Command and Control (94 page)

“It's laying in a ditch”
:
Transcript, Air Force Radio Traffic.

“Okay, I'd recommend that we wait”
:
Ibid.

“Fine with me”
: Ibid.

“Goddamn it, Harold, I'm the vice president”
:
This anecdote was told to me by Senator David Pryor and later confirmed by Vice President Walter Mondale.

Peurifoy didn't like hearing that bit of information
:
My account of the accident response and render safe procedures at Damascus is based on interviews with Bob Peurifoy, William H. Chambers, Matt Arnold, and other EOD technicians.

None of the work at Los Alamos and NEST had made Chambers feel anxious
:
Chambers interview.

About a dozen people in Guy, Arkansas
:
See Art Harris, “Residents Near Site of Missile Explosion Complain of Illness,”
Arkansas Democrat
, September 26, 1980.

“The Air Force wouldn't tell us a damn thing”
:
Quoted in “Air Force Says ‘No' to Plea for Inspection,”
Arkansas Democrat
, September 21, 1980.

Gary Gray . . . said that he learned more from the radio
:
See Lamar James, “Civilians ‘Got Cold Shoulder' from Military, Deputy Says,”
Arkansas Gazette
, September 21, 1980.

security police stopped Tatom on the access road
:
See “Air Force says ‘No' to Plea for inspection.”

doing “the best they could”
:
Quoted in Don Johnson, “Clinton to Talk to Air Force Officials,”
Arkansas Democrat
, September 21, 1980.

“I assume they're armed”
:
Quoted in “Mondale Avoids Admitting Missile Armed with Warhead,”
Arkansas Gazette
, September 20, 1980.

“I believe that the Titan missile system is a perfectly safe system”
:
“Transcript, News Conference by Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark, Friday, September 19, 1980, 4:00
P.M
., the Pentagon,” David H. Pryor Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

“Accidents happen”
:
Ibid.

“pretty much the worst case”
:
Ibid.

“the emergency teams whose job it is”
:
Ibid.

“the emergency procedures worked properly”
:
Ibid.

the Titan II accident . . . was its first big, breaking story
:
CNN was the only national news network with a live camera at the sight. See Reese Schonfeld,
Me Against the World: The Unauthorized Story of the Founding of CNN
(New York: Cliff Street, 2001), pp. 182–86.

“
as a means of reducing or preventing widespread public alarm”
:
Quoted in Ellen Debenport, “Air Force Could Have Confirmed Warhead's Presence,” United Press International, September 26, 1980.

A newspaper cartoon depicted three Air Force officers
:
See “The Air Force on Nukes,”
Arkansas Gazette,
September 24, 1980.

“If you're on the military's side”
:
Art Buchwald, “Arrivederci, Arkansas,”
Los Angeles Times
, October 2, 1980.

“a nuclear conflict”
:
Quoted in “Russians Say Accidental Nuclear Explosion Could Touch Off War,” Associated Press, September 21, 1980.

“If it's not safe and effective”
:
Quoted in “Congressman Wants Inquiry of Missile Silos,”
Arkansas Democrat
, September 20, 1980.

“Hey, Colonel, is that what you won't confirm or deny?”
:
Quoted in “Titan Warhead Taken to Air Base,”
Arkansas Gazette,
September 23, 1980.

The End

Reagan soundly defeated Jimmy Carter
:
Reagan got about 51 percent of the popular vote and 489 electoral votes; Carter about 41 percent, and 49 electoral votes. For a contemporary view of the political implications, see David S. Broder, “A Sharp Right Turn: Republicans and Democrats Alike See New Era in '80 Returns,”
Washington Post,
November 6, 1980.

“Peace through strength”
:
Quoted in Lou Cannon, “Reagan Assures VFW He'll Restore Defenses,”
Boston Globe,
August 19, 1980.

America's defense budget would almost double
:
In 1980, the United States spent about $134 billion on defense; it spent about $253 billion in 1985. And the following year, it spent about $273 billion. Cited in “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013,” Table 7-1, p. 247.

Reagan opposed not only détente
:
For the origins of Reagan's anti-Communism and his opposition to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, see Paul Lettow,
Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 10–18.

“motivated by fear of the bomb”
:
Quoted in ibid., p. 15.

“the most evil enemy”
:
Quoted in ibid., p. 17.

Iklé was still haunted
:
Iklé interview.

“assured genocide”
:
Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?,” p. 281.

a “form of warfare universally condemned”
:
Ibid., p. 281.

“an
auto-da-fé
”
: Fred C. Iklé, “The Prevention of Nuclear War in a World of Uncertainty,”
Policy Sciences
, vol. 7, no. 2 (1976), p. 250.

Two Air Force reports on the Titan II
:
“Report of Missile Accident Investigation: Major Missile Accident, 18–19 September 1980, Titan II Complex 374-7, Assigned to 308th Strategic Missile Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas,” Conducted at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, December 14–19, 1980, Eighth Air Force Missile Investigation Board, December 1980; and “Titan II Weapon System: Review Group Report,” December 1980.

destroyed by three separate explosions
:
See “Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” pp. 18–20; Tab I-8, pp. 1–4.

“It may not be important whether the immediate cause”
:
Ibid., Tab I-8, pp. 2–3.

the vapor detectors . . . were broken 40 percent of the time
:
Cited in “Titan II Review Group Report,” pp. 16, B–7, C-25.

the portable vapor detectors rarely worked
:
Ibid., pp. 17, B-8.

the radio system . . . was unreliable
:
Ibid., pp. B-8, B-9, C-29.

missile combat crews should be discouraged from evacuating
:
Ibid., pp. B-9, B-10.

the shortage of RFHCO suits often forced maintenance teams
:
Ibid., p. C-28.

the suits and helmets were obsolete
:
Ibid., pp. 17, C-40.

the air packs were obsolete
:
Ibid., p. C-40.

some of the missile's spare parts were either hard to obtain
:
Ibid., p. C-35.

security police officers should always be provided with maps
:
Ibid., pp. E-73, E-74.

“modern safing features” should be added to the W-53 warhead
:
Ibid., p. D-4.

“modern nuclear safety criteria for abnormal environments”
:
Ibid.

a warning siren at every launch complex might be useful
:
Ibid., p. 33.

“potentially hazardous” . . . but “basically safe”
:
Ibid., p. 1.

“supportable now and in the foreseeable future”
:
Ibid., p. x.

Jeff Kennedy was angered by both of the reports
:
Kennedy interview.

guidance in the medical literature was scarce
:
One of the few good studies on the danger of the oxidizer happened to be published during the same week as the explosion at Launch Complex 374-7. It was written by Air Force physicians. See “The McConnell Missile Accident: Clinical Spectrum of Nitrogen Dioxide Exposure,” Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Yockey, MC, USAF; Major Billy M. Eden, MC, USAF; Colonel Richard B. Byrd, MC, USAF,
Journal of the American Medical Association,
vol. 244, no. 11 (September 12, 1980).

nobody from the Air Force would speak to him, for three days after the accident
:
Anderson later told Morley Safer, a correspondent for
60 Minutes,
that the Air Force didn't share information about how to treat victims of oxidizer exposure until “three or four days” after the Damascus accident. Anderson was interviewed for “Titan,”
60 Minutes,
November 8, 1981.

“Do not operate the switch”
:
“Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” Statement of Michael A. Hanson, Tab U-30, p. 7.

Kennedy thought the report was wrong
:
Kennedy interview.

Powell . . . blamed himself for Livingston's death
:
Powell interview.

Jeff Kennedy was served with a formal letter of reprimand
:
For the reprimands sent to Kennedy, see
Richard C. Gross, “Titan Accident: Air Force Reprimand for Heroics,” United Press International,
February 12, 1981; and Walter Pincus, “‘Hero' of Titan II Missile Explosion Is Reprimanded by Air Force,”
Washington Post,
February 12, 1981.

Air Force regulations permitted a violation of the two-man rule
:
In fact, a SAC training video about the Titan II encouraged airmen to break the rule in certain situations. According to the narrator of the video: “Under normal operating conditions, a solitary individual is never allowed inside a no-lone zone. However, during an actual emergency, a lone individual may have to take action to save lives or equipment, if at all possible. If you are working near a no-lone zone and see an emergency in that zone, you will be expected to take action
by yourself
to save the critical component or other equipment from damage, if possible. Yes, your action will be in direct violation of the SAC two-man policy, and you will have to report it as such. However, your action—provided it is taken under an emergency condition—is expected and condoned.” This “exception” to the rule is explained in “Nuclear Surety Program, Initial Training, Part 1: History—An Overview,” Aerospace Audiovisual Service, U.S. Air Force (n.d.). The tape can be found in the archives of the Titan Missile Museum. According to the museum's archivist and historian, Chuck Penson, the video was most likely recorded some time between 1976 and 1979.

David Powell was given an Article 15 citation
:
Powell wasn't charged with using a ratchet instead of a torque wrench—because the socket fell off before the ratchet could be “used.” See Carol Griffee, “Airman at Silo Is Disciplined,”
Arkansas Gazette,
February 13, 1981.

placed in the psychiatric ward there—along with Greg Devlin
:
Kennedy and Devlin interviews.

Bill Carter was an Air Force veteran and a former Secret Service
agent
:
Carter spoke to me at length about his dealings with the Air Force over its management of the Titan II missiles in Arkansas.

“a substance no more dangerous than smog”
:
Quoted in Bill Carter and Judi Turner,
Get Carter: Backstage in History from JFK's Assassination to the Rolling Stones
(Nashville: Fine's Creek Publishing, 2006), p. 208.

A few months later, at a ceremony in Little Rock
:
Kennedy, Devlin, and Sandaker interviews. See also Walter Pincus, “Eight Honored as Heroes in '80 Titan Missile Blast,”
Washington Post,
May 23, 1981.

his local congressman in Maine, David Emery, said that if he took the medal
:
Kennedy interview. See also John S. Day, “Behind an Effective Lawmaker—a Good Staff,”
Bangor Daily News,
March 19, 1982.

a “temporary medical leave by reason of disability”
:
Quoted in ibid.

Devlin got a check for $6,400
:
Devlin interview.

A study commissioned by the Air Force later questioned
:
Peurifoy interview.

“expedite the proposed retrofit of the 28”
:
“Letter, To Lieutenant General Howard W. Leaf, Inspector General, Headquarters, United States Air Force, From Harold P. Smith, Jr., President, the Palmer Smith Corporation, July 17, 1981” (
SECRET
/
RESTRICTED DATA
/declassified), p. 2.

Peurifoy quietly arranged for a unique signal generator
:
Peurifoy interview.

expected to cost approximately $1.5 trillion
:
Cited in “Economy Can't Absorb Defense Increase,”
Washington Post,
October 18, 1981.

About $250 billion would be spent on nuclear weapon systems
:
Cited in ”Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives,” A CBO Study, Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, May 1983, p. 1.