Command and Control (65 page)

The Defense Science Board later conducted an investigation of the safety and security lapses at Minot. It found a serious breakdown in command and control. Cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were being stored in the same bunker as those armed with conventional or training warheads. Verification checklists were routinely ignored to save time. On the day of the incident, the breakout crew that initially entered the bunker, the convoy crew that drove the cruise missiles to the B-52, the load crew that placed them on the bomber, and the aircrew that flew the plane were all supposed to check whether the missiles were carrying nuclear warheads. None of the crews did. After interviewing them, the Defense Science Board noted a basic lack of understanding about who had the authority to remove weapons from the bunker—and “
significant confusion about delegation of responsibility and authority for movement of nuclear weapons.” Nobody seemed to know who was in charge. And
nobody was ever asked to sign a piece of paper recording the movement of nuclear weapons or acknowledging the transfer of custody from one Air Force unit to another. Paper would be necessary for that sort of record keeping—unlike packages shipped by Federal Express, the weapons had serial numbers that had to be written down, not bar codes that could be scanned.

On May 28, 2008, the Air Force discovered another safety problem.
A maintenance team arrived at a Minuteman III silo near F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming and found the walls covered with soot. A fire had started in an equipment room, melting a shotgun case, part of a shotgun, and the shotgun shells stored there. Heat from the flames had damaged one of the electrical cables attached to the Minuteman III. The fire had extinguished itself—but hadn't been detected by the smoke alarm at the
site. The launch crew in its control center miles away never received any indication that the missile might be at risk.
The fire was most likely caused by a lightning strike or an improperly installed battery charger. And
it may have occurred five days before the maintenance team noticed the soot.

The Global Strike Command was created in 2009 to improve the management of the Air Force's nuclear weapons. The command assumed responsibility for the remaining Minuteman III missiles, as well as the B-2 and B-52 bombers that still have nuclear missions. It is a successor to the Strategic Air Command, though smaller and less influential, with the same narrow focus on maintaining deterrence and fighting a nuclear war. Among other reforms, the new command has recently introduced “
unique identifiers” for its nuclear weapons—bar codes that will allow them to be tracked. The Global Strike Command hopes to instill the same sort of dedication, motivation, and attention to detail that SAC long possessed. But the Air Force emphasis on tactical warfare has left the new command with aging and expensive weapon systems.
Each of its twenty B-2 bombers costs $2 billion, and no more will be produced. Its Minuteman III missiles were first deployed in 1970.
And its B-52 bombers haven't been manufactured since John F. Kennedy was president.
The B-52s are scheduled to remain in service through the year 2040.

The age of these strategic weapons raises doubts about whether the Air Force will have a significant nuclear role in the future. At the moment, funding for new long-range missiles and bombers has not been approved. But the command-and-control mechanisms used by the Air Force, the Global Strike Command, and the other armed services are continually being upgraded. The World Wide Military Command and Control System was deactivated in 1996.
Its mainframe computers had become hopelessly out of date. The WWMCCS was replaced by
the Global Command and Control System and its various subsets: the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, the Pentagon Global Information Grid, the Army LandWarNet, the Air Force Constellation Net, the Navy FORCENet, the Minimum Essential Communications Network, and the Defense Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System Replacement Command
and Control Terminal System.
Known by the acronym DIRECT, it sends and receives the war order to use nuclear weapons. A DIRECT terminal looks like a desktop PC, circa 2003, with a round slot on the front for a metal key.

All of these military computer networks are far more technologically advanced than the gold telephone that used to connect General LeMay to the White House. But sometimes they experience a glitch. In October 2010
a computer failure at F. E. Warren Air Force Base knocked fifty Minuteman III missiles offline. For almost an hour, launch crews could not communicate with their missiles. One third of the Minuteman IIIs at the base had been rendered inoperable. The Air Force denied that the system had been hacked and later found the cause of the problem: a circuit card was improperly installed in one of the computers during routine maintenance. But the hacking of America's nuclear command-and-control system remains a serious threat. In January 2013,
a report by the Defense Science Board warned that the system's vulnerability to a large-scale cyber attack had never been fully assessed. Testifying before Congress, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General C. Robert Kehler, expressed confidence that
no “significant vulnerability” existed. Nevertheless, he said that
an “end-to-end comprehensive review” still needed to be done, that “we don't know what we don't know,” and that the age of the command-and-control system might inadvertently offer some protection against the latest hacking techniques. Asked whether Russia and China had the ability to prevent a cyber attack from launching one of their nuclear missiles, Kehler replied, “
Senator, I don't know.”

Operation Neptune Spear, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, was an extraordinarily complex military operation, and much of its success can be attributed to the Global Command and Control System. Personnel belonging to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the CIA, as well as unmanned drones, secretly communicated with one another in real time. And details of the raid in Pakistan were simultaneously shared with President Barack Obama at the White House; CIA director Leon Panetta at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia; and Admiral William H.
McRaven at a special operations base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The effectiveness of a command-and-control system in launching
an attack, however, reveals little about how it will perform when under attack.

The
9/11 Commission Report
offers a sobering account of the confusion, miscommunication, and parallel decision making that occurred at the highest levels of the government during an attack on the United States that lasted about seventy-eight minutes. President George W. Bush did not board Air Force One until almost an hour after the first hijacked airliner struck the World Trade Center.
His calls to the Pentagon and the White House underground bunker were constantly dropped. Continuity of government measures weren't implemented until more than an hour after the initial attack. Vice President Cheney ordered Air Force fighter planes to shoot down any hijacked airliners over Washington, D.C., and New York City, but the order was never received. The only fighter planes that got an authorization to fire their weapons belonged to the District of Columbia Air National Guard—and
they were ordered into the air by a Secret Service agent, acting outside the chain of command, without Cheney's knowledge. A command-and-control system designed to operate during a surprise attack that could involve thousands of nuclear weapons—and would require urgent presidential decisions within minutes—proved incapable of handling an attack by four hijacked airplanes.

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A
S
OF
THIS
WRITING
,
the United States has approximately 4,650 nuclear weapons.
About 300 are assigned to long-range bombers,
500 are deployed atop Minuteman III missiles, and
1,150 are carried by Trident submarines.
An additional 200 or so hydrogen bombs are stored in Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands for use by NATO aircraft.
About 2,500 nuclear weapons are held in reserve, mainly at the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex near Albuquerque, New Mexico. America's current nuclear war plan,
now known as the Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010, has two official aims: “
Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike.” Both seek to prevent an attack with weapons of mass destruction against the United States—one, with an implied threat;
the other with an American first strike. While the attack options of the SIOP focused primarily on targets in the Soviet Union, the OPLAN enables the president to use nuclear weapons against
Russia, China, North Korea, Syria, and Iran. “
Adaptive planning” allows targets in other countries to be chosen at the last minute.

The United States now plans to spend as much as $180 billion, over the next twenty years, to maintain its nuclear weapons, run its weapon laboratories, and upgrade its uranium-processing facilities. The world's other nuclear powers are behaving in much the same way.
Russia has about 1,740 deployed strategic weapons and perhaps 2,000 tactical weapons. It plans to introduce a new long-range missile by the end of the decade.
France is adding new aircraft and submarines to carry its roughly 300 weapons.
The United Kingdom plans to obtain new Trident submarines for its approximately 160 warheads.
China is thought to have about 240 nuclear weapons. It is building new cruise missiles, long-range missiles, and submarines to carry them. It has also constructed
an “underground Great Wall”—thousands of miles of deeply buried tunnels, large enough to fit cars, trucks, and trains—in which to hide them. The size of China's arsenal is not limited by any arms control treaties. After vowing for decades that nuclear weapons would be used only for retaliation after an enemy attack, China may be abandoning its “no-first-use” pledge. And a more aggressive Chinese strategy would increase the number of ballistic missiles, worldwide, that are ready to be fired at a moment's notice—as well as the risk of mistakes.

The number of nuclear weapons possessed by Israel has never been revealed. Israel recently purchased submarines from Germany to deploy some of them and hopes in the near future to place others on long-range missiles. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran remain shrouded in mystery. Both may be seeking to deploy long-range missiles with nuclear warheads.
North Korea may already have half a dozen nuclear weapons. Despite well-publicized threats to launch a nuclear attack on American cities, North Korea may not have the capability to destroy targets thousands of miles away. The technical proficiency of the world's aspiring nuclear powers remains unknown.
The yield of North Korea's first weapon test was
less than 1 kiloton. And Iraq's nuclear weapon program, before it was halted, may have posed a greater threat to Baghdad than to Saddam Hussein's enemies. “
It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one United Nations inspector said about the Iraqi weapon design. “I wouldn't want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk.”

The United States and Russia still maintain thousands of missiles on alert, ready to be launched within minutes. As tensions between the two countries have eased, the risk of an accidental war has diminished; but it has not disappeared. The targets of American missiles are no longer preprogrammed. They are transmitted right before launch, and the default setting of the missiles would send their warheads into the nearest ocean. The command-and-control systems of both countries, however, are still profoundly important. Russia has become far more dependent on land-based missiles than the United States—and, as a result, more vulnerable to a first strike. Any sign of a surprise attack must be taken seriously at the Kremlin.
The ballistic-missile submarines in the Russian fleet are old, poorly maintained, and rarely leave their ports. The subs have become easy targets and no longer provide a secure retaliatory threat. The odds of the United States launching an all-out surprise attack on Russia's nuclear forces are infinitesimal. But the pressure to maintain a launch-on-warning policy may be stronger now in Moscow than it was thirty years ago. And the reliability of the Russian early-warning system has declined considerably since the end of the Cold War.

On January 25, 1995,
the launch of a small research rocket by Norway prompted a warning at the Kremlin that Russia was under attack by the United States. Russian nuclear forces went on full alert. President Boris Yeltsin turned on his “football,” retrieved his launch codes, and prepared to retaliate. After a few tense minutes, the warning was declared a false alarm. The weather rocket had been launched to study the aurora borealis, and Norway had informed Russia of its trajectory weeks in advance.

The greatest risk of nuclear war now lies in South Asia. The United States and the Soviet Union, for all their cultural differences, were separated by thousands of miles. Their animosity was more theoretical and
geopolitical than personal. Pakistan and India are neighbors, embittered by religious and territorial disputes. Both countries have nuclear weapons. The flight time of a missile from one to the other may be as brief as four or five minutes. And the command-and-control facilities on both sides are not hardened against an attack. During a crisis, the pressure to launch first would be enormous.

Much like China, India for many years embraced a strategy of minimum deterrence, building a small arsenal of weapons and vowing to use them only in retaliation. But India may be moving toward a more aggressive strategy, too.
Pakistan has doubled the size of its arsenal since 2006.
It now has about 100 nuclear weapons. It is the only nuclear power whose weapons are entirely controlled by the military. And the Pakistan army has not ruled out using them first, even in response to an Indian attack with conventional weapons. To make that sort of deterrent credible, the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons has probably been given to lower-level Pakistani officers, much like the United States once predelegated it to NATO commanders on the front lines.