep trenches across them, or destroying bridges, this they did with impress labour on all roads except one or two selected main roads which they left open for the ordinary civilian traffic and also with a view to catching lorry convoys in ambushes on these roads.

The attacks on the Crown Forces increased in intensity and assumed larger proportions than before, as the Crown Forces increased the strength of their escort parties in view of probable ambushes and the IRA had accordingly to increase their attacking parties. The IRA also began to use road mines for blowing up the leading lorries in the ambushes.

A good instance of an encounter which took place about this time was the Upton Train Ambush. This was an attack made by about 50 of the IRA on a train at Upton Station, as they knew a mail escort of about a dozen soldiers would be travelling on this train. The attackers seized the train station buildings and opened fire on the train as it drew up to the platform. The attack was beaten off by the escort with the loss of one soldier killed and one wounded. One of the attackers was killed and one captured, and about eight civilians were killed or died of their wounds. The attackers, of course, always cleared off as soon as possible to avoid being caught by military reinforcements and they were great adepts in the art of disappearing quickly.

On this occasion, although we had a strong party from Bandon on the scene about half-an-hour after the attack started, we could find no trace of the attackers.