Deadly Deceits (19 page)

After the survey operation the chief of station, Rod Johnson, called me to Bangkok for a meeting. When I entered his office, he had with him several other of the top station
officers, including my branch chief. “Hello, Ralph,” said Johnson. This was the first time he had ever used my correct name. For years he had called me Bob. “You old rascal, you. You really did a job up there. How in the hell is everything going?”

He continued, “I want you to know just how pleased everyone is with the results you've accomplished. Yesterday Saiyut [General Saiyut Kerdpol, the operating head of the Communist Suppression Operations Command] told me he had been up there to see you. He said you and Colonel Chat Chai have really turned things around and that Governor Bo Daeng is extremely pleased with your work.”

Rod went on in this vein for some time, and the other officials chimed in with their praise. He then said, “You've done such a good job that I plan to assign you PCS [permanent change of station] to that province. If you accept, you'll be the new officer-in-charge of other CIA officers stationed in the province.”
[One 27-word sentence deleted.]

He need not have bothered with the snow job. I had never in my career seen such dramatic results as we had achieved. The chief would have had a hard time talking me out of continuing the program. I accepted his offer at once.

I worried that the permanent transfer to the Northeast would disrupt my family life, as Norma and the children would have to stay in Bangkok near the international school. I felt, however, the momentum, the career potential, the job satisfaction, the destruction of the hated communist movement, and the benefits to my country all outweighed the problem of family separation.

As it turned out, my older daughter and older son were able to spend several months with me in the province during the school vacation. By that time I had rented an American-style house and had a maid-cook. I felt they would benefit from having the opportunity to see a different aspect of life in a foreign country as well as a chance to see their father at work.

When I returned to the Northeast, we immediately began a second survey with about 50 percent new team members replacing the others, who had to return to their established jobs. The governor had appointed Lieutenant Somboon as his aide, and in that capacity he was to lead this and three more district surveys over the next year. The second survey
culminated in a massive phone book-sized final report. This time the management team stayed away from the villages. The first village of the first survey had taught us that it was extremely bad public relations for an American to be seen associated with the operation. The Communists constantly harped on the theme that the Praphat-Thanom clique were running dogs of the American imperialists. My presence with the team lent credence to that story and from that point on, the two colonels, the translators, and I moved to the district seat or stayed in the provincial capital while couriers brought the interrogation reports to us and carried back my follow-up suggestions to Lieutenant Somboon.

Unfortunately, not all American-sponsored programs took this unobtrusive approach, and the impression left on the Thai peasants was not always good. For example, one day a case officer for the People's Action Teams and the Census Aspiration Teams took the monthly payroll directly to the
nai amphur
, who was then to disburse the funds to the individual team members. The bad roads and the lack of security caused by Communist incidents forced the case officer to travel via a station helicopter. The
nai amphur
was holding a combined meeting and festival attended by hundreds of villagers. Our men in the helicopter landed and in front of all those people handed the
nai amphur
stacks of the bright red Thai
baht
—money. The Communists could not have asked for more graphic proof of what they had been saying.

In mid-summer 1967 I received a cable from the acting chief of station. He noted that my tour was scheduled to end in October 1967 but that he and Thai counterinsurgency officials wanted me to sign up for a new two-year tour to head the survey program on a nationwide scale. The new tour would have to be approved by Headquarters, the cable said, but that would be absolutely no problem.

His request was a great thrill. It was just what I had hoped and prayed for. I immediately sat down and composed a cable accepting the offer.

A few weeks later, in about August 1967, William Colby, then chief of the Far East division, came to the province for a
day of briefings. I picked him up at the airport. Dressed in khaki, Colby was his usual calm, concerned self. We drove to the CPM-1 base, where he received a short briefing. We then went to another location for a briefing by American and Thai personnel associated with the People's Action Team and Census Aspiration programs. Since I felt so strongly about our work, I reserved the rest of Colby's day for briefings on the district surveys.

I first led him on a tour of the office and showed him the several file cabinets full of reports and interrogation statements. I explained the procedures of the survey and then outlined my general conclusions, including my doubts about previous Agency reporting which said that the Communists did not have the support of the local people and that they forced people to support them with threats and terrorism.

“Such a picture is inaccurate,” I told Colby, who just sat there and didn't bat an eye. “We have found that the Communists concentrate the majority, almost the entirety, of their time winning the cooperation of the peasants. Take this village,” I said, pointing to the map. “The MMU [Masses Mobilization Unit] of the Thai Communist Party sent two members into the village. They said they were looking for work. For three months they just hung around helping people and making friends. Quietly, however, they were assessing the class structure of the villagers and finding out who had grievances against the government. After three months they reported to their parent MMU unit that the village was ripe for revolution and received approval to proceed to the next phase.

“These two then began to criticize the government, saying the Praphat-Thanom clique were nothing but running dogs of the Americans who support the rich people and landowners against the poor peasants who are the vast majority of the Thai people. The two MMU cadre identified as their first recruit a poor young man who was married and had a child and was angry at the government. He was recruited into the Farmers' Liberation Association.”

Colby was listening, but still said nothing. I told him about numerous documents we had found that outlined the goals and beliefs of the FLA. These called for the Thai Communist Party to expel the imperialists, to overthrow the fascist dictatorship, to achieve national independence through armed
struggle. Their plan was first to build base areas in the rural parts of the country (some 80 percent of the population were farmers), then to encircle and capture the cities step by step.

Colby still did not respond at all.

“Once they had the first recruit in the village,” I continued, “they went after two more and then formed the three into the first cell of the FLA. These three were led out to concealed sites where members of the MMU attached to local guerrilla units indoctrinated them and slowly began to introduce them to a simplified version of the Marxist class struggle. They told the three recruits that the Communists represented the poor people and would lead them in overthrowing the oppressors and setting up a real people's government. Each of the three was then asked to recruit three more people, and the effort spread like a cancer until virtually every man, woman, and child was recruited into some sort of organized revolutionary structure. The local guerrilla units also carried out minor terrorist incidents that were announced in the indoctrination sessions to show the ability of the Communists to fight the government.”

At this point I explained that the Thai government's reaction to the terrorism—sending in brutal armed units to beat innocent people—only created an atmosphere of hate that the Communists were able to exploit. The big difference between our district surveys and past government counter-insurgency programs, I explained, was that instead of using brute force we had used our intelligence to penetrate the Communists' crucial shield of secrecy and had thereby effectively crushed their movement. Our work and follow-up actions by the governor's staff seemed to have completely reversed Communist organizational successes. Everything was going fine, the intelligence was flowing in, the insurgency was being destroyed, and the future was looking good.

But I went on to say that what was happening in that village was happening in all 30 villages we had surveyed and was no doubt happening in every village in Thailand where the Communists were organizing. The pattern, which I was not yet aware of and therefore could not tell Colby, was that once a village was fully organized, the most active FLA members became candidates for membership in the Communist Party and a village militia was established along with a provisional
government that replaced the authority of the national government. From the militia a few people were drawn off to become full-time guerrillas. The movement would then be expanded to include a regional force and finally a full-time regular army unit. When a number of villages in one area were organized and linked up, they would form what the Communists called a base area—a region where most all villages were united into one complete, active, dedicated revolutionary structure.

Although I did not then know that the early stages of this plan were being followed, it seemed clear to me from our surveys that Communist organizing was well under way in Thailand and undoubtedly in South Vietnam as well. The most alarming part of it, I told Colby, was that previous Agency intelligence had failed to report any of this widespread Communist activity. It had instead reported that there were only a few thousand Communist guerrillas in the mountains who commanded no support from the people.

Colby seemed puzzled by my presentation. I had never seen him at a loss for words before. He looked at the ground, he looked everywhere. Finally he looked at me and said quietly, “We always seem to be losing.”

I expected congratulations and for him to rush out and push for immediate expansion of the survey operations into other provinces. What I didn't expect was this non-response. I was shocked. I had presented my best case, and he could say nothing other than, “We always seem to be losing.” What in the hell did he mean by that? Thinking about it later, I realized that Colby was probably weighing the broader ramifications of my survey information.

An entourage of jeeps and land rovers escorted Colby back to the airport. He rode with me, but I was too puzzled and concerned by his response to participate in any conversation. Another American, a junior officer, babbled on as we drove.

Two months later, in October 1967, the chief of station summoned me. He was alone when I entered his office and not at all his usual back-slapping self. He read me a dispatch that the station had received from Headquarters giving my next assignment as branch chief of liaison operations in Taiwan, the same branch I had worked for on a prior tour. This assignment
was a real plum. It would put me into the management channel, ensuring rapid promotions and even better future assignments. Taiwan was the Playboy Club of the Far East division, and if I wanted to go that route, it was open. Taiwan also had a good American school, good housing, excellent extra pay. Everything about the job was great—except that I did not want it.

I told Rod Johnson about the recent work of the surveys, the cable I had received from the acting chief while Rod had been in Headquarters, and my positive response. I pulled out the Directorate for Intelligence rating sheet, told him that the State Department had rated the survey reports the same, and said, “We are beating the bastards. We break through then secrecy and they can't survive without it.”

Rod slowly turned the rating sheet over in his hand. He did not need to read it. He knew what it said. He looked up at me and asked, “How soon can you get out of here?”

I was momentarily too stunned to reply. I finally began to calculate what had to be done to wind up my affairs and replied, “I'm just finishing another survey report, which will take a few more weeks to write. The team has just gone into another district and will be there three months, so someone will have to manage that aspect.”

Rod said that after this survey was completed there would be no one to handle them, so the program would be ended. “Finish up as soon as possible,” he said, “but I want you out of here in three weeks. Goodbye.”

I traveled back to the province in a fog of angry disbelief, trying to figure out what was happening. How could the Agency let such a program die? It produced the highest-rated intelligence, and I thought it destroyed the insurgency. It did all of this at virtually no cost. What in the hell was going on? Could it be that Colby and the chief did not want the surveys to confirm something they already knew?

The American consul stationed in Udorn, who frequently had come to my office to read the survey reports, learned of the decision to reassign me and to cancel the surveys. He reacted angrily and traveled to Bangkok several times to try to change Johnson's mind. The governor of the province said this was intolerable and sent several cables to Johnson asking that I be allowed to remain. In fact, when my replacement showed
up, the governor refused to meet him. General Saiyut Kerdpol also made entreaties to Johnson—all to no avail.

During those last confused weeks I continued to try to figure out what had happened. I paced back and forth, going over and over in my mind the events leading up to my dismissal. Had I offended someone? If so, I was not aware of it. But if I had, why not dismiss me and continue the surveys? Had Colby not understood all we had achieved? This seemed impossible. During the entire preceding year we had received glowing reports from Colby's Far East division, so he must have known.