Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy (107 page)

Despite these passionate appeals for a reinvestigation into the assassinations, action stalled in the House for more than a year. The Rules Committee simply refused to even consider the idea.

Finally in mid-1976, the Black Caucus-at the instigation of Dr. King's
wife, Coretta-put pressure on the House leadership and the Gonzalez
and Downing bills were merged into House Resolution 1540 and passed in
September 1976. However, the Committee would expire at the end of the
congressional term on January 3, 1977.

Trouble began immediately. House tradition dictated that the author of a
resolution creating a select committee be named chairman. Downing, who
had not sought reelection in 1976, would soon retire and Gonzalez-a
highly individualistic Mexican-American-was not liked by House power
brokers.

Despite Downing's lame-duck status, he was named chairman of the
House Select Committee on Assassinations by Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill-a decision that did not please Gonzalez, who began to operate as
co-chairman.

Early on, Downing wanted Washington attorney Bernard Fensterwald to
serve as the Committee's chief counsel and director. Fensterwald, who had
formed a clearinghouse of assassination material called the Committee to
Investigate Assassinations, was an early critic of the Warren Commission
and thoroughly familiar with most aspects of the John F. Kennedy case.

Gonzalez objected and Fensterwald withdrew from consideration. But
not before an article appeared in the Washington Star under the headline,
ASSASSINATION INQUIRY STUMBLING-IS FENSTERWALD A CIA PLANT? Later

it was learned that information for this attack came from Gonzalez's
office.

In October 1976, Downing and Gonzalez settled on a former Philadelphia prosecutor, Richard A. Sprague, as the Committee's chief counsel.
Initially, Sprague seemed like an excellent choice. He had a record of
sixty-nine convictions out of seventy homicide cases, was well regarded as
a tough and independent prosecutor. He had received national attention by
his prosecution of United Mine Workers president Tony Boyle for the
murder of UMW reformer Joseph Yablonski.

Sprague stated he planned to break his investigations into two separate
areas-one for John Kennedy and one for Dr. King. He said these assassination inquiries would be treated as homicide investigations. This was a
novel approach to the Kennedy assassination since, until that time, all
investigation and deliberation had been done secretly by government groups.

Bypassing the FBI and the CIA, Sprague hired professional investigators
and criminal lawyers from New York City. He made it clear that his
investigation would not hesitate to look into FBI and CIA involvement and
that he would use subpoena power and lie detector tests to get to the truth.
Aware of the CIA connections to the Kennedy assassination, Sprague let it
be known he planned to subpoena both Agency files and personnel.

Sprague also contacted many of the responsible Kennedy assassination
researchers, including Jim Garrison in New Orleans, and privately told
them he planned to use them as Committee consultants.

He was also truthful in projecting the costs of such a massive investigation, saying he needed a staff of at least two hundred and an initial budget
of $6.5 million to start work.

Sprague's openness about both his needs and his goals prompted immediate outrage among congressmen who had never wanted the Committee in
the first place. Many of these lambasted Sprague for his statements about
using lie detectors, voice stress analyzers, and hidden tape recorders to
learn the truth. Soon Sprague was almost too busy fending off media
attacks to get his investigation rolling.

Other developments began to raise doubts in the minds of many assassination researchers, whose hopes had grown since creation of the Committee. To begin with, Sprague early on stated: "I have not, as of this date, read the Warren Commission Report or testimony. But I have never read
any books by the critics, either."

This unfamiliarity with the assassination was reflected in Sprague's
selection of the prosecutors and lawmen as investigators and staff for the
Committee. Many were agressive and able-but they did not understand
the full ramifications of the case. Many had ties back to the FBI or CIA
and none of them had the time to properly study the complex and convoluted assassination issues.

Furthermore, despite Sprague's wooing of the research community-the
people with detailed knowledge of the cases-with few exceptions, they
were excluded from the House Committee's staff.

Then there was the question of Sprague's close friendship with his
former boss Arlen Specter, the Warren Commission staffer who created
the "single bullet" theory of the assassination. Sprague was quoted as
saying: "I did not talk to Arlen before I took this thing."

Sprague incensed Gonzalez immediately by renting a plush apartment in
Washington's Watergate complex, then leaving for a vacation in Acapulco
without informing the Committee's founder.

Almost singlehandedly, Gonzalez continued to work to save the Committee. Upon Sprague's return to Washington, Gonzalez was quoted in
Newsweek as telling his chief counsel: "If I had known in September what
I know now, I would never have affirmed your appointment."

With his pronouncements and absence, Sprague was making enemies
everywhere. Representative Robert E. Bauman of Maryland charged that
Sprague "virtually assumed the role of chairman of the Committee."

One of the only field investigators retained by the Committee during this
time was Gaeton Fonzi, who was busy developing assassination leads
among organized-crime and anti-Castro circles in Miami. In a 1980 article,
Fonzi wrote:

After talking with Sprague, I was now certain he planned to conduct a
strong investigation and I was never more optimistic in my life... .
The Kennedy assassination would finally get the investigation it deserved and an honest democracy needed . . .

As 1976 drew to a close and Sprague found himself under attack by the
media, including The New York Times, the Committee's reconstitution in
January suddenly began to appear precarious.

Sprague was baffled at the hostility directed at him. He told Committee
staffers: "You know, I don't understand it. I've never been in a situation
like this before where I am getting criticized for things I might do.
It's nonsense, but I don't know why it's happening. .. ."

His proposed budget was targeted for attack, but Sprague held his
ground, saying:

Several people around here who are familiar with the bureaucratic game
told me to first present a smaller budget. They assured me that I
could always go back later and plead for more. That's the way they do
things in Washington, I was told. Well, I won't play that game.

The press attacks caused second thoughts in Congress. A resolution
reconstituting the Assassinations Committee by a unanimous-consent voice
vote on January 4, 1977, failed. It would take weeks of maneuvering
before the Committee could officially be reconstituted. By this time,
Downing had retired and Gonzalez had been named chairman of the
Committee.

Suddenly the outside media attacks on Sprague were joined by an
unexpected source-Committee Chairman Gonzalez. According to persons
familiar with this situation, Gonzalez-already angered at not being named
chairman until after Downing retired and at Sprague's early activities or
lack of them-was further incensed that Sprague would not allow him to
run the Committee the way he saw fit.

And there was the continuing problem of funding. Sprague had been
told he had $150,000 a month for expenses until the Committee was
reconstituted in January 1977. Later he found out that amount actually was
only $84,000, which caused a cost overrun for which Gonzalez was taken
to task by the House Rules Committee-the same committee that had
stalled the Assassinations Committee in the first place. Gonzalez claimed
Sprague had spent money without his knowledge or consent.

Gonzalez ordered Sprague to take a "number of steps," including
giving written assurance that he would stay within the financial constraints
of the Committee's funding and firing staff members recently hired.
Sprague's refusal to bow to Gonzalez's demands, prompted the hottempered Texas representative to write:

Owing to an evident inability of the Committee in times past to adequately control the use of its letterhead and franked materials, and in the
absence of any present controls on such materials, you are directed to return
to me immediately any and all letterhead materials bearing my name.

Fonzi wrote:

Since all congressional committees use the postal franking privileges of
its chairman, and every expense voucher, travel order, and most directives
and requests are made under the chairman's signature, what Gonzalez was
doing, in effect, was virtually stopping the operation of the Committee.

Next Gonzalez further subverted the Committee's work by asking the
attorney general to deny Committee staffers access to FBI files and by
cutting off long-distance phone calls by the Committee's staff.

Sprague reportedly remarked to co-workers: "Gonzalez went berserk."

Finally, in a hand-delivered letter, Gonzalez charged Sprague with being
"engaged in a course of conduct that is wholly intolerable for any employee of the House" and ordered him to vacate his office that same day.
However, within a few hours the other eleven members of the Committee
had written their own letter, instructing Sprague to ignore Gonzalez. This
in-fighting continued, with Gonzalez telling newsmen that Sprague was a
` `rattlesnake. "

It appears that both Gonzalez and Sprague may have been the objects of
secret personal smear campaigns-Sprague being told Gonzalez was trying
to subvert the Committee's work while Gonzalez was being told that
Sprague was a CIA plant on the Committee.

Early in March 1977, Gonzalez resigned from the Assassinations Committee claiming that Sprague had refused to cut costs and had tried to
undermine his authority as chairman. Back home in San Antonio, Gonzalez told a reporter he had been forced out of the investigation by "vast and
powerful forces, including the country's most sophisticated criminal element." Gonzalez told newsmen: "I am like a guy who's been slugged
before he's got a chance to fight. . . . It was an exercise in futility. The fix
was in."

While the life of the Committee had been extended for two more months
in January, it was due to expire at the end of March 1977. Near that time,
a new chairman was named-Representative Louis Stokes, a low-key,
black Democrat from Ohio. With the more acceptable Stokes in charge,
the Assassinations Committee was revived by the passage of House Resolution 433, which passed on March 30, 1977, reconstituting the Committee
until January 3, 1979, and assigning it a pared-down budget of $2.5
million.

Just before the House vote to continue the Committee, Sprague was
called to Stokes's office. Despite having been promised support by Stokes
and other Committee members, Sprague could see the writing on the wall.
He told them: "Gentlemen, it's clear it's in everyone's best interest if I
resign." Sprague's resignation prompted several Committee members to
state publicly that the chief counsel had been the victim of a McCarthy-like
"witch hunt" and character assassination.

Although the Committee had been in existence for six months, the
constant bickering and lack of funds prevented any meaningful work.
Throughout its brief life, its focus so far had not been on assassinations,
but on sheer survival.

Earlier in March, Fonzi-still on the job-had tried to contact the
last-known close friend of Lee Harvey Oswald, George DeMohrenschildt,
who was staying in Manalapan, Florida. Soon after arriving home and
learning of Fonzi's visit, DeMohrenschildt was found fatally shot in his
room. His death was ruled a suicide. Fonzi later wrote:

The inability of the Assassinations Committee to effectively react to the
death of a key witness revealed that it was still-six months after it was
formed-totally incapable of functioning as an investigative body. It
reflected six months of political reality and how successful its opponents
had been in keeping it distracted and off-balance.

Representative Gonzalez stated simply: "Strong organized forces have
combined to stop the inquiry at any cost."

In June 1977, a new chief counsel was selected-G. Robert Blakey, a
respected academician with impressive credentials.

No investigation can be better than its leadership, and the House Select
Committee on Assassinations with its new chief counsel and director was
no exception.

G. Robert Blakey, a professor of law and director of the Notre Dame
Institute on Organized Crime, spent four years in the organized-crime and
racketeering section of the Kennedy Justice Department; was former chief
counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures;
was principal consultant to President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; and a consultant to the
publications Time, Life, and Look.

Upon becoming chief counsel and director for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Blakey firmly took control of the panel and its
investigation. He oversaw every aspect of the Committee's work, selecting
witnesses, deciding which leads to follow and which to ignore, picked the
expert panels, hired and fired staff members, and set the Committee's
agenda.

It quickly became obvious that the Assassinations Committee was
changing directions in key areas. Where Sprague had opted for openness
in the Committee's inquiry, Blakey advocated secrecy. In fact, in his
first statement to the news media, Blakey announced: "The purpose of
this news conference is to announce there will be no more news con-
erences." Blakey also announced that the Committee would not be looking at any new evidence in the Kennedy-King assassinations, but would
concentrate on evaluating the old evidence accumulated by the federal
government.