Death to Tyrants! (24 page)

In this light one should note a significant difference between the law of Eukrates and both the decree of Demophantos and the Eretrian tyrant-killing law. Those two promulgations promised great honors to the tyrant killer. According to the decree of Demophantos, the tyrant killer would receive the monetary value of half the “tyrant's” property, and, should he be killed, he would be treated like Harmodios and Aristogeiton and his descendants treated like their descendants. And the honors prescribed by the Eretrian law were no less grand. If Knoepfler's restorations are correct, the tyrant
killer would receive
proedria
,
sitēsis
, a cash payment, and a statue in his likeness would be erected in a conspicuous location; and should he die while killing the tyrant, the state would provide for his children. The law of Eukrates, on the other hand, prescribes no such positive, selective incentives for the tyrannicide, only the assurance that he would not be prosecuted. Why would that be the case?

One part of the answer might be that, in the Athens of 337/6, tyrannicide was not considered to be an especially daring act. The driving logic behind that conclusion is quite simple: incentives are offered in order to encourage people to do something that they might not otherwise do. The question thus becomes, why would an individual democrat need an incentive to kill a tyrant? One reason—likely the most significant reason, it seems—would be to counter the weight of his concern that, should he commit that act, an insufficient number of people would follow him. The greater his uncertainty, the greater the incentive required to make tyrant killing potentially worth the risk. It thus stands to reason that the absence of incentives in Eukrates's law reflects the widespread belief that the democrats—a majority of the population—will fight to defend their regime. This does not mean that any democrat would be as likely as any other democrat to kill a tyrant. It means that would-be tyrannicides would come from the (relatively large) pool of proactive democrats, not the (very small) pool of extraordinarily brave, proactive democrats. That is, Athenian democrats became increasingly more confident, more aware of their collective strength, between the promulgation of the decree of Demophantos and the law of Eukrates.

1
For modern discussions of the battle (and citations of the ancient evidence), see Ellis (1976: 197–98); Cawkwell (1978b: 144–49); Griffith (1979: 596–603); Hammond (1989:115–119); Sealey (1993: 196–98); Worthington (2008: 147–51).

2
Philip founded this league in the winter of 338/7 (Diod. Sic. 16.89). All member states sent representatives to a common council (
synedrion
) that was charged with (inter alia) maintaining a common peace, adjudicating disputes between members (see, for example,
RO
82), and preserving the integrity of each member state's constitution (
politeia
). But Philip, as holder of the office of
hegemōn
, controlled the council: his approval was likely necessary for a bill (
dogma
) to be ratified, and he probably could propose bills too. In addition to the
synedrion
and the office of the
hegemōn
, there were officials called “those appointed for the common safety” ([Dem.] 17.15). Those men (Antipater might have served on this board) likely were charged with ensuring that the citizens of member states were abiding by the league's charter. For the oath-bound duties of member states, see
RO
76 and [Dem.] 17. For a short description of the Korinthian League, see Cawkwell (1978b: 169–76) and Heisserer (1980: xxiii–xxvii). On the post-Chaironeia peace, see Ryder (1965). For Philip's settlements with various poleis after Chaironeia and before the foundation of the Korinthian League, see Roebuck (1948).

3
For Philip's settlement with Athens, see Ellis (1976: 199–200, 295–96nn80–87).

4
It is, for example, on the cover of several well-known books: Ober (1989); Murray and Price (1991); Ober and Hedrick (1996); Arnaoutoglou (1998); Bakewell and Sickinger (2002); Cataldi (2004); Gagarin and Cohen (2005). News of the inscription's discovery was published in the
New York Times
(May 26, 1952).

5
Text and translation:
RO
79 (but changing
RO
's “the people” to
dēmos
). Editio Princeps: Meritt (1952). Other editions include: Pouilloux (1960: no. 32); Schwenk (1985: no. 6). English translations (without Greek text): Harding (1985: no. 101); Arnaoutoglou (1998: no. 65).

6
See, for example: [Dem.] 7.17; Dem. 8.61; 9.53; 10.68; 19.225–27, 299.

7
For a presentation of the evidence for post-Chaironeia Athens, see Worthington (1992: 246–49). Among other measures, Demosthenes proposed the fortification of the city and Piraeus (Dem. 18.248), and Hypereides proposed to enfranchise
atimoi
, metics, and slaves (Hyp. F 18 [Loeb]).

8
It is certainly worth pointing out, however, that the Korinthian League authorized Philip's invasion of the Persian Empire in the Archonship of Phrynichos (Diod. Sic. 16.89). Perhaps Eukrates feared that Philip would seek to increase his control over Athens—the most powerful Greek city on the Aegean Peninsula—before marching too far eastward.

9
On the Areopagos, especially in the time of the promulgation of the law of Eukrates, see the section of this chapter titled “The Areopagos.”

10
The meaning of
atimos
here is unclear. As is well known, originally an
atimos
was an outlaw and could thus be killed with impunity. Yet, later, an
atimos
was a man who had lost only certain rights. Demosthenes (9.44) noted this change in a way that suggests that people had forgotten that the word originally meant outlawry. Thus one might conclude that the word is used in its more lenient sense in Eukrates's law. However, use of the archaic sense of
atimia
seems more likely. First, since the law of Eukrates is traditional legislation (going back to the old legislation—called a
thesmos
—quoted in
Ath
.
Pol
. 16.10), the archaic flavor of
atimia
would be welcomed; see the section in
chapter 1
titled “Solution to Coordination Problem.” And, second, because Areopagites who convened after the democracy was overthrown would most likely be considered to be “joining in establishing a tyranny” (line 8 of Eukrates's law), they presumably could be killed with impunity, which, again, is the archaic sense of
atimia
. On
atimia
, see Hansen (1976).

11
For a comparison of the language of the decree of Demophantos and the law of Eukrates, see
Table 1.1
in
chapter 1
. It should be noted that, subsequent to the promulgation of the decree of Demophantos, provisions concerning the overthrow of the democracy (
katalusis
tou dēmou)
became part of the
nomos eisangeltikos
(part of which is quoted, apparently verbatim, in Hypereides's speech
In Defense of Euxenippos
[7–8]). The significance of that transfer concerns the punishment for the crime: pursuant to the decree of Demophantos, a guilty man may be assassinated, while the
nomos
eisangeltikos
states that a suspect is to be denounced and subsequently tried in a
dikasterion
. Thus Eukrates's law restored the self-help provision for
katalusis tou dēmou
found in the decree of Demophantos. For the likely rationale behind that change, see the section in this chapter titled “The Tyrannical Threat.” With respect to the date for the
nomos eisangeltikos
, Ostwald (1955: 115–19) suggests after the fall of the Thirty. Hansen (1999: 213) agrees with that date.

12
In addition: he was granted citizenship (Plut.
Dem
. 22.3); and, after granting him an honorific crown, the Athenians promised—a promise made at the wedding of Philip's daughter Kleopatra—to punish anyone who might plot against him (Diod. Sic. 16.92.1–2).

13
The Athenians honored, for example, the pro-Macedonian Euthykrates from Olynthos (Hyp. frag. B.19.1).

14
Arrian (
Anab
. 1.1.3) provides a particularly fine glimpse into the Athenians' use of honors to buy security. After the assassination of Philip, the Athenians planned to revolt from the Macedonians. But, after Alexander approached Athens with an army, the Athenians “conceded to him honors still greater than had been given to Philip.”

15
Demades is a fine example. He captured the goodwill of prominent Macedonians and was thus quite powerful in Athens. For example, he convinced Alexander to drop his demand, after the sack of Thebes, that the Athenians hand over several prominent political figures. The Athenians rewarded him for that success with a statue and
sitēsis
. But he was also considered to be dangerous and to have successfully proposed decrees (several of which honored Macedonians and friends of Macedonians) that were seen as being against the interests of the
dēmos
(e.g., Din. 1.101;
Tod
181 provides a list of decrees moved by Demades). See Worthington (1992: 271–72) for ancient sources and modern discussions. For the general dynamic, see Aischin. 3.250.

16
The date of both speeches is debatable. Hypereides's speech is likely exactly contemporary with the law of Eukrates (see the Loeb introduction to the speech for an explanation). [Demosthenes's] speech is notoriously difficult to date; scholars have dated it anywhere between 336/5 (before Alexander's destruction of Thebes) and 330. Cawkwell (1961) dates it to 331 BCE. Ostwald (1955: 124) dates it to the winter of 336/5.

17
The orators often noted that law upholds the rule of the
dēmos
: Dem. 21.223; Aischin. 3.6, 233–35; Lykourg.
Leok
. 4.

18
One of course thinks of the indictment lodged by Aischines against Ktesiphon for proposing that Demosthenes be crowned in the Dionysia for his work—after the battle of Chaironeia—as Commissioner for the Repair of Walls (Aischin. 3). There the alleged illegality was threefold: (1) Demosthenes had not yet undergone his financial audit (
euthynai
) for his time in office; (2) the crown was to be awarded during the Great Dionysia and thus in the theater of Dionysos (instead of in the Pnyx, as required by law); (3) Demosthenes did not deserve such an honor.

19
One thinks here of Aristotle's advice (
Pol
. 1307b31–37) that small breaches of the law must be vigorously addressed—“for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates … for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays.”

20
For statements in the oratorical corpus that support this conclusion (apathy, subversion by evolution), see: Aischin. 3.250–51; Dem. 18.45–46, 149; 19.224–28.

21
One should note that—per this chapter's hypothesis—it is unnecessary to posit a large “pro-Macedonian” faction to suppose that Macedonian interests were vigorously advanced in Athens.

22
It is to be noted that, before the end of the fifth century, the Athenians did not distinguish between a decree and a law. Thus the decree of Demophantos was a law, not a decree, in the fourth-century sense: it articulated general norms to which all Athenians were beholden.

23
Eukrates apparently availed himself of the so-called repeal law in order to propose his legislation: (1) the law does not date to the first prytany, so the law is not a result of the “review law”; (2) there is no reason to think that the
thesmothetai
initiated the procedure as a result of using the “inspection law.” On
nomothesia
in the fourth century, see, above all, Hansen (1999: 161–77). See also MacDowell (1975); Hansen (1985); Rhodes (1985b).

24
The
dēmos
likely also chose five advocates to defend the old law—in this case, provisions concerning
katalusis tou demou
contained in the
nomos
eisangeltikos
—at this assembly (Dem. 24.36).

25
The evidence for this step must be inferred from Dem. 24.21 (describing the step in the so-called review law). All potential
nomothetai
had already sworn the heliastic oath for that year (and were thus also eligible to be jurors in the
dikasteria
). The
nomothetai
for a particular case (e.g., deciding on Eukrates's legislative proposal) were selected by lot from those eligible men who presented themselves for service on that particular day.

26
The
boulē
was also involved in the
nomothesia
process: not only did it establish the agenda for the
ekklesia
, it also had a legislative secretary (
Ath
.
Pol
. 54.4; Hansen [1999: 256–57]). Therefore the
ekklesia
, the
boulē
,
ho boulomenos
(the interested citizen), and
nomothetai
were formally involved in the discussion. And that is in addition to informal discussion that would have begun after Eukrates placed his proposal on the white boards.

27
This conclusion is based on the facts that (1) Leokrates was spared conviction by one vote (Aischin. 3.252) and (2) Autolykos, an Areopagite, was condemned for removing his wife and children from Athens after Chaironeia (Lykourg.
Leok
. 53, frag. 9). Thus it would appear that the law was passed after Leokrates left Athens and before Autolykos sent away his wife and children.

28
On Phrynichos during the coup of the Four Hundred, see the section in
chapter 1
titled “Mobilization.”

29
It should be noted that Lykourgos mistakenly wrote (124) that the decree of Demophantos was promulgated after the fall of the Thirty. That is certainly a peculiar error. Perhaps he attempted to link the famous decree with that famous “tyranny.”