Read Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan Online
Authors: Caroline Fourest
Therein lies the danger to society that a fundamentalist as prudish as
Tariq Ramadan represents. If he were content to apply his restrictions to
himself alone, he alone would bear the burden of these constraints, born of
an extremely archaic vision of spirituality. Unfortunately, his project is not
for one individual, but for a community, and even for society as a whole,
with the resulting disruption of every aspect of social life. His preaching is
directly responsible for the increasing number of Islamic headscarves that
are appearing all over France, in particular among third-generation North
African immigrants. Following his advice, an increasing number of young
girls, instead of choosing to attend private schools, try to have the state schools
accept the wearing of the headscarf, putting pressure on the girls of North African descent who still refuse to do so. More than 1,500 cases were registered in 2003, 150 of them serious, that is to say, accompanied by attempts
to proselytize and the refusal to attend certain courses. Since many teachers were at a loss as to how to handle the problem, the French government
appointed a commission to look into the situation. During a public debate
that lasted for months, France discovered just how bad things were: hospital emergency wards, where women refused to be treated by male doctors
in the name of "decency"; female students refusing to take oral exams with
male teachers; young girls no longer attending gym classes. Let's not forget the demands for separate hours for men and women in the municipal
swimming pools that dot the (secular) landscape. In Lille, the mayor (Martine Aubry) finally gave in. Until the mayor changed her mind in the wake
of secularist protestations, the South Lille swimming pool was reserved for
women; the personnel were all women; and curtains protected them from
the outside world. Other city halls have refused to give in to this blackmail,
invoking the principle of secularity, but it is obvious that the pressure is growing stronger. The countervailing secular powers have never been so close to
giving way. While they have been most effective in dealing with Catholic fundamentalism acting in the name of moral standards, they tend to lose their
willingness to fight when religious minorities ask for special treatment in the
name of respecting cultural difference, even if it is the same secular principle that is at stake.
Triq Ramadan has impressed many political and media observers by
playing the role of the person who will show European Muslims how to find
a satisfactory balance between their Muslim identity and their identity as citizens. That is what one might be led to think on going through some of his
writings, such as Les musulmans dans la laicite [Muslims in a Secular Society] (1994), Etre musulman europeen [To Be a European Muslim] (1999), or Les
musulmans d'Occident et l'avenir de l'Islam [Western Muslims and the Future of
Islam] (2003). These three books say more or less the same thing, but the
fact that they appeared at intervals several years apart was an advantage, for
it provided their author with the opportunity to reappear in public debate on
a regular basis in order to spread his message-a message, however, that
was ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Here and there, one can find in his
writings certain passages that suggest that Ramadan has succeeded in defining a proud and militant Islam that allows European Muslims to find a balance between their religious and civic identities. But he does not make it clear
whether this is a sign of progress for Islam, or for society as a whole: "We, in
the Muslim community, are experiencing a genuine silent revolution in the
Occident. More and more young people are becoming involved, searching
for the means to live in harmony with their faith, while at the same time taking part in the societies that are now theirs. French, English and American
Muslims-women, as well as men-are constructing a 'Muslim personality'
that will come as a surprise to a great many of their fellow citizens."'
But just what sort of surprise does he have in mind? Even a close reading
does not really tell us. For the most part, journalists and intellectuals prefer to give him the benefit ofthe doubt. Each ofTariq Ramadan s books is greeted as
the work that will finally mark the emergence of a generation of Muslims that
will enjoy full citizenship, thanks to an Islam that is determinedly dynamic
and modern. That is also what certain Swiss journalists thought-until the
day they attended the Congress of the Muslim Men and Women of Switzerland ... How can one explain this discrepancy between the praiseworthy
aims announced by the preacher and the concrete impact of his words on the
Muslims who listen to him? Once again, the key is to be found in his numerous cassettes, which together outline a conception of citizenship that can
enlighten us as to what the "surprise" foreseen by Tariq Ramadan will turn
out to be.
In theory, even on his cassettes, Ramadan sees no contradiction between the
fact of being Muslim and French, or Muslim and Swiss, etc. He encourages
his fellow Muslims to say they are "Muslim Frenchmen," just as readily as
"French Muslims," without fearing that they are thus being traitors to their
identity. This equanimity in regard to terminology could lead one to conclude that there is a form of equality, or equilibrium, between the two identities, the religious and the civic. In reality, ifTariq Ramadan does not want to
make an issue out of word order, it is because he considers that religion and
citizenship belong to two totally different spheres. In a footnote to his book
Muslims in a Secular Society, he specifies: "The distinction that is made much
of between being first a Muslim or first a Frenchman is, to our way of thinking, a false issue, for the two affiliations are of a different nature and a different order. Being a Muslim means embodying a certain conception of life,
a sense of the meaning of life and of death; being a Frenchman means playing one's role as a citizen of a nation."' Already, in this book, one sees foreshadowed the idea that the two affiliations are not comparable, and that one
is superior to the other: the tension is between, on the one hand "the meaning of life and of death," and, on the other, a role that one plays as "a citizen
of a nation." However, the use of the term "citizen' gives the impression that Tariq Ramadan takes this latter affiliation seriously. This is by no means the
case on his cassettes, where the fact of being French no longer entails acting
as a citizen, but simply refers to "geographical circumstances."3 He takes it
even further: "Geography cannot take precedence over my life or the meaning I give to my life." If someone asks a French Muslim to say if he is more of
a Muslim or more of a Frenchman, here is the reply he suggests: "Muslim,
it's a conception of life, it's the meaning of my life, and the meaning of my
death." And he adds: "My conception of life is beyond everything."' For him,
putting these two identities on the same level is like confusing "the sea with
a swimming pool." French citizenship is the swimming pool, while Islam is
the engulfing, all-encompassing sea, "beyond everything."
This way of setting the divine law above the law of men is characteristic of fundamentalists. Tariq Ramadan is aware of the fact, and intends
us to be reassured: "My conception of life tells me that, wherever I am, I
must respect the social norms."5 He does not see this as "a contradiction,
but as a clarification." When it comes to clarification, this added proviso
only makes his conception of citizenship more opaque. The message is so
ambiguous that one can make anything one wants of it. A reader who is
generally well disposed towards him will retain the fact that Tariq Ramadan
calls for respect for the law, particularly since, in his books, he emphasizes
this aspect: A Muslim, whether simply a resident or a citizen, must think
of himself as bound by a moral and social contract to the country in which
he is living. In other words, it is up to him to obey the law."' Someone
more critical of Ramadan, or one of the faithful, will pay attention, above
all, to the other half of his message, in which he urges Muslims to consider
their religious affiliation as "beyond everything," all the more since, in his
lectures, it is this other aspect that he emphasizes.
The ambiguity of such a stance comes to light in the cassette "Vivre en
Occident" ["Living in the West"]. At the outset, he appears to be harping on
the same theme as in his books: As a resident of this country and a citizen,
I respect the Constitution. It's an Islamic principle." But then a crucial clarification gives this statement of intention a radically different sense. He stipulates that the Constitution and the laws are to be obeyed once "everything in this country-in social, cultural, economic and legal terms-that is not
contrary to Islamic principles ... becomes Islamic."' This added provision
is obviously essential. Up to this point, one might well have thought that the
civic and the religious were compatible, without, as yet, being certain which
side would win in case of conflict. Tariq Ramadan's reply is clear: a Muslim
respects the country's laws, so long as they do not contradict Islamic principles. And on the same cassette he drives the point home: "Whatever in the
culture in which we live is not in contradiction with Islam, we accept." Which
eliminates the rest.
This view of things has practical consequences. In the name of this conception, Hani Ramadan urged young French Muslims not to serve in the
French army if France was at war with Muslims, such as the Taliban, for
example. Tariq Ramadan also advocated conscientious objection: "In cases in
which two unjust principles clash, conscientious objection is the wise course
and the one to be preferred. A Muslim citizen of an Occidental country must
be mature in his analysis and determine what is at stake in his choice: alone,
before God, with his conscience, and after having consulted the relevant legal
authorities."8 The footnote to this sentence refers to the debates between
Islamic "scholars" concerning the participation of American Muslims in the
war in Afghanistan. Ramadan simply notes that certain scholars authorized
taking part, in the name of loyalty to one's country, while others refused to
do so. The preacher encouraged Muslims to decide in all conscience: if they
held that the war was a just one, then let them take part! If not, then let them
refuse. He, himself, had his own opinion on the subject, and regretted the
fact that the American Muslims did not denounce the war as illegitimate:
"Citizens of the Muslim faith were obliged to prove their patriotism and their
allegiance to the extent that even pausing to question the legitimacy ofbomb-
ing Afghanistan was itself considered condemnable."
One aspect that most fascinates people about Tariq Ramadan is that he gives
the impression of having at last found a third way between assimilation and
withdrawal into communitarianism in a society that no longer wants to have to choose between the two alternatives. Until recently, integration seemed
to represent a middle ground. Today, preachers such as Tariq Ramadan take
advantage of the disappointment engendered by the failures of integration
to shift the terms of the debate in such a way that "integration" becomes the
equivalent of "assimilation."
In a lecture entitled "Notre identity face au contexte: assimilation, integration ou contribution?" ["Our identity and its context: Assimilation, integration or participation?"] his proposal is as follows: "We agree to integration,
but it is up to us to determine the contents." And what are these contents? "I
accept the law, provided it does not force me to do something in contradiction
with my religion."9 In other words: "If, to be a good citizen, you must be a bad
Muslim, the answer is no."10 This declaration would not raise any problems
if Tariq Ramadan stood for a modern, enlightened Islam. But we know this is
not the case. As it is, his way of treating Islam as superior to everything, laws
included, means that he is as dangerous a reactionary as is a fundamentalist
Christian who considers the Bible as infinitely superior to the Declaration of
the Rights of Man. Moreover, Ramadan comes close to treating the Declaration-at any rate the concept of citizenship that it implies-as an instrument
in the hands of "secularists" and "Zionists" conspiring against Muslims:
No declaration of the rights of man can, at any point, require of a person that he give
up part of himself in order to become a citizen! You will notice, moreover, that this
idea is the interpretation given by certain atheist, secularist, or Zionist ideologues
who, it turns out, want to determine for themselves the nature of Muslim identity, a
definition that it is up to us to contest."
The conspiracy in question no doubt referred to the Islamic headscarf,
without which Tariq Ramadan considers a Muslim woman to have sacrificed
a part of herself: "If by integration is meant: `Be a Muslim, but change your
clothing,' then it's no. ,12 This intransigence concerning one ofthe issues that
divides archaic Islam from modern Islam is only a start, building up to a conception of citizenship according to which integrated Muslims are labelled
"assimilated." In a conference on "Muslim identity," Tariq Ramadan alluded
in thinly veiled terms to the rector of the Paris Mosque, whom he described as the very prototype of the assimilated Muslim. He warned against taking an
open-minded approach, the equivalent of denying one's identity: "You are so
open-minded that you are no longer anything at all; seeking assimilation, you
no longer take pride in what you are, because you are afraid of being judged
for what you are." He ended by explaining that "giving in on principles" is the
sign of "fear" and "weakness." He is outspoken in his refusal to allow Islam
to "become a form of relativism within relativism," 13 in the name of what he
calls "developing a clear-cut sense of our identity as Muslims" so as to avoid
being "dissolved" in Occidental societies."14