Destroy Carthage (25 page)

Even so, he fared no better in attack than Manilius. Again, a
storm of missiles struck the Romans, while the citizen de­fenders rallied fiercely to the sector. Like his fellow general,
Censorinus had to draw off and lick his wounds. Notice had
been served by their opponents that Carthage intended to die
hard. It was frustrating for the consuls, even abashing, but
less than devastating. The remedy clearly lay in assault-
machines, invaluable adjuncts of siege war.

The Romans had confiscated many at the time of the city's
disarming, but they were cumbersome vehicles and the consuls
had elected to march 'light.' They now sought timber with
which to make good their needs. There were woods beyond the lake of Tunis, and Censorinus
sent working-parties to fetch supplies. Tempting prey for the
roving Himilco Phameas and his horsemen, the Roman gangs
succeeded in their quest at a painful cost. At least one was
severely mauled. But Censorinus got his timber, and machines
were constructed. They included two massive battering de­vices, one of which, according to Appian, was operated and
escorted by 6,000 men.

The next snag was the marshy bank of the lake beside the
taenia,
where the wall was weakest and most vulnerable to at­tack. Laboriously, the Romans packed the ground with stones
and firm soil until it was possible to bring the battering-rams
to bear in the area. The great engines quickly pounded a breach
in the defences, but the Carthaginians, swarming to the danger-
spot, repaired the wall overnight. In a sudden foray, they also
disabled the siege-machines.

Censorinus, provoked by such audacity, replied by thrusting
assault troops through a gap which remained in the damaged
wall. The attackers, quickly in difficulty and obliged to with­draw through the narrow exit, owed their escape to a covering
action inspired by a young officer soon to rise to prom­inence
-
the Scipio Aemilianus noted during the war with
Numidia which he witnessed during his trip to buy ele­phants.

It was now July and the Romans were uncomfortably aware
that they were in Africa. Censorinus, camped by the swampy
banks of the lagoon, began to lose troops to heat and pestilence.
Transferring his men and ships from the fetid waters of the
lake to the sea coast across the
taenia,
he encountered more
trouble. Familiar with the currents and prevailing winds,
the Carthaginians prepared fire-ships in the safety of the
bay of Kram then released them to drift to the consul's
anchorage. Appian alleged the near-destruction of the Roman
fleet.

Plainly, the straightforward reduction of Carthage as en­visaged by the aggressors was going wrong. Each day, more
weapons flowed from the Punic forges. Emboldened, the de­fenders dared to sally intrepidly beyond their walls. Himilco
menaced the Roman supplies with his cavalry. A review of
strategy had become urgent in the consuls' camp.One striking omission in Roman plans had been the neglect
of Masinissa, a vital ally at Zama and more recently the scourge
of Hasdrubal's army. In their confidence, the consuls had dis­missed the Numidian. 'When we need you, we'll let you know,'
he had been told.

Not that the old King was eager to take sides. For years he
had dreamed of Carthage as his own prize; now Rome meant
to rob him of that dream. With Carthage gone, the usefulness
of Masinissa to Rome would have gone, too. If the Romans
could smash the Punic empire, certainly they could have their
way with a Numidian state isolated in North Africa. Resent­fully, Masinissa brooded at Cirta.

One reason his importance was now recognized by the in­vaders was their growing concern with Hasdrubal. While
Carthage had been thought to fall like a ripe plumb, the Punic
troops of the interior had seemed of little consequence. Their
collapse would follow that of the metropolis. But the city's
resistance had altered their significance.

Based on Nepheris, about eighteen miles south of Carthage,
Hasdrubal not only bestrode lines of communication crucial in
a long siege, but was a disconcerting force behind the Roman
camps. Numerically he lacked the power to intervene directly.
His raiding capability, however, was considerable, particularly
as expressed by the horsemen led by Himilco. Against these
swooping riders the Romans had no answer
-
except to enlist
the aid of Masinissa's cavalry.

The conclusions were twofold. The snubbed Numidian would
have to be approached for assistance, and Hasdrubal would
have to be neutralized: the second flowing, ideally from the
first. An obvious ambassador to the old king existed at the
Roman camp in the person of Scipio Aemilianus. Masinissa
held the memory of his ally 'Africanus' in great respect. Even
an adopted member of the Scipionic family could expect to be
honoured at Cirta.

But Manilius was impatient. Left in sole command of the
siege for the winter while Censorinus returned to Rome for the
annual elections, the remaining consul resolved to march on
Nepheris without waiting for Numidian assistance. It was
perilous. Hasdrubal was a rugged and experienced comman­der, none the less formidable for having learned a painful
lesson from Masinissa. He knew the territory intimately;
his troops were campaign veterans; his cavalry was menac­ing.

While compelled by Roman numbers to avoid a set-piece
battle, Hasdrubal might severely embarrass his foes in wild
country. And so it happened.

At this stage, the reputation of Scipio Aemilianus takes
heroic flight. Remembering that in Polybius he had the out­standing historian of the day as a close friend, it is wise to
recognize an element of propaganda in the exploits recounted
of the young tribune. At face value, he appears to have up­held the Roman campaign almost single-handed for several
months.

Thus, Scipio is credited with disapproving of his superior's
plan; with rescuing Manilius and his army from disaster on
the futile Nepheris enterprise; with saving four cohorts from
massacre on the withdrawal; with persuading Hasdrubal to
give decent burial to the Roman dead. Polybius quotes Homer
to describe his hero: 'he alone is flesh and blood, the rest are
fleeting shadows.'

Improbably, the words are put into the mouth of Cato, an
inveterate opponent of Hellenist and Scipionic modes of life.
Yet, if some scepticism is valid, Scipio clearly justified a grow­ing reputation.

Leaving soon for Numidia, he arrived at Cirta to find
Masinissa dead and the old king's very different sons faced with
resolving the succession. It was said that he solved the problem
with consummate finesse. At Scipio's suggestion, Micipsa, the
oldest of three legitimate sons to have survived, 'a lover of
peace,' took charge of the palace and Cirta. The youngest,
Mastanubal, a student of law, was assigned the post of justice.
The middle son, Gulussa, a warlike prince, was given charge
of foreign policy.

With Gulussa's goodwill, Scipio indeed gained a political
trump in what was emerging as a bid for control of the whole
campaign. Confronting Himilco Phameas with the dual pros­pects of Numidian intervention and a substantial bribe, Scipio
now induced the cavalry leader to desert Hasdrubal. It was
the nearest thing to a Roman triumph since the advance on
Carthage, and, in 148, Scipio left for Rome with the Punic
defector to make the most of it.

The
chief source for the Third Punic War is Appian, a writer
who not only lived much later than the event but whose im­pression of the world was sufficiently eccentric to place Britain
half a day by galley from Spain, and the gulf of Valencia north
of the Ebro. Fortunately, Appian's description of the fall of
Carthage draws heavily on the lost original by Polybius, an
historian of distinction and a witness of the climatic scenes.

Polybius, invaluable to students of Carthage, was a Greek of
Megalopolis, in Arcadia. Carried to Rome with a number of
suspect Achaeans after the conquest of Macedonia in 168, he
formed a close relationship with the victorious Aemilius
Paullus and his family, not least the youngest son, Scipio.

Like Thucydides, whose rationalist principles he echoed,
Polybius was rare among the ancients for his scientific con­ception of history, eschewing the legendary traditions of the
age. 'In history,' he wrote, 'the end is by real facts and real
speeches to instruct and persuade for all time the lovers of
knowledge.' He was exceptional, too, for a comprehensive or
synoptic view. Thus:

History is, as it were, an organic whole; the affairs of
Italy and Africa are intertwined with those of Asia and
Greece, and all have reference to one end.

No man is impartial, and Polybius did not claim to be.
Historians, he asserted, should avoid intentionally falsifying
facts to favour nations or friends, but they might, he allowed,
'incline the balance.' That Polybius inclined the balance in
favour of the Scipionic cause was a small and human price
imposed on posterity for the nearest thing it possesses to a
clear description of Carthage and her last defence.

The extent to which the Roman family confided in the Greek
historian is suggested by a conversation between Polybius and
Scipio when the latter was eighteen and burdened with his
heritage. 'They consider me unambitious and idle’ complained
the youth of his compatriots, 'entirely untypical of a Roman.
My family, they say, needs a leader quite the opposite of my­self. It distresses me.'

Reassuringly, Polybius promised guidance 'to help you speak
and act worthily.' How much Scipio owed to his mentor is
uncertain - perhaps less than the teacher liked to think - but
there is no doubt that his remarkable progress to high com­mand was accompanied by a real affection for Polybius.

The campaign season of 148 proved depressing for the
Romans.

In several ways the Carthaginians were encouraged in their
brave defence. With Scipio elsewhere, the sons of Masinissa
showed little eagerness to help the invaders; indeed, some
Numidian cavalry joined the Carthaginians. While Hasdrubal
contrived to get supplies to the city, messengers slipped out
to establish ties with distant allies - the Moors beyond
Numidia, and the Macedonia pretender Andriscus, then in arms
against the Romans. Diplomatic initiatives brought little prac­tical assistance, but helped to keep up morale.

Spirits in the Roman camp were at low ebb. The men had
come for easy victory; stayed to get their heads drubbed. The
new generals for the year, the consul Calpurnius Piso and his
legate Mancinus, appear to have shrunk from asking much of
their unhappy troops. Either circumspectly or pusillanimously
- perhaps both - the commanders refrained from directing
fresh attacks against the city, marching instead on such lesser
places still loyal to Carthage as Clupea and Neapolis.

Aimless, desultory, the campaign promised little and, stra­tegically, achieved less. Neapolis, at the base of the Cap Bon
peninsula, surrendered, but its merciless sacking by the Romans
only stiffened resistance elsewhere. Hippo Acra defended her­self so fiercely that the besiegers withdrew empty-handed. It
is difficult to see any purpose in the scattered offensive other
than a desire for easy booty, a sop to the moody troops. Even
then, success was limited.

Dissatisfaction in Rome made way for Scipio. He had re­turned to Italy to stand for election as aedile; he found himself
suddenly within grasp of the consulship. Stories of his martial
daring; laudatory letters from soldiers in Africa; the presence
of Himilco Phameas in his party - the only glimpse of success
so far afforded Rome -, all contributed to a growing conviction
that if anyone could bring operations to a speedy conclusion it
was Scipio.

When the one objection to his nomination for consul - the
fact that he was still six years below the legal age
-
was dis­creetly waived, popularity and propaganda did the rest. By
direct vote of the people, Scipio was awarded command in
Africa not only for 147 but, at least by implication, for
as long as necessary to raze Carthage.

Embarking reinforcements, the young general sailed for
Africa with a personal friend, Laelius, as his legate, and an
entourage reflecting his taste for Greek culture in the persons
of his trusted mentor Polybius and the Stoic philosopher
Panaetius. It was spring. The red cliffs at Sidi Bou Said stood
out vividly from the sea. Carthage, the 'ship at anchor,' lay
grandly, defiantly beside her temple-capped citadel.

Scipio returned to the front at a critical moment for the
legate Mancinus, who had celebrated the last days of his office
with a belated assault on the northern suburbs. Appian, fol­lowing Polybius, makes this a reckless venture rescued from
disaster by Scipio. Other sources, notably Livy, credit Mancinus
with some success. At all events, he had run into difficulty and
was evacuated from a tricky cliff-top position, perhaps near
Cape Gammart.

Recalling the second army of Piso from the country, Scipio
set himself to restore discipline to a debased force.

The camp was cleared of all ineffectives, particularly the
profiteers who had spawned in large numbers over two years.
All superfluous goods were to be sold under supervision by a
given date. In a pep-talk to his soldiers, the new commander
made it clear that they would be rewarded - but not until
victory had been secured.

While Scipio revitalized his army, the Carthaginians took
steps to meet a heightened offensive. Of these, the most im­portant was perhaps the transfer of Hasdrubal from Nepheris
to assume command of the city's defence. A coarse type of
officer, florid, pot-bellied, domineering - in many ways the
antithesis of Scipio the Punic general was by no means
universally popular. He had, however, handled his modest
forces with skill against the Romans, and his fire and re­solution were formidable.

The Nepheris command now passed to a captain named
Diogenes, seemingly a Greek mercenary, while one Bytheas
led the cavalry once under Himilco. What proportion of the
interior force accompanied Hasdrubal to Carthage is unclear,
but 6,000 men were established with the general in a post on
the isthmus, close to the triple fortifications.

Hasdrubal's first problem was the sheer expanse of the
front. With nothing like the garrison required to man all sec­tors of the ramparts, his only hope of holding the outer walls
of the city was by means of mobile units forewarned of hostile
movements. So far, the clumsy assaults of the consuls had
allowed the citizens either to mass in advance on the threat­ened bulwarks, or at least time to limit penetration.

Scipio quickly pointed the need for a new strategy.

In a swift attack on two portions of the wall beside the
northern gulf (Sebka er Riana), he succeeded in entering the
rural quarter of the Megara with 4,000 troops. That he was
forced to withdraw with no more luck than Mancinus had met
earlier was due mainly to the density of orchards, olive groves
and irrigation channels in the area - features greatly impeding
his heavy infantry. Both sides made new plans. While Hasdrubal withdrew his
forward post, Scipio, apprised of the unfavourable nature of
the Megara - a gift to light defensive groups -, switched his
thoughts to the south, and the precedent of Censorinus. One
way or another, the defences of the inner city had to be over­come. He resolved to take the Byrsa and harbours by direct
assault.

Before he could safely concentrate on this sector, the
isthmus had to be sealed against the influx of supplies to
Carthage, and diversionary movements by her forces. To this
end, the Romans spent the next few weeks on an extraordinary
piece of military engineering: a screen of fortifications cover­ing the entire front of the land wall. These works, found in
part by modern archeologists, were described in detail by
Polybius.

Two parallel trenches were dug from shore to shore across
the isthmus and joined near the water on either side by two
more, completing a quadrilateral. Then the mounds from the
trenches were palisaded - on the section facing Carthage, to a
height of twelve feet. On the same side was built a series of
observation towers, the central of which had a wooden super­structure of four storeys. Loftier even than the nearby city
rampart, this post offered a clear view of the Megara.

The whole undertaking, completed in the face of repeated
Punic sallies, engaged the Roman army day and night for
twenty days. The result was a fortified enclave blocking Carth­age from the mainland, defensible by a fraction of Scipio's
total force. Combined with a sea blockade by the Roman
fleet, its effect on the city was grimly claustrophobic. The siege
was now in earnest.

Hasdrubal had pulled into the Byrsa to shorten his defensive
line. The inner walls were strong, the inhabitants resilient.
An inspired leader might have personified the glory of resist­ance in the crisis, but the stout general, more at home among
his mercenary guards than the citizens, responded with savage
wrath. Dragging his Roman prisoners to the ramparts, he tor­tured and slew them in full view of their comrades, tossing
the bodies to the ground outside. Those Carthaginians who
protested were also killed.

Hasdrubal's tactics, recalling the horrors of the Mercenary
War, were calculated it seems to commit his men. Perhaps
some of his soldiers had been wavering. But that the mass ofCarthaginians required any such gesture is denied by all the
evidence, and a man of sensitivity must have known it so. The
crude brutality did nothing for Carthage; plenty for Scipio.
His legionaries needed just such a motive for the job ahead.