Defense of Hill 781 (14 page)

The three belts of the defense had been thickened by an intricate obstacle plan supplemented by a battle of movement. Always would bank on the superior speed of his tanks and Bradleys to outrace the enemy through the depth of his sector. Initially Echo and Bravo would decimate the enemy in the open ground behind Phase Line (PL) FORWARD. This was the greatest killing ground, as the motorized rifle regiment would expose itself here on all sides. Speed, however, would probably get the enemy through here with sufficient remaining strength to be a serious threat to a successful defense. Accordingly, Evans would have to pull back from Battle Position 1 (BP 1) to BP 7. Baker would have to pull his three platoons from BP 2 to BP 6. While this shift was going on, the second belt of defense would contribute its arms to killing the enemy—Team Alpha fighting from BP 5 in front of Hill 910 and Team C fighting from BP 4 (with two tank platoons) and BP 3 (with one Bradley platoon).

Mines, wire, and tank ditches would thicken the defense in front of the engagement areas. The infantrymen from A, B, and C would have to move close enough to the obstacles to cover them, thereby detaching themselves from the subsequent movement of their parent companies to the alternate battle positions. This worried Always, yet he could see no alternative other than to cancel the movement, a sacrifice he could not afford.

Team C under Captain Carter would remain in its central position at BP 4, shifting the orientation of its fires to the rear as the majority of the enemy came by him. During this period of time, hopefully, the repositioned Echo and Bravo elements would add their fires to the battle. The aviation’s attack helicopters would move up along Axis NORTH, thereby forming a gigantic kill sack in the middle of the sector. The final fight would occur in front of Team Coving in BP 11, Team Delta in BP 12, and a relocated Team Alpha in BP 8. The terrain at this point would restrict the enemy’s movement, and if his attrition had been great enough in the earlier stages of the fighting, sufficient defensive
firepower and the final belt of obstacles should stop him cold. At least, that was the hope of the defending task force.

Always was optimistic. The artillery officer had presented an excellent plan that covered the map with scores of targets. The air force officer promised no less than eight sorties to add to the close-in fires of the ground defenses. Technological advances in the ordnance guaranteed the air force would destroy whatever it hit, and probabilities were high that the artillery would stop a significant percentage of the vehicles and virtually all infantrymen caught in the open. Accordingly, the mortars initially would be in direct support of Team Bravo, then chopped to Team Charlie as the fight broke at PL MIDHELD. The enemy had air to help him, but this time Always could preposition his air defense assets, avoiding the confusion that had come with movement in the previous two battles. The air defense platoon broke into two sections, covering the airspace between FORWARD and MIDFIELD, and between MIDHELD and STOP. The Stinger gunners were assigned to A, B, C, D, and Team Coving, dug in and connected to the company commanders they were supporting with field phones. They would be ready and waiting when the enemy aircraft appeared, even if they failed to get any advanced warning. To negate that possibility, Always arranged to have their platoon sergeant stationed at the TOC, where he could monitor the air defense early warning net.

The scout platoon was broken up into squads, and squads were further broken down into mounted and dismounted teams. The dismounts would take to the high ground, monitoring any movements and giving advance notice of major developments (for example, “the main attack is coming in the north,” “the lead battalion is caught in the mine field in front of BP 8”). The mounted teams would cover all routes into the sector, looking in particular for the enemy mounted reconnaissance effort that would likely occur that night, and giving early warning of the enemy main efforts during the day. Their mission was to avoid
contact until the enemy had committed himself, then to continue to report the foe’s activities throughout the depth of the battle.

The engineer and artillery staff had coordinated the placement of artillery-delivered mine fields. These would be on call to plug any holes in the defense and stop the enemy dead in his tracks. They would complement the obstacles already in place at the start of the battle and, as in every other case, would be covered by direct fire.

To the task force commander, the plan looked complete. Moreover, it appeared to be understood by his key subordinates. He had required each company commander to back-brief him on his understanding of the concept; the mistakes had been few and quickly corrected. As insurance Always scheduled a visit to each of his company command posts later in the day for a final review of company plans. Always would leave nothing to chance this time. The orders group broke up in an optimistic mood. A prayer had been given by the battalion chaplain asking for their success (interestingly enough, there are chaplains in Purgatory), punctuated by a fiery closing comment from Always to the effect of let the bastards come! Six and a half hours remained until darkness.

By midafternoon the enemy had a fairly clear picture of Always’ intentions. He perceived that the defenders had spread out their forces over the breadth and depth of the battlefield but had failed to cover the extreme right flank of the sector. There was no room for an attack there, but just south of BP 3 was a cut in the ridge line that offered an opportunity for the scouts to infiltrate through that night.

Throughout the day the enemy was able to call in artillery fire on the defenders, seriously impeding their work efforts. The worst of these fires fell on Bravo Company in BP 2 and Echo in BP 1. Each company suffered several casualties during the day and had to take cover, losing precious time for digging in. At last light a spoiling attack momentarily disrupted Baker on
BP 2, costing him two vehicles and four infantrymen. The enemy suffered heavier losses, but he possessed the ability to replace them in time for the morning’s attack.

Perhaps even more damaging was the enemy’s ability to pick out the TOC location as well as the positioning of Always’ obstacles. Throughout the day this information was passed back to the enemy commander, who in conjunction with his staff worked up a plan of attack that would avoid the strength of the defenses. In order to slow down the emplacement of the obstacles, he occasionally called for harassing artillery fires on the infantrymen emplacing them. He scored a major success with a direct hit on one of the bulldozers, killing the operator and puncturing the transmission. This exacerbated the time crunch that the defenders were already facing.

By dark the work effort was only about 40 percent completed. The obstacles forward had been emplaced, but the bulldozers had not been released to the waiting companies to the rear. Bravo and Echo were reluctant to let them go until they had dug in all of their vehicles, and Captain Baker insisted they also dig holes for the mortars attached to him. This caused great confusion when after dark the section sergeant was unable to locate Charlie and Alpha companies. After four hours of drifting (and quick snatches of sleep by the exhausted operators), they were located by Major Rogers and put back to work. They had only begun to emplace the obstacles in front of BP 8 and BP 11 when dawn brought the enemy attack.

Nor did all the rehearsals get completed. Bravo and Echo had been distracted by the artillery and spoiling attacks during the day and had never made it back to BP 6 and BP 7. After dark Evans and Baker were able to rehearse their own movements, but since their platoons were already scrambling to make up for lost time, they left them to continue their work. The competing pulls on the engineer officer, who had to oversee the obstacle effort as well as the leadership of his own platoon, had kept
him from meeting with the artillery officer on the ground to plot the exact grid coordinates for the indirect fires covering the obstacles. The time lost in this delay also kept the artillery officer from making his way to Delta and Bravo companies to coordinate the fire plan with their respective artillery lieutenants. As a result, the two young men were not sure at what point they would take over the requirement of calling for fires in the face of the attack and what targets were their specific responsibility. This lack of understanding was never fully expressed to their company commanders, who therefore failed to bring it up with Always when he visited them after dark.

The battalion leaders were active throughout the long day and night, and wherever they discovered a snafu they rapidly put things back together. Every soldier, from highest to lowest in rank, was committed to a vigorous defense. There was no lack of desire on anyone’s part, and it would seem that with a full understanding of the commander’s intentions the mission could not fail. But the execution of a plan is difficult. The forces of nature, human and environmental, often combine to make even the most simple things difficult. Jeeps get flat tires, messages are misunderstood, units are diverted by uncoordinated leaders, soldiers get lost, winds blow down an antenna, map markings get smeared and are redrawn a few hundred meters off the intended location, weapons malfunction, transmissions overheat, and vehicle loads fail to get to their intended recipients. The list of calamities, great and small, is endless. Yet with strong leadership and aggressive initiative things are set right for a little while at least, only to be caught up again in another wave of confusion.

Always was gaining a keen appreciation of the complexity of leading a heavy task force. Just getting to visit all of his units, spread out over so great an expanse, was a chore. He reflected on the cavalier manner in which he had belittled such units in his lifetime, and how he and his buddies had laughed derisively when they recounted a tale of some botched-up battalion
tripping over itself trying to complete a mission. How easy it had been to sit comfortably removed from the fray and critique the failings of others. How difficult to have the mission yourself. How pompous to spout doctrine knowingly with an attitude that success lies in the knowing, not in the doing. How humbling to discover the excruciating difficulty that lies in the doing!

It was shortly after 2200 that he returned to the TOC, sore and tired, to get an update from his staff on the readiness of the battalion for the morning’s effort. Stoically he listened to the reports of enemy vehicular movement working its way in from the south. He was glad to hear that defenders at BP 3 had caught and destroyed two BRDMs (Soviet reconnaissance vehicles) slipping in behind Hill 899 at 2100, but he was concerned that they might have missed a couple that tried to come through earlier. He glowered at his S-2, probably unfairly, for overlooking the avenue of approach to the south.

Replacements were still coming in from the field trains, and he hoped they would be able to link up with their squads and vehicles in the dark. He was disconcerted to learn that one of the fuel tankers had gotten lost in the dark (there were not enough night vision goggles to go around) and blundered into a mine field. He considered restricting further movement at night, but dismissed the thought when he remembered how much work remained to be done. The scouts were reporting all types of movement but had been unable to put together a coherent picture. So much was going on that it was difficult to differentiate friendly movements from enemy activity, particularly when the distances were so great. Always could see that this would be a trying night.

He called his forward companies and warned them to be on the lookout for enemy probes into their sectors, particularly in and around the mine fields. It was imperative that the obstacles be in place by morning. When Bravo Company got into a major firefight at 0100, Always was glad he had urged vigilance. Mortar
and artillery fire with variable time (VT) fuses had chopped up the enemy infantry, leaving them with two platoons of dead and wounded. Captain Baker immediately set to work to repair any breaches in the existing mine fields.

Always himself had slept between 2300 and 0200, awakened for thirty minutes during the fight at 0100. Despite his exhaustion, his sleep was not deep, and when he moved back into the TOC for a final update before leaving for Charlie Company he was having trouble focusing on the reports from the assistant S-3 and the S-2. He left instructions for a net call at 0300 and departed for his forward command post, located in the center of the defensive sector and north of BP 4. Major Rogers, realizing he could not observe adequately from the TOC, had already moved up in an armored personnel carrier to take his post on the right with Bravo Company; Major Walters was making final arrangements with the combat trains in regard to medical evacuation and was due at the TOC at 0300.

The big Bradley vehicle moved with surprising quiet across the desert floor. The sky was clear, full of stars that lent a serenity to the night air. Lieutenant Colonel Always relaxed, allowing his crew to do the lion’s share of maneuvering the fighting vehicle into position. The driver picked the way in the dark, helped by his night vision goggles, the gunner keeping a vigilant lookout for encroaching enemy. A few minutes before 0300 they crept into place beside Charlie Company, the artillery officer and the air force liaison officer close behind in their M113. For a moment Always allowed himself to enjoy the pleasant coolness of the early morning, then set to work memorizing the call signs that he would be using at a rapid-fire pace within the next hour.

The net call went well, all parties coming up and sharing information on work completed, unit strengths, and enemy sighted. The intelligence officer had the hardest task, having to make a best guess on which avenue of approach the enemy
would use for his main attack. In fairness, it was virtually impossible to predict with any degree of certainty. The desert floor, being wide open at the forward edge of the battle area and extending so deep into the rear, gave the enemy ample opportunity to shift his direction of movement. Having to make a call, the S-2 chose the northern avenue as the most likely, hitting Echo Company in BP 1, then swinging north of Alpha at BP 5 before picking up the wadi that hugged the south face of the mountain range to the north. Always agreed that this seemed most likely but understood that anything could happen; he tried to keep an open mind about where the action was likely to break. He sought to instill that sense of flexibility in the minds of his commanders.