Delphi Complete Works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Illustrated) (1368 page)

This completes a superficial view of the experiences of the Sixth Corps upon March
21. In
order to get the full picture one should understand that the Sixth Division upon the right had also been driven from their sector, including several important villages. For the sake of continuity of narrative it will be best to merely indicate this fact for the moment, and to continue to follow the fortunes of Haldane’s Corps during the fateful days which followed, casting a glance also to the north where the Seventeenth Corps was gradually involved in the fight. We shall bear in mind, then, the long slanting front from the old positions on the left to Henin Hill and the Hog’s Back upon the right, and we shall return to the Third Division at the northern end of the line.

The night had been quiet along the whole corps front, which seemed to imply some exhaustion of the attack. In the morning this lull still continued in the region of the Third Division, which had up to now been just outside the track of the storm. During the morning and afternoon of March 22 no serious attack was made upon this point, but in the evening the enemy, having made a lodgment upon Henin Hill in the south-west, was able to make a powerful onslaught from the flank which met with very little success. Its first onrush pushed back the 20th K.R.R., pioneer battalion of the division, in the trench called Hind Avenue, but the ground was regained by the 13th King’s Liverpool, while the 4th Royal Fusiliers loosened the German grip of another small corner of trench. Up to nightfall the attempts continued, alternating with bombardments, but no progress was made, the 9th Brigade beating down every new advance.

About ten o’clock at night orders reached the division that as the Seventeenth Corps were falling back for strategic reasons to the west of Monchy on the north, while the Thirty-fourth were also retreating upon the south, the Third Division must retire in conformity with them. It was no easy task under a heavy shell-fall and with an elated enemy in close contact. It was of importance that the telephoned orders should not be tapped, and it is suggestive of the world-wide services of the British soldier that they were sent over the wires in Arabic and Hindustani. Before morning the weary troops had been quickly withdrawn without confusion or mishap, and all were safely aligned in their new positions. Their defence of their battleground had been a splendid one, and though they had no huge mass attack to contend with, such as had dashed the line of the Fifty-ninth to pieces, still they had constant severe pressure and had withstood it completely.

We left the Thirty-fourth Division upon the evening of March 21 still holding its reserve lines, with its three brigades in line, the 103rd on the right in touch with the Fortieth Division, and the 101st on the left where the Third Division joined it. A spirited little body, the J Special Company R.E., had joined the fighting line of the Thirty-fourth, and did good work with it. About
8 A
.M. upon March 22nd the enemy attacked the 102nd Brigade in the Croisilles sector, but two attempts had no result, though the general British line was now
500 yards
west of the village. About ten o’clock a misfortune occurred, for a heavy column of the enemy, moving up through a dense mist, broke through the 101st Brigade and carried the greater part of Henin Hill, a most important strategic point. The possession of the hill was, however, contested most strongly by the Fortieth Division machine-gun company and by the 11th Suffolks, who by their valiant resistance prevented the enemy from gaining the whole crest, though they could not stop them from extending north and south, which turned the line of the troops at the flanks and caused them to fall back. The troops to the south, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots, withdrew slowly to a new position west of Boyelles; the remains of the 102nd Brigade (it was but 500 strong at the beginning of the action) fell back upon the supports; while the valiant men of Suffolk, aided by Colonel Roberts’ machine-guns, still fought stoutly upon the top of the incline, though entirely isolated upon the right flank. Finally the shattered remains of this staunch battalion withdrew towards the north-west, their slow retreat being covered by Lieutenant Woods, who met his death in the venture, and by a handful of machine-gunners.

The chief evil result from the capture of Henin Hill was in the south, where it enabled the enemy by a joint frontal and flank attack at the junction of the Thirty-fourth and Fortieth Divisions, to push back the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers and 13th Yorkshire, and to get possession of the village of St. Leger. The 103rd Brigade moved back to Judas’ Farm to the west of St. Leger, while the 119th Brigade prolonged the line to the south. A few machine-guns, with their feed blocks removed, were lost on Henin Hill, but otherwise no booty was obtained by the enemy. On the evening of the 22nd the infantry of the Thirty-first Division was rushed to the front, and the Thirty-fourth Division after their two days of desperate and honourable battle, were drawn back for a rest. During March 22 the 103rd Brigade held on to St. Leger and St. Leger Wood, and so blocked the valley of the Sensée.

To the south of the Thirty-fourth Division the Fifty-ninth Division had now been entirely replaced by the Fortieth, save for the 177th Brigade, the artillery, and machine-guns, some of which rendered splendid service during the day. There was little fighting in the morning of March 22, but about mid-day it was found that some hundreds of Germans s with a profusion of machine-guns (“many bullets but few men” was the key-note of the new advanced tactics) were close to the divisional front in the region of St. Leger Wood. These were driven back, and fourteen of their guns taken, after some confused but vigorous fighting, in which Lieutenant Beal captured four guns himself before meeting a glorious death. Several times the enemy pushed strong patrols between the Sixth and Fortieth Divisions in the Vaux-Vraumont sector, but these were always expelled or digested. Shortly after mid-day, however, a very strong attack broke upon this line, pushing back the left of the Sixth Division and causing heavy losses to the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade upon the right of the Fortieth Division. The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands, with the 10/11 Highland Light Infantry, were the units concerned, and they restored their line, which had been bent backwards. Finding, however, that they had lost touch with the Sixth Division to the south, they fell back until communication was restored. All day groups of German machine-gunners could be seen rushing forward, their crouching figures darting from cover to cover, while all day also the guns of the division observed and shattered the various nests which were constructed. Major Nesham distinguished himself in this work. Towards evening of the 22nd it was known that Vraumont to the south was in German possession, and orders were given to withdraw to the new general line which this change and the Capture of Henin Hill must entail. In the new position the Fortieth was still in close touch with the Sixth in the neighbourhood of Beugnatre, the general line of the withdrawal being in a south-westerly direction. The losses had been heavy during Sixth the day, and included Colonel Eardley-Wilmot of the 12th Suffolks.

The line of the Seventeenth and of the Sixth Corps, upon the morning of March 23, stretched from the south of Fampoux, west of Heninel.and of St. Leger down to Mory. The Seventeenth Corps had not yet been seriously attacked. We shall continue with the record of the Sixth Corps, which now consisted of the Third Division in the north, parts of the Guards Division, which had formed up to their right, the Thirty-first Division north of Mory, and the Fortieth Division to the west of Mory, with outposts in the village. We shall again trace the events from the northern flank. No serious movement occurred during the day in front of the Third Division or of the Guards, but there was a report of concentrations of infantry and other signs which indicated that the storms of the south would soon spread upwards in that direction. The Thirty-first Division, the well-tried Yorkshire unit, still retained two of its old brigades, but had an additional 4th Brigade of Guards, cut from the old Guards Division by the new system of smaller units. General Bridgford had taken over command just before the battle and would be the first to admit that the splendid efficiency of his troops was due to General Wanless 0’Gowan, who had been associated with them so long. They carried a high reputation into this great battle and an even higher one out of it. On the morning of March 23 the division faced the Germans to the north of Mory Copse, having the 4th Guards Brigade upon the right and the 93rd Brigade upon the left. Two German divisions which had already been engaged, the 111th and the 2nd Guards Reserve, tried to break this fresh line and were each in turn broken themselves, as were the German batteries which pushed to the front and found themselves under the double fire of the Thirty-first and Thirty-fourth divisional artillery. Prisoners taken in this repulse gave the information that the Germans were already a full day behind their scheduled programme in this quarter. All attacks upon the Thirty-first met with the same fate during the day, but the enemy, as will be shown, had got a grip of Mory for a time, and pushed back the Fortieth in the south. Instead of a retirement the 92nd Brigade was brought from reserve and placed upon the exposed flank, while the Guards and Yorkshiremen still stood firm. In the evening the general line extended from north of Ervillers, where the 92nd Brigade was on watch, to the region of Hamelincourt, where the 93rd had their line.

The heaviest work of the day had fallen upon the Fortieth Division, which had dug itself in west of Mory and of Mory Copse, with strong posts in the village itself. The enemy attacked in the morning of March
23 in
great force and got complete possession of Mory. A splendid counter-attack, however, by the 13th East Surreys and 21st Middlesex at 2:30 P.M. regained the village. A deep cutting ran up to Mory from Vraucourt in the south-east, and along this the Germans sent their reinforcements, but the artillery of the British got the range of it and caused heavy losses. The village was held all day, under the local direction of Colonel Warden of the Surreys, and was violently attacked by the enemy after dark, with the result that desultory hand-to-hand fighting went on among the houses during the whole night. At one time the British had won to the eastern edge, and then again they were forced back to the centre. When one remembers that these men had been fighting for three days, with little food and less sleep, it was indeed a fine performance. One small post of the 18th Welsh under Sergeant O’Sullivan was isolated for nearly two days and yet cut its way out, the gallant Irishman receiving a well-deserved honour. The morning of March 24 found little change along the line of the corps. If the Germans were already a day behind they showed no signs of making up their time. The 40th Machine-gun Battalion had done particularly fine work during the day. As an example of the gallantry which animated this unit it may be recorded that two of the guns having been rushed by the Germans near Ervillers, Lance-Corporal Cross volunteered to recover them single-handed, which he did in such fashion that seven German prisoners appeared carrying them and marching at the point of his revolver, an exploit for which he was decorated.

March 24 was marked by considerable activity in the Mory district, but no strong attack developed to the north of it. On the front of the Thirty-first and Fortieth Divisions, however, the battle raged with great intensity. The enemy had full possession of Mory by
9 A
.M., and was attacking the depleted battalions opposed to them along the, whole divisional front so that they were compelled to fall slowly back, and by the late afternoon held a line about half a mile east of the Arras-Bapaume road. The situation to the south had been such that the Fourth Corps had to arrange to withdraw to the west of Bapaume, so that in any case the Sixth Corps would have been compelled to throw back its right flank. The Sixth Division on the immediate right had been relieved by the Forty-first, but touch had been lost and a gap formed, the enemy pushing on to Favreuil. The Forty-second Division was on the march up, however, in order to relieve the Fortieth, and two brigades of this formed a defensive line covering Gomiecourt.

These events had their reaction upon the Thirty-first Division to the north. When the enemy were seen in Mory at
9 A
.M. they were upon the flank of the 4th Guards Brigade, which at the same time could see heavy columns massing to the east of St. Leger. The Guards at once dug in a new support switch line towards Ervillers and so kept touch with the Fortieth in its new position. The 93rd upon the left was in the meanwhile heavily attacked in front, the enemy coming on again and again with a powerful support from trench mortars. These attacks were all beaten back by the stout Yorkshire infantry, but nothing could prevent the enemy from working round in the south and occupying Behagnies and Sapignies. The British artillery was particularly masterful in this section, and no direct progress could be made by the Germans.

In the late afternoon of the 24th the Germans made a new and violent attack upon the exhausted Fortieth Division and upon the 4th Guards Brigade on the right of the Thirty-first. In this attack the enemy succeeded in forcing their way into Ervillers, while the Fortieth reformed upon the west of it, so as to cover Hamelincourt and Moyenneville. The situation in the morning of March 25 was exceedingly critical for the two advanced brigades of the Thirty-first, the Guards and the 93rd, who had not budged from their position. The enemy were now to the right rear, and if they advanced farther northwards there was imminent danger that the defenders would be cut off. As usual the best defence of a dashing commander is an attack, so the reserve brigade, the 92nd, was ordered to advance upon Ervillers, which had already been consolidated by the 91st German Infantry Regiment. The 10th East Yorkshires led the attack and seized the village once again, but the situation was still critical, for the enemy were round the south-west, so that they enveloped the whole right wing of the division, which was stretched to cracking point with every man in the line. Touch had for the moment been lost with the troops on the right. As the Germans poured past the right wing of the Thirty-first they presented a menace for the future, but a most tempting mark for the present, and ten machine-guns were kept in continuous action for three hours upon ideal targets ranging from 300 to
1500 yards
. The enemy losses upon this occasion were undoubtedly very heavy, but with fine persistency they kept upon their way, as one-idea’d and undeviating as a swarm of ants in a tropical, forest. A thick trail of their dead marked their westward road.