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Authors: Samantha Power
Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (31 page)
BOOK: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
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He wondered if a Cyprus-like stalemate was the best that the former Yugoslavia could hope for. At a May 10 meeting with a delegation of potential donors, he exclaimed dogmatically that in the Balkans “hatred is the bottom line!”
40
He saw that the UN brand could end up permanently soiled if it remained implicated in a mission that was no more achievable than Somalia had been. The countries on the Security Council that had sent the peacekeepers to Bosnia with an ambiguous mandate and insufficient means were the ones letting the Bosnians down. But it was the “UN,” and not the responsible individual governments, that would take the blame. “Americans are justifiably wary about putting troops at the United Nations’ disposal,” said a
New York Times
editorial. “UN troops in Bosnia are empowered to do little more than flash their blue berets and count the Serb shells obliterating Gorazde.” The editorial hailed a new U.S. presidential directive that placed strict limits on U.S. funding and participation in UN peacekeeping missions.
41
40
He saw that the UN brand could end up permanently soiled if it remained implicated in a mission that was no more achievable than Somalia had been. The countries on the Security Council that had sent the peacekeepers to Bosnia with an ambiguous mandate and insufficient means were the ones letting the Bosnians down. But it was the “UN,” and not the responsible individual governments, that would take the blame. “Americans are justifiably wary about putting troops at the United Nations’ disposal,” said a
New York Times
editorial. “UN troops in Bosnia are empowered to do little more than flash their blue berets and count the Serb shells obliterating Gorazde.” The editorial hailed a new U.S. presidential directive that placed strict limits on U.S. funding and participation in UN peacekeeping missions.
41
When Rose first arrived in Bosnia, he had been eager to push the boundaries of the UN mandate. But he had grown similarly resigned. “The guns could be heading for their next offensive,” he said. “If somebody wants to fight a war here, a peacekeeping force cannot stop it.”
42
Under his command UNPROFOR would not call in NATO air strikes to protect civilians. “We took peacekeeping as far as it could go,” Rose said. “We took it right to the line.”
43
The Serbs, who carefully tracked all international statements, took heed. With no threat of NATO air power hanging overhead, the Serbs treated UNPROFOR as a nuisance that they could manipulate or ignore.
42
Under his command UNPROFOR would not call in NATO air strikes to protect civilians. “We took peacekeeping as far as it could go,” Rose said. “We took it right to the line.”
43
The Serbs, who carefully tracked all international statements, took heed. With no threat of NATO air power hanging overhead, the Serbs treated UNPROFOR as a nuisance that they could manipulate or ignore.
While Vieira de Mello had hoped to use humanitarian achievements to bring about political change, by the late summer of 1994 it was clear that international heavyweights like the United States, Russia, and Europe would have to step up their commitments if they were to negotiate a peace to save civilians. UNPROFOR was increasingly unable even to deliver food to hungry civilians. In July the Serbs suspended UN aid convoys into Sarajevo. On July 20, after several UN planes were hit by Serb gunfire, the UN stopped sending in relief by air. And on July 27 Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić sent a letter to UN authorities announcing the closure of Vieira de Mello’s precious Blue Routes, which had done so much to restore life in the Bosnian capital. Some 160,000 civilians and 32,000 vehicles had made use of the open roads.
44
But after a four-month reprieve, the Serbs were strangling Sarajevo once again. What Vieira de Mello did not seem to recognize was that by covering up Serb violations rather than appealing to Western countries for sustained help, UNPROFOR was actually reducing the odds of a stronger Western stand. He, Akashi, and Rose were making it easier for powerful governments to look away.
44
But after a four-month reprieve, the Serbs were strangling Sarajevo once again. What Vieira de Mello did not seem to recognize was that by covering up Serb violations rather than appealing to Western countries for sustained help, UNPROFOR was actually reducing the odds of a stronger Western stand. He, Akashi, and Rose were making it easier for powerful governments to look away.
He plodded ahead, attempting to negotiate a large prisoner exchange. Bosnian vice president Ejup Ganic asked how Vieira de Mello could trust the Serbs to free prisoners when in the previous two months they had deported some two thousand elderly Bosnians from the town of Bjeljina. “I appreciate Mr. Vieira de Mello’s optimism,” Ganic said at a press conference. “But for God’s sake, they are expelling thousands of people from their homes, putting them into labour and concentration camps.”
45
Vieira de Mello relayed the statements made by Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić as if they were reliable. “[Karadžić] assured us this was not his policy, that this was obviously contrary to the interests and the reputation of the Bosnian Serbs and that he was taking every possible measure, including the replacement of the police chief of Bjeljina, so as to bring these practices to an end,” he said credulously.
46
The longer he remained a part of the flawed UNPROFOR mission, the more he sounded as though he had stopped seeing the facts as they were. For the first time in his career, he seemed to be valuing the UN’s interest in looking good over civilians’ interest in being safe.
45
Vieira de Mello relayed the statements made by Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić as if they were reliable. “[Karadžić] assured us this was not his policy, that this was obviously contrary to the interests and the reputation of the Bosnian Serbs and that he was taking every possible measure, including the replacement of the police chief of Bjeljina, so as to bring these practices to an end,” he said credulously.
46
The longer he remained a part of the flawed UNPROFOR mission, the more he sounded as though he had stopped seeing the facts as they were. For the first time in his career, he seemed to be valuing the UN’s interest in looking good over civilians’ interest in being safe.
He had been a consistent supporter of the nascent UN war crimes tribunal that had been set up in The Hague in 1993 to punish crimes carried out in the former Yugoslavia. Even if he was willing to “black box” the brutal deeds of suspected war criminals in his negotiations, he believed it was important that the UN system as a whole find a way to punish the perpetrators of atrocity. He had argued this position over Akashi’s objections. Yet by the fall of 1994 he was so dispirited that he started contradicting his own beliefs. He sat down with the
Washington Post
’s John Pomfret and discussed the role that grievances from the Second World War were playing in fueling the Balkan crisis.“These people should just forget,” he said sharply. He compared the military rule in Argentina with that in Brazil and argued that the reason Brazil had managed to move on, while Argentina still seemed mired in recriminations over its past, was that Brazilians had decided to let go of their pain. Pomfret challenged him, arguing that it was precisely the failure to reckon with previous crimes that had made it easier for Serb extremists to rally their people to pursue long-sought revenge.This time around, when the wars ended, some form of accountability for the atrocities and some attempt at closure were essential.Vieira de Mello said he disagreed, calling the idea “very American.” When Pomfret, a China expert, said that in fact he had learned these lessons in China, where the crimes of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution had been covered up at considerable cost, Vieira de Mello shook his head. “China is on the right track,” he argued.“Remembering history will only slow them down.”
Washington Post
’s John Pomfret and discussed the role that grievances from the Second World War were playing in fueling the Balkan crisis.“These people should just forget,” he said sharply. He compared the military rule in Argentina with that in Brazil and argued that the reason Brazil had managed to move on, while Argentina still seemed mired in recriminations over its past, was that Brazilians had decided to let go of their pain. Pomfret challenged him, arguing that it was precisely the failure to reckon with previous crimes that had made it easier for Serb extremists to rally their people to pursue long-sought revenge.This time around, when the wars ended, some form of accountability for the atrocities and some attempt at closure were essential.Vieira de Mello said he disagreed, calling the idea “very American.” When Pomfret, a China expert, said that in fact he had learned these lessons in China, where the crimes of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution had been covered up at considerable cost, Vieira de Mello shook his head. “China is on the right track,” he argued.“Remembering history will only slow them down.”
In September he traveled to Pale to attempt to defuse tensions between UNPROFOR and the Serbs. When Karadžić lectured him about the UN’s “intolerable” pro-Muslim bias, he said he understood the Serbs’ bitterness but rejected their allegations. “The UN
is
impartial,” he said.“Our efforts to seek peace in the Balkans are benefiting all sides equally.” And then to underscore the point he admitted, “NATO intervention might have been far more serious if not for UNPROFOR’s restraint.” Karadžić knew this to be true, but he countered that “UNPROFOR’s presence had prevented the total defeat of the Muslims.”
47
Here Karadžić too was correct.
is
impartial,” he said.“Our efforts to seek peace in the Balkans are benefiting all sides equally.” And then to underscore the point he admitted, “NATO intervention might have been far more serious if not for UNPROFOR’s restraint.” Karadžić knew this to be true, but he countered that “UNPROFOR’s presence had prevented the total defeat of the Muslims.”
47
Here Karadžić too was correct.
Despite the mounting indications that he and UNPROFOR were addressing symptoms and not causes,Vieira de Mello kept his focus on tactical humanitarian gains. He began his final negotiations on prisoner exchanges on September 30, 1994. The talks began in the morning, and the parties spent the entire day feuding. As the discussions dragged on past midnight, French UN officials began serving whiskey and plum brandy. Several people drank so much that they passed out in their chairs. Vieira de Mello, who was returning to UNHCR in Geneva the following week, would not be denied. As dawn broke, after twenty hours of negotiation, the Bosnians and the Serbs settled on the terms of the lengthy agreement, which would allow for the release of more than three hundred prisoners. All that was left was for him to add his official signature.
However, when Darko Mocibob, a Bosnian UN official, began translating the annexes to the agreement,Vieira de Mello realized that, during the bathroom breaks, the parties had struck a number of side deals benefiting their friends and families. As Mocibob translated the handwritten side texts, he watched a frown come over his boss’s face. “I could hardly suppress my laughter as I read him the additional terms, which none of us had expected,” Mocibob recalls. “It was ‘when Mehmed is released to the other side, he can carry 400 deutsch marks and 5 kilos of tobacco. Milos will be allowed to bring his pistol. And all the returnees will all be able to carry shoe glue.’” Vieira de Mello was desperate to close the deal, but not at the expense of the UN’s prestige. He refused to affix his signature to the private bargains. “I’m very happy for you that you have reached this agreement,” he said, too tired to be amused. “But you’ll have to find somebody else to be a witness. I am a senior official with the United Nations.” Only when the parties removed their side annexes did he agree to sign.
The UNPROFOR mission was neither effective nor respected. Vieira de Mello had been away from UNHCR for a year and was due back. In one of his final interviews, he said he was leaving the region with a “bitter taste in my mouth.”
48
Yet while he would not miss the humiliations, he would miss the people, the drama, and the global stakes. At a farewell reception at UN headquarters in Zagreb, his colleagues presented him with a parting gift of a framed photograph of the trams running along Sniper’s Alley in Sarajevo, with children running nearby. One UN official joked, “Just think, Sergio, one of those children might be yours.” Vieira de Mello smiled politely, but as Elisabeth Naucler, his Finnish aide, recalls, “He could have done without it.”
48
Yet while he would not miss the humiliations, he would miss the people, the drama, and the global stakes. At a farewell reception at UN headquarters in Zagreb, his colleagues presented him with a parting gift of a framed photograph of the trams running along Sniper’s Alley in Sarajevo, with children running nearby. One UN official joked, “Just think, Sergio, one of those children might be yours.” Vieira de Mello smiled politely, but as Elisabeth Naucler, his Finnish aide, recalls, “He could have done without it.”
He conducted a mini-farewell tour of the former Yugoslavia. In Zagreb he bade a stiff farewell to Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, whom he had never liked. In Belgrade he pounded the pavement of the old city, looking for a gift for Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. In the end he settled on a painting, which he presented at a warm final meeting in the Presidential Palace in downtown Belgrade. In Sarajevo, the city that had stolen his heart, he said good-bye to President Izetbegović, and Prime Minister Silajdžić, whom he now considered a close friend.
What was most remarkable about his departure was that each of the feuding factions had come to believe he was their ally. “How many UN officials do you think would be sent off like that by all sides?” asks Vladislav Guerassev, who headed the UN office in Belgrade. “It shows you what a remarkable diplomat he was.” But during a bloody and morally fraught conflict in which the Serb side committed the bulk of the atrocities, his popularity with wrongdoers stemmed in part from his moral relativism. Even though he was unfailingly kind to Bosnian
individuals,
he had lost sight of the big picture. He seemed more interested in being liked and in maintaining access than in standing up for those who were suffering. He had brought a traditional approach to peacekeeping to a radically novel set of circumstances. And uncharacteristically, he had failed to adapt. Although Vieira de Mello was unaware of it, his seeming eagerness to side with strength had caused some of his critical UN colleagues to nickname him “Serbio.” It would take a massacre in another of the UN’s “safe areas” to jolt him into the belated recognition that impartial peacekeeping between two unequal sides was its own form of side-taking.
individuals,
he had lost sight of the big picture. He seemed more interested in being liked and in maintaining access than in standing up for those who were suffering. He had brought a traditional approach to peacekeeping to a radically novel set of circumstances. And uncharacteristically, he had failed to adapt. Although Vieira de Mello was unaware of it, his seeming eagerness to side with strength had caused some of his critical UN colleagues to nickname him “Serbio.” It would take a massacre in another of the UN’s “safe areas” to jolt him into the belated recognition that impartial peacekeeping between two unequal sides was its own form of side-taking.
Nine
IN RETROSPECT
Vieira de Mello was demoralized by his time in the Balkans, but he was not yet ashamed. Impartiality was such a bedrock UN principle and his daily activities had so consumed him that he had not yet questioned his or the UN’s performance.
When he returned to Geneva in October 1994 he also had more prosaic matters on his mind. For starters, he was not sure whether High Commissioner Ogata would welcome him back. Ogata had qualities that Vieira de Mello admired. New to the UN, she disdained organizational habits that had been reflexively passed from one generation of UN officials and aid workers to the next. She was unafraid to speak her mind. UN staff in Geneva joked that in the male-dominated UN, Ogata kept a box outside her office, accompanied by a sign that read: PLEASE BE SURE TO DEPOSIT YOUR BALLS IN THE BOX BEFORE ENTERING. Vieira de Mello referred to Ogata as “La Vieille” (the Old Lady) and the “Diminutive Giant,” terms of both endearment and respect.
But no matter how long he interacted with her, he never felt as though he knew her. She did not have the personal warmth that he most valued in people. Her eagerness to “put UNHCR on the map” had caused UNHCR to compete with agencies with which it had once collaborated. He still ventured into their one-on-one lunches with apprehension, sometimes dramatically grabbing his stomach and feigning physical cramps to show his amused colleagues the physical toll of his anxiety. Before entering her office, he would sigh, shake his head, and mockingly offer one of his favorite expressions: “Ahhh, the things I must do in service of humanity!”
Having been away from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva for three years while in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, Vieira de Mello expected to undergo an uncomfortable period of hazing, and it duly followed. He saw the UN holistically, as a system with many complementary parts, but Ogata saw other branches of the UN—such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for which he had worked in Bosnia—as competition. Toward the end of his time in the Balkans, she had grudgingly written to Kofi Annan, who was running the peacekeeping department in New York, that UNHCR was “under extreme strain” and that she wished Vieira de Mello “could have been around to help me tackle these crises.” The absence of staff of his caliber, she had written, “was jeopardizing the capacity of my Office to answer adequately to emergencies.”
1
1
But since Annan was closer to Boutros-Ghali, the boss, he had gotten Vieira de Mello’s leave from UNHCR extended three times. “For Ogata if you work at Toyota, you stay at Toyota until the end,” recalls Kamel Morjane, then director of the Africa Division at UNHCR. “Sergio decided to leave Toyota and work at Honda. When he returned, he had to be subjected to a new test. He had to prove his loyalty.” Ogata now denies that she was testing him and claims she had no objection to his lengthy leave. “What Sergio was doing in Bosnia was rather limited compared to what we in UNHCR were doing,” she says. “There were many brilliant officials in UNHCR that I could call upon in his absence.” She could often sound as though his emerging public profile was a threat to her own.
BOOK: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
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