Complete Works of Xenophon (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics) (116 page)

Now while the leaders of the Arcadians were using the sacred treasures, and therefrom maintaining the Epariti, the Mantineans were the first to pass a vote not to make use of the sacred treasures. For themselves, they collected in their city the amount which fell to their share towards the payment of the Epariti and sent it off to the leaders. The leaders, however, said that they were doing harm to the Arcadian League, and summoned their rulers before the Ten Thousand; and when they refused to heed the summons, they passed sentence upon them and sent the Epariti to bring those who had been thus condemned. Then the Mantineans shut their gates and would not admit the Epariti within their walls.
[34]
As a result of this some others likewise were soon saying in the meeting of the Ten Thousand that they ought not to use the sacred treasures, or to leave to their children for all time such an offence in the eyes of the gods. When, accordingly, a vote had been passed in the Arcadian assembly not to make use of the sacred treasures any longer, those who could not belong to the Epariti without pay speedily began to melt away, while those who could, spurred on one another and began to enroll themselves in the Epariti, in order that they might not be in the power of that body, but rather that it might be in their power. Then such of the Arcadian leaders as had hqndled the sacred treasures, realizing that, if they had to render an account, they would be in danger of being put to death, sent to Thebes and explained to the Thebans that if they did not take the field, the Arcadians would be likely to go over to the Lacedaemonians again.
[35]
The Thebans accordingly prepared to take the field; but those who sought the best interests of Peloponnesus persuaded the general assembly of the Arcadians to send ambassadors and tell the Thebans not to come under arms to Arcadia unless they sent them a summons. And while they said this to the Thebans, at the same time they reasoned that they had no desire for war. For they held that they had no desire for the presidency of the shrine of Zeus, but that they would be acting more justly as well as more righteously if they gave it back, and that in this way, as they supposed, they would please the god better. Now since the Eleans also were desirous of this course, both parties resolved to make peace; and a truce was concluded.
[36]
<]ILESTONE ED=“P” UNIT=“para”>After the oaths had been taken and, besides all the rest, the Tegeans had sworn and the Theban governor himself, who chanced to be in Tegea with three hundred hoplites of the Boeotians, then, while the bulk of the Arcadians, still remaining there in Tegea, feasted and made merry, poured libations and sang paeans over the conclusion of peace, the Theban and such of the Arcadian leaders as were fearful about their accounts, after closing txe gates in the wall of Tegea with the help of the Boeotians and their partisans among the Epariti, sent to the feasters and proceeded to seize the aristocrats. But inasmuch as the Arcadians of all the cities were present and all of them were desirous of having peace, those who were seized were necessarily many, so that their prison was speedily full, and the city hall likewise.
[37]
Since, however, there were many who had been imprisoned, and many who had leaped down outside the wall, and some also who had been let out through the gates (for no one, unless he expected to be put to death, felt resentment against anyone else), it was a cause of the greatest embarrassment to the Theban governor and those who were acting with him in this matter that of the Mantineans, whom they most wanted to capture, they had but a very few; for because their city was near by, almost all of them had gone home.
[38]

Now when day came and the Mantineans learned what had been done, they straightway sent to the other Arcadian cities and gave them word to hold themselves under arms and to guard the passes. The Mantineans likewise followed this course themselves, and at the same time, sending to Tegea, demanded back all the men of Mantinea whom they were holding there; and they said that they demanded in the case of the other Arcadians also that no one of them should be kept in prison or put to death without a trial. And if anyone had any charges to bring against these men, they gave assurances that the city of Mantinea pledged itself in very truth to produce before the general assembly of the Arcadians all whom anyone might summon to trial.
[39]
The Theban accordingly, on hearing this, was at a loss to know how he should deal with the matter, and released all the men. Then on the following day he called together as many of the Arcadians as chose to gather and said in his defence that he had been deceived. For he had heard, he said, that the Lacedaemonians were on the borders under arms and that some of the Arcadians were going to betray Tegea to them. Upon hearing this they acquitted him, although they knew that he was speaking falsely about them, but they sent ambassadors to Thebes and brought charges against him, saying that he ought to be put to death.
[40]
It was said, however, that Epaminondas (for he chanced to be general at that time) urged that he had acted far more rightly when he seized the men than when he released them. “For,” he said to the ambassadors, “it was on your account that we entered upon war, and you concluded peace without our approval; should we not, therefore, be justified in charging you with treason for this act? But be well assured,” said he, “that we shall make an expedition to Arcadia and shall wage war in company with those who hold to our side.”

5.

When these things were reported back to the general assembly of the Arcadians and to the several cities, the Mantineans and such of the other Arcadians as were concerned for Peloponnesus inferred therefrom, as did likewise the Eleans and the Achaeans, that the Thebans manifestly wanted Peloponnesus to be as weak as possible so that they might as easily as possible reduce it to slavery.
[2]
“For why in the world,” they said, “do they wish us to make war unless it is in order that we may do harm to one another and consequently may both feel the need of them? Or why, when we say that we do not at present need them, are they preparing to march forth? Is it not clear that it is for the purpose of working some harm upon us that they are preparing to take the field?”
[3]
And they sent to Athens also, bidding the Athenians come to their aid, while ambassadors from the Epariti proceeded to Lacedaemon as well, to invite the help of the Lacedaemonians in case they wanted to join in checking any who might come to enslave Peloponnesus. As for the matter of the leadership, they arranged at once that each people should hold it while within its own territory.
[4]

While these things were being done, Epaminondas was on his outward march at the head of all the Boeotians, the Euboeans, and many of the Thessalians, who came both from Alexander and from his opponents. The Phocians, however, declined to join the expedition, saying that their agreement was to lend aid in case anyone went against Thebes, but that to take the field against others was not in the agreement.
[5]
Epaminondas reflected, however, that his people had supporters in Peloponnesus also — the Argives, the Messenians, and such of the Arcadians as held to their side. These were the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans, the Aseans, the Pallantians, and whatever cities were constrained to adopt this course for the reason that they were small and surrounded by these others.
[6]
Epaminondas accordingly pushed forth with speed; but when he arrived at Nemea he delayed there, hoping to catch the Athenians as they passed by, and estimating that this would be a great achievement, not only in the view of his people’s allies, so as to encourage them, but also in that of their opponents, so that they would fall into despondency — in a word, that every loss the Athenians suffered was a gain for the Thebans.
[7]
And during this delay on his part all those who held the same views were gathering together at Mantinea. But when Epaminondas heard that the Athenians had given up the plan of proceeding by land and were preparing to go by sea, with the intention of marching through Lacedaemon to the aid of the Arcadians, under these circumstances he set forth from Nemea and arrived at Tegea.
[8]
Now I for my part could not say that his campaign proved fortunate; yet of all possible deeds of forethought and daring the man seems to me to have left not one undone. For, in the first place, I commend his pitching his camp within the wall of Tegea, where he was in greater safety than if he had been encamped outside, and where whatever was being done was more entirely concealed from the enemy. Furthermore, it was easier for him, being in the city, to provide himself with whatever he needed. Since the enemy, on the other hand, was encamped outside, it was possible to see whether they were doing things rightly or were making mistakes. Again, while he believed that he was stronger than his adversaries, he could never be induced to attack them when he saw that they held the advantage in position.
[9]
However, when he perceived that no city was coming over to him and that time was passing on, he decided that some action must be taken; otherwise, in place of his former fame, he must expect deep disgrace. When he became aware, therefore, that his adversaries had taken up a strong position in the neighbourhood of Mantinea and were sending after Agesilaus and all the Lacedaemonians, and learned, further, that Agesilaus had marched forth and was already at Pellene, he gave orders to his men to get their dinner and led his army straight upon Sparta.
[10]
And had not a Cretan by a kind of providential chance come and reported to Agesilaus that the army was advancing, he would have captured the city, like a nest entirely empty of its defenders. But when Agesilaus, having received word of this in time, had got back to the city ahead of the enemy, the Spartiatae posted themselves at various points and kept guard, although they were extremely few. For all their horsemen were away in Arcadia and likewise the mercenary force and three of the battalions, which numbered twelve.
[11]

Now when Epaminondas had arrived within the city of the Spartiatae, he did not attempt to enter at the point where his troops would be likely to have to fight on the ground-level and be pelted from the house-tops, nor where they would fight with no advantage over the few, although they were many; but after gaining the precise position from which he believed that he would enjoy an advantage, he undertook to descend (instead of ascending) into the city.
[12]
As for what happened thereupon, one may either hold the deity responsible, or one may say that nobody could withstand desperate men. For when Archidamus led the advance with not so much as a hundred men and, after crossing the very thing which seemed to present an obstacle, marched uphill against the adversary, at that moment the fire-breathers, the men who had defeated the Lacedaemonians, the men who were altogether superior in numbers and were occupying higher ground besides, did not withstand the attack of the troops under Archidamus, but gave way.
[13]
And those in the van of Epaminondas’ army were slain, but when the troops from within the city, exulting in their victory, pursued farther than was fitting, they in their turn were slain; for, as it seems, the line had been drawn by the deity indicating how far victory had been granted them. Archidamus accordingly set up a trophy at the spot where he had won the victory, and gave back under a truce those of the enemy who had fallen there.
[14]
Epaminondas, on the other hand, reflecting that the Arcadians would be coming to Lacedaemon to bring aid, had no desire to fight against them and against all the Lacedaemonians after they had come together, especially since they had met with success and his men with disaster; so he marched back as rapidly as he could to Tegea, and allowed his hoplites to rest there, but sent his horsemen on to Mantinea, begging them to endure this additional effort and explaining to them that probably all the cattle of the Mantineans were outside the city and likewise all the people, particularly as it was harvest time.
[15]

They then set forth; but the Athenian horsemen, setting out from Eleusis, had taken dinner at the Isthmus and, after having passed through Cleonae also, chanced to be approaching Mantinea or to be already quartered within the wall in the houses. And when the enemy were seen riding toward the city, the Mantineans begged the Athenian horsemen to help them, if in any way they could; for outside the wall were all their cattle and the labourers, and likewise many children and older men of the free citizens. When the Athenians heard this they sallied forth to the rescue, although they were still without breakfast, they and their horses as well.
[16]
Here, again, who would not admire the valour of these men also? For although they saw that the enemy were far more numerous, and although a misfortune had befallen the horsemen at Corinth, they took no account of this, nor of the fact that they were about to fight with the Thebans and the Thessalians, who were thought to be the best of horsemen, but rather, being ashamed to be at hand and yet render no service to their allies, just as soon as they saw the enemy they crashed upon them, eagerly desiring to win back their ancestral repute.
[17]
And by engaging in the battle they did indeed prove the means of saving for the Mantineans everything that was outside the wall, but there fell brave men among them; and those also whom they slew were manifestly of a like sort; for neither side had any weapon so short that they did not reach one another therewith. And the Athenians did not abandon their own dead, and they gave back some of the enemy’s under a truce.
[18]

As for Epaminondas, on the other hand, when he considered that within a few days it would be necessary for him to depart, because the time fixed for the campaign had expired, and that if he should leave behind him unprotected the people to whom he had come as an ally, they would be besieged by their adversaries, while he himself would have completely tarnished his own reputation, — for with a large force of hoplites he had been defeated at Lacedaemon by a few, and defeated likewise in a cavalry battle at Mantinea, and through his expedition to Peloponnesus had made himself the cause of the union of the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleans, and the Athenians, — he thought for these reasons that it was not possible for him to pass by the enemy without a battle, since he reasoned that if he were victorious, he would make up for all these things, while if he were slain, he deemed that such an end would be honourable for one who was striving to leave to his fatherland dominion over Peloponnesus.
[19]
Now the fact that Epaminondas himself entertained such thoughts, seems to me to be in no wise remarkable, — for such thoughts are natural to ambitious men; but that he had brought his army to such a point that the troops flinched from no toil, whether by night or by day, and shrank from no peril, and although the provisions they had were scanty, were nevertheless willing to be obedient, this seems to me to be more remarkable.
[20]
For at the time when he gave them the last order to make ready, saying that there would be a battle, the horsemen eagerly whitened their helmets at his command, the hoplites of the Arcadians painted clubs upon their shields, as though they were Thebans, and all alike sharpened their spears and daggers and burnished their shields.
[21]
But when he had led them forth, thus made ready, it is worth while again to note what he did. In the first place, as was natural, he formed them in line of battle. And by doing this he seemed to make it clear that he was preparing for an engagement; but when his army had been drawn up as he wished it to be, he did not advance by the shortest route towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea, so that he gave the enemy the impression that he would not join battle on that day.
[22]
For as soon as he had arrived at the mountain, and when his battle line had been extended to its full length, he grounded arms at the foot of the heights, so that he seemed like one who was encamping. And by so doing he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their array for battle. It was not until he had moved along successive companius to the wing where he was stationed, and had wheeled them into line thus strengthening the mass formation of this wing, that he gave the order to take up arms and led the advance; and his troops followed. Now as soon as the enemy saw them unexpectedly approaching, no one among them was able to keep quiet, but some began running to their posts, others forming into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breast-plates, while all were like men who were about to suffer, rather txan to inflict, harm.
[23]
Meanwhile Epaminondas led forward his army prow on, like a trireme, believing that if he could strike and cut through anywhere, he would destroy the entire army of his adversaries. For he was preparing to make the contest with the strongest part of his force, and the weakest part he had stationed far back, knowing that if defeated it would cause discouragement to the troops who were with him and give courage to the enemy. Again, while the enemy had formed their horsemen like a phalanx of hoplites, — six deep and without intermingled foot soldiers, —
[24]
Epaminondas on the other hand hqd made a strong column of his cavalry, also, and had mingled foot soldiers among them, believing that when he cut through the enemy’s cavalry, he would have defeated the entire opposing army; for it is very hard to find men who will stand firm when they see any of their own side in flight. And in order to prevent the Athenians on the left wing from coming to the aid of those who were posted next to them, he stqtioned both horsemen and hoplites upon some hills over against them, desiring to create in them the fear that if they proceeded to give aid, these troops would fall upon them from behind.