Burning the Reichstag (63 page)

67
. “Übernahme des Karl-Liebknecht-Hauses durch den Staat,” [name of paper illegible], March 9, 1933, BA R. 8034 III 187.

68
. Tobias,
Reichstagsbrand
, 10; Sven Felix Kellerhoff, “Der Mann, der den Reichstagsbrand aufklärte,”
Welt Online
, January 5, 2011.

69
. 27 VT 82-83; Braschwitz to Untersuchungsrichter, March 11, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/109, Bl. 107; Verfügung, August 18, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/156, Bl. 11.

70
. Diels,
Lucifer
, 149; Tobias,
Reichstagsbrand
, 307–8.

71
. Vermerk, March 3, 1933, Vermerk, March 4, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/109, Bl. 259, Bl. 260; Sommerfeldt Report, October 6, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/199, Bl.
73; Heisig to Diels, October 12, 1948, TA; Braschwitz Stellungnahme, January 13, 1959, in LNRW-W, Personalakten Nr. 2688, Bd. 1, Bl. 13.

72
. Guy Liddell, “The Liquidation of Communism, Left Wing Socialism and Pacifism in Germany,” BNA KV 4/111.

73
. Diels to ORA July 14, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/9, Bl. 376–77; Diels to Göring, August 11, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/199, Bl. 124; Werner to Diels, July 20, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/9, Bl. 379.

74
. Vogt to Diels, August 15, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/139, Bl. 129.

75
. Ernst Torgler, “Der Reichstagsbrand und was nachher geschah,”
Die Zeit
, October 21, 1948.

76
. Helmer Statement, March 7, 1933, Statement, March 9, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/35, Bl. 1, Bl. 7–9.

77
. Reed,
Burning
, 51–52, 70; Judgment, December 23, 1933, in Deiseroth,
Reichstagsbrand
, 232–33.

78
. Kynast Report, March 16, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/35, Bl. 41–43; Dimitrov Statement, March 17, 1933, Statement, March 18, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/35, Bl. 49, Bl. 50.

79
. Reed,
Burning
, 260–61; Judgment, December 23, 1933, in Deiseroth,
Reichstagsbrand
, 280; Grothe Statement, July 22, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/139, Bl. 132 ff.

80
. Vogt to Reichstagsbrandkommission, August 15, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/139, Bl. 130; Heisig to Raben, August 15 1933, BA-BL R.3003/139, Bl. 134; Abschrift, April 10, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/139, Bl. 125.

81
. Heisig Report, March 9, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/2, Bl. 142; 2 VT 40–41; Vink Statement, March 10, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/2, Bl. 145; Reed,
Burning
, 178–79.

82
. Meusser Statement, March 18, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/2, Bl. 62; Wendt Statement, March 20, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/3, Bl. 74–75.

83
. Reichstagshandbuch 1933, 87 (
http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/bsb00000008/images/index.html?id=00000008&fip=xseayaeayaqrsewqeayaewqfsdreayaxdsydeaya&no=&seite=88
); Reed,
Burning
, 253–54; Tobias,
Reichstagsbrand
, 294.

84
. Albrecht Statement, March 24, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/2, Bl. 150–51; Elisabeth Berkemeyer Statement, February 27, 1933, Maria Hessler Statement, October 26, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/110, Bl. 7–9.

85
. Tobias,
Reichstagsbrand
, 295.

86
. Ferdinand Kugler,
Das Geheimnis des Reichstagsbrandes
(Amsterdam: Van Mu nster's Verlag, 1936), 111.

87
. Protocoll April 25, BA-BL R. 3003/5, Bl. 162–63; Protocoll April 27, 1933, in BA-BL R. 3003/55, Bl. 162–70.

88
. Professor Karl Stephan, e-mail to the Author, April 15, 2011.

89
. 22 VT 31 ff.

90
. 22 VT 175.

91
. Wagner Gutachten, May 22, 1933, in BA-BL R. 43 II/294, Bl. 139; 22 VT 181; Schatz Gutachten, June 26, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/56, Bl. 27 ff, Bl. 33.

92
. 22 VT; Schatz Gutachten, Bl. 32–33.

93
. Wagner Gutachten, Bl. 131, 135; Schatz Gutachten, Bl. 36; Josse Gutachten, May 15, 1933, BA-BL R 43 II/294, Bl. 243; 22 VT 181–82.

94
. Franz Ritter, “Über den Brand im Reichstag,” June 9, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/56, Bl. 21–23; Schatz Gutachten, Bl. 34–35; Josse Gutachten, Bl. 269; Wagner Gutachten, Bl. 155–57.

95
. Reed,
Burning
, 186; “Van der Lubbe Not Alone,”
Manchester Guardian
, October 24, 1933; 22 VT 218–20, 252; Schatz Gutachten, Bl. 41.

96
. Reed,
Burning
, 187, 215.

97
. 22 VT 184.

98
. Vogt Vermerk, April 26, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/5, Bl. 154.

99
. 16 VT 151, 161.

100
. Report, May 17, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/56, Bl. 9.

101
. Schnitzler, “Reichstagsbrand”; Zirpins Testimony, July 6, 1961, LNRW-D Rep. 372/992, Bl. 36, 39–40.

102
. Allianz Zentrum für Technik Press Release, February 25, 2005, at
http://www.allianz.com/de/presse/news/unternehmensnews/geschichte/news11.html
, accessed June 28, 2009; Dr. Peter Schildhauer, e-mail to the Author, September 4, 2012.

103
. “Expertise des Instituts für Thermodynamik der Technischen Universität Berlin vom 17. February 1970,” in Hofer,
Reichstagsbrand
, 97–115, 100–109, 112; Professor Karl Stephan, e-mail to the Author, April 15, 2011.

104
. “Stehen Sie auf, van der Lubbe!”
Der Spiegel
, December 2, 1959; Tobias,
Reichstagsbrand
, 450, 452.

105
. “Stehen Sie auf, van der Lubbe!”
Der Spiegel
, December 2, 1959.

106
. Ibid.

107
. Mommsen, “Reichstagsbrand,” 372–82.

108
. Ibid., 373–74.

109
. Professor Karl Stephan, e-mail to the Author, April 15, 2011.

110
. See Alfred Berndt, “Zur Entstehung des Reichstagsbrands. Eine Untersuchung über den Zeitablauf,”
VfZ
23 (1975): 77–90. Berndt tried to suggest that van der Lubbe had in fact had more time, beginning with breaking into the Reichstag at 8:59 rather than 9:05 to 9:10. As Karl Stephan pointed out in a devastating rebuttal (Karl Stephan, “Brandentstehung und Brandablauf,” in Hofer,
Reichstagsbrand
, 130–40, originally 1978), Berndt's argument rested not only on attributing incredible “slow-wittedness, indecision and torpor” to all
the relevant witnesses, police and firefighters, and virtual “genius” to van der Lubbe, he assumed that all the witnesses who gave time estimates of what they saw or heard were substantially wrong in the same direction, a kind of collective hysteria. Among many other problems, Berndt's effort to find enough time for van der Lubbe in the plenary chamber raises the question of who set all the other fires, or who or what Buwert fired at seven and a half to eight minutes after van der Lubbe broke into the Reichstag. Tellingly, single-culprit advocates have quietly let Berndt's argument lie. Sven Kellerhoff's recent argument that the phenomenon of “backdraft” explains “all known details” of the fire is even less persuasive. “Backdraft” occurs in cases of fires in closed rooms; when the oxygen is consumed the raised temperatures cause pyrolysis, the decomposition of compounds through heat. Unoxidized and thus combustible gases rise and collect under the ceiling. The pressure in the room drops. If oxygen then enters the room, it can mix with the gases within seconds and lead to a disastrous explosion. The theory here is that it was Klotz who brought backdraft disaster to the plenary chamber by opening the door to bring in a hose. But as Peter Schildhauer explained, backdraft “presupposes a fire that has already become very large, which first of all can generate such great heat that correspondingly great quantities of pyrolysis gases arise, and secondly consumes the available oxygen so rapidly, that the flames are extinguished again…. A backdraft occurs therefore only in a later phase of a fire and not already at the ignition. Therefore the appearance of a backdraft only says something about the size of the fire and the ventilation situation, but not anything about the source of ignition and the initial fire.” In the case of the Reichstag, the burning of the curtains, which was all that van der Lubbe claimed to have set on fire, “would not suffice for this.” (Schildhauer, Comment on Kellerhoff, February 12, 2008, on file with the Author). According to Karl Stephan, Kellerhoff's argument “proves the opposite” of what he wants to prove, because a backdraft would be most likely with the use of kerosene. Otherwise the wood would form pyrolysis gases too slowly. (Stephan, Comment on Kellerhoff, February 8, 2008, on file with the Author). Kellerhoff claimed that “backdraft” had “not yet been researched” in 1933, and thus his explanation was a breakthrough unavailable then, but he is wrong about this as well. Stephan says that the phenomenon of “backdraft” was “certainly known to the experts in 1933,” it was just that, the use of English being less common then, it was known as
Rauchgasexplosion
(Karl Stephan, e-mail to the Author, April 15, 2011). Indeed, anyone who takes the trouble to read the trial transcript, which presumably Kellerhoff did not, will find that in fact Wagner discussed the possibility of a
Rauchgasexplosion
and rejected its application to the Reichstag fire for exactly the same reason as did Schildhauer (VT 22 176). In 2002 Kellerhoff had apparently been certain that another phenomenon, “flashover,” explained the
fire; he seems to have quietly dropped that one, and advisedly so, as experts like Stephan found flashover no more compelling an explanation than backdraft. See Bahar and Kugel,
Reichstagsbrand: Provokation
, 291–94.

111
. Albrecht Brömme to Klaus Wiegrefe, March 26, 2001, BFA; Interview in Tina Mendelssohn and Gerhard Brack,
Neues vom Reichstagsbrand
, documentary film, 2003, YouTube, accessed April 13, 2011.

112
. “Reichstagsbrand mit Kohlenanzünder?”
http://abenteuerwissen.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/26/0,1872,5565338,00.html
, accessed February 10, 2012; Professor Lothar Weber, e-mail to the Author, February 7, 2012.

113
. Dr. Jürgen Lieske, Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG, e-mail to Dr. Alexander Bahar, February 14, 2008, copy on file with the Author.

1
. Göring, Speech of March 1st, PA des AA R. 98307.

2
. Willi Frischauer,
The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 4; “Telegram to European Missions,” February 28, 1933, PA des AA R. 98417.

3
. Paris Embassy to AA, March 4, 1933, PA des AA R. 98417; Neurath to all Missions, March 6, 1933, PA des AA R 98304; Memo, no date, PA des AA R. 98417.

4
. Guy Liddell, “The Liquidation of Communism, Left Wing Socialism and Pacifism in Germany,” BNA KV 4/111;
Philadelphia Public Ledger
to Knickerbocker, May 8, 1933, Morrison to Knickerbocker, June 1, 1933, Huburtus Renfro Knickerbocker Papers, Columbia University; Philip Metcalfe,
1933
(Sag Harbor, N.Y.: The Permanent Press, 1988), 127.

5
. Knickerbocker to Messersmith, August 7, 1933, Messersmith to Knickerbocker, August 11, 1933, Diels to Knickerbocker, October 31, 1933, Knickerbocker to Morrison, May 15, 1933, Huburtus Renfro Knickerbocker Papers, Columbia University.

6
. “Arrested Reds Unhurt in German Cells,”
Chicago Daily Tribune
, March 26, 1933.

7
. David Ayerst,
Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper
(London: Collins, 1971), 507; George Orwell,
Homage to Catalonia
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1980), 65; Elizabeth Wiskemann,
The Europe I Saw
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 19–20; Metcalfe,
1933
, 115.

8
. Diels to Goebbels, July 11, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/201, Bl. 214; Diels to Göring, August 30, 1933, GStA Rep. 90 P/68/3, 150–52.

9
. Diels to Goebbels, July 11, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/201, Bl. 214.

10
. Diels to Göring, September 22, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/199, Bl. 65; Diels to Gestapa Saxony, September ibid., Bl. 77; intercepted letters BA-BL R. 3003/195; Diels to Vice Consul Renet, July 13, 1933, BStU MfS HA IX/11 ZR 881 A6, Bl. 45; Arthur Garfield Hays,
City Lawyer: The Autobiography of a Law Practice
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), 364.

11
. Arthur Koestler,
The Invisible Writing: Being the Second Volume of Arrow in the Blue: An Autobiography
(New York: Macmillan, 1954), 199; Anson Rabinbach, “Staging Antifascism: The Brown Book of the Reichstag Fire and Hitler Terror,”
New German Critique
103 vol. 35 No. 1: Spring 2008, 99.

12
. Rabinbach, “Staging,” 100; Babette Gross,
Willi Münzenberg: A Political Biography
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1974), 211–12.

13
. Koestler,
Invisible
, 205–6.

14
. Gross,
Münzenberg
, 216, 242–43.

15
.
Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitlerterror
, facsimile of the original 1933 edition (Frankfurt/Main: Röderberg Verlag GmbH, 1978).

16
. McMeekin,
Red Millionare
, 265; Else Steinfurth Statements, January 15–16, 1934, BA-BL NJ 14220 Bd. 1, Bl. 4–8; Rudolf Schwarz Statement, January 9, 1934, ibid., Bl. 21–22.

17
. STA LG München II to the GSTA, June 1 1933, in NARA RG 238, Prosecution Exhibits, T 988 Roll 17, frames 091930, 091954–55; Goeschel and Wachsmann,
Nazi Concentration Camps
, 5–6.

18
. Grauert to AA, May 19, 1933, PA des AA R. 98424.

19
. Notes, November 6, 1933, BA-BL R. 3003/201, Bl. 24;
Braunbuch II
, 67, 69; Roths's handwritten notes, 1936, BStU MfS HA IX/11 SV 1/81 Bd. 35, Bl. 2–3.

20
. Gross,
Münzenberg
, 247–48; Koestler,
Invisible
, 199; McMeekin,
Red Millionaire
, 266.