Decoding the IRA (37 page)

Though tear gas is primarily used today by police riot squads, armies used it during the war as an offensive weapon. It had the ability to quickly incapacitate enemy troops or force them to don gas masks, which limited their fighting ability. Tear gas rapidly cleared from the atmosphere, leaving
the area again safe for the occupying force. Tear gases (or lachrymators) incapacitate opponents by causing involuntary weeping and temporary blindness. Once exposed to fresh air the victims rapidly recover.
¹⁰⁴

Soon after the war, tear gas weapons were developed for use by the police, particularly in dealing with riots and prison disturbances. Most of these weapons utilised the chemical chloroacetophenone or CN gas, which has more recently been marketed as a personal protective spray under the trade name Mace. CN gas remained the primary tear gas used by law enforcement agencies until replaced by the less toxic CS gas in the 1960s.

The IRA showed considerable interest in tear gas, and given its resources this was a much more practical weapon for the organisation than poison gas. It was particularly interested in tear gas truncheons or billies, among the most commonly produced tear gas weapons in the US, in continuous production from the 1920s through the 1960s. These were primarily used by the police and consisted of a truncheon or billy stick that contained a tear gas cartridge. The firing mechanism and trigger were incorporated into the handle, while the truncheon itself was a metal barrel. To fire the weapon, the trigger in the handle was pressed, resulting in a burst of tear gas emanating from the end of the barrel. There were two basic types of truncheons: spray or blast. The spray type sprayed tear gas vapour for several seconds in the direction the club was pointed, while the blast type instantaneously blasted out a cloud of tear gas, with an effective range of five to fifteen feet. These weapons could be used against one opponent or a small crowd, but tended to have little effect against the rush of a large crowd or in a riot.
¹⁰⁵

In the inter-war years many military experts believed that chemical weapons, specifically agents such as mustard gas, could play a decisive role in the next major conflict.

The first reference I have found connecting the IRA to chemical weapons was an incident from the Anglo-Irish War in 1920 during an attack on the police barracks in Blarney, County Cork. When the IRA failed to blow a breach in the barracks wall with gun cotton, P. A. Murray produced a German bomb, which he ‘believed to be a gas bomb'. He was considering using it until someone shouted ‘Do it if you want to gas us all' and with that he put it away. Ironically, both Connie Neenan and Dan ‘Sandow' Donovan (who was probably the true identity of ‘Mr Jones') were among the group
with Murray.
¹⁰⁶
Since IRA personnel had contact with German arms dealers it's not surprising they may have come across the odd chemical weapon among the stocks left over after the world war. However, at the time there doesn't seem to have been any clear plan or strategy to use these weapons.

In December 1921 during the period of the Anglo-Irish truce, the Royal Irish Constabulary's (RIC) director of intelligence, Brigadier-General Ormonde Winter, feared the IRA would resume hostilities and that ‘gas will be used, which is being, I am informed, manufactured in laboratories owned by the Christian Brothers, and other like institutions, some of the chemists so employed having had special training in the manufacture secretly in Germany.'
¹⁰⁷
While this report owes more to a fertile imagination (combined with British stereotyping) than the nefarious plans of the Christian Brothers and the IRA, it does raise the question as to whether Winter had information that elements in the IRA were investigating the possibilities of poison gas. Certainly the IRA's munitions and explosives experts, such as Seán Russell, weren't inactive during the time of the truce.

The first reference to chemical weapons in the encrypted documents shows that there was indeed interest in such weapons at GHQ. In April 1925 Frank Aiken asked Liam Pedlar in New York if he had been able to acquire samples of artillery shells containing poison gas. Aiken wrote:
‘Artillery gas
. Have you succeeded in getting samples of these or is there any hope of it?'
¹⁰⁸

In November 1926, ‘Mr Jones' in New York sent a despatch with a
‘tear gas formula'
to Moss Twomey. The letter went by ocean liner to Southamptom, where George, the OC. Britain, received it, and noted it was
‘a formula for the making of some sort of bombs'
.
¹⁰⁹
He passed it on to a courier, who was later stopped by the customs in Dublin. The customs officers confiscated adaptors for revolvers she was carrying but let her through with the letter and other IRA despatches. GHQ reported back to George that the despatches ‘got through safely' and Cooney replied to ‘Jones' that he had received the ‘chemical formulas'.
¹¹⁰

That same month Moss Twomey was arrested and briefly imprisoned in Mountjoy along with Mick Price. The ever resourceful ‘Mr Jones' felt that tear gas billies could be used to rescue them both. ‘Jones' wrote to
Andy Cooney:
‘If I can get [in] touch with the right people – I will be able to devote some time to this now – I think there is a chance to get some tear gas here. I was offered six dozen billys and some hundreds of cartridges for $1,500. I refused. If I hang on, I will be able to buy direct from the manufacturer. I am working on this now. I am trying to get about a dozen. If I succeed you might be able to get Price and Moss out.'
¹¹¹

With Twomey already released, ‘Jones' again sent Cooney a letter that would have also been meant for Moss Twomey:
‘Let me know if I should buy machines for releasing gas [and] also [gas] bombs. Billys cost $25 each.'
¹¹²
The
‘machines for releasing gas'
were most likely gas cylinders, while ‘bombs' probably referred to gas greanades, which could be thrown by hand or fired by grenade launchers.
¹¹³
Twomey was now interested in the idea and replied:
‘It would be fine if you succeed in getting some tear gas. Could you there get [
sic
] a number of men trained in [the] use of this?'
Referring to the increased garda activity following the barrack raids, Twomey felt that ‘under present conditions' it wouldn't be possible to train IRA men in Ireland in the use of tear gas. He added:
‘Let me have more particulars and a sketch or drawing if possible of machines you mention for releasing gas, and bombs. Re [regarding] purchase of billys etc it is chiefly a question of being able to get them sent home [to Ireland]. If you can do this get a small quantity for a trial and to experiment with.'
¹¹⁴

‘Jones' replied with great enthusiasm:
‘You ought to be able to make the [tear] gas. I am almost sure I could buy the machines but I have no money. Send an appeal to Clan [na Gael] thru [
sic
] An Timthire [Connie Neenan] for [the] machines. No training is necessary, all you need to do is turn on a faucet or tap and let it rip. You would need [gas] masks. I think ‘Stephen' [the Soviet intelligence officer] could supply them. With twenty machines you might be able to take all [of] Dublin without killing non-combatants. I am sending you a pamphlet, which gives you some idea of it. Expect a price catalogue. I will then have prices. There ought be no difficulty in getting small articles like billys across … They are very effective I understand.'
‘Jones' said he needed $500 to buy the machines.
¹¹⁵
Twomey carefully considered the
logistics of a tear gas attack and posed pertinent questions about these machines or cylinders:
‘[The] principal considerations [are]: amount [of gas] these contain [the] pressure under which [the gas is] released, the power and the radius affected, and [the] atmospheric conditions [needed] for successful employment [
sic
].'
¹¹⁶
The following month Twomey complained to ‘Jones':
‘Catalogue and price list for gas apparatus you promised not received yet'
.
¹¹⁷

Twomey told ‘Mr Jones' and Connie Neenan that he was ‘anxious' to get a few tear gas billies, and he arranged for a sailor, John Hannon, to call on Miss Lagan, an IRA contact in New York. Miss Lagan could introduce Hannon to Neenan or ‘Jones' and they should hand over the billies and some ‘gun cotton' to Hannon to be smuggled back to Ireland.
¹¹⁸

In addition to tear gas, Twomey was interested in mustard gas, and he asked ‘Jones':
‘Try and get formulae for these tear gases and mustard gases, and [an] idea of [the industrial] plant necessary [for manufacturing them].'
¹¹⁹
The Soviet agent ‘Stephen' told ‘Jones' he would give him the formula for mustard gas, but given the complexity of the production process
‘you will not be able to manufacture [it]'
. Additionally ‘Jones' reminded Twomey that he had already sent him the formulae for tear gas in 1926.
¹²⁰

‘Jones' clandestinely obtained considerable information on chemical weapons, much of it in the form of reports by the US army's Chemical Warfare Service. This information was passed on to the Soviets, rather than kept for the IRA's own use (see Chapter 8). At one stage he obtained
‘the formulae for all the poison gases manufactured here [in the US]. I was very sorry [that] I could not copy this and send it to you [Twomey].'
¹²¹

As things turned out there was no IRA tear gas or poison gas attack in Ireland. However, the questions Moss Twomey asked ‘Jones' about deploying tear gas showed he had considered the technical aspects of gas warfare, and had likely talked the issue over with Seán Russell. In these documents two types of attacks were considered.

The first was a limited attack using tear gas firing truncheons to rescue IRA prisoners. Given the right plan, you could probably use any weapon to rescue someone from jail, but the tear gas billy would not be the first choice – though it certainly would have caught the warders and gardaí at Mountjoy by surprise. The warders could have been briefly incapacitated,
but the weapon had a short range of only five to fifteen feet and the rescuers, along with the rescued prisoners, would have needed gas masks. Furthermore, if a firefight had broken out, the IRA with their billies would have been badly ‘outgunned'.

The second idea, put forward by ‘Mr Jones', was for a mass tear gas attack in Dublin, allowing the IRA to take over the capital. This was militarily a ridiculous idea. The IRA would have needed to mount attacks throughout the city, and as to how all the appropriate targets could have been blanketed in tear gas is inconceivable. Releasing such a volume would have required formidable resources and equipment, and on top of that a major limitation would have been the capriciousness of the wind, especially in a city where it is funnelled by the buildings. If all went according to plan, tear gas could have enabled the IRA to take one or two key targets in the city, but they would then have had to deal with a Free State counter-attack and there is nothing to suggest that the IRA had the capability to fight a set piece battle with the better armed, disciplined and trained regular army.

Aside from the military considerations there was the virtual certainty that a large number of civilians would have been exposed to the gas. Children, the elderly and those with lung disease in particular are at increased risk of toxicity and possibly long-term complications. Little is known of the long-term effects following exposure to tear gas, particularly on those with pre-existing medical conditions.
¹²²

The IRA men would have been operating without proper training in the handling and use of chemical weapons, posing a danger to themselves, their opponents and the civilians of Dublin. Anybody intending to use tear gas needs to be properly trained and aware of its limitations and advantages. At least five deaths have been reported from the inappropriate use of tear gas grenades in confined spaces, and fring a blast type tear gas billy into someone's face can cause permanent blindness.
¹²³

Twomey showed an interest in mustard gas, one of the most effective of the poison gases. However, producing it was a very complex procedure, requiring an industrial plant far beyond the IRA's capability. Mustard gas could have been loaded into artillery shells and caused havoc among the Free State soldiers, but again the IRA didn't have artillery, or a ready supply of the chemical. If, despite all this, it was somehow possible to deploy
mustard gas, it could have been used in conjunction with tear gas to maximise the effectiveness of the attack. The Free State army, which was unlikely to have had ready access to gas masks, could have suffered severe casualties. Because of its persistence, mustard gas is a defensive-type gas not well suited to an attacking force, and the IRA would have had to equip their men with gas masks and protective clothing. Those exposed to the gas, including civilians, were liable to develop severe burns, and some would have died agonising deaths. In the highly unlikely event the IRA could accumulate sufficient supplies, deploy the weapon, and protect its own men, it would then have had to defend itself from a counter-attack by the Free State army.

The evidence from these documents suggests that there was a prolonged discussion at GHQ regarding the IRA's use of chemical weapons. It was a period of two full years from Aiken's mention of gas artillery shells to Twomey's request for the weapons from America. And if the RIC's director of intelligence, Brigadier-General Ormonde Winter, was correct in his information then the IRA considered their use for over five years. Throughout this period Seán Russell remained at GHQ, and so the finger of suspicion must point to his involvement. Considering that the IRA's plan for seizing power in the Free State depended on swiftly taking control of Dublin, rather than a set piece war, it seems possible that chemical weapons figured in this plan. The IRA had no other surprise weapon or tactic.