Creative People Must Be Stopped (3 page)

BOOK: Creative People Must Be Stopped
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The arts organization appears to suffer from a combination of
organizational
and
societal
constraints. It has tied up immense resources in a building that has high value but comes with an even higher cost. Although the space is nice, the requirements of maintaining it create significant financial pressure on the organization. As a result, it finds itself forced to cater more than ever to the tastes and social values of potential audiences who are unwilling to pay to watch art being made when they just want to be entertained.

Identifying the “Showstopper” Constraint(s)

This framework of innovation constraints helps us understand more specifically why an attempt to innovate fails: it runs afoul of one or more of the six main types of constraints. But as you may have already started to see from the examples just discussed, in any given case the constraints are not all created equal. Instead, any given innovation is likely to satisfy several constraints (including the ones we intuitively see as important, and therefore pay attention to) but fail on one or more
critical
constraints (often ones we have failed to take into account). Identifying those showstopping constraints will further sharpen our understanding of why a particular innovation succeeds or fails.

One example of using the framework in this way concerns the early development of a product called Sow-N-Gro. The product comes in the form of a spongy black round mat about a half-inch thick and available in a variety of diameters ranging from about six to about twelve inches. This mat is made of organic materials and is intended for the inside bottom of pots that contain potted plants. According to the product packaging, the Sow-N-Gro material “retains moisture, promotes root growth, [and] releases nitrogen.” The individually packaged mats were to be offered at a very economical price in the home and urban gardening enthusiast market.

At first glance, this innovative product, assuming it does what the packaging claims, would seem destined for immediate success, particularly in a segment of society that harbors increasing concerns about synthetic chemicals and excessive fertilizer use. Unfortunately, early success was elusive. A simple pass through the constraint analysis will show why.

At the individual level, someone had come up with a promising idea and recognized it as a good one, so it seems that individual constraints were met. Inasmuch as the innovation made it all the way from the “aha!” moment to production, we have to assume that it survived group constraints and won backing from people who helped fund and develop the idea. The Sow-N-Gro organization was created to commercialize the concept, and it possessed the skills and resources necessary to manufacture the material and get it in front of the retailers and distributors who would facilitate retail sale and adoption. This suggests that organizational constraints were met. The material was abundant, and the processes for matting and packaging it were relatively inexpensive. Because it had never been used in this industry before, it had no direct competitor in the “no chemicals” home gardener market, thus satisfying the industry constraints. The fiber was easily sterilized and therefore met all health code requirements that might impede importing it into the United States, thereby meeting a key societal constraint.

Despite all this, Sow-N-Gro didn't fly off the shelves. The product exists, meets a real need, is priced right, and can't be faulted for failing to do what it promised. The problem is with the last step—adoption by the intended users. But where exactly had the innovator and the organization gone wrong?

Clues to the answer may lie in the negative reaction Sow-N-Gro elicits from people when I pass samples around in seminars and workshops. At first, when I pass the disk around the room and people look at it, sniff it, and feel it, they are mostly sold. Where can they buy some of these organic plant disks? they ask. Then I show them the product packaging. As that gets passed around, there is invariably a gasp as someone reads the statement of what the product contains. It proudly states, “Sow-N-Gro is 100% Recycled Human Hair.” Suddenly the enthusiasm for the product vaporizes. The poor person holding the material at the moment involuntarily flings the mat onto the floor in disgust. No one seems to want anything more to do with it after that (except to make jokes about one of the bald men in attendance).

These admittedly unscientific samplings of potential customers' reactions point to the showstopping constraint that the makers of Sow-N-Gro failed to anticipate. We clearly have a problem when an innovation's intended customers say “Yuck!” and fling the product to the floor when they are told what it is made of. Fundamentally, Sow-N-Gro, an economically and technologically sound product, fails at the
societal
level—at least in our culture—by clashing with the values of the people it was designed for. So oblivious to this constraint were the manufacturers of the product that they actually boasted about Sow-N-Gro's fatal flaw.

Beyond casting light on what exactly went wrong with Sow-N-Gro, this diagnosis suggests what we need to do to give the innovation a better chance of success. We need to somehow “enlarge” the societal-level constraint in a way that allows it to enter the full overlap—that is, the area where the constraints can
all
be satisfied (see
Figure 1.3
).

At this point I ask people how they might go about fixing the innovation problem in this way. With this little bit of coaxing, the ideas come pouring out. First, use a different material—anything but human hair. Another common piece of advice is to prevaricate about the contents: disclose the truth, but not too much of the truth. Simply call it “organic material” or “natural keratin” or, as human hair is described scientifically, “filamentous biomaterial.” Clearly the company received and acted on similar advice; the latest iterations of the product describe it as “all-natural organic plant-growth supplement.”

A later version of the product shows several other ways that an enlarged overlap was pursued. The name Sow-N-Gro is confusing. When heard aurally it is not clear which meaning of the sound “so” is intended: So? Sew? Sow? Changing the name to SmartGrow alleviated that confusion. The new name SmartGrow also served to enlarge the constraint by enacting a basic strategy of marketing: change the basis of comparison. The consumer is led to conclude,
Since this stuff is the smart grow, that other stuff on the shelf next to it must be “dumb grow”!
Another tactic was to change the color of the packaging. The original packaging was bright yellow, which brought to my mind the last time I had spilled a large quantity of Roundup herbicide on my lawn. Changing to a “healthy” green color makes for a much more coherent presentation to the consumer.

This example suggests that if we can identify the key constraints for a particular innovation, we can usually come up with ideas for interventions that increase the odds that our innovation will succeed. Quite often the knowledge we need is already at hand. We already know the things we need to know; we just need to remember that we know them.

With the benefit of hindsight, identifying the key constraint may seem quite simple. Yet the showstopping constraint on what came to be known as SmartGrow managed to elude the smart people who invented, manufactured, and packaged it. And their case is not at all uncommon. Why? The problem is that we tend to interpret situations using only our “favored” constraint perspectives, the ones that we are most comfortable with, based on our experience, training, area of expertise, and so on. As a result, we may spend a great deal of time and energy on the wrong set of problems. For example, the makers of Sow-N-Gro may have initially congratulated themselves on having come up with a new idea and conquering every technological challenge in producing it. At that point they might have felt that their key problem was “industry economics.” In that case they might have devoted their attention to the question,
How can we cut our costs so that we can price our product more competitively?
Now this may have been wise, in that price might well have been a significant constraint, one that could sink their product if it were not met. However, there was an even more binding constraint that became evident only after the product was already on the market.

What we need is the kind of vision correction that will enable us to see
in advance
the vital factors that determine our chances for success when we embark on an innovation. This is just what the constraints framework is designed to provide.

How to Use This Book

I have found this innovation constraints framework to be applicable to every type of innovation in all of the hundreds of organizations that I have worked with. I have been using the framework (along with appropriate tools) on a daily basis in my teaching, workshops, and consulting to give individuals and organizations the analytical and practical knowledge they need to identify, understand, and overcome the particular constraints they face.

To put the constraints framework to work in your own situation, you need several things:

  • An overview of innovation constraints that you reliably apply so that you are sure not to overlook a potential source of disaster
  • A clear understanding of each of the six main types of innovation constraints
  • A way to diagnose which of the constraints is particularly critical for the case at hand (there may be more than one) so that you can direct your attention and corrective action appropriately
  • Ideas for how to satisfy or overcome those key constraints

Over the next six chapters, I will explore each type of constraint in detail, showing how it operates and why, with plentiful examples drawn from real-world cases. The analysis is followed by a discussion of ways that the particular constraints can be overcome. Toward the end of each chapter, you will find a “constraints diagnostic survey” that you and your colleagues can fill out and score. The surveys are based on my research and consulting work and will serve as a pointer to the most urgent and potentially limiting constraints you are facing. (An electronic version can be found on the book's Web site.) Appendix A, Using the Assessment Results, presents a process for analyzing your diagnostic results to help you pinpoint the steps you can take to overcome the constraints you have identified in each chapter. The appendix also contains additional exercises to help you move toward action. In the last chapter of the book, I will consider how the constraints model might be applied to your potential customers, explore the big-picture issues in leading an innovation team, and discuss the steps you might take to help your organization become more strategic about innovation.

Taken together, the analysis, stories, recommendations, and tools in this book provide a springboard for effective action, not a fail-safe recipe for success. No one can give you that recipe, especially when it comes to innovation, which by definition is constantly new. Only you can devise the specific solutions that will work for your particular situation. But if you engage with the analysis in the chapters to come, and follow through with the diagnostic surveys and exercises, you will be able to identify and come to grips with innovation killers with a deeper and sharper understanding of what they are and how you can overcome them.

Summary

It is puzzling when people say that they want innovation, then seem to do everything they can to stop it; but this is bound to happen when we rely on our vague intuitions and don't have a clear idea of what innovation is or how it really works. This mystery is compounded by the thousands upon thousands of authors and thinkers who use differing definitions of innovation and who diverge completely in their prescriptions about how to make it work. However, there is one assumption they all have in common—that there are specific conditions or constraints that have to be met in order for innovation to be successful—that serves as the key for bringing the six perspectives into a single framework.

The innovation constraints framework described in this book allows you to gain deeper and more specific insights about the constraint or set of constraints that were critical for a particular innovation. By learning to analyze these constraints in advance, turning from retrospective analysis to proactive strategy development, you can dramatically improve your chances of innovation success.

CHAPTER 2

Why Most of Us Are More Creative Than We Think

Individual Innovation Constraints

In 1966, after finishing his PhD in chemistry, young Spence Silver joined the R&D division of a diverse and entrepreneurial products company. Then, in 1968, while working in one of the labs, essentially “fooling around” with some of the company's established technology, Silver developed what should have been a high-end version of one of its core products. Unfortunately, the product he had invented simply could not compete against the firm's current product lineup. Still he thought it might be interesting to play with.

Instead of throwing the experiment away and starting over, Silver insisted on showing the thing to his colleagues. He characterizes the reception as “not stellar.” Still he continued to play with it and show it around.

Over the next five years, Silver kept working on his pet idea without the faintest idea of what it might actually be useful for. Unwilling to take no for an answer, he continued to hold seminars for people throughout the company, hoping that maybe they would have a better idea for how to use his technology. Unfortunately, they didn't.

Some time later, Art Fry, another employee of the firm, realized that he had a problem that Silver's invention might just be able to solve: organizing the music for his hobby of choir singing. Fry met with Silver, and together they began trying to develop a prototype. Over the next two years, the two of them kept working on their “unauthorized” project, eventually resorting to building a prototype-manufacturing setup in Silver's basement. Several more years passed by the time a stable manufacturing process was developed. As this was happening, Fry had taken to giving away the invention to a few people inside the company. They started using it and began to tell other colleagues; the users couldn't get enough! So maybe there was a demand, after all.

Armed with this evidence about the potential popularity of their idea, Silver and Fry approached the marketing department. There they received “an unenthusiastic reception.” It was only through Fry's appeals for the intervention of more senior managers that the marketing group begrudgingly agreed to help market the invention.

In the first market trials, conducted in four major cities, customers failed to see the value of the product and didn't bite. The marketing department was clear that the project should now be put to rest. Fry rejected these findings, believing that people loved the product once they used it, but that no amount of advertising could convey its true value. He appealed to the chairman and CEO for help. Only after this high level of intervention did the marketing group agree to conduct a final trial, a very expensive “product sampling” strategy in the Boise, Idaho, test market.

In that test, they found that more than 90 percent of the people who tried the product wanted to buy it, so it was finally given the official go-ahead. In 1980, twelve long years after Sliver's accidental invention of an “inferior adhesive,” the product they invented for 3M, the Post-it, finally launched.

There are a number of questions that may come to mind in this story of the travails of a creative individual in a bureaucratic organization. For example, what motivates a person like Silver to keep working on a failed and unauthorized project for over five years? What enabled him to perceive the makings of a successful invention where others saw only a failed experiment? Why do some people continue to push hard and long while others give up at the first sign of rejection or resistance? Was 3M just lucky to find Silver, or did he possess some secret qualities that the company identified in its recruiting process? Were Silver's creative abilities genetic and unique only to him, or are they ones everyone has but that they just don't express? And, finally, why on earth wasn't he fired!?

Are Innovators Born or Made?

You may have heard the Post-it saga before and wondered why 3M didn't see the immense value of Silver's product much earlier. That is the thought that occupied me the first time I heard it. But after considering the story more carefully over the years, I came to understand it to be less about how organizations recognize a brilliant idea and more about how they make innovation immensely difficult because they don't understand what creativity is or how to foster it.

Despite one hundred years of study, there is still a great deal of contention about what creativity is and where it comes from. The one thing that does seem certain, however, may surprise you:
there is no such thing as a creative personality
(Taggar, 2002). At least, creativity is not a fundamental attribute of “personality” in the technical sense that psychologists reserve for those core behavioral tendencies that are relatively stable over time, such as how introverted or extroverted we are.

But if personality is not what determines how creative we are, then what is? Research suggests that our habits of perception and thinking drive creativity more than some mysterious genetic trait—and habits are things we can do something about. Specifically, the power to be creative largely relies on three core components:

  • Perception
  • Intellection (thinking)
  • Expression

But if these three components are the heart of individual creativity, it is also just as true that limitations, or constraints, found within each of these three components can squash creativity flat. We can all learn to be more creative by overcoming the constraints associated with perception, intellection, and expression. By the same token, an understanding of these constraints can help organizations do a better job of supporting individuals' efforts to be innovative. Let's look at some of these constraints in detail.

Perception Constraints: Looking Without Seeing

The first step in the creative process is to get raw data (perceptions) into your brain, where they can serve as the basis of new ideas. Although this may seem as simple as looking around you, you often look without seeing, certainly without seeing clearly what really matters to your problem.

Selective Perception and Stereotyping

Let's start by considering how our perceptual apparatus actually gathers data we use in everyday life. Most of us are “naive realists,” which is a fancy way of saying that we take for granted that the world outside our bodies is just as we experience it through our senses. In fact, however, perception even at a very physical level, is always selective, limited, and, in a sense, biased.

Figure 2.2
shows the human body with the parts shown in a size proportional to the number of touch-sensitive nerves that connect that part to the brain. Notice that your big toes have an enormous amount of neural representation, which means that they are constantly sending immense amounts of data to your brain. Yet when was the last time you actually paid close attention to all that “big-toe” data? (Probably it was the last time you stubbed your toe.)

Figure 2.2

Source:
Adapted from Knapp, 1978.

This simple example illustrates a larger truth: we're constantly bombarded by vast amounts of information that we routinely ignore because of the cognitive limits of the human brain. One strategy the brain uses to deal with the onslaught of input coming from the senses is to look for patterns that simplify the data. For example, when you enter a room and experience certain visual sensations, your brain looks for a close-enough match to a set of familiar patterns and very quickly labels its perceptions as “chair” or “regrettably tasteless table lamp.”

Pattern finding, or stereotyping, is of course both necessary and ordinarily quite beneficial. We literally couldn't get through the day without it. But stereotypes and patterns can also obscure a great deal of potentially relevant data that might open our minds if only we were aware of them. Silver's colleagues at 3M probably had a clear stereotype of what a “bad adhesive” looked like: like the thing that Silver had just produced. For them this was something to be thrown away, not to be paraded around the lab and company. Silver, in contrast, found it curious and worthy of investigation.

Limiting the Universe of “Relevant” Data

We exercise another kind of selectivity in our perceptions when we short-circuit the search for relevant data. Here the problem is not that we fail to see what is right in front of us, but rather that we go too far in limiting where we look.

Seeking out and processing data beyond our usual sources of information carry a cost, even if the data are available elsewhere in the building. To avoid incurring these search costs, people commonly start out by gathering the familiar data they understand to be needed based on a stereotyped definition of the problem. Recall that when Art Fry finally convinced the 3M marketing department to gather market data for the Post-it, it set up the market test the way it always sets up market tests. This was efficient, as the department already had test markets established and already knew how to interpret the data. Unfortunately, because this product needed to be tried before people would be convinced of its value, these were the wrong kind of data to answer the question. Only by insisting on an alternative data-gathering method was Fry able to generate the insights he needed to understand the value of the product in the consumer's mind and to go about convincing the consumer of that value.

The kind of data we have access to may also be limited by organizational policy or even organizational culture. For instance, we may arbitrarily or unconsciously limit data gathering to data that are already available inside our organization, perhaps because of organizational policies that discourage revealing ideas to the public or to competitors. Even Fry confined early “market testing” inside 3M by providing samples to colleagues. In addition, some kinds of information may be tightly guarded and inaccessible to the innovator, such as information on financial performance, market size, clientele, and product failures. Organizations may also limit the types of outside data you can buy or subscribe to. In one consumer products company, the marketing director had to go to her local university to gain access to important market-share information because her company “was too cheap to buy it.” Only after proving the value of insights she had gleaned from the data was she able to convince the company of the wisdom of purchasing a legitimate subscription.

Not Getting Close to the Data

Your physical environment also affects the perceptions you have and the data you gather. Look around your work environment and think about the things you've used as inspiration or as sources of information. I recently gained insight into my own reliance on my environment for data. Instead of using my small office to meet with student project teams for a course I teach, I tried conducting the meetings in a nearby conference room. The conference room was larger and had a bigger whiteboard, more comfortable seating, and better climate control; yet the meetings in the conference room felt oddly unsatisfactory. I couldn't figure out why. Then, because of a scheduling glitch, I was forced to move the meetings back into my office. It was then that I realized that I relied heavily on the many books on my shelves for inspiration and as memory aids. Simply glancing at them on the shelves was enough to give me ideas to help the teams during discussions and to remind me of what I know. Also, when my own words failed at conveying what I meant, I could pull down a book with an example and show them.

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