Collapse of Dignity (33 page)

Deserving of special mention is
La Jornada
, which has never abandoned objective reporting and the defense of the interests of the mine-workers.
La Jornada
has also been publicly confronting campaigns of denigration and hostility in other media, as well as the fallacious publicity campaigns carried out by the government. The magazine
Proceso
has at times also been bold in its exposure of the complicities and aggressions against the Miners' Union and its members.

These principled publications make up a sector of the media that is no less effective by virtue of being relatively small. Their readers are thoughtful, and their writers serve as a voice of caution and a breath of fresh air in a journalistic environment contaminated by private interests and the abusive power of the right wing. These voices appeal to the conscience of the citizens, entreating them to avoid the corruption that has sadly become a way of life in Mexico.

Without a doubt, it's no easy task for independent journalists to write objectively about these highly charged issues. Some journalists, initially swayed by the massive campaign of the PAN and its corporate backers, came to later realize the truth of the situation. I admire these writers who had the courage to refute the official lies in favor of the miners' struggle for justice. Luckily for Mexico and its democracy, despite the exorbitant financial resources mobilized against Los Mineros, and despite the government's control of the media, not all journalists are open to such influences.

In addition to the few courageous journalists who refused to take
part in the war against the Miners' Union, we had the constant support of our friends in the labor movement. I was—and I am—constantly
overwhelmed by the international support we received, from union leaders, from foreign judges, from attorneys and law professors, from academics and legislators on six continents, and from politicians and opinion leaders. All these individuals saw that we were being maliciously and unfairly persecuted and never bought the media's lies.

Nevertheless, we knew we needed hard proof that no money was missing from the $55 million Mining Trust. We had to show without a doubt that Larrea and his puppets in the government were lying when they accused me of scamming the members of my own union. To confirm that I had committed none of the crimes I was accused of, the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) hired Horwath Berney, the Swiss division of the independent, international public accounting company Crowe Horwath, in early 2007 to perform a third-party audit on the union's finances.

On July 19, 2007, the results of the investigation were made public in Mexico City at a press conference attended by representatives of the USW and the IMF. Horwath Berney accounted for the entire $55 million dollars thusly:

    
•
  
$20.5 million is in accounts belonging to the Miners' Union. All these accounts were seized by the Federal Mediation and Arbitration Board in 2006.

    
•
  
$21.8 million was delivered to the workers who fulfilled the criteria established by the union as the sole proprietor of the assets coming from the Mining Trust. Once the assets from the Mining Trust became part of the union's estate, the union's members freely decided to distribute a part of those assets to the workers and ex-workers of the privatized companies—those firms that the 5 percent of shares had come from in the first place. More than five thousand workers (or workers' families or legal representatives) received payments from that sum, each signing a receipt. We presented seven boxes of these receipts, along with copies of identifications and other documents, to prove that $22
million was distributed to the workers without any objection from the PGR office or Grupo México's lawyer Agustín Acosta Lagunes.

    
•
  
$1 million was charged by the bank as fees for the administration of the Mining Trust, a fact proven by the bank's own records.

    
•
  
$3.9 million was paid in lawyers' fees to the professionals who managed in 2004, after years of trials, to recover the $55 million owed to the union by Grupo México. That amount had been agreed upon many years earlier.

    
•
  
$1.7 million was used for the renovation of several buildings belonging to the union, as proven by extensive documentation.

    
•
  
$5.2 million was invested in real estate belonging to the union.

    
•
  
$900,000 was paid to have press releases printed in several newspapers and other media.

When he saw the report, Jorge Campos Miranda, the IMF's Latin America representative, commented that it “proves beyond doubt that the $55 million are accounted for and that the accusations against Gómez Urrutia are entirely false.” The USW, reaching a similar conclusion, demanded that the Mexican government end its persecution of the union, release our frozen assets, and drop the outstanding charges against the union's leadership.

Horwath Berney's findings notwithstanding, Calderón's administration was intent on defending its sham to the death. The PGR and the labor department continued to insist that a $55 million fraud had been committed, endlessly charging me of mishandling the $55 million dollars, even though 40 percent of that amount is accounted for in the union assets seized
by the government itself
. The media campaign against us continued in earnest, as if Horwath Berney's findings had never happened. The state-level fraud charges continued to move forward.

In October 2007, I found out that Germán Larrea had even tried to insert himself in the independent audit we had conducted. Top managers at Horwath Berney had told the IMF's general secretary, Marcello Malentacchi, that Larrea sent them a friendly letter asking for certain documents regarding the audit commissioned in part by the IMF. Horwath Berney representatives had flatly refused Larrea, knowing his goal was likely to change the outcome of the audit. They turned the letter over to Malentacchi. Malentacchi then sent a letter to Larrea, stating that he had knowledge that Grupo México had requested these documents. “Instead of trying to contact Horwath Berney,” Malentacchi wrote, “it would be better to have a direct meeting between IMF and Grupo México to seek a joint solution for the conflict affecting the members of the Miners' Union in the companies under the control of Grupo México.”

In order to be as thorough and fair as possible, my defense lawyers also asked UNAM's Institute of Juridical Research and the law school at Ibero-American University to take a look at all the paperwork surrounding the termination of the Mining Trust and the handling of the assets it held. After an in-depth analysis, these scholars presented their reports in writing, and each one concluded that no assets belonging to the Mining Trust had been improperly diverted, confirming the Horwath Berney audit. In their expert opinions, the Mining Trust had been created, modified, and then terminated correctly—the exact opposite of the story Germán Larrea and his cohort were peddling to the citizens of Mexico.

It was sweet vindication, even if no Mexican officials paid much attention. We knew that the Miners' Union had always administered its assets with transparency and clarity. We were facing a storm in the press, but with the findings of Horwath Berney, we had yet another tool in our fight against the depravity of our enemy.

When men are united, they lose the sense of weakness . . . and gain the sense of strength.

—
MONTESQUIEU

When Grupo México and its PAN backers mobilized to persecute
me and drive me out of the country, they had undoubtedly hoped that the miners would believe all their lies. They hoped the workers would blindly sign up for their useless company unions and stop causing so much trouble. But even as the media disparaged us with great zeal in 2007, the members of Los Mineros held fast. They were more determined than ever to fight for respect, dignity, and freedom and to oppose the oppressions of the corporations that were eager to exploit them.

At three separate Grupo México worksites, conditions had become so bad that, by mid-2007, workers were prepared to go on strike once again. All through the month of July, we worked on negotiating collective bargaining agreements with company officials. From Vancouver, I was in frequent contact with the executive committee and the union's bargaining commissions at these work sites: a silver mine in Taxco, Guerrero; a multi-mineral mine in Sombrerete, Zacatecas; and the famous copper mine in Cananea, Sonora. Despite our best efforts at negotiation, Grupo México was displaying its characteristic irresponsibility and arrogance. The company was offering a 3.5 percent wage increase, though it could afford to pay more—a lot more—if it wanted to. The price of metals was soaring; the market was excellent. We were demanding a
minimum increase of 8 percent, but then the company directors who'd been put in charge of negotiating with the union simply refused to compensate the miners fairly.

During this negotiation process, Grupo México also refused to review the safety conditions of the three mines. Working conditions in all three were more hazardous than ever—rivaling even Pasta de Conchos in the days before the blast. At the silver mine in Taxco, Union Section 17 explicitly drew the Pasta de Conchos comparison as they entreated company officials to do something about the atrocious condition of the mine. In this picturesque southern city of about 100,000 people, silver is a mainstay of the economy, and the workers who excavated it from under the earth were risking their lives daily. Machinery was broken down and badly in need of replacement. The electrical system was teetering on the edge of disaster, with cables intertwined dangerously with water lines. Rock slides were a constant threat.

At the mine in Sombrerete, Zacatecas, conditions were similar. The electrical system was just as bad as in Taxco, and the pairing of an abundance of silica dust and a badly insufficient air-filtration system in the mine brought to mind Pasta de Conchos, too. Silica dust, also present in abundance at the third site, the open-pit copper mine in Cananea, Sonora, is infamous for its detrimental effects on miners and stonecutters; in addition to being carcinogenic, it leads to a severe condition called silicosis, in which the lungs are inflamed and scarred by the inhaled dust, causing irreversible damage.

The unacceptable working conditions at all three of these sites were not a new development, either. Back in 2005, the union's safety commissions had alerted the executive committee to the sorry state of the mines at Taxco and Sombrerete in particular. I visited them myself and saw the company's damage and neglect firsthand. Ever since then, we had been demanding that the problems be resolved, to no avail.

The pervasive disregard for safety was our most pressing concern during the July negotiations, but miners in Taxco, Sombrerete, and Cananea had other reasons to protest as well. There was the abundant environmental damage visited upon these towns by the irresponsible
practices of Grupo México. Plus, the company was still hard at work to undermine the union's leadership, and their efforts weren't lost on these miners. And one final demand of the miners echoed the ongoing call from the union's national leadership: they, like all their comrades in the Miners' Union, insisted that the bodies left at Pasta de Conchos be recovered. But it was a condition Grupo México officials deemed “unacceptable.”

The deadline for ending negotiations was July 30, 2007, and when that day arrived, Grupo México had made no effort to meet the needs and demands of workers. We were left with no choice but to raise the red and black flag—the traditional sign that a site is being struck—at all three mines. On that day, with the full support of the national union, workers from the three union sections corresponding to these three atrocious work sites walked off their jobs, refusing to return until their demands were met.

July 30 was a tense day for all of us, including for me in Vancouver. The three simultaneous strikes would put tremendous pressure on Grupo México, and company officials seemed sure that the miners wouldn't go through with it, especially at Cananea, Grupo México's largest and most important holding. Yet leaders of the union local in Cananea assured me that they were more than ready to stop work if an agreement with the company was not reached. I didn't relish the idea of a new conflict—and I knew that if we struck at Cananea there would be one—but standing up to Grupo México was the only dignified move we could make. After a day full of calls and conferences, I set about preparing a press release that would announce the three strikes to the world.

In the following weeks, Labor Secretary Lozano and Germán Larrea placed their attention mainly on the Cananea strike. The town of Cananea, home to 32,000 citizens, sits thirty miles south of the Mexico–Arizona border, and the copper mine on its outskirts is perhaps the richest copper deposit in Latin America. The mine was one of the Grupo México purchases that led to the creation of the Mining Trust in 1990. Back then, President Salinas had closed the Cananea mine, declared it bankrupt, and sent in federal troops to eject the workers. Three months later,
the government sold the mine to the Larrea family for a pittance. As soon as Grupo México acquired the site, it began tearing apart the systems that had supported the miners. It immediately closed the Workers Clinic, a company-subsidized, union-run hospital that provided much-needed medical care to the Cananea miners and their families. That left only a small company-run healthcare facility open at the site, the Ronquillo Hospital. After the 1990 takeover, the company also went back on promises to provide the town with electricity and water, services the government had provided when it owned the mine. Instead, Grupo México hoarded the town's water and refused to pay for the residents' electricity. This forced many citizens to go without power and to rely on the badly contaminated Sonora River for drinking water.